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To the loving memory of Angela, my mother

The scientist [...] cuts open the visible body to look at its interior or catches
hidden objects by means of all sorts of sophisticated equipment that deprives
them of their exterior properties through which they show themselves to our
natural senses.
H. Arendt – The Life of the Mind
Then he flung himself into his chair, and drew out his keepsake, his treasure,
that consisted, this time, not of a few reddish-brown shavings, but a thin glass
plate, which must be held toward the light to see anything on it. It was
Clavdia’s X-ray portrait, showing not her face, but the delicate bony structure
of the upper half of her body, and the organs of the thoracic cavity,
surrounded by the pale, ghostlike envelop of flesh.
T. Mann – The Magic Mountain
What is the use of a book thought Alice, without pictures or conversations?
L. Carroll – Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
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Abstract
The objective of this dissertation is to contribute to the development of an epis-
temology of medical imaging. My central thesis is that medical imaging does
not merely produce more or less accurate pictures of the inner organs, it rather
transforms the living body into a scientific object by changing its very visibility.
The imaging apparatus turns the body into a visual object that can be observed
under experimental conditions: unlike the real body, it can be filed, retrieved,
shared, measured and manipulated in several ways. Alongside this main the-
sis there are two others: firstly diagnostic images – like all scientific images –
are actual cognitive instruments, epistemic objects inscribed within theoretical
contexts and experimental practices. Secondly, an image of the inner body has
diagnostic meaning and value only in the scope of a specific conceptualization of
the body and its ailments. Accordingly, if we are to develop an epistemology of
medical imaging, we cannot limit our analysis to diagnostic images qua images,
we also have to understand them qua diagnostic instruments.
This is the reason why I take into examination the historical and conceptual
conditions of possibility of radiography – the first medical imaging technology,
invented in 1895 – in the first chapter of the dissertation. My aim is to under-
stand which medical theories and practices had to be at work in the nineteenth
century for those shadow-images produced by the X-ray apparatus, to be per-
ceived and employed as diagnostic devices. I argue that the diagnostic relevance
of radiography is rooted in the conceptualization of body, disease and diagnosis
put forward by clinical anatomy, as early as the end of the eighteenth century.
I also defend the idea that the stethoscope, developed in 1816, was the ma-
terial and intellectual predecessor of medical imaging, because it introduced a
primitive form of mediated perception in medical diagnosis, and allowed the
clinician to explore the inner body of the living patient from the outside, ex-
tracting from it signs of illness. The stethoscope was only the first of a vast
array of instruments invented in the nineteenth century to visualize diﬀerent
aspects of the inner morphology and physiology of the living body. Each of
these instruments fulfilled specific diagnostic aims and posed distinct epistemo-
logical problems, but all of them shared some commonalities: they were meant
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to replace the subjective sensations of patients and doctors with objective in-
dices of health and disease; they created visual records of the inner body that
could be filed, retrieved and shared among physicians; they required the devel-
opment of a specialized language agreed upon by a community of experts; they
created a progressive physical separation between the body of the patient and
the body of the physician. It was in this complex scenario of medical practices,
objects, images and ideas that radiography appeared and progressively acquired
its diagnostic function.
In the second chapter, I take into account the early developments of medical
photography in order to understand how the early technology for the production
of mechanical images entered and influenced the domain of medicine. The main
theoretical references in this chapter are Charles Sanders Peirce’s semiotics (in
particular his classification of signs in indices, icons and symbols) and Walter
Benjamin’s reflections on the photographic series (mechanical production and
reproduction of an image and of the body it represents), on the intrinsic analytic
and dissecting potential of photography (the photographer as a surgeon), and
on the optical unconscious (photography as a prosthesis that enriches and trans-
forms our sensorial experience). Drawing on these authors, and analyzing the
works of early physicians-photographers in psychiatry, dermatology, neurology
and physiology, I show that the photographic series collected in medical jour-
nals, manuals and hospital archives produced a clinical gaze in the Foucauldian
sense. I also argue that the photographic series was part of a larger experimental
apparatus, which encompassed the patient, the camera and the observer, and
whose aim was to turn the body and disease into a visual object available for
scientific analysis.
In the third chapter, I discuss the problem of the invisible referent, that is,
I analyze the processes whereby photographs that reveal invisible phenomena
are endowed with meaning. This is likely to be the fundamental problem of all
scientific imaging. When the referent of a picture is invisible, the iconic mode
of signification fails, because in this case the image produced by the mechanical
or electronic apparatus does not look like anything we already know, it resem-
bles nothing. So, how do we know that the object we see in the photograph
– e.g., a cell or a tubercular lesion – is really there and does really look like
that? Drawing on the theoretical analysis developed in the previous chapter, I
maintain that the visualization of the invisible entails a peculiar combination of
the indexical, iconic and symbolic modes of signification. My reasoning opposes
Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison’s idea of mechanical objectivity, and demon-
strates that their notion of mechanical objectivity as the moralizing suppression
of subjectivity is a caricature of the actual ideas and practices developed by the
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scientists of the nineteenth century to deal with the problem of visualizing the
invisible. The argument is articulated in three moments, corresponding to the
analysis of the problem of objectivity and image signification in microphotogra-
phy, chronophotography, and radiography.
In the fourth chapter, I argue that images are cognitive tools and that repre-
sentation and observation are never an act of automated repetition, they always
entail a creative component. As in the previous chapter, part of my discourse
is built in contrast with Daston and Galison, challenging their claims about the
passive nature of representation. For these authors, up until the development
of digital technologies for image manipulation, scientific images were mere re-
presentations of the world, focused on copying nature. Computer images, on
the contrary, are presentations, because the observer can virtually manipulate
them so that they show the object in ever changing ways. I criticize this classi-
fication of scientific images with historical and theoretical arguments. From the
historical point of view, I show that at least since the sixteenth century there
have been attempts to create images that can be actually manipulated by the
observer. From the theoretical perspective, I draw on a variety of literature
spanning from art theory to neuroscience, to demonstrate that the very notion
of a passive representation is unsustainable, because images always engage the
observer in an embodied act of perception, which elicits not only visual, but also
tactile sensations and motor reactions. Moreover, I argue that Daston and Gali-
son’s emphasis on nanoimaging as the only technology that allows manipulating
the object of study during the process of image production is misleading. In
fact, even when they do not reach the peaks of technological sophistication that
characterizes nanoimages, scientific images are the result of some manipulation
of the natural object they represent. A scientific image cannot be a passive
copy of nature, because it is part of an experimental praxis, whose goal is to un-
derstand natural phenomena, not just to reproduce them. To corroborate this
idea I explore actual scientific practices of image signification, taking into ac-
count written documents (semiotic analysis of a radiology article) and material
practices (laboratory ethnography describing the interpretation of electrophore-
sis images in a molecular biology laboratory, and description of an example of
signification of electron microscopy pictures). From this analysis three remarks
can be put forward: (1) the process of signification of scientific images has a
distributed character, because it can involve diﬀerent persons, objects and ac-
tivities; (2) scientific images can be considered experimental tools, in the sense
that scientists and physicians handle them in several forms in order to explore
diﬀerent aspects of their object of study; (3) scientific images are to be under-
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stood as controlled, artificial phenomena produced with the aim of redefining
the visibility of natural objects.
In order to clarify this latter idea, in the final chapter I introduce Gas-
ton Bachelard’s concept of phenomenotechnique. Although the idea of phe-
nomenotechnique cannot be directly applied to medical imaging, there are two
characterizing elements of this concept that provide important insights for con-
ceptualizing medical imaging. The first is the idea that in order to study a
natural phenomenon, scientists must previously transform it into a scientific ob-
ject. The second, closely related to the former, is that scientific experience is by
necessity mediated, and such mediation has both an intellectual and material
character. This means that the development of instruments and new technolo-
gies is not a second-order product of science, it is part and parcel of the scientific
process. Technology is embedded into science, because our scientific grasping
of the world is necessarily mediated by instruments; scientific instruments, in
turn, are materializations of a vast body of scientific knowledge and practices
(in the case of digital imaging this knowledge has an eminently mathematical
character). Thus, science and technology are reciprocally constituted. On these
grounds, I propose a description of medical imaging in terms of phenomenotech-
nique, using this concept as a key word around which to reorganize the ideas
previously discussed. Firstly, I resort to the concept of phenomenotechnique
to gain insight into how diagnostic images mediate the physician’s sensory and
intellectual experience. Secondly, I give an account of diagnostic images as ar-
tificial phenomena (visual reconfigurations of non-visual signals) that work as
simulations of the patient’s body, and that reify diﬀerent domains of knowledge
(from medicine to physics and engineering). Finally, I argue that the proper
and eﬃcient signification of a diagnostic image requires a phenomenotechnique
of the observer. To recognize the signs of disease in an image of the inner body,
one has to master the explicit and implicit rules necessary to make sense of the
novel sensory domain produced by the technological apparatus. This implies
abandoning spontaneous modes of perception and signification to engage in a
process of educated perception. The expert viewer goes through a formal and
informal training that deeply transforms natural vision, by placing the act of
watching within a wide epistemic network that encompasses both theoretical
and practical knowledge.
Key-words: epistemology; history of medicine; image theory; medical
imaging; photography; radiography.
Resumo
O objetivo deste trabalho é o de contribuir para o desenvolvimento de uma
epistemologia da imagiologia médica. A minha tese central é que a imagiologia
médica não produz meramente imagens mais ou menos precisas dos órgãos in-
ternos, antes torna o corpo vivo num objeto científico ao modificar a sua própria
visibilidade. As tecnologias de imagiologia tornam o corpo num objeto visual
que pode ser observado em condições experimentais: ao contrário do corpo real,
pode ser arquivado, recuperado, partilhado, medido e manipulado de variadas
formas. Esta tese é acompanhada por duas outras: em primeiro lugar, as ima-
gens diagnósticas, como todas as imagens científicas, são efetivamente instru-
mentos cognitivos, objetos epistémicos inscritos em contextos teórico-práticos
específicos. Em segundo lugar, uma imagem do interior do organismo tem sig-
nificado e valor diagnóstico apenas no âmbito de uma dada contextualização do
corpo e da doença. Por conseguinte, se queremos desenvolver uma epistemo-
logia da imagiologia médica, não podemos analisar as imagens de diagnóstico
simplesmente como imagens, mas também como instrumentos médicos.
É por isso que no primeiro capítulo da dissertação tento compreender quais
foram as condições de possibilidade históricas e conceptuais da radiografia – a
primeira tecnologia de imagiologia médica, inventada em 1895. O meu obje-
tivo é o de entender quais as teorias e práticas médicas que estavam em jogo
no século XIX, que permitiram que umas imagens que mostravam sombras do
interior do corpo fossem percecionadas e usadas como um instrumento clínico.
Defendo que a relevância diagnóstica da radiografia está enraizada na concep-
tualização de corpo, doença e diagnóstico estabelecida pela anatomia clínica já
em finais do século XVIII. Defendo também que o estetoscópio, desenvolvido
em 1816, foi o precursor material e intelectual da radiografia, pois introduziu
uma forma primitiva de perceção mediada no diagnóstico médico, e permitiu
ao médico explorar a partir do exterior, o interior de um corpo vivo, extraindo
sinais de doença. O estetoscópio foi apenas o primeiro de um vasto conjunto
de instrumentos inventados no século XIX para visualizar diferentes aspetos
tanto da morfologia como da fisiologia do corpo humano. Cada um desses ins-
trumentos respondia a objetivos de diagnóstico específicos e punha problemas
xiii
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epistemológicos distintos, mas todos partilhavam alguns aspetos comuns: eles
deveriam substituir as sensações subjetivas de pacientes e médicos por indica-
dores objetivos de saúde e doença; criavam registos visuais do interior de um
corpo vivo; necessitavam do desenvolvimento de uma linguagem especializada
fruto de um acordo da comunidade médico-científica; criaram uma progressiva
separação física entre o corpo do paciente e o corpo do médico. Foi neste cená-
rio complexo de práticas, instrumentos, representações e ideias médicas, que a
radiografia apareceu e progressivamente adquiriu a sua função diagnóstica.
No segundo capítulo examino o nascimento da fotografia de modo a enten-
der como a primeira tecnologia de produção de imagens mecânicas entrou nas
teorias e práticas médicas. A principal referência teórica neste capítulo é a se-
miótica de Charles Sanders Pierce, em particular a sua classificação dos signos
em índices, ícones e símbolos, e as reflexões de Walter Benjamin sobre as séries
fotográficas (produção e reprodução mecânica de uma imagem e do corpo que ela
representa), sobre o intrínseco potencial analítico e de “dissecção” da fotografia
(o fotógrafo como cirurgião), e sobre o inconsciente ótico (a fotografia como uma
prótese que enriquece e transforma a nossa experiência sensorial). Baseando-
me nestes autores e analisando os trabalhos dos primeiros médicos-fotógrafos
em psiquiatria, dermatologia, neurologia e fisiologia, mostro que as séries fo-
tográficas colecionadas em revistas médicas, manuais e arquivos de hospitais,
produziram um “olhar clínico” no sentido Foucauldiano. Defendo também que
a série fotográfica era parte de um dispositivo experimental mais vasto, que
abrangia o paciente, a câmara fotográfica e o observador, e cujo objetivo era
tornar o corpo e a doença num objeto visual, disponível para análise científica.
No terceiro capítulo discuto o problema do referente invisível, isto é, analiso
os processos através dos quais é atribuído significado às fotografias que revelam
fenómenos invisíveis. Este é provavelmente o problema fundamental de toda a
imagiologia científica. Quando o referente de uma imagem é invisível, a modali-
dade de significação icónica falha, porque neste caso a imagem produzida pelos
instrumentos (sejam eles mecânicos ou eletrónicos) não se parece com nada que
conheçamos já. De facto, podemos dizer que não se parece com nada. En-
tão, como podemos saber que o objeto que vemos na fotografia – por exemplo,
uma célula ou uma lesão tubercular – está realmente lá e tem realmente o as-
peto do que vemos? Baseando-me na análise teórica desenvolvida no capítulo
anterior, defendo a ideia de que a visualização do invisível comporta uma com-
binação peculiar das modalidades de significação de índice, ícone e símbolo. A
minha argumentação é construída em oposição à ideia de objetividade mecânica
de Lorraine Daston e Peter Galison, e demonstra que a noção de objetividade
mecânica como a supressão moralizante da subjetividade, defendida por estes
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historiadores, é uma caricatura das ideias e práticas desenvolvidas pelos cien-
tistas do século XIX para lidar com o problema de visualizar o invisível. A
argumentação é articulada em três momentos, correspondendo à análise do pro-
blema da objetividade e significação das imagens na área da micro-fotografia,
crono-fotografia e radiografia.
No quarto capítulo defendo que as imagens são instrumentos cognitivos (no
sentido forte, não metafórico da palavra instrumento) e que representação e
observação nunca podem ser atos de repetição automática, porque comportam
sempre uma componente criativa. Como no capítulo precedente, parte da argu-
mentação é construída em contraste com Daston e Galison, desafiando as suas
posições acerca da natureza passiva da representação. Para estes autores, até
ao desenvolvimento das tecnologias digitais, as imagens científicas eram meras
“re-apresentações” do mundo focadas em copiar a natureza. Com o desenvol-
vimento das tecnologias digitais, porém, as imagens passaram a ser “apresen-
tações”, porque através dessas imagens o observador pode visualizar o objeto
representado de muitas maneiras, e manipulá-lo virtualmente. A minha crítica
a esta posição é baseada em argumentos históricos e teóricos. Do ponto de vista
histórico, mostro que pelo menos desde o século XVI houve tentativas de criar
imagens que podem ser de facto manipuladas pelo observador. Do ponto de
vista teórico, apoio-me numa vasta literatura que vai desde a teoria da arte às
neurociências, para demonstrar que a própria noção de representação passiva
é insustentável, porque as imagens envolvem sempre o observador num ato de
perceção corpórea, que provoca sensações não só visuais, mas também táteis,
bem como reações motoras. Além disso, mostro que é enganadora a ênfase posta
por Daston e Galison no nanoimaging como a única tecnologia que permite a
manipulação do objeto de estudo durante o processo de produção da imagem.
De facto, mesmo quando não atingem os picos de sofisticação tecnológica que
caracteriza as nano-imagens, as imagens científicas são o resultado de alguma
manipulação do objeto natural que representam. Uma imagem científica não
pode ser uma cópia passiva da natureza, porque é parte de uma praxis experi-
mental, cujo objetivo é o de aprender algo acerca dos fenómenos naturais, não
apenas reproduzi-los. A fim de corroborar esta ideia, analiso algumas práticas
concretas de significação de imagens científicas, tomando em conta documen-
tos escritos (análise semiótica de um artigo de radiologia) e práticas materiais
(etnografia de laboratório sobre a interpretação de imagens de eletroforese em
biologia molecular, e descrição de um caso de significação de imagens de micros-
copia eletrónica). Esta análise permite fazer três observações: (1) O processo
de significação das imagens científicas é um processo distribuído, e pode incluir
várias pessoas, ações e instrumentos; (2) As imagens científicas podem ser con-
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sideradas instrumentos de investigação, no sentido em que cientistas e médicos
as manipulam de várias formas, para explorar aspetos diferentes dos seus obje-
tos de estudo; (3) As imagens científicas devem ser entendidas como fenómenos
artificiais controlados, produzidos com o intuito de redefinir a visibilidade dos
objetos naturais.
Para esclarecer e aprofundar esta última ideia, no capítulo final introduzo
o conceito de fenomenotécnica de Gaston Bachelard. A ideia de fenomenoté-
cnica não pode ser aplicada diretamente à imagiologia médica. Não obstante,
há dois elementos caracterizantes deste conceito que fornecem ensinamentos
importantes para uma filosofia da tecnologia e, consequentemente, para uma
epistemologia da imagiologia médica. O primeiro é a ideia de que, para se estu-
dar um fenómeno natural, os cientistas devem previamente transformá-lo num
objeto científico. O segundo, estreitamente relacionado com o anterior, é o de
que a experiência científica é necessariamente mediada, e que essa mediação tem
um caráter tanto intelectual como material. Isto significa que a construção de
instrumentos e o desenvolvimento de novas tecnologias não é um produto se-
cundário da ciência, mas sim parte integrante do próprio processo científico. A
tecnologia está integrada na ciência, porque o nosso entendimento científico do
mundo é necessariamente mediado por instrumentos; por outro lado, os instru-
mentos científicos são materializações de um vasto conjunto de conhecimentos
e práticas científicas (no caso da imagiologia médica este conhecimento tem um
caráter eminentemente matemático). Portanto, ciência e tecnologia são cons-
tituídas reciprocamente. Com bases nessas considerações apresento uma con-
ceptualização da imagiologia médica em termos de fenomenotécnica, utilizando
este conceito como palavra-chave que permite reorganizar as ideias desenvolvi-
das anteriormente. Em primeiro lugar, recorro ao conceito de fenomenotécnica
para explicar como as imagens de diagnóstico medeiam a experiência sensorial
e intelectual do médico. Em segundo lugar, descrevo as imagens de diagnóstico
como fenómenos artificiais (reconfiguração visual de sinais não visuais) que fun-
cionam como simulações do corpo do paciente e que incorporam diferentes áreas
do conhecimento (da medicina à física e engenharia). Finalmente, defendo que a
significação correta e eficiente de uma imagem de diagnóstico requer uma feno-
menotécnica do observador. Para reconhecer os sinais de doença numa imagem
do interior do corpo, o médico tem de dominar as regras implícitas e explí-
citas necessárias para extrair um sentido do novo domínio sensório produzido
pelo dispositivo tecnológico. Isto implica abandonar a perceção espontânea para
entrar num processo de educação da perceção-significação que molda as capaci-
dades sensoriais do observador. O observador especializado é um observador que
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tem feito um percurso formativo que transforma profundamente a visão natural,
colocando o ato de olhar dentro de uma vasta rede epistémica.
Palavras chave: epistemologia; história da medicina; imagiologia médica;
fotografia; radiografia; teoria da imagem.
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Riassunto
L’obiettivo di questo lavoro è quello di contribuire allo sviluppo di un’epistemolo-
gia dell’imaging medico, intendendo con questo termine sia le immagini utiliz-
zate a fini diagnostici, sia le tecnologie che le producono. La mia tesi principale
è che le tecnologie di imaging medico non si limitano a produrre immagini più
o meno accurate degli organi interni e di alcuni processi fisiologici, ma piut-
tosto trasformano il corpo in un oggetto scientifico, operando un cambiamento
profondo della sua visibilità. Gli strumenti di imaging mutano il corpo in un og-
getto visivo che può essere osservato in condizioni sperimentali. A diﬀerenza del
corpo reale, tale oggetto può essere archiviato, consultato, condiviso, misurato
e manipolato in varie maniere. Questa tesi di fondo è accompagnata da altre
due: (1) Le immagini diagnostiche, come tutte le immagini scientifiche, sono
veri e propri strumenti cognitivi, strumenti epistemici integrati in un quadro
teorico-pratico specifico; (2) Un’immagine che rivela l’interno dell’organismo ha
significato e valore diagnostico solo nell’ambito di una specifica concettualizza-
zione del corpo e della malattia, di conseguenza uno studio sull’epistemologia
dell’imaging medico non si potrà limitare a esaminare le immagini diagnostiche
in quanto immagini, ma dovrà analizzarle anche nella loro veste di strumenti di
diagnosi medica.
Per questo motivo nel primo capitolo della dissertazione traccio le linee ge-
nerali delle condizioni di possibilità storiche e concettuali della radiografia – la
prima tecnologia di imaging medico – inventata nel 1895. Lo scopo è quello di
comprendere quali teorie e pratiche mediche dovessero essere vigenti alla fine del
XIX secolo, aﬃnché immagini che parevano ombre del corpo interno potessero
essere considerate strumenti diagnostici. La spiegazione da me proposta è che
la rilevanza diagnostica della radiografia si fonda sulla concettualizzazione di
corpo, malattia e diagnosi resa operativa dall’anatomia clinica già alla fine del
XVIII secolo. Seguendo e supportando questa linea di ragionamento mostro
che lo stetoscopio, inventato nel 1816, può essere considerato il predecessore
materiale e intellettuale dell’imaging medico perché introdusse una primitiva
forma di mediazione sensoriale nel campo della diagnostica e permise al medico
di esplorare dall’esterno le profondità del corpo del paziente, estraendone segni
xix
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di malattia. Lo stetoscopio è solo il primo di una vasta famiglia di strumenti
inventati nel XIX secolo per visualizzare diversi aspetti della morfologia interna
e della fisiologia del vivente. Sebbene ciascuno di questi strumenti rispondesse
a specifiche necessità diagnostiche e ponesse specifici problemi epistemologici,
si possono identificare alcune caratteristiche comuni: tutti avevano come ob-
biettivo quello di sostituire le sensazioni soggettive dei pazienti e dei medici con
indici oggettivi di salute e malattia; tutti creavano registri visivi dell’interno del
corpo umano che potevano essere archiviati, recuperati e condivisi da diversi
medici; tutti richiedevano la creazione di un linguaggio specializzato, condiviso
da una comunità medico-scientifica; tutti creavano una progressiva separazione
tra il corpo del paziente e il corpo del medico. È in questo complesso scenario
di pratiche, oggetti, raﬃgurazioni e idee che la radiografia fece la sua comparsa
e acquisì la sua funzione diagnostica.
Nel secondo capitolo prendo in esame la nascita della fotografia, al fine di
comprendere in che modo la prima tecnologia di produzione meccanica di im-
magini influenzò la medicina. I principali riferimenti teorici di questo capitolo
sono dati dalla semiotica di Charles Sanders Peirce, in particolare la sua classifi-
cazione dei segni in indici, icone e simboli, e dalla riflessione di Walter Benjamin
sulla serie fotografica (produzione e riproduzione meccanica di un’immagine e
del corpo in essa rappresentato), sull’intrinseco potenziale analitico e di dissezio-
ne della fotografia (il fotografo come chirurgo), e sull’inconscio ottico (fotografia
come protesi che arricchisce e trasforma l’esperienza sensibile). Basandomi su
questi autori e esaminando i lavori dei primi medici-fotografi nell’ambito della
psichiatria, dermatologia, fisiologia e neurologia, mostro che le serie fotografiche
raccolte in riviste mediche, manuali di studio e archivi ospedalieri produssero
uno sguardo clinico in senso foucauldiano. Sostengo, inoltre, che la serie fo-
tografica faceva parte di un più ampio apparato sperimentale che includeva il
paziente, la macchina fotografica e l’osservatore il cui scopo era trasformare il
corpo e la malattia in oggetti visivi che potessero essere sottoposti ad analisi
scientifica.
Nel terzo capitolo discuto il problema del referente invisibile, ossia analizzo
i processi attraverso cui le immagini fotografiche di oggetti invisibili vengono
dotate di significato. Probabilmente questo è il problema fondamentale di qua-
lunque tipo di imaging scientifico. Quando il referente di una fotografia è invi-
sibile, la modalità iconica di significazione non può essere messa in atto, perché
nell’immagine prodotta dallo strumento (sia esso meccanico o elettronico) non
possiamo riconoscere nessuna similitudine con l’oggetto rappresentato. Di fat-
to, potremmo dire che in questi casi l’immagine non assomiglia a nulla. Come
sappiamo, dunque, se l’oggetto che vediamo nella fotografia – per esempio una
Riassunto xxi
cellula o una lesione tubercolare – è davvero là, e possiede davvero l’aspetto
mostrato dall’immagine? Sulla scorta dell’analisi teorica sviluppata nel capitolo
precedente, difendo l’idea che la visualizzazione dell’invisibile richieda una pecu-
liare combinazione delle modalità di significazione indicale, iconica e simbolica.
La mia argomentazione è costruita in opposizione al concetto di oggettività mec-
canica proposto da Lorraine Daston e Peter Galison. In particolare, dimostro
che l’idea di oggettività meccanica come soppressione moralizzante del sogget-
to proposta dai due storici è una caricatura delle idee e pratiche sviluppate
dagli scienziati del XIX secolo per risolvere il problema della visualizzazione
dell’invisibile. La mia argomentazione si articola in tre momenti, corrispondenti
all’analisi del problema dell’oggettività e della significazione delle immagini in
tre diversi ambiti: microfotografia, cronofotografia e radiografia.
Nel quarto capitolo aﬀronto il problema del valore cognitivo delle immagi-
ni, sostenendo che le immagini sono strumenti epistemici (nel senso forte, non
metaforico della parola strumento) e che rappresentazione e osservazione non
sono mai atti puramente automatici, perché richiedono sempre una componente
creativa. Come nel capitolo precedente, parte del mio discorso è una refutazione
della posizione di Daston e Galison, in particolare per quanto riguarda le loro
aﬀermazioni sulla natura passiva di certe rappresentazioni visive. Secondo Da-
ston e Galison, infatti, fino allo sviluppo delle tecnologie digitali, le immagini
scientifiche erano mere ri-presentazioni [re-presentations] del mondo, miranti a
copiare la natura. Con la comparsa del digitale, invece, si è passati a un’epo-
ca in cui le immagini sono presentazioni [presentations], perché attraverso di
esse l’osservatore può visualizzare l’oggetto in mutevoli forme, manipolandolo
virtualmente. La mia critica a questa posizione è basata su argomenti stori-
ci e teorici. Sul piano storico mostro che i primi tentativi di creare immagini
mediche manipolabili risalgono almeno al XVI secolo. Sul piano teorico, ricor-
rendo alla letteratura prodotta in campi così diversi come la teoria dell’arte e
le neuroscienze, dimostro che la nozione di ricezione passiva di un’immagine è
insostenibile, perché le immagini coinvolgono sempre l’osservatore in un atto
corporeo di percezione che sollecita non solo sensazioni visive, ma anche sensa-
zioni tattili e reazioni motorie. Inoltre, sostengo che l’enfasi posta da Daston
e Galison sul nanoimaging come l’unica tecnologia che permette di manipolare
l’oggetto durante la fase di produzione di un’immagine è fuorviante. Infatti,
anche nei casi in cui non raggiungono le vette di sofisticazione tecnologica pro-
prie delle nano-immagini, le immagini scientifiche sono sempre il risultato di
una manipolazione dell’oggetto naturale rappresentato. Un’immagine scientifi-
ca non può essere una mera copia della natura, perché è sempre parte di una
praxis sperimentale il cui obiettivo è comprendere un fenomeno naturale, non
xxii Riassunto
solo riprodurlo. Per corroborare questa idea analizzo alcune pratiche concrete
di significazione di immagini scientifiche, prendendo in esame documenti scritti
(analisi semiotica di un articolo di radiologia) e pratiche materiali (etnografia di
laboratorio riguardante l’interpretazione di immagini di elettroforesi in biologia
molecolare e descrizione di un caso di significazione di immagini di microscopia
elettronica). Questa analisi permette di fare tre osservazioni: (1) Il processo
di significazione delle immagini scientifiche è un processo distribuito; (2) Le
immagini scientifiche possono essere considerate strumenti di ricerca, nel senso
che scienziati e medici le manipolano in varie forme al fine di esplorare aspetti
diversi del loro oggetto di studio; (3) Le immagini scientifiche vanno comprese
come fenomeni artificiali controllati prodotti allo scopo di ridefinire la visibilità
degli oggetti naturali.
Per approfondire meglio quest’ultima idea, nel capitolo finale introduco il
concetto di fenomenotecnica sviluppato da Gaston Bachelard. La nozione di
fenomenotecnica non può essere applicata direttamente all’imaging medico, ma
alcuni degli elementi che caratterizzano il concetto bachelardiano oﬀrono spunti
importanti per pensare l’imaging medico. Il primo di questi elementi è l’idea che
per studiare un fenomeno naturale, lo scienziato deve innanzitutto trasformarlo
in un oggetto scientifico. Il secondo elemento, strettamente legato al primo, è che
l’esperienza scientifica è necessariamente mediata, e tale mediazione ha un ca-
rattere intellettuale e materiale. Questo significa che la costruzione di strumenti
e lo sviluppo di tecnologie non sono un prodotto della scienza, ma piuttosto un
elemento interno al processo scientifico. La tecnologia è integrata nella scienza,
perché la nostra apprensione? scientifica del mondo è necessariamente mediata
da strumenti. Gli strumenti, a loro volta, sono materializzazioni di un vasto cor-
po di conoscenze e pratiche scientifiche (nel caso dell’imaging digitale tale sapere
ha un carattere eminentemente matematico). Scienza e tecnologia, dunque, si
costituiscono reciprocamente. A partire da queste considerazioni propongo un
descrizione dell’imaging medico in termini di fenomenotecnica, utilizzando tale
concetto come parola chiave attorno alla quale riorganizzare le idee discusse in
precedenza. In primo luogo ricorro al concetto di fenomenotecnica per spiegare
come le immagini diagnostiche mediano l’esperienza sensoriale e intellettuale
del medico. Successivamente descrivo le immagini diagnostiche in termini di
fenomeni artificiali (riconfigurazione visiva di segnali non visivi) che funziona-
no come simulazioni del corpo del paziente e che materializzano ambiti della
conoscenza diﬀerenti (dalla medicina alla fisica, passando per l’ingegneria). In-
fine, mostro che la significazione corretta ed eﬃcace di un’immagine diagnostica
richiede una fenomenotecnica dell’osservatore. Per riconoscere i segni di malat-
tia in un’immagine dell’interno del corpo è necessario padroneggiare le regole
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implicite ed esplicite che permettono di dare senso al nuovo dominio sensoria-
le prodotto dalla tecnologia. Ciò implica un abbandono dei modi spontanei di
percezione-significazione e il passaggio attraverso un processo educativo che mo-
dula le capacità percettive. L’osservatore specializzato è un osservatore che ha
preso parte a un processo di formazione che trasforma profondamente la visione
naturale, inserendo l’atto del guardare all’interno di una vasta rete epistemica
che include conoscenze teoriche e pratiche concrete.
Parole chiave: epistemologia; imaging medico; fotografia; radiografia; sto-
ria della medicina; teoria dell’immagine.
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Introduction
Since its initial proposal, this dissertation has gone through a deep reformula-
tion of both the object of study and the method of investigation. Developed
within the context of an interdisciplinary research project called Image in Sci-
ence and Art,1 my early ideas for a doctoral thesis revolved around the artistic
use of medical imaging technologies. The objective was to understand how med-
ical imaging has transformed our perception and first-person experience of the
inner body, both at an individual and social level. The main question was to
understand if our experience of the body changes, once we can look inside it
without having to cut it open. Do we relate diﬀerently to our own body, and
to the bodies of other people, if we perceive them as potentially transparent
rather than ineluctably opaque? The working hypothesis was that the study of
artworks related to medical imaging technologies could provide valuable insights
into such problems. The rationale underlying this approach was that, as expres-
sion of an individual, artworks can help disentangling questions related to body
visualization and personal identity. At the same time, as cultural objects, they
can be used as instruments of analysis to explore social notions of body and
technology.2 Thus, the initial research plan did not focus on medical images per
se, but rather on the meanings these images acquire outside the medical setting.
It concerned the first-person perception of the inner body mediated by images,
rather than the epistemology of medical imaging.3
1The FCT research project Image in Science and Art (PTDC/EAT/64201/2006), directed
by Prof. Olga Pombo, began in 2007 and ended in 2011 with the exhibition “CorpoImagem.
Representações do Corpo na Ciência e na Arte”, held in February and March 2011 in Lisbon,
at the Pavilhão do Conhecimento-Ciência Viva.
2See Coulombe, 2006.
3In the first year or so of my doctoral research, I attempted a comprehensive survey of the
artists who work with medical imaging. The task proved unattainable, but nevertheless it
was possible to outline a general view of the multiple ways whereby visual artists encapsulate
medical imaging in their work, both at the conceptual and formal level. The results of this
early phase of the research were published in the article “Inside the body: Medical imaging
and visual arts” (Di Marco, 2012a), and in a chapter of the book Representações do Corpo na
Ciência e na Arte (Azevedo Tavares, 2012) published within the context of the aforementioned
FCT research project. Both texts are in the Appendix attached in electronic format to this
dissertation.
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The change of conceptual focus derived from the need to extricate and clarify
the multiple meanings that tend to grow around medical images. In fact, if an
image arises not only diﬀerent interpretations, but also diﬀerent emotions,4 it
is because it is inherently ambiguous. In order to unravel the origins of this
ambiguity, it was necessary to understand the material and conceptual genesis
of medical imaging. That is, it was necessary to understand how such images are
produced and endowed with meaning in their native context, clinical medicine.
In the course of my research this historical, conceptual, and epistemological
analysis became the central object of the dissertation. In other words, an inquiry
into the extra-medical meaning of medical imaging morphed into a study on its
epistemology. More precisely, it morphed into a study that aims at clarifying
the relationship between the images produced by medical imaging technologies
and the body they make visible.
Before saying more about the questions approached in this dissertation and
the methodology employed, it is important to clarify what is meant by medical
imaging. The term medical imaging refers to a vast array of images and imag-
ing technologies developed since the end of the nineteenth century to provide
indirect visual access to the inner organs (morphological imaging), and to some
physiological or molecular processes (functional imaging). The first of such tech-
nologies was radiography, invented by the German physicist Wilhelm Roentgen
in 1895. Since then, a number of diﬀerent imaging modalities have emerged, and
they have completely redefined the visibility of the interior of the living body.
Nowadays Computed Tomography (CT), Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)
and ultrasound scanning allow visualizing inner structures with astonishing de-
tail, while Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and functional MRI (fMRI)
allow visualizing the metabolic activity of diﬀerent biological tissues, including
the brain. Medical imaging is generally used for diagnostic aims. However, it
can also serve research purposes, as in the case of neuroimaging in cognitive
science, or rather mundane goals, as in the case of fetal ultrasound, which is
routinely performed not only to check the health conditions of the fetus, but
also to let parents enjoy the experience of seeing their prospective baby on the
screen.5 In my study I focus on the diagnostic use of medical imaging. This is
4The art historian and image theorist James Elkins remarks that, unlike other scientific
images, which can be strictly informational, medical images tend to show vestiges of expressive
meaning, because they can evoke questions of life and death, gender and sexuality, pleasure
and pain. See Elkins, 1995, 556.
5See Chudleigh, 1999; Mitchell, 2001; van Dijck, 2005, Ch. 6. Fetal sonograms are partic-
ularly interesting images, from both an epistemological and sociological perspective. Before
the introduction of ultrasound scanning for pregnancy monitoring, the presence of the unborn
could be felt only by the pregnant woman. Since it has become visible, however, the fetus has
acquired a new status. On the one hand, it has become an object of study, as well as a medical
subject (fetal medicine). On the other hand, it has acquired a new identity and individuality,
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why I will often use the expression diagnostic images. I also employ the des-
ignations mechanical images, radiological images, and medical images as loose
synonyms, even though, strictly speaking, the term medical images encompasses
a much larger domain of images, including, for instance, anatomical drawings.
A peculiarity of medical imaging is that the images it creates seem to ren-
der the body transparent. Intuitively, we think that the medical relevance of
diagnostic images depends on the fact that they are faithful representations of
the inner body, but, as soon as we set out to study them in terms of diagnostic
instruments and, more generally, in terms of cognitive objects, we come across
a number of problems: What do these images represent, exactly? And how do
they represent? Do they work by mimesis? If we do not know how their refer-
ent looks like, how can we trust their representational value? Are these images
portraits of the inner body? Or are they maps? If they are portraits, are they
the portrait of someone (a person) or of something (a disease)?
These questions, present already in the first version of my doctoral project,
turned out to be much more diﬃcult to answer than I had initially assumed.
In fact, although there are several works on medical imaging from the per-
spective of cultural studies6 and anthropology,7 very little has been published
about medical imaging epistemology. Indeed, unlike historians and sociologists,
philosophers of science have traditionally neglected images and, until relatively
recently, in both continental and analytic philosophy the reflection on visual rep-
resentation has been a preserve of aesthetics and art theory.8 For what concerns
the specific domain of medical imaging, the philosophers of science who have
paid attention to this topic have typically focused on the use of neuroimaging in
cognitive science and, to a lesser extent, psychiatry.9 However, to the best of my
entering as a silent actor into a set of relationships between medical practitioners, parents and
society. The eﬀects of this transformation on the creation of a new social and juridical subject
has been widely investigated by sociological and anthropological literature. Feminist authors,
in particular, have repeatedly analyzed the role of fetal scans in the increased medicalization
and commercialization of pregnancy, in the strengthening of ideologies of good motherhood,
in the creation of the fetus as an autonomous individual independent from the mother’s body,
and in the debates surrounding abortion. See, for instance, Petchesky, 1987; Duden, 1993;
Taylor, 1998 and 2008; Morgan and Michaels, 1999; Morgan, 2009; Roberts, 2012.
6See Zwijnenberger and van de Vall, 2009; van Dijck, 2005; Natale, 2008, 2011, 2012;
Stephens, 2012.
7See 2004; Radstake, 2009; Müller-Rostock, 2009; Estival, 2009, 2010.
8This situation has been changing over the last decade. See, for instance, Pombo and
Di Marco, 2010; Pombo and Gerner, 2010; Carusi, 2011, 2012. In the analytic tradition see
French, 2003; Perini, 2005ab, 2006, 2012.
9See Kosslyn, 1999; Bogen, 2002; Taraborelli, 2003; Roskies, 2007; Huber, 2009; Huber
and Huber, 2009, Mole and Klein, 2010; Klein, 2010. Even in the book Medical Imaging and
Philosophy. Challenges, Reflections and Actions (Fangerau et al., 2012), all the articles that
deal with epistemology refer to neuroimaging.
4 Introduction
knowledge, virtually nothing has been published on the philosophy of medical
imaging as a diagnostic instrument.10
Objectives and methodology The main objective of this dissertation is
to contribute to the development of an epistemology of medical imaging. My
central thesis is that medical imaging does not merely produce more or less
accurate pictures of the inner body, it rather turns the body into a scientific
object by transforming its very visibility. Simultaneously it aims at reducing
illness to a visual entity. Medical imaging does not simply make visible the inner
organs, it actually presents the body in such a way that it becomes possible to
extract relevant diagnostic information from it. This is why I maintain that the
images produced by medical imaging technologies are more akin to simulations
than to portraits. The imaging apparatus turns the body into a visual object
that can be observed under experimental conditions: unlike the real body, it
can be filed, retrieved, shared, measured and manipulated in several ways.
This thesis is accompanied by two others: first, diagnostic images, as all
scientific images, are actual cognitive instruments. They are epistemic objects
inscribed within theoretical contexts and experimental practices. Second, an
image of the inner body has diagnostic meaning and value only in the scope
of a specific conceptualization of the body and disease. This means that, in
order to put forward an epistemology of medical imaging, to develop a the-
ory of technology-mediated images and technology-mediated perception is not
enough. One must also clarify the medical concepts and practices that pro-
vide the substratum for the whole process of production and signification of
diagnostic images.
Medical imaging is to be understood both as an imaging technology and
as a diagnostic practice, hence, as an object of philosophical analysis it must
be approached from diﬀerent perspectives. For this reason in my research I
resorted to literature from a variety of disciplinary fields, such as image theory,
semiotics, history and philosophy of medicine, and history and philosophy of
science. The aim was to put forward an epistemology of medical imaging that
accounts for the poietic rather than mimetic nature of visual representation, as
well as for the fact that through medical imaging the human body is embedded
10An exception is the doctoral dissertation Signal into Vision: Medical Imaging as In-
strumentally Aided Perception, defended by Nola Semczyszyn at the University of British
Columbia in 2010. Drawing mostly on analytic philosophy of art and perception, Semczyszyn
appeals to theories of pictorial representation to explain how medical imaging represents and
how we access its content. I refer to her work in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2. Overton et al.,
2011, focuses on the problem of the relation between diagnostic images and verbal language,
and the creation of ontologies associated to software tools to improve communication among
radiologists, other health professionals, and patients.
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into an empirical apparatus, which encompasses medical instruments, medical
knowledge, and clinical practices.
For what concerns the methodology, I relied chiefly on historical and con-
ceptual analysis. On the one hand, I studied the genesis, development and
transformation of concepts such as disease and diagnosis; on the other hand, I
critically applied philosophical concepts developed by diﬀerent authors to prob-
lematize and examine my objects of research (e.g., the production of mechanical
images and the visualization of the invisible). The study of original scientific
documents, such as medical treatises and medical journals’ articles was indis-
pensable for understanding how medical imaging has progressively imposed itself
as a fundamental diagnostic method, and how illness has become a visual object.
Thus, I relied on documents’ analysis to unravel how the diagnostic meaning of
images was generated in the scope of actual scientific and clinical practices and
debates. The emphasis on material scientific practices was reinforced, whenever
possible, by resorting to literature from laboratory ethnology and anthropol-
ogy.11 Also, since this work is about images, I devoted much attention to the
iconographic apparatus of the documents I examined, employing iconographic
and semiotic analysis.
As mentioned above, given the multifaceted nature of the epistemological
problems posed by medical imaging, I had to draw on concepts and ideas devel-
oped by a variety of thinkers. In particular, I follow Charles Sanders Peirce’s
truth-value theory of photography to better understand how mechanically pro-
duced images were conceptualized in the nineteenth and early-twentieth cen-
turies.12 Moreover, I resort to his semiotics, in particular his classification of
signs into indices, icons and symbols, to develop a tool for semiotic analysis
that I employ at various points of the dissertation to investigate the processes
of signification of diﬀerent kinds of instrument-generated images that visualize
invisible referents (from microphotographs to radiographs and PET scans).
I explore at length the idea that optical media such as photography and cin-
ema are prostheses that enrich and transform our sensorial experience through
Walter Benjamin’s notion of optical unconscious. Benjamin remarked that pho-
tography and cinema allow for manipulations of space and time that are pre-
cluded to natural perception. Consequently, these imaging technologies endow
us with enhanced mechanical senses that allow exploring completely new facets
11See Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3, and Chapter 5, Section 5.2.3.
12In my study I payed much attention to photography because when radiography appeared,
at the turn of the nineteenth century, it was perceived as a particular kind of photography.
Hence, to understand how radiography was conceptualized, it is necessary to look at the
photographic practices and theories of the time.
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of nature.13 I combine the concept of optical unconscious with Peirce’s semi-
otics to discuss the problem of the invisible referent, that is, the question of
how we can make sense of images that are meant to visualize invisible phenom-
ena. Besides the idea of optical unconscious, two other aspects of Benjamin’s
reflection on photography and cinema proved fruitful for my investigation on
medical imaging. One is his seminal discussion of the cognitive eﬀects of the
mechanical reproduction of images; the second is his account of the objectify-
ing nature of photography, which he compares to the dissecting activity of the
surgeon. I draw on his considerations on these subjects to elaborate an account
of the role played by photographic series in creating a new clinical gaze, and
to reflect upon the role played by photography and radiography in turning the
human body into a scientific object.
The idea of mechanical objectivity, developed by the historians Lorraine Das-
ton and Peter Galison,14 oﬀers me the opportunity to engage with the problems
of image realism and objectivity through polemical reasoning. These authors
developed an articulated taxonomy of scientific images aimed at demonstrating
the historical character of objectivity, which should be considered one of the
many epistemic ideals that can drive scientific work in diﬀerent historical pe-
riods. Mechanical objectivity, they argue, has been the main epistemic ideal
between the 1830s and the 1920s. It prescribed the strenuous suppression of the
subjectivity of the image makers, and put harsh limitations on image interpre-
tation, too. In order to refute this account of what it means for an image to
be objective, and to clarify what sort of photographic realism was embraced by
the scientists of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, I develop a
number of arguments concerning the relationship between objectivity and inter-
subjectivity, as well as between mechanically produced images and imagination.
Similarly, Daston and Galison’s characterization of virtual and haptic images
gives me the opportunity to critically delve into the problem of the embodied
and material dimension of scientific images’ production and fruition.
A concept I came across in a late phase of my research is Gaston Bachelard’s
“phenomenotechnique.”15 Bachelard developed the idea of phenomenotechnique
to account for the fact that, in advanced physics and chemistry, scientific en-
tities (e.g., the Zeeman eﬀect, perfect crystals, atomic isotopes) are not found
13See Benjamin, 1939, 266.
14The historiographic work of Daston and Galison is guided by strong epistemological as-
sumptions. Indeed, together with the philosopher Ian Hacking, they are considered among
the most prominent exponent of so-called historical epistemology, an approach to the study
of scientific knowledge that emphasized the historical development of scientific concepts and
objects, as well as of scientific disciplines and styles of reasoning. See Hacking; 2002, Kusch,
2011; Sturm, 2011.
15Bachelard, 1931, 18.
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in nature ready made. They must be produced in the laboratory as technical
phenomena. They are the materialization of mathematical rationality or, as
Bachelard put it, of a mathematical noumenon. In other words, through phe-
nomenotechnique, science creates its own phenomena in a process of progressive
rationalization of the real. Through this process science leaves behind the world
as it is understood by commonsensical experience and received mental habits,
and sets free “a surrationalism that will multiply the occasions for thinking.”16
If rigorously interpreted, the notion of phenomenotechnique cannot be applied
to medical imaging and diagnostic images, for reasons I discuss in detail in the
dissertation. Yet, the analysis of this concept oﬀered me an additional stimulus
for thinking medical imaging. In fact, not only it provides specific insights for
reflecting on contemporary medical imaging, wherein mathematical algorithms
for image acquisition and reconstruction play a fundamental role; more impor-
tantly, it works as an organizing concept, which helps bring together and refine
the diﬀerent ideas and intuitions developed in the various steps of my research.
Plan of the dissertation The dissertation begins with an analysis of the his-
torical and conceptual conditions of possibility of medical imaging. By outlining
an archaeology of radiography, I will try to understand what medical theories
and practices had to be at work in the nineteenth century, for a technology that
produced shadow-images of the inner body to be perceived and employed as a di-
agnostic instrument. I will suggest that when radiography appeared, at the turn
of the twentieth century, it engendered less a theoretical than a technological
revolution, because its diagnostic relevance was grounded in the conceptual-
ization of body, disease and diagnosis put forward by clinical anatomy at the
end of the eighteenth century. Following Michel Foucault’s The Birth of the
Clinic, I will maintain that it was with the work of the French clinicians Xavier
Bichat and Jean-Nicolas Corvisart that diagnosis became a matter of eliciting
signs from the inner body and that visibility became a fundamental epistemo-
logical and perceptual category of medicine.17 I will also defend the idea that
the stethoscope, invented by Théophile Laennec in 1816, was the material and
intellectual predecessor of radiography, because it introduced a primitive form
of mediated perception in medical diagnosis, and allowed the clinician to ex-
plore from the outside the inner body of the living patient, extracting signs of
disease.18 In the course of the nineteenth century, several ways of understanding
16Bachelard, 1936, 7, my translation.
17See Foucault, 1963, 166.
18The stethoscope is used to auscultate the patient. Auscultation is a basic clinical ex-
amination. It consists of listening to the sounds produced by the heart and by the air that
circulates in the respiratory organs.
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the functioning of the body and the ontology of disease emerged. I will show
that these theoretical transformations went hand in hand with the development
of diﬀerent instruments, from the microscope to the sphygmograph, which vi-
sualized diﬀerent aspects of both the morphology and physiology of the human
body. Each of these instruments fulfilled specific diagnostic aims and posed
distinct epistemological problems, but all of them shared some commonalities:
they were meant to replace the subjective sensations of patients and doctors
with objective indices of health and disease; they created visual records of the
inner body that could be filed, retrieved and shared among physicians; they re-
quired the development of a specialized language agreed upon by a community
of experts; they created a progressive physical separation between the body of
the patient and the body of the physician. It was in this framework of medical
ideas and practices that X-ray imaging appeared and progressively acquired its
diagnostic function.
In the second chapter I examine the early developments of medical photog-
raphy in order to understand how the first technology for the production of
mechanical images entered the domain of medicine. Although photography is
not considered a diagnostic instrument proper, it is important to explain how
it influenced the way doctors looked at the patient’s body and visualized dis-
ease. The main theoretical references in this chapter are Peirce’s semiotics and
Benjamin’s reflections on the optical unconscious, the mechanical production
and reproduction of images, and the intrinsic analytic and dissecting poten-
tial of photography and cinema. Drawing on these authors, and analyzing the
works of early physicians-photographers in psychiatry, dermatology, neurology
and physiology, I will show that the photographic series collected in medical
journals, manuals and hospital archives, produced a new visibility of the pa-
tient’s body by creating an updated version of the Foucauldian clinical gaze.
According to Foucault, the clinical gaze was born in the hospital wards, because
that was the place were the individual body of each patient became a public and
visible body that could be compared to many others, finding out similarities and
diﬀerences that helped organizing a variety of signs, symptoms and anatomical
lesions into nosological categories. I will argue that the photographic collection
allowed to replicate this sensorial experience and cognitive operation from a dis-
tance. I will also demonstrate that the photographic series was part of a larger
experimental apparatus, which encompassed the patient, the camera and the
observer, and whose aim was to turn the body and disease into visual objects,
available for scientific analysis.
In the third chapter I discuss the problem of the invisible referent, that is,
I analyze the processes whereby photographs that reveal invisible phenomena
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are endowed with meaning. This is likely to be the fundamental problem of all
scientific images. When the referent of a picture is invisible, the iconic mode of
signification fails, because in this case the image produced by the mechanical or
electronic apparatus does not look like anything we already know, it resembles
nothing. So, how do we know that the object we see in the photograph – e.g., a
cell or a tubercular lesion – is really there and does really look like that? Draw-
ing on the conceptual analysis developed in the previous chapter, I will defend
the idea that the visualization of the invisible entails a peculiar combination
of the indexical, iconic and symbolic modes of signification. My reasoning is
built in opposition to Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison’s idea of mechanical
objectivity.19 According to Daston and Galison, for the scientists of the nine-
teenth century, photographs were unerring records of reality. Consequently, the
researcher should restrain from any intervention during image production, avoid
any subjective interpretation, and let the image speak for itself. This aim was
purportedly reached by endorsing strict procedural protocols in the diﬀerent
phases of production and publication of scientific photographs. I will show,
however, that the notion of mechanical objectivity is a caricature of the actual
ideas and practices developed by the scientists of the nineteenth century to deal
with the problem of the visualization of the invisible. The argument will be
articulated in three moments, corresponding to the analysis of how the problem
of objectivity and image signification was managed by scientists who worked
with microphotography, chronophotography, and radiography.
In the fourth chapter I argue that images are cognitive tools and that rep-
resentation is never an act of mechanical repetition, it always entails a creative
component. As in the previous chapter, part of my discourse is built in contrast
with Daston and Galison, challenging their claims concerning the passive nature
of representation. For these authors, scientific images can be classified in three
categories: traditional, virtual and haptic images. Traditional images are all
those images that cannot be manipulated on a computer screen; virtual images
are digital images associated to computer algorithms for image manipulation;
while haptic images are images whose production requires the actual manipu-
lation of the object during the imaging process (for Daston and Galison, this
definition only applies to nanoimages). Traditional images, they say, are mere
re-presentations of the world, because they are “focused on copying what already
exists,”20 while virtual and haptic images are presentations, because they dis-
play their objects in ever changing ways. Accordingly, traditional images work
19See Daston and Galison, 1992, 2007.
20Daston and Galison, 2007, 383.
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as “evidences,” while virtual and haptic images are “tools.”21 I will criticize
this classification of scientific images with historical and theoretical arguments.
From the historical point of view, I will show that at least since the sixteenth
century there have been attempts to create images that can be actually ma-
nipulated by the observer, resorting to paper flaps that can be lifted revealing
diﬀerent layers of a representation. From the theoretical perspective, I will draw
on a variety of literature spanning from art theory to neuroscience, to demon-
strate that the very notion of a passive representation is unsustainable, because
images always engage the observer in an embodied act of perception, which elic-
its not only visual, but also tactile sensations and motor reactions. Moreover, I
will argue that Daston and Galison’s emphasis on nanoimaging is misleading. In
fact, even when they do not reach the peaks of technological sophistication that
characterizes nanoimages, scientific images are the result of some manipulation
of the natural object they represent. A scientific image cannot be an automated
copy of nature, because it is part of an experimental praxis, whose goal is to
learn something about natural phenomena, not just to reproduce them. This
position will be further corroborated by the analysis of actual scientific practices
of image signification, taking into account written documents (semiotic analysis
of a radiology article) and material practices (laboratory ethnography).
In the last chapter, I wrap-up the diﬀerent arguments discussed through-
out the dissertation, and apply them to contemporary medical imaging. I do
so by first analyzing and subsequently re-elaborating Bachelard’s concept of
phenomenotechnique. As already mentioned, the idea of phenomenotechnique
cannot be applied to medical imaging in rigorous terms. However, there are
two characterizing elements of this concept that provide important insights for
a philosophy of technology and, consequently, for an epistemology of medical
imaging. The first is the idea that in order to study a natural phenomenon, sci-
entists must previously re-create it as a scientific phenomenon, and this requires
the creation of artificial objects. The second, strictly related to the former, is
that scientific experience is by necessity mediated, and such mediation has both
an intellectual and material character. This means that the development of
scientific instruments and technologies is not a second-order product of science,
but rather part and parcel of the scientific process. Technology is embedded into
science, because our scientific grasping of the world is necessarily mediated by in-
struments; scientific instruments, in turn, are materializations of a vast body of
scientific knowledge and practices (in the case of digital imaging this knowledge
has an eminently mathematical character). In other words, science and technol-
ogy are reciprocally constituted. On these grounds I will propose a description
21Daston and Galison, 2007, 385.
Introduction 11
of medical imaging in terms of phenomenotechnique, using this concept as a
key-word around which to reorganize the ideas previously discussed. Firstly,
I will resort to the concept of phenomenotechnique to gain insights into how
diagnostic images mediate the physician’s sensory and intellectual experience.
Secondly, I will give an account of diagnostic images as artificial phenomena
(visual reconfigurations of non-visual signals) that work as simulations of the
patient’s body, and that reify diﬀerent domains of knowledge (from medicine to
physics and engineering). Finally, I will argue that the proper and eﬃcient signi-
fication of a diagnostic image requires what I call a “phenomenotechnique of the
observer.” To recognize the signs of disease in an image of the inner body, one
has to master the explicit and implicit rules necessary to make sense of the novel
sensory domain produced by the technological apparatus. This implies aban-
doning spontaneous modes of perception and signification to engage in a process
of educated perception. The idea that we only recognize what we know and that
we need to know in order to see is a truism in both contemporary psychology of
vision and philosophy of science, and the relevance of education in shaping the
scientist’s ability to see has been acknowledged and discussed by philosophers as
diverse as Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. The idea of a “phenomenotechnique
of the observer,” however, helps stressing some specific features of the education
of vision related to the medical use of machine-mediated images, and I will use
it as a conceptual tool to analyze the complex and extended epistemic network
that envelops diagnostic images and makes them intelligible.
To unravel this extended epistemic network is a necessary precondition for
understanding the tendency of diagnostic images to produce a proliferation of
meanings that span beyond the clinical domain. The images produced by med-
ical imaging technologies are open to multiple processes of signification because
of their inherent complexity, and they are complex because they embody mul-
tiple domains of knowledge, because they alter the visibility of the body, and
because they invite the beholder to abandon or rethink ingrained habits of visual
perception.
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Chapter 1
Disease and diagnosis in the
19th century
Within the history of medicine, radiography and its cognate visualization tech-
nologies (e.g., ultrasound imaging, Computed Tomography, Magnetic Resonance
Imaging, Positron Emission Tomography) stand at the crossing of perceptive and
cognitive strategies developed to deal with two diﬀerent problems. The prob-
lem of representing the inner body as an object of scientific knowledge (thus, a
universal object), and the problem of accessing the body in order to diagnose
a specific ailment of an idiosyncratic individual. While the first endeavor dates
back at least to 3000 BC,1 the second became a major concern for physicians
only in the early-nineteenth century, and went hand in hand with a profound
redefinition of the concepts of disease and diagnosis. Additionally, within the
history of diagnostic techniques – which is strictly related to the history of
the concept of disease – diagnostic images blend together two complementary
strategies for accessing the inner body: (1) the indirect (mediated) collection
of invisible signs from internal organs, made possible by instruments like the
stethoscope and the sphygmograph, and (2) the direct visual access to the inner
body through optical devices, like the vaginal speculum and the laryngoscope,
which exploit natural corporeal orifices (endoscopy). We can say that diagnos-
tic images combine (1) and (2) because they provide an indirect visual access
to the inner body, based on the collection of invisible signs from the internal
organs. More precisely, they are visual representations based on non-visual (or
non-optical) properties of the inner body.2
1See Cazort et al., 1996; Cosmacini, 1997.
2I will elaborate on the issue of the visual-mimetic configuration of non-visual data in
Chapter 5, where I give some details on the physical processes underlying the production of
diﬀerent diagnostic images. For the moment it is enough to recall that while natural vision
and analog photography depend on the absorption and reflection of electromagnetic waves
in the frequency of visible light by the surface of the objects (optical property), an imaging
13
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This means that, if we are to develop an epistemology of diagnostic images,
we cannot limit our analysis to the problems of visual representation, but we
have to consider medical imaging as part of a wider group of tools (or tech-
nologies) used to extract information from the healthy and the diseased body.
Moreover, we have to understand which concepts of disease and body underlaid
the use of such tools and were, in turn, reinforced by them. That is to say, we
should try to disentangle the reciprocal shaping of ideas, natural objects, and
instruments.
It is widely recognized that the introduction of radiography in clinical prac-
tice marked a major turning point in the history of medicine. According to
the historian of medicine Stanley Reiser, it opened a new visual era in medical
practice. For Reiser, medical imaging “changed the ways patients and doctors
experienced illness [. . . ] and caused medicine to see its task and itself diﬀer-
ently.”3 Similarly, in her much quoted book Screening the Body, visual studies
scholar Lisa Cartwright claims that radiography accomplished “a quite literal
disintegration of the body,”4 which transformed the way illness is perceived by
both medical practitioners and patients. Indeed, unlike the majority of medical
innovations developed during the nineteenth century, from the stethoscope to
the germ theory, X-ray images exerted an almost immediate impact on medi-
cal practice. To understand this phenomenon, stressed by many historians of
medicine, it is important to emphasize that radiography neither acquired its
epistemic relevance in a void, nor redefined the notion of disease and the (med-
ical) representation of the body out of nothing. Quite the contrary.
In this chapter I defend the view that for what concerns the domain of medi-
cal diagnosis, radiographic techniques entailed less an epistemological revolution
than a technological one, since its primary diagnostic relevance is anchored to
the conception of body and disease (localizationist paradigm) put forward by
clinical anatomy, at the dawn of the nineteenth century. Moreover, radiography
enriched the armamentarium of research and diagnostic techniques developed
during the nineteenth century in order to transform medicine from ars curandi
into a full-fledged empirical science, on the model of physics and chemistry. This
entailed the reorganization of the concepts of body and disease around facts and
basic units that could be measured and compared. Accordingly, it became neces-
sary to produce objective representations of the body, through instruments that
process like radiography exploits the electromagnetic waves in the frequency of X-rays and
their diﬀerential absorption by the internal and external structures of our bodies (non-optical
property). If the skin absorbed the X-rays like the bones do, or if all the inner bodily structures
had the same opacity to X-rays, then it would be impossible to see into the body by means
of a radiograph.
3Reiser, 2009, 14.
4Cartwright, 1995, 108.
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could bypass both the patient and the doctor’s sensorial limitation and subjec-
tivity, in formats that could be shared among diﬀerent observers, in diﬀerent
places and times. Since a specific sensible perception and rationality had devel-
oped during the century, medicine was ready to immediately take on radiography
when it appeared in 1895. There is no doubt that since then medical imaging
has gone a long way, yet, I think that many of the conceptual problems put
forward by ultrasound imaging, Computed Tomography (CT), Magnetic Res-
onance Imaging, (MRI) and Positron Emission Tomography (PET) are rooted
in the nineteenth century’s attempt to produce a new, specific expressivity of
the body. That is, to force it (or to allow it) to express its forms, motions, first
constituents, and ailments clearly and unmistakably.
1.1 From symptoms to lesions
In the text “L’élaboration du diagnostic,” Peitzman and Maulitz describe the
making of a diagnosis as a complex process of “divination” [divination]. The
doctor has the task to put some order in the confusion of signs and symptoms
manifested by the patient, with the aim of answering the complex question:
“What is wrong with this person?” This requires the implementation of a number
of “cognitive and methodological negotiations.” Such negotiations occur within
the constraints of the biological information and technical resources available at
any given historical moment, as well as on the basis of cultural preferences and
of the unstable notion of disease. A notion that, as Peitzman and Maulitz say, is
“formulated and reformulated, framed and reframed [. . . ] [t]hrough a dynamic
and tireless play between reality, taxonomy and technique, between what is to
be seen, what we see, and what we see with.”5 In the case of radiography, what is
to be seen is a lesion, a nodule, a proliferation of cells within an organic tissue;
what we see is a shadow of the lesion or of the nodule, what we see with is the
radiographic apparatus and the trained eye. Hence, in the case of radiography
what is to be seen largely depends on the notion of disease put forward by
clinical anatomy. For this reason, before turning to medical technology (what
we see with) it is necessary to expound some fundamental concepts of clinical
anatomy, because it was against the background of these concepts that the first
diagnostic technologies acquired their meaning.
Clinical anatomy emerged at the dawn of the nineteenth century, through
what Michel Foucault, in his seminal The Birth of the Clinic, has described as
a mutual redefinition of Morgagni’s pathological anatomy, dating back to 1761,
5Peitzman and Maulitz, 1999, 169.
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and of the clinical method that had been developed in French hospitals during
the second half of the eighteenth century.6 Clinical anatomy actually succeeded
in bringing together two conflicting, but ultimately complementary, forms of
knowledge. The clinical method, characterized by “a neutral gaze directed upon
manifestations, frequencies, and chronologies, concerned with linking up symp-
toms and grasping their language,” and pathological anatomy, which located
diseases in the “mute, intemporal bodies”7 of the corpses. Based on the inter-
pretation of signs and symptoms, clinical medicine was at its origins a discursive,
analytic practice pertaining to the domain of history. On the contrary, patho-
logical anatomy was interested in forms, colors, and positions. It belonged to
geography.8 The redefinition of the clinic into clinical anatomy required the
materialization of symptoms and signs into anatomical lesions, while for patho-
logical anatomy it was a matter of integrating the logic of the taxonomy of
disease (nosology) and pathology’s evolution into the tangible space of the inner
body. As Xavier Bichat famously wrote in his Anatomie générale appliquée à la
physiologie et à la medicine, of 1801:
You may take notes, for twenty years, from morning to night at the
bedside of the sick [. . . ] and all will be to you only a confusion of symp-
toms, which, not being united in one point, will necessarily present only
a train of incoherent phenomena. Open a few bodies, this obscurity will
soon disappear, which observation alone would never have been able to
have dissipated.9
In this statement Bichat summed up the longstanding problem of traditional
clinic of organizing symptoms – primary sensorial data collected at the bedside
– into a coherent and reliable body of knowledge, linking them to a concrete,
observable entity. He followed the path of the founder of pathological anatomy,
Giovanni Battista Morgagni, who in 1761 published the treatise De sedibus et
causis morborum per anatomen indagatis. It was a five volumes work contain-
ing hundreds of case histories supported by autopsy findings, which aimed at
correlating symptoms with organs’ structural alterations. The idea to associate
organic lesions to disease symptoms was quite groundbreaking because, at the
time, the organic lesions found while dissecting a cadaver were considered an
eﬀect of death (decomposition) rather than a cause of the disease. Morgagni
agreed with his colleagues that the forces initiating the illness resided outside
of the body, but he thought that organic lesions were the eﬀect of a chain of
events initiated by such forces, and at the same time the proximate cause that
6See Foucault, 1963, 122ﬀ.
7Foucault, 1963, 126.
8See Foucault, 1963, 126.
9Bichat, 1801, vol. 1, 60.
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determined the actual manifestation of the illness within the patient’s body.10
His treatise was praised by his contemporaries, but it had scant influence on
medical thought and practice of the time. On the one hand, there was clini-
cians’ traditional distrust of anatomy;11 on the other hand, with its emphasis on
organs and lesions, Morgagni’s approach could not be easily integrated into the
nosological systems of the eighteenth century, still based on the Hippocratic vi-
sion of the body as an integrated whole. Although by the middle of the century
the doctrine of humors was loosing its strength, challenged by new physiological
theories mostly based on the circulatory or the nervous systems, the actual space
in which the disease manifested itself was the living individual, not an organ or
a body part.12 Within this cognitive framework, lesions that merely pinpointed
the eﬀect of disease on the organs conveyed little information. In order to be
assimilated into the clinical thought, a new vision of clinical medicine and a
new conceptualization of the anatomical lesion had to be put forward. These
epistemological ruptures took place in the French hospitals in the years after
the Revolution.
A redefinition of bodies and places According to medical historian W.F.
Bynum, the annus mirabilis for modern medicine was 1794, with the institution
of the new écoles de santé in Paris, Montpellier and Strasbourg.13 In these new
schools, which integrated medical education into a single system, all students
were trained both in medicine and surgery. The immediate objective of this
measure was to ensure that the army medical professionals could deal with
wounds, infections and fevers alike, but it also had an extremely important
consequence on medical thinking, because, as Bynum states:
It taught generations of students to conceptualize disease as surgeons
would: in terms of anatomic structures, the solid parts, local lesions.
This systematic integration created the ambiance for the emphasis on
pathology, physical diagnosis, and clinico-pathological correlation, which
are the hallmarks of hospital medicine.14
10See Reiser, 1978, 16-25; Grmek, 1999, 148-149. Like the famous clinicians of his time,
François Boissier de Sauvages and William Cullen, Morgagni refused to speculate on the
ultimate causes of pathologic phenomena, but unlike them he opted for topographical ordering
(a capitem ad calcem, from the head to the lower extremities) rather than Linnaean nosology.
See Bynum, 1994, 30-31.
11For Thomas Sydenham it diverted physicians’ attention form diligent patient’s observation
and recollection of the disease history; for Boissier de Sauvages, who actually performed many
autopsies, post mortem lesions were too variable and unstable to provide reliable knowledge.
12See Bynum, 1994, 29-31.
13This new system of medical education was consolidated in 1803 with Georges Cabanis’
hospitals reform.
14Bynum, 1994, 26.
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Bynum’s claim that surgery played a seminal role in laying the foundations of
clinical anatomy is corroborated by the fact that both Xavier Bichat and Jean-
Nicolas Corvisart, the pioneers of clinical anatomy, had been surgeons before
turning to medicine.15 And their disciple Théophile Laennec, who systematized
a fundamental part of clinical anatomy’s nosology, in the preface to the second
edition of his seminal Traité de l’auscultation médiate (1826), explicitly wrote:
“For what concerns diagnostics, I made an eﬀort to put internal organic lesions
at the same level of surgical ailments.”16
However, Foucault defends that the epistemic rupture entailed by the medical
reforms of the Revolution was caused not so much by the approximation of
medicine and surgery, as by the reorganization of hospitals into clinics, where
medical care, research and education merged.17 In the wards of the clinic, the
gaze of the doctor could easily pass from one body to the other. It was no
more a medicine of the individual, articulated with a private practice, but a
medicine that could and would compare individuals, in a public space. In this
new context clinical observation became “a gaze of the concrete sensibility, a
gaze that travels from body to body, and whose trajectory is situated in the
space of sensible manifestation.”18
The hospital became the locus of proper medical knowledge, because it was
the place where all the phenomena that compose the disease (signs, symptoms,
and anatomical lesions) could be observed by an all encompassing eye. On the
one hand, the hospital provided a “dense concentration of diseased humanity”19
that allowed comparing diﬀerent medical cases, an activity that simultaneously
required and promoted the introduction of probabilistic thinking in medicine.20
On the other hand, hospitals provided systematic and easy access to the cadav-
ers, immediately after decease, and this allowed performing more rigorous autop-
15Educated under the ancient régime (thus before the medical teaching reforms), they had
been two of the most distinguished pupils of the surgeon Pierre-Joseph Desault, who trained
his students at the Hôtel Dieu. Besides perfoming surgical interventions, Desault’s students
had to take care of patients in the hospital wards and keep accurate medical records. See
Bynum, 1994, 8-9.
16Laennec, 1826, vol. 1, xxv.
17As charity institutions financed by the rich, the hospitals rested on the liberal principle
according to which by paying for the poor to be sheltered an treated, the rich was also
making possible and advancement of medical knowledge whereby he himself could one day take
advantage. The hospital, Foucault says, was an ambiguous domain “open to the indiﬀerence of
experiment,” where pain could become a spectacle “by virtue of a subtle right that resides in
the fact that no one is alone, the poor man less so than others, since he can obtain assistance
only through the mediation of the rich.” Foucault, 1963, 83-84. In the hospital of the late-
eighteenth century, the poor literally paid for his life with his body. In fact, the admission to
the hospital implicitly entailed that physicians had the living and dead body at their disposal.
18Foucault, 1963, 120.
19Bynum, 1994, 43.
20See Foucault, 1963, 97-98.
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sies to keep track of organic lesions. Within the physical and conceptual space
of the hospital it became possible for Bichat to renew pathological anatomy. It
also became possible for Corvisart to envisage a medical practice in which the
systematic analysis of the symptoms that could be observed in the patient went
hand in hand with the active elicitation of physical signs through percussion.21
At the same time, both symptoms and physical signs could be checked through
autopsy. Hospitals became the place were medical knowledge was actively pro-
duced. Indeed, the historian and philosopher of medicine Mirko Grmek remarks
that although in the early-nineteenth century hospitals changed from asylums
for the paupers and all sorts of “deviants” into actual medical places, they were
less “health factories” than “factories for teaching and learning,” due to the
relative impotence of the therapeutics of the time.22
Both Bichat and Corvisart had a clinical concept of disease: they related
the disease (the manifestation of a typical train of symptoms) with the organic
lesions, but they did not identify the former with the latter, because symptoms
were the very “essence” of the disease.23 Accordingly, making a diagnosis was to
recognize a specific configuration of symptomatic phenomena. Bichat’s endeavor
was a nosological one, but he introduced two elements that proved fundamen-
tal for the development of clinical anatomy: (1) he selected the tissue as the
primitive unit of pathological analysis; (2) he re-conceptualized the relationship
between life, death, and disease, so that it became possible to track the dynamic
history of an illness in the fixed geography of the corpse.
The tissue, a new unit of analysis The choice of the histological struc-
ture as the basic functional unit resulted from the need to connect function and
morphology, and was related to the observation that we find the same kind of
tissue in diﬀerent organs and that, in turn, each organ is composed by diﬀerent
tissues. As a consequence, the tissue can work simultaneously as the unifying
structure of the organism and the analytic unit that makes possible to estab-
lish general pathological categories. It is an ubiquitous element that presents a
certain range of variations. As Foucault puts it: “In his Traité des membranes,
Bichat imposes a diagonal reading of the body carried out according to expanses
of anatomical resemblances that traverse the organs, envelop them, divide them,
compose and decompose them, analyze them, and, at the same time, bind them
21Percussion is a technique for physical examination which consists of eliciting sounds from
the patient’s thorax by hitting his or her back with a finger.
22Grmek, 1999, 148-149.
23Grmek, 1999, 148.
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together.”24 Bichat understood organs as histological “functional folds,”25 con-
sequently, both their characteristics (morphological and functional), and their
disorders could be described through the combination of a limited set of prop-
erties. This methodological choice allowed a more refined analysis compared to
the organ-based pathological anatomy of Morgagni. Moreover, while Morgagni
had associated the notion of lesion with that of eﬀect produced by the external
forces that caused illness, for Bichat it became an ordering criterion, “the point
from which the pathological organization radiates.”26 A site along which one
could observe the organization of the disease, a spatial entity, rather than a
temporal one. Importantly, disease was no longer conceptualized as an external
event that would strike the body wherever possible letting its marks, it was the
body itself that became ill because it underwent a process of degeneration, a
sort of death within life.27
This new conception of disease transformed the conceptualization of the ca-
daver as source of medical knowledge and influenced the way of understanding
the relation between death, life, and disease. Foucault contrasts the traditional
conception of death with that put forward by Bichat. In the medicine of the
eighteenth century, he says, death was the limit that erased both life and illness:
in the cadaver the traces of death and disease melted in an “indecipherable dis-
order.” Pathological anatomy, as a “technique of the corpse,” had to put order
in that disorder, defining a more rigorous, instrumental notion of death.28 At
first, an elementary solution to this problem was oﬀered by the very organiza-
tion of the hospitals. Here, in fact, it was possible to perform autopsies right
after the decease, when the traces of illness had not been confounded yet by
the grossest eﬀects of death (organic decomposition).29 Besides, taking up an
idea of the British anatomist John Hunter (1728-1793), Bichat made an im-
portant distinction between phenomena connected with the disease itself, and
phenomena related to the relatively autonomous process leading to death (mor-
tification). This meant that death was not an absolute endpoint, but rather
a multiple process distributed both in the time (the duration of life) and the
space of the body. Death itself could be the object of an analysis of chrono-
logical events (sensorial extinction, slowing down of brain activity, and so on)
organized into a specific spatial distribution along the relay of heart, lungs and
brain.30 In practical terms it implied the diﬃcult but not impossible task of
24Foucault, 1963, 129.
25Foucault, 1963, 128.
26Foucault, 1963, 140.
27See Foucault, 1963, 153-156. See also Cosmacini, 1997, 329.
28Foucault, 1963, 141.
29See Foucault, 1963, 141.
30See Foucault, 1963, 142.
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comparing the cadavers of people dead from diﬀerent causes, in order to find
out which events were common and appeared in the same order, and which
were variable. Once its specific mechanisms and processes were defined, death
could no longer be considered a confounder of disease. Foucault remarks: “The
system of functional dependencies and normal or pathological interactions [was]
also illuminated by the detailed analysis of these deaths.” It could be recognized,
for example, that while lung failure immediately aﬀects the heart, cerebral dis-
turbances have no such direct eﬀect. Thus, death became an instrument that
“act[ed] as a point of view on the pathological, and makes it possible to fix its
forms and stages.” It could no longer be conceived of “as a screen (functional
or temporal) separating it from the disease, but as a spontaneous experimental
situation providing access to the very truth of the disease, and to its diﬀerent
chronological phases.”31
From surface phenomena to underlying lesions With Bichat, organs
became an heterogeneous and yet ordered surface. Death was divested of its
meaning of absolute closure and became an instrument of empirical knowledge.
But if disease is a manifestation of the continuous death of tissues, then superfi-
cial phenomena (signs and symptoms) are no longer all there is to know about a
disease, nor its privileged indicators. Signs and symptoms acquire a new mean-
ing in that they point to a lesion concealed in the depth of the body. It is here
that the passage from clinical medicine to clinical anatomy occurred. In this
new theoretical framework, making a diagnosis was no longer (or not only) a
matter of connecting symptoms, it became reasonable to elicit bodily signs that
could denounce an underlying lesion. Diagnosis became a matter of probing
the interior of the body, and the perceptual and epistemological structure of
medicine became that of an “invisible visibility.”32
In this new perceptual and epistemological structure, which is still with us
today, the exploration of the inner body as a source of diagnostic information
acquired a meaning it could not have had before. The recognition of the dis-
ease was no longer a matter of organizing its visible manifestations, but rather
of taking to the surface hidden phenomena, to let them express themselves.
Therefore, the doctor had to actively stimulate or even fabricate the signs that
pointed to the disease.33 This opened the way to physical examination (also
called objective examination), and to a vast range of diagnostic technologies.
As pointed out by Grmek, while pathological anatomy was meant to explain
31Foucault, 1963, 143.
32Foucault, 1963, 166, italics in the original.
33See Foucault, 1963, 162.
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the diseases, clinical anatomy was meant to diagnose them. The making of a
diagnosis in the context of clinical anatomy became an inductive process carried
out on the grounds of a semiology of vision, touch and hearing. The doctor had
now to “guess” the state of the inner organs, a state that could be directly ob-
served only post mortem. In Grmek’s words: “[With clinical anatomy] medical
diagnosis becomes hypothetical: it states the probability of a specific lesion,
often not accessible to observation. It is a sort of indirect pathological anatomy,
performed on the living and without dissection.”34
1.2 In search of hidden signs of disease
In the same years in which Bichat founded modern pathological anatomy, taking
on and transforming the work of Morgagni, Corvisart retrieved and made sense
of percussion. This technique for physical examination, developed in 1761 by the
Austrian physician Leopold Auenbrugger, consisted in actively eliciting sounds
from the patient’s chest by hitting it with a finger. According to the quality
of the pitch, a trained ear could recognize, for example, the presence of an
accumulation of fluid in the lungs or around the heart, or a consolidation of the
pulmonary tissue. As Reiser explains:
For Auenbrugger the morbid sound he elicited from the body, not the
patient’s thoughts or his physical appearance, was the most dependable
index of the nature and course of chest disease. [. . . ] He advocated a
technique that removed the personality and physical appearance of the
patient from their earlier central place in the evaluation of illness. [. . . ]
Just as Morgagni concentrated on identifying disease-produced alteration
of internal structures in the dead body, Auenbrugger searched for such
altered structures in the living. The two men were equally concerned
with finding objective evidence of disease, and both were convinced that
understanding the relation of a specific structural change to a specific
illness was the key to learning medicine.35.
Thus, some forty years ahead of its time, Auenbrugger’s method contained a
quite radical conceptual transformation, because it implicitly posited a direct
link between the anatomical lesion and the disease. Moreover, it implied that
subjective symptoms and visible signs where no longer to be considered the
cornerstones of diagnosis: if the origin of the lesion lied inside the body, then
the physician had to actively evoke some sort of perceptible manifestation from
the inner organs. However, as in the case of Morgagni’s pathological anatomy,
in the middle of the eighteenth century clinicians could not make much sense
34Grmek, 1999, 151.
35Reiser, 1978, 20.
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of a technique that pointed to some hypothetical and hidden manifestation of
disease. At the time of its invention (which, has it happens, occurred in the
same year as the publication of Morgagni’s De Sedibus), percussion went largely
unnoticed, and although the prominent clinician William Cullen mentioned it,
he did so only to dismiss it.36
Now, in the new, localizationist medical framework that took shape within
the French clinic, percussion acquired new relevance. In 1808 Corvisart trans-
lated Auenbrugger’s synthetic pamphlet Inventum novum ex percussione tho-
racis in an annotated version. He added detailed descriptions of the quality
of the sounds generated by percussion and the related anatomical lesions that
he observed at the autopsy. Corvisart, like Bichat, still identified disease with
a set of symptoms, not with an anatomical lesion. As explained by Foucault,
he used the lesion to confirm the symptoms, not to predict them.37 However,
he explicitly brought into medical practice the idea that the physician should
actively elicit signs of disease from the patient’s body. Within this new method,
the search for signs of the disease required that the doctor transformed audi-
tory patterns into spatial (i.e., visual) analogues that matched a hypothetical
histological lesion. In the rise of the anatomo-clinical school, physicians used
percussion to produce sounds from the inner body, and these signs provided in-
direct evidence on the condition of the organs. The semeiotic art of perceiving
and interpreting sounds was re-defined, improved, and systematized by Laennec,
with the invention of the stethoscope and the publication of the monumental
Traité de l’auscultation médiate.
1.2.1 Laennec’s stethoscope: mechanical mediation be-
gins
Invented in 1816, the stethoscope was basically a wooden cylinder with a lon-
gitudinal hollow core: the doctor placed one top on the patient thorax and put
his ear to the other end. In this way sound waves are transmitted better, and
noises coming from the patient’s body become, at least in principle, more easily
discernible for the physician. Technically, mediated auscultation (i.e., auscul-
tation by means of a stethoscope) diﬀers from percussion in that it does not
imply an active elicitation of sounds from the patient body, and it requires the
interposition of an instrument between the patient and the doctor’s sensorial
organs. Like in percussion, however, the rationale for using the stethoscope as
a diagnostic instrument is that of associating specific sounds to mental images
36See Bynum, 1994, 35.
37See Foucault, 1963, 135.
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that hypothetically point to actual organic lesions, which in turn correspond to
a disease.
The idea of a sort of synaesthesis between hearing and vision is patent in
the instrument name (from the Greek stèthos, chest and skopèo, I see), and the
metaphor of vision was recurrent in the medical literature between 1820 and
1850, when the idea of “seeing” a disease by listening through the stethoscope
was largely endorsed by the promotors of mediated auscultation. “We anatomise
by auscultation (if I may say so), while the patient is yet alive,” wrote one
physician, and in the preface to the first English translation of Laennec’s treatise,
John Forbes claimed: “[auscultation] is a window in the breast through which we
can see the precise state of things within.”38 This confidence in the scopic powers
of the stethoscope was backed by the studies of Laennec, which had shown a
close correspondence between the sounds coming from the chest of hundreds of
diseased individuals, and the lesions revealed by their autopsies (Figure 1.1).
As his teachers Bichat and Corvisart, Laennec studied and worked in an
hôpital géneral, where he had access to the dissecting rooms and to many seri-
ously ill patients, those paupers who “oﬀered” their bodies to science in exchange
for a shelter and basic care. Dividing his time between the hospital lanes and
the morgue, he could systematically examine a vast number of cases. In 1819,
he published the first edition of the Traité de l’auscultation mediate, where he
painstakingly described the characteristics of the sounds he perceived by auscul-
tation and their relations to the damaged tissues he observed post mortem. Re-
markably, his descriptions of clinical cases covered not only the diﬀerent stages
of a disease, but also the variations observed in people with diﬀerent physical
makeups. In the introduction to the Traité, he claimed:
The diseases of the thoracic viscera are very numerous and diversified,
and yet have almost all the same class of symptoms [cough, dyspnea,
expectoration]. The consequence is, that the most skillful physician who
trusts to the pulse and general symptoms, is often deceived in regard to
the most common and best known complaints of this cavity.39
Laennec’s critique of the diagnostic method based on general symptoms was not
contingent on the idiosyncrasies of chest anatomy and ailments. It mirrored that
seminal concept of clinical anatomy, according to which diseases cannot be un-
derstood and defined through transient symptoms that disappear as soon as the
vital functions come to a stop. They should rather be understood and defined
through the recurrent lesions observed in cadavers. This idea was expounded
by G.L. Bayle (colleague of Laennec and disciples of Bichat and Corvisart) in
38Both authors are quoted in Reiser, 1978, 30.
39Laennec, 1826, 2.
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Figure 1.1: Figure representing diﬀerent forms of tubercular matter and some of
its eﬀects. (a) Developed tubercle, completely yellow; (b) group of early tubercles,
whose exterior is still grey and semi-transparent; (c) small cartilaginous cyst which
contained tubercular matter and that discharged its content due to its own softening;
(d) tubercular excavation completely empty and covered by two membranes [. . . ];
(e) Small tubercular excavation completely empty and uncovered; (f) part of the
external surface of the lung; (g) partially softened and empty tubercle; (h) tubercular
infiltration starting from the pulmonary tissue. T. Laennec, Traité de l’auscultation
mediate, 2nd Edition, 1826, Paris, Plate II, Fig. 2. Original caption, my translation.
Public domain.
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his doctoral thesis in 1802. In a text published a few years laterBayle wrote:
“individuals must be regarded as phthisic who are neither feverous, nor thin,
nor suﬀering from purulent expectoration; it is enough that the lungs should be
aﬀected by a lesion that tends to disorganize and ulcerate them; phthisis is sim-
ply that lesion.”40 It was through the works of Laennec and Bayle that phthisis
ceased to be “phthisis,” that is, a condition defined by manifest symptoms of
consumption, and became “tuberculosis,” which consists in the presence of “tu-
bercles” (characteristic lesions) in the lungs or in other organs, for example, the
bones or the kidneys.41 This transformation was not accomplished overnight.
The words phthisis and consumption were still in use in medical literature at
the end of the nineteenth century, which is an evidence of how long it can take
for radical changes to be accepted by the medical community and integrated
into daily practice. That notwithstanding, a new direction for medicine was set.
An epistemological rupture With the invention of the stethoscope and with
the publication of the Traité de l’auscultation mediate (in particular, the sec-
ond edition of 1826), the conceptualization of disease as organic lesion became
operative, because it had a proper diagnostic instrument and its nosology. This
is why medical historian Giorgio Cosmacini has called the stethoscope a “philo-
sophic instrument, connected to an epistemological rupture.”42 Cosmacini also
stresses the fact that since the stethoscope was the first diagnostic instrument of
general use “it transformed the practice of medicine, helped changing doctors’
perception of illness, and inaugurated a tendency to widen the distance between
doctor and patient, introducing between them the first, rudimental technological
apparatus.”43 This transformation was by no means an anodyne process, and it
triggered a heated debate. The medical community did not consensually accept
it, neither in the academic circles nor in actual medical practice. On the one
hand, there were Laennec’s supporters (mostly out of France), who considered
mediated auscultation not only an extremely valuable diagnostic tool, but also
an indispensable instrument for transforming medicine into an empirical science,
in which causal connections could be verified through laboratory evidences (in
this case the laboratory was the morgue), and whose precision was comparable
40Bayle, 1810, 8-9, quoted in Foucault, 1963, 138-139.
41According to Grmek, the oﬃcial “birth certificate” of the modern anatomo-clinical concept
of disease is to be found in G.L. Bayle’s doctoral thesis and in the second edition of Laennec’s
treatise, organized according to the anatomo-clinical definition of the chest ailments. Grmek,
1999, 150.
42Cosmacini, 1997, 329, my translation.
43Cosmacini, 1997, 329, my translation.
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to that “attainable in some of the higher branches of physics.”44 These doctors,
as their mentor Laennec, were generally highly dismissive of patient’s narrative,
considered untrustworthy and of little clinical (hence, medical tout court) rele-
vance. On the other hand, there were physicians who dismissed the stethoscope,
considering it a quite useless, if not ridiculous, instrument. Many other prac-
titioners, even if less interested in general medical theory, could simply make
no sense of auscultation. Transforming into a diagnosis ephemeral sounds –
that Laennec and his successors had subdivided in endless tones – was no easy
task, and to rely on usual techniques as patient’s story, observation and manual
inspection of the chest seemed far more secure.45 Furthermore, even among doc-
tors who appreciated the method of auscultation, there were many who found
mediated auscultation diﬃcult to perform, and felt that they would be better
oﬀ with the naked ear, rather than the stethoscope. Indeed, it was not clear if
the stethoscope actually improved the reception of sounds from the chest.
Instrument-mediated perception In the second edition of his treatise Laen-
nec himself recognized that for doctors who had little experience with the in-
strument, direct auscultation might be easier and more fruitful. He nevertheless
advocated the superiority of the mediated technique, and his arguments were of
diﬀerent orders: moral, practical, and medical. For what concerns the moral as-
pect, Laennec observed that: “[Immediate auscultation] is always inconvenient
both to the physician and patient; in the case of females it is not only indelicate
but often impracticable; and in that class of persons found in hospitals it is dis-
gusting.”46 Concerning the practical reasons, he specified that there are points
of the body where it is impossible to apply the ear directly (e.g., on the axilla,
or under the female breast), and that the strong pressure on the chest required
by the application of the naked ear for immediate auscultation is uncomfortable
for the patient and thus “gives rise to extraneous sounds from the contraction
of the muscles.”47 Finally, he briefly expounded the medical argument:
Moreover, some of the most important of the stethoscopic signs have
for one of their causes the stethoscope itself . Thus, perfect pectorilo-
quism, which consists in the transmission of the voice through the tube
of the instrument, is changed, in the trial of immediate auscultation, into
a simple resonance, stronger no doubt than in the natural condition of
the parts, but such as to be with diﬃculty discriminated from oegophon-
ism and bronchophonism. For these and other reasons I do not hesitate
44J. Taylor, Introductory lecture on the opening of the medical session of 1841-1842 in
University College, quoted in Reiser, 1978, 30.
45See Cosmacini, 1997, 327-331.
46Laennec, 1826, 4.
47Laennec, 1826, 26.
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to aﬃrm, that the physicians who shall confine themselves to immedi-
ate auscultation, will never acquire great certainty in diagnosis, and will
every now and then fall into serious mistakes.48
Hence, Laennec claimed that the stethoscope itself was one of the causes of the
most important signs of disease that could be perceived through it. Does this
mean that he believed that the stethoscope created the signs of disease (and,
eventually, the disease itself)? No. What Laennec was saying is that “perfect
pectoriloquism” – a specific sign that the pulmonary texture around the main
excavation had undergone considerable condensation accompanied by the for-
mation of further cavities – was “the transmission of the voice through the tube
of the instrument,” characterized by a specific clarity and intensity. Immediate
auscultation (without the interposition of the stethoscope) would still reveal a
thoracic resonance stronger than that one would hear if the organs were healthy.
However, the quality of the perceived sound would not allow to discriminate per-
fect pectoriloquism from other signs such as oegophonism or bronchophonism,
indicators of other specific forms of necrobiosis. Hence, the instrument caused
the signs of disease to appear more clearly to the human senses, and in a more
varied range of tones, thus allowing for finer distinctions. This means that it
created finer audible patterns and a range of possible gnoseological constructs
compatible with them.
According to the French physician and epistemologist François Dagognet,
Laennec’s invention was groundbreaking because it provided an instrument
that, in spite of its simplicity, was able to convey valuable information not
just about heart and lungs’ anatomy but, more importantly, about their func-
tionality. Through the stethoscope the trained doctor could “fix, on the basis
of an uninterrupted natural language [of the chest], the place, the volume, the
nature and the evolution of the disease.”49 However, Dagognet stresses that the
stethoscope’s translation of the natural language of the body was trustworthy
only to the ear of those who were able to decode it.50 Well before the diﬀusion
of photography and the invention of radiography, the stethoscope introduced in
medicine the question of instrument-mediated perception and mediated observa-
tion. Inventing the stethoscope, using it and making sense of it, were activities
that implied diﬀerent forms and diﬀerent levels of mediation. In the first place,
doctors had to agree that mediated experience was as valuable as (if not more
valuable than) direct experience. They should trust the instrument and believe
that it gave access to some information relevant for the diagnosis. Moreover,
since medicine is meant to be a relationship between a doctor and a patient,
48Laennec, 1826, 26-27.
49Dagognet, 1986, 100, my translation.
50See Dagognet, 1986, 100.
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turning the stethoscope into a full-fledged medical tool also implied that pa-
tients recognized the authority of the instrument in the hand of the doctor.
This meant that the patient too, and not only the practitioner, had to believe
that the signs collected by the physician through this new medium – signs which
the patient himself could not perceive – were as truthful as the symptoms he or
she could actually feel and display.
The stethoscope as a medium
I will elaborate on the concept of mediation from diﬀerent perspectives in the
development of this thesis. Here I just want to begin to introduce the problem
and make some preliminary remarks on the basis of what I consider the most
salient features of mediated auscultation.
1. In auscultation (mediated or immediate) sounds from the inner body are
taken as valid proxies of the disease. Through a quite complex and artic-
ulate cognitive process, the doctor converts thoracic sounds in mental im-
ages that match the anatomical lesions revealed by pathological anatomy,
which, in turn, coincide with a certain disease. Hence, the sound perceived
by the doctor becomes a medium of the condition of the patient’s internal
organs and tissues. It is a medium because it conveys indirect evidence of
an invisible condition (in the specific case of tuberculosis, the presence of
tubercles).
2. The stethoscope in itself transmits a range of tones (e.g., pectoriloquism,
oegophonism, bronchophonism) that could not be perceived just by placing
the ear right on the patient’s body (they are the specific sound of breathing
or voice passing through a wooden cilinder). It mediates the sensorial
experience of the physician enhancing his or her hearing capabilities. That
is, it is amedium between the auditive system of the doctor and the sounds
emitted from within the body of the patient. Thus, the stethoscope is a
diﬀerential transmitter (a go-between) of sounds produced by the inner
organs.
3. Auscultation and the stethoscope are thinkable and epistemically sound
within the localizationist paradigm of clinical anatomy, which entails that
we accept the cadaver as amedium for the living, diseased body. In clinical
anatomy, in fact, the dead body is considered more reliable than the living
one in manifesting the signs of disease, since post mortem anatomical lesion
are stable testimonies of the transient event of illness (with its related and
overt symptoms) experienced by the patient. In other words, within the
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localizationist paradigm of clinical anatomy the corpse becomes a medium
of the living being in that it constitutes the material support of the signs,
traces and marks of the disease.51 In other words, it replaces the living
body. It is a medium because it allows the pathologist to observe the inner
body in all its details (as I will show in Chapter 3, with the invention of
radiography X-ray images replaced the cadaver as media of the inner body,
with the advantage of granting access to the interior of the living body).
4. Once the signs collected by the doctor become more relevant than the
patient’s transient and subjective symptoms in defining and diagnosing
the disease, the very experience of illness becomes potentially mediated.
In a sense, we can say that the doctor becomes the medium (and the
oracle) of the patient’s experience, that is, the doctor enters in contact
with and gives voice to what happens inside the patient’s body bypassing
the patient himself.
In relation to this latter point, it could be objected that it has always been the
case, since only the physician, and before him the priest and the magician, has
the social authority to tell the patient what is going on within the sick (and the
healthy) body. Before the institution of modern clinical diagnosis, however, the
doctor had to rely exclusively on the patient’s narrative, in addition to manifest
bodily symptoms and signs, in order to establish what was going on with that
specific person. Modern clinic did without the patient’s story and symptoms,
it diagnosed the disease before it could even manifest itself. Laennec praised
the stethoscope of allowing “to detect or even to suspect, diseases in their very
commencement,”52 when the patient was not aware of them, yet.
Historians of medicine have reported that many patients were embarrassed,
perplexed or even frightened by the stethoscopic examination. At the same
time, most of them were amazed by the ability of the physician to tell what
was happening inside the body from sounds inaudible to the patient himself.53
This is why Dagognet locates in the stethoscope the beginning of a medicine
that, in its ideal limit, will be without patient, without doctors and, paradoxi-
cally, without disease.54 Without patient, because technology enables medicine
to discover the disease independently from, or even in spite of, the confusion
of subjective symptoms (most symptoms are unspecific, and some diseases are
simply asymptomatic). This becomes possible because technology, even in the
51For a very interesting analysis of the body as material medium of inscription of diﬀerent
signs and images see Belting, 2001.
52Laennec, 1826, 3.
53See, Reiser, 1978, 36; Cosmacini, 1997, 329-330.
54See Dagognet, 1986, 100.
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very primitive form of the stethoscope, forces the disease to come to the surface,
making abstraction of the patient’s lived experience. Without doctor, because
the ideal diagnostic technology exposes so clearly the disease that no hypothet-
ical inference is required. It speaks the “truth” of the disease and needs no
potentially faulty interpretation. Without disease, because an ideal medicine
catches the disease even before it appears, and diverts the natural course of
pathological events.
1.3 Endoscopic visions
With the French school of clinical anatomy, physical diagnosis became a tenet
of medical practice. Semeiotics, the search of signs of disease through percus-
sion and auscultation was just one form of physical examination. The others
were, and still are, anatomical exploration, performed through palpation or with
endoscopic tools, and functional diagnosis. Anatomical exploration shares the
localizationist paradigm of semeiotics, but implies a diﬀerent kind of sensorial
contact with the disease: the doctor can touch (through the skin) a swollen
liver by palpating the abdomen, or see a polyp on the vocal cords by means of
a laryngoscope.55 Many endoscopic devices, which allowed looking literally into
the body exploiting its natural orifices, were developed by surgeons during the
nineteenth century.
Although archaeological testimonies show that anal and vaginal specula were
already familiar to ancient Greek and Roman physicians, the first attempt to
actually illuminate the inner organs was made by the German surgeon Philipp
Bozzini, between 1804 and 1805. He oﬃcially presented his invention, which he
called Leichtleiter (light conductor), to the Austrian Faculty of Medicine in Vi-
enna, in 1806, raising harsh criticism and a heated controversy.56 In his analysis
of the origins of modern endoscopy, the historian of science Claudio Pogliano
shows that the negative reaction to this new instrument was due to a number
of reasons,57 including diﬀerent conceptions of the relative epistemic cogency of
vision and touch. While Bozzini claimed that vision renders more certain even
the touch of the most trained expert, and that “only seldom are the other senses
prepared to dispense with its assistance,”58 the director of the Vienna Faculty
55See Peitzman and Maulitz, 1999, 180.
56See Reiser, 1978, 51; Bynum, 2006, 169-170; Pogliano, 2011, 52.
57The Leichtleiter provided a good visualization of the pharynx and nasal cavities, but when
employed in other orifices, the illuminated spot was too small to provide valuable information.
In addition, it was very diﬃcult to operate. Institutional factors also hampered Bozzin’s
invention: supported by the progressive Josephsakademie, it was harshly criticized by the
more conservative Faculty of Medicine. See Pogliano, 2011, 57-58.
58Bozzini, quoted in Pogliano, 2011, 53.
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of Medicine, who wrote a negative report on the Leichtleiter, maintained that,
in order to receive the best treatment, “the patient should place his confidence
in the judgement of a reasonable doctor and the hand of an experienced inves-
tigator.”59 It seems also reasonable to suppose that a technique which required
not only to touch, but literally penetrate into the living body generated some
moral discomfort both in doctors and patients (for the latter the discomfort was
also physical, given that endoscopy is a very painful examination).
Touch vs. vision In spite of the institutional resistances, Bozzini’s work
paved the way for further research. First successes came in 1812, with An-
thelme Récamier’s vaginal speculum, and in 1822, with Pierre Ségalas’ urethro-
cystoscope. However, the main developments occurred between the 1830s and
the 1860s, when the otoscope, the urethroscope, the laryngoscope, and the oph-
talmoscope appeared. And yet, even if endoscopy was making significant tech-
nical progresses, still in 1855, on occasion of a demonstration of the use of the
urethroscope by his inventor, Antonin Jean Desormeaux, a former teacher of his
commented: “One can see very well with your instrument, but what is there
to see, really?”60 Indeed, endoscopy was not unanimously accepted by French
physicians. Pogliano mentions the criticisms of Félix Guyon, a prominent pro-
fessor of urology in Paris, who repeatedly expressed his conviction that in most
cases skilled touch coupled with clinical intuition would gather enough informa-
tion without the aid of artificial devices. In his Leçons cliniques sur les maladies
des voies urinaires, published in 1881, Guyon claimed that one should not con-
sider a great progress in medicine the simple fact of being able to see something
which until then had been usefully perceived by the sense of touch. Sight, he ar-
gued, will tell us nothing about the consistence and sensitivity of a constriction
of the urinary tract, and it will say even less on its extension. Consequently,
he warned his students that even if the techniques to illuminate the urethra
and the bladder (endoscopy) would improve in the future, they could never do
without the “endless resources of touch.”61 Guyon was suspicious of the media-
tion between doctor and patient (and between doctor and the signs of disease)
introduced by the endoscope, with its systems of lenses and mirrors. His mis-
trust, however, was not so much about the instrument, but more substantially
about the epistemic virtues of vision. In a time in which the confidence in the
cognitive accountability of sight was gaining momentum, thanks also to the pro-
gressive diﬀusion of photography, he insisted on that sensorial experiences are
59Quoted in Pogliano, 2011, 57.
60Desormeaux, 1865, 8, my translation.
61Guyon, 1881, 625.
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interchangeable only to a limited extent, and that certain information provided
by the sense of touch (e.g., consistence and sensitivity of a section of an organ)
could not be replaced by eyesight. He was ready to admit that in the human
body only a few organs, or sections of organ, are available to direct touch, but
he nevertheless stressed the fact that endoscopy could supersede haptic exami-
nation only in organs like the eye and the larynx, which could not be touched
at will.62
Guyon’s position did not pass the test of history, as the current developments
in video-endoscopy definitely demonstrate. Not only has vision largely replaced
the sense of touch in diagnosis, but also the development of telesurgery seems to
prove that a whole reversibility of touch into sight is actually possible. However,
we can take Guyon’s reluctance about vision as a source of medical knowledge
as an indicator of how complex was the process that led to the “dematerializa-
tion” of the body characteristic of modern medicine. Vision, we know, is the
sense of distancing and objectivation par excellence, while touch is the sense of
proximity, whereby the observer melts with the perceived object.63 For Guyon,
the very texture of the organ and its sensitivity were essential components of
medical perception. According to him, touch granted a form of direct knowledge
that vision, being physically removed from its object, could not entail. Yet, Des-
ormeaux, who was also a surgeon, in his De l’endoscope, of 1865, praised vision
unconditionally (he opened the book with a quotation from the fifth paradox
in Cicero’s Paradoxa Stoicorum: “Nosquoque oculos eruditus habemus”), and
claimed that compared with the advancement of general pathology and of the
clinical study of diﬀerent organs, urology scored far behind, mostly because until
the invention of the endoscope the urinary tract had been inaccessible to vision.
He placed the endoscope among the means – which also included percussion and
auscultation – that allowed medicine to explore human organs directly, by ex-
tending and perfecting the doctor’s senses.64 Clearly, two very diﬀerent notions
about what count as direct observation, and about the primacy of vision in the
acquisition of medical knowledge were at stake.
1.3.1 The case of the ophtalmoscope
Within the domain of endoscopic devices, the case of the ophtalmoscope, de-
signed in 1851 by Hermann Von Helmholtz, is particularly interesting, because
unlike the other endoscopic tools, it did not need to be inserted into the human
body. Almost fifty years before the discovery of X-rays, this invention enabled
62See Guyon, 1881, 621.
63I develop the topic of the relation between touch and vision in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.
64See Desormeaux, 1865, xi and 1-2.
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physicians to visually explore a (small) part of the living inner body from the
outside. Thanks to the ophtalmoscope, anatomical causes of eye’s pathologies,
which previously could be seen only in post mortem autopsy, became easily vis-
ible in vivo. Moreover, it did not simply allowed the visualization of the inner
eye (retina, optic nerve head, and eye’s arteries), but also proved valuable in
the indirect diagnosis of diseases of the kidneys and arteries, as well as of some
neurological conditions.65 With this instrument, the physician could see both in
and through the eye: in, because it became possible to actually look at the inner
structures of the organ of vision; through, because on the basis of the alteration
of some of these structures it was possible to infer the state of other parts and
functions of the body.
As already noted in the case of Laennec and auscultation, an aspect of phys-
ical diagnosis particularly praised by physicians was the fact that it freed the
diagnostician from patient’s subjective testimony. In the case of the ophtalmo-
scope, for example, it became easier to diagnose astigmatism in persons who
could not read.66 To stress this point, Reiser quotes a physician who, on the
occasion of a meeting of the American Medical Association, in 1894, wrote that
the ophtalmoscope reduced the physician’s dependence “on the faltering judg-
ment of the untrained patient, substituting therefor the skill of the expert who,
reasoning from scientific data, is thus able to fit glasses in less time and more ac-
curately with consequent satisfaction to himself and his patient.”67 This sentence
exemplifies quite well some fundamental ideas about the relationship between
body, first-person experience, and knowledge that informs scientific medicine.
In fact, if medicine is a science, then it requires a specialized knowledge and a
specialized language developed within a community of peers, who collect, share,
and elaborate scientific data (in this case the lesions or malformations revealed
by the ophthalmoscope), and cannot rely on the imprecise words that a pa-
tient normally uses to describe the experience of illness. All the patient can do
is to describe symptoms, but scientific medicine can track disease even before
symptoms appear, and a great deal of its eﬃcacy comes from this possibility.
With the ophtalmoscope, for example, the nosology of eye diseases changed,
because the instrument revealed a range of diﬀerent lesions that could not even
be imagined before. At the same time, both the prevalence (the total number
of cases of disease in a given population at a specific time) and curability of
these diseases were redefined.68 In fact, if a disease can be detected in an early
stage, before the patient can feel or display any clear symptom, its prevalence
65See Bynum, 2006, 169.
66See Reiser, 1978, 47.
67H.V. Wuerdemann, 1894, 341, quoted in Reiser, 1978, 49.
68See Bynum, 2006, 167.
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will rise. Simultaneously, since many disorders incurable in their advanced stage
can still be treated when discovered in their pre-symptomatic state, curability
will improve. In turn, the prevalence of secondary diseases, that is disease asso-
ciated with other pathological conditions, will decrease. Instrument creates new
perceptions of the body that do not only reorganize medical knowledge creating
new nosological entities, but also redefine the very meaning of being ill.
1.4 Looking into the microscopic body
A diﬀerent way of accessing the inner human body, much less obvious than
endoscopy, came from the microscope. With the improvement of the compound
microscope69 and the development of microtomes, cellular staining, and fixation
methods, by the late nineteenth century the microscopic dimension entered the
realm of diagnostic medicine in two very diﬀerent areas: (1) cellular pathology,
which entailed a refinement of clinical pathology; and (2) microbiology, which
broke completely with clinical pathology and put forward a new conception
of disease, rotted in the germ theory. While in the first case the microscope
transformed the body into a jigsaw puzzle of minute interwoven pieces, in the
second it turned the body into a porous and fluid entity, open to the attacks of
external invisible pathogens.
1.4.1 Cellular pathology
Cellular pathology was first theorized in 1858 by the German pathologist Rudolf
Virchow. With the help of the microscope and of histochemical analysis, Vir-
chow demonstrated that cells found in diseased tissues were modifications of
normal cellular types.70 On these grounds he posited that it was the cell, and
the disruption of its functions, the primary locus of disease. Consequently the
work of microscopists – carried out in the laboratory, far away from the patient’s
body – became fundamental for studying these invisible units of life.71 Virchow
worked within the localizationist paradigm and considered his ideas the natural
development of Morgagni, Bichat and Laennec’s morphological views of the dis-
ease. However, he did not restrain his analysis to the structural changes of the
impaired cell, but rather insisted on the importance of chemical and physical
alterations. Although he believed that the organism’s vital properties could not
69The first compound microscope was built in 1595, but the first scientific book on mi-
croscopy was Robert Hook’s Micrographia, published in 1665. In the 1670s Anton Van
Leeuwenhoek described sperm cells, bacteria and protozoa. Achromatic lenses (corrected
for chromatic aberrations) became available only in the early nineteenth century.
70See Grmek, 1999, 155.
71See Reiser, 1978, 79.
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be completely reduced to physics and chemistry, he nevertheless thought that
living organisms function according to chemical and physical laws, and that on
the basis of these laws it is possible to understand the mechanisms of disease.
Bynum remarks:
By urging doctors to think about disease in terms of cells, Virchow
emphasized process rather than result. Looking at the cell behaviour in
diseases placed the pathological centre-of-gravity towards the beginning,
rather than at the end stages of a disease. [. . . ] The anatomo-pathological
definitions of many diseases remained pretty secure, but notions of cause
and mechanisms also came to the fore. [. . . ] The microscope as well as
the dissecting scalpel became constant tools of the pathologist. Stains,
microtomes, and fixation methods were developed, enabling thin sections
of tissues to be cut and diﬀerent kinds of cells to be more clearly diﬀer-
entiated.72
One of the most relevant practical outcomes of this new conceptual approach
was that it became possible to discriminate malignant tumors from the benign
ones, with enormous consequences in terms of prognosis and therapeutics (the
surgeon would operate the tumor only if the pathologist declared it malignant).
In turn, observing thin layers of tissue under the microscope became a specialized
activity, and for the first time emerged the figure of a clinician who spent his
time in the laboratory, rather than in the hospital wards, and made his diagnoses
away from the bedside.
With Virchow, the cell became the ultimate morphological and functional
unit of life, an idea that he summarized in the precept omins cellula e cellula
(all cells come from cells). However, Grmek points out that even though he
started from a localizationist assumption, Virchow had a dynamic view of the
disease and the concept of Krankheitsprozess was a tenet of his thought. He
explicitly maintained that the aim of pathology was to study vital activity under
its deviations and hindrances. As his contemporary Claude Bernard, Virchow
saw no intrinsic diﬀerence between health and disease, physiology and pathology,
and his thought played a seminal role in the debate about the antinomies whole-
part, solid-fluid, process-state, structure-function.73 To him, the organism was a
combination of cells, and disease was the sum and the result of cellular aﬀections.
It was inside the cell that the ens morbi resided, because the cell reacted in
diﬀerent ways to internal and external stimuli (physical and chemical) that
could determine a pathological condition.74 The ens morbi, the disease, was a
possible state of the cell (Figure 1.2).
72Bynum, 2006, 121-122.
73See Grmek, 1999, 155.
74See Grmek, 1999, 155-156.
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Figure 1.2: Illustration of Virchow’s cell theory. Archiv fur Pathologische Anatomie
und Physiologie (now Virchows Archive), 1847, first issue. Wikimedia Commons.
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1.4.2 Microbiology
Microbiology and the related germ theory of disease gained momentum some
twenty years after cellular pathology. It presented a quite diﬀerent vision of
disease and, consequently, of the body. While cellular pathology focused on the
internal pathological process (pathogenesis), the germ theory was centered on
the external causes (etiology) of disease, which was seen as the result of the
interaction between two living beings, namely, a human being and a parasite.
More precisely, at least according to Grmek, the germ theory of disease implied
a biologic, non-anthropocentric vision of illness, in which “the infectious disease
is nothing but a specific aspect of the food chain of organisms.”75
Ideas about the existence of “atoms” of biological material that could trans-
mit disease were already discussed in the sixteenth century,76 but it was only in
the second half on the nineteenth century, with the discoveries of Louis Pasteur
and Robert Koch, that the microbial theory established itself as a complete
medical doctrine and the microscope became an indispensable diagnostic tool.
In particular, Koch’s successes in isolating the bacteria responsible for cholera,
anthrax and tuberculosis, in the 1880s, encouraged many clinicians to rede-
fine the diagnostic process, identifying the micro-organism, with the diagnosis.
For these doctors the disease acquired a specific ontological status, because the
germ was the disease. Within the germ theory of disease, elusive cognitive clues
like signs and symptoms were replaced by the certainty of the microbiological
test. Tuberculosis was no more an illness specified by its characteristic symp-
toms (phthisis), nor a specific histological lesion revealed by auscultation and
the histological examination (the tubercle), it was rather the infection provoked
by Koch’s bacillus (Mycobacterium tuberculosis). As a consequence of this re-
definition, a number of apparently diﬀerent ailments, like pulmonary phthisis,
scrofula, and white tumor of the knee became particular forms of the same dis-
ease.77 Diagnosis was made in the laboratory, growing colonies of bacteria on
Petri dishes, staining them and observing them under the microscope. As in
cellular pathology, which required the specialization of pathologists who cut,
stained and analyzed histological samples, with the germ theory a new figure
of clinician emerged: the specialist in bacteriology who could deal with cell cul-
tures and microscopic images. A medical specialist who did not spend time at
75Grmek, 1999, 160.
76Girolamo Fracastoro published his De contagione et contagiosis morbis in 1546, and prior
to Luis Pasteur’s work on silkworm disease, in 1835-1836, Agostino Bassi had suggested that
it was caused by the microorganism muscardine. Favus (a skin disease) and anthrax were
known to have, respectively, diﬀerent microbic origins. In 1840 Jacob Henle defended that
many diseases were probably caused by a contagium vivum (living contagion). See Cosmacini,
2007, 232; Bynum, 1994, 128; Reiser, 1978, 78-79.
77See Grmek, 1999, 160.
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the bedside of the patient, but rather examined little fragments of his or her
body, or minuscule particles that infected it.
With the development of microscopy, the perception of the body mediated by
mechanical instruments entered a new phase. The body could still be thought
of as an ordered landscape of organs, but in order to reveal its constituting
elements and expose the structure of cells, one should walk away from it and
enter the laboratory, where an array of instruments and experimental techniques
allowed the visualization of the invisible. In terms of perception of the human
body, this implied recognizing that it was opaque not simply because its inner
organs were concealed by the skin, but also because its very components as well
as its parasites were extremely minute. An image of the body removed from
any possible natural perception came to the fore.78
1.5 Functional anatomy: disease in numbers
and graphs
In the same years in which Virchow developed cellular pathology, Claude Bernard
was revolutionizing functional anatomy while creating experimental medicine.
To him, function not structure was the key to understand the living body and
disease was no more to be understood as a static entity (the anatomical lesion),
but rather as the alteration of a process. Indeed, like Virchow, Claude Bernard
thought that the diﬀerence between the physiological (normal) and the patho-
logical state was of quantitative rather than qualitative order.79 This meant
that, as Cosmacini puts it: “function and disfunction, physiology and pathol-
ogy constituted a graduated, measurable continuum.”80 Within this vision, the
relation between tissue and disease was deeply transformed: the lesion of a tissue
was irrelevant as far as it did not aﬀect its function, while an impaired function
did not necessarily lead to a structural alteration, even though it produced a
state of disease.81
78I discuss in depth microscopic images and microscopic vision in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.
79See Grmek, 1999, 157. Grmek points out that before Bernard and Virchow, François
Magéndie, Bernard’s teacher, had already defended that pathology was physiology under
special conditions.
80Cosmacini, 1997, 343, my translation. It should be noted that Bernard’s conceptualization
of disease as a mere quantitative modification of normal (healthy) states, has been criticized
by Georges Canguilhem (1966) on both conceptual and empirical grounds.
81Anatomo-pathologists were already aware of this problem, and they tried to solve it by
reducing the impaired process to an alteration of the structure. According to Laennec, the fact
that some diseases did not present any clear morphological alteration did not mean that their
origin was not anatomical, it barely meant that pathological anatomy was still an imperfect
discipline and thus was not able to reveal all the possible anatomical alterations that could vex
the human body. Nevertheless, for what concerns mental illnesses he was willing to accept
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Now, while the description of structure implies the recourse to space only, the
description of a process entails space and time, thus requiring diﬀerent research
methods and instruments. Moreover, if pathology diﬀers from the healthy state
by degree, and not by some fixed property, then measuring quantities becomes
important both for understanding disease and for making diagnoses. For medi-
cal research, the second half of the nineteenth century was the time of Bernard’s
experimental pathology, with his laboratory experiments on living animals, and
of Etienne-Jules Marey’s graphic method, which included studies on blood cir-
culation (with the sphygmograph) as well as on animal locomotion (with the
invention of chronophotography and instant diagrams).82 Accordingly, in the
domain of medical practice, it was the time in which new diagnostic strategies
were developed. They were based on graphic and quantitative methods, and
their aim was to record such elusive data as breathing, blood pressure, heart-
beat or temperature. As noted by Reiser, in this renewed epistemic context, “the
statement of the body’s vivifying activities in numbers and graphs provided a
factual transcription of pathology equivalent to the discovery of an anatomical
lesion.”83 In clinical anatomy the corpse was intended to be the medium that
made visible the disease located in the tissues and organs; in physiology a new
form of visibility was put forward: graphs were perceived as faithful inscrip-
tion of vital functions, and numbers were taken as exact quantifications of vital
parameters.
Although clinical anatomy and physiology were very diﬀerent endeavors –
they looked at diﬀerent things using diﬀerent methods, diﬀerent languages and
diﬀerent images – they shared the same goal, namely providing a good rep-
resentation of the state of health of a human body. Bichat and his disciples,
thanks to the concept of disease as death within life, were able to track the
continuum life-disease-death fixing the transient history of the illness in the se-
cure geography of the corpse. Bernard and the other physiologists, working on
the continuum between the normal and the pathological could bracket death,
and re-conceptualize the disease as a range of possible vital states. While the
anatomists had been forced to come to terms with the geography and history of
the dying tissue, physiologists needed to come to terms with the quantities and
degrees of the functions of the body, in order to capture them in their patholog-
ical state. The solution to this problem was to measure functions and fix them
that the lesion could directly concern the vital principle, and consequently could never be
observed. See Grmek, 1991, 151.
82Claude Bernard published the two volumes of his Léçons de physiologie expérimentale
appliquée à la medicine between 1855 and 1856; Etienne-Jules Marey published La méthode
graphique dans les sciences expérimentales, et principalement em physiologie et medicine in
1878.
83Reiser, 1978, 91.
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in numbers and graphs. Instruments as the spirometer, the thermometer, the
sphygmometer and the sphygmograph gradually entered the diagnostic toolbox.
1.5.1 The spirometer
One of the first attempts to make “a numerical portrait”84 of the patient was
made in the 1840s by John Hutchinson, an English surgeon, with the invention
of the spirometer (Figure 1.3). This device measures lungs capacity on a grad-
uate scale, thus transforming the process of breathing into a precise and visible
quantity.85
Hutchinson tested his instrument on more than 2,000 individuals (26 women),
most of whom were healthy, and in 1846 published a monograph where he pre-
sented his results organized in charts and tables, putting in relation lungs’ vital
capacity,86 age, height, weight and profession (Figures 1.4 and 1.5). He reached
the conclusion that his quantitative method not only detected lung diseases at
an earlier stage than auscultation or percussion, but was also a reliable instru-
ment for judging men’s overall physical fitness. Just like Laennec had praised
the exactitude of the stethoscope, Hutchinson claimed: “When all these [quan-
titative] observations are made, and noted in a book properly headed, the state
of the person examined is then expressed in the unerring measure of figures –
which immediately presents to the eye a certain state of things.”87 Yet, in spite
of Hutchinson’s confidence, it took many years before the spirometer became
part of respiratory medicine’s routine.88
As the other vital indexes, lungs’ vital capacity is basically a statistical indi-
cator, that is, it acquires clinical meaning only by comparing the data concerning
the members of a population with specific characteristics. Now, for integrating
a statistical index into medical practice, physicians should grant numbers a far
higher epistemic import than they did in the 1840s. At that time,the very
idea that knowledge based on the laws of chance was as valuable as knowl-
edge based on the deterministic comprehension of phenomena was still under
construction.89 However, even if probabilistic thinking took a long time to be
84Reiser, 1978, 91.
85The spirometer consists of a tube – through which the patient has to breath – connected
to a balanced receiver, which is elevated by each increment of expired air inside a graduated
pipe. A slightly modified version of Hutchinson’s device is still in use today.
86Vital capacity is the quantity of air expelled by the greatest voluntary expiration following
the deepest inspiration. It is still used as a first line test for evaluating pulmonary functionality.
87Hutchinson, 1846, 244.
88As remarked by Bynum, this was true for the majority of diagnostic techniques, whose
passage from elite experimentation to general practice normally took quite a long time. See
Bynum, 2006, 169.
89For a study on how statistical and probabilistic thinking eroded determinism during the
nineteenth century, see Hacking, 1990.
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Figure 1.3: Silhouette illustration of how to position the patient’s body in relation
to the spirometer in order to perform the respiratory test. From J. Hutchinson, 1846,
236.
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Figure 1.4: An example of Hutchinson’s tables. Here vital capacity is presented in
relation to professional activity and stature. From J. Hutchinson, 1846, 156.
Figure 1.5: An example of Hutchinson’s charts. From J. Hutchinson, 1846, 155.
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integrated in medical knowledge at large, it constituted since the beginning an
important aspect of hospital medicine. According to Foucault, French clinicians
started to re-conceptualize incertitude in medicine already by the end of the
eighteenth century, under the influence of the work of Pierre-Laplace,90 and an
elementary form of statistical method was introduced in clinical medicine in
the 1820s by Pierre Louis, whose méthode numérique was aimed at improving
both diagnosis and therapy. For what concerns diagnosis, Louis developed the
idea that the recollection of subjective symptoms through patient’s narrative
should be guided by specific questions, and he tried to objectify each sign of
disease by numeration.91 Probabilistic and statistical thinking fitted well the
redefinition of disease as a segment, or a degree, on the continuum from the
normal to the pathological, characteristic of laboratory medicine. In that con-
text, Hutchinson’s endeavor was particularly interesting in that it was the first
attempt to define a diagnostic index that could be measured only by a mechan-
ical device and that had to be studied in a systematic way using the conceptual
and methodological tools of statistics.
1.5.2 The thermometer
Compared to the spirometer, the use of the thermometer became common in a
relatively short time after the publication of Carl Wunderlich’s treatise on body
temperature and disease, in 1868.92 According to Reiser, Wunderlich’s text,
with its comprehensive analysis of the relation between temperature and dis-
ease, was crucial in convincing physicians that a quantitative estimate of fever
was valuable for diagnosis.93 In fact, although thermometers had been available
since the seventeenth century, in the 1860s only a few doctors, and mostly in
hospitals, used it. This happened for conceptual and practical reasons. Con-
ceptually, fever had been traditionally considered a disease in its own right, and
not the symptom of something else. It was diagnosed touching or observing
the body, and classified on the basis of the patient’s pulse, skin complexion,
sweating or chills. Indeed, Foucault stressed the fact that the discussion of the
theory of essential fevers occupied a good twenty-five years at the beginning
90According to Foucault, with the work of P.J.G. Cabanis and other clinicians who sub-
scribed the philosophy of the idéologues inspired by the analytical method of the Abbé de
Condillac, “medicine discovered that uncertainty may be treated, analytically, as the sum of
a certain number of isolatable degrees of certainty that were capable of rigorous calculation.”
Foucault, 1963, 97.
91See Reiser, 1978, 32-33; Cosmacini, 1997, 350n; Grmek, 1999, 152.
92C.A. Wunderlich, 1868, Das Verhalten der Eigen Wärme in Krankheiten. Wunderlich’s
analyses were based on the measurements from about 25,000 patients over several years.
93See Reiser, 1978, 114.
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of the nineteenth century,94 and it was only when the metamorphosis of fever
from disease into symptom was accomplished that temperature could be assimi-
lated to other vital indexes and treated statistically. A confirmation of the fact,
emphasized by many historians of medicine, that the sheer availability of a tech-
nology does not entail its immediate use, and that a new diagnostic technique
can be integrated into medical practice only when its results make sense within
the scientific context of the moment.95 At the technical level, what restrained
doctors from taking up thermometry was the fact that the first thermometers96
were cumbersome instruments, diﬃcult to use, and with low accuracy. Addi-
tionally, they used diﬀerent temperature scales, and this made the comparison
of data extremely diﬃcult.
However, by the time Wunderlich published his treatise, these problems had
been overcome: the thermometer could be easily used and data from diﬀerent
subjects, or from the same subject at diﬀerent times, could be easily compared.
For the German clinician, thermometry had quite a few characteristics that
made it a superior diagnostic approach in relation to other diagnostic methods.
Compared to patient anamnesis it had the advantage that temperature could
“neither be feigned nor falsified,”97 while compared to percussion and auscul-
tation, it provided quantitative data, thereby oﬀering “materials for diagnosis
which are incontestable and indubitable, which are independent of the opinion
or the amount of practice or the sagacity of the observer.”98 Moreover, in con-
trast with spirometry and lungs vital capacity, it measured a phenomenon that,
although ever changing, was more clearly related to the disease. Tracking vari-
ations in body temperature, Wunderlich maintained, would allow defining the
natural laws of fever in diseases as diverse as typhus, neuroses, or injuries of the
spinal cord.99 The temperature graph portrayed the disease, and in this portrait
neither the patient nor the doctor could spoil the objectivity of the representa-
tion by introducing their subjective feelings or lack of skills. In fact, since the
thermometer was simple to use and provided an automatic output, a new figure
could enter the diagnostic arena: the unskilled measurer. While a qualitative
94See Foucault, 1963, Ch. 10. According to Foucault, the debate on the essential fevers was
the final step in the definition of anatomo-clinical perception. Fever, in fact, questioned the
very being of the disease in its relation to the lesional phenomena.
95See, for instance, Faure, 2005, 22-23; Bynum, 2006, 169.
96The first thermometer was probably build by Galileo, between 1593 and 1597, while San-
torio Santorio, who built his thermometer in1625, is credited for having extensively attempted
to measure the temperature of the human body. See Reiser, 1978, 110-11.
97Wunderlich, 1868, vi. It should be noted that distrust of patients’ subjective reports was
a tenet of clinical medicine, and it was quite common already in the eighteenth century. See
Peitzman and Maulitz, 1999, 176-177.
98Wunderlich, 1868, 48.
99See Wunderlich, 1868, 51.
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description of fever required a highly educated sense of touch and an adequate
vocabulary, a precise quantitative measure was necessarily mechanical, and was
expressed in numbers on a graduate scale. In this scenario, the unskilled mea-
surer was valuable not only because he or she would save time to the doctor,
but also because, as argued by the author of an article published in the British
Medical Journal in 1868, not having any previous theory about temperature
and disease, he “would see things as they really occurred.”100 Portable and easy
to use, the thermometer was finally adopted by a large number of doctors, and
it encouraged the growing belief that the physiological conditions of health and
disease could be measured precisely.101
Confidence in the mechanical recording of phenomena, and in the virtues of
the naïve eye of the unskilled observer, were part of the scientific ethos of the
second half of the nineteenth century,102 so it is not surprising that it also perme-
ated medicine, which, as already noted, was struggling to become a full-fledged
empirical science at least since Sydenham’s time. It should also be noted that
with the thermometer, and with Wunderlich’s conceptualization of temperature
as a marker of the course of diseases, for the first time appeared the idea that
the doctor could collect physical signs for diagnosis and follow-up without being
at the bedside. The stethoscope had introduced the first mechanical mediation
between doctor and patients, but it still required a physical proximity and con-
tinuity. With the thermometer, this continuity was potentially broken, since the
physician could touch, as it were, the patient’s body even being far away from
him.
1.5.3 The sphygmometer and the sphygmograph
If we think about the relationship between vital indices and the instruments
used to measure them, we observe diﬀerent dynamics. The very idea of lungs
capacity as a medical concept with a specific diagnostic meaning could not exist
without an instrument that measured it,103 while body temperature passed from
being a disease (fever), to be a qualitative generic symptom, and with the ther-
mometer, it eventually became a quantitative index. On the contrary, for what
concerns the pulse, the proxy of blood circulation and heartbeat, the diagnostic
100Quoted in Reiser, 1978, 117.
101See Reiser, 1978, 119.
102A famous and much debated account of “mechanical objectivity” have been provided by
Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison in Daston and Galison, 1992 and 2007. On the same topic
see also Galison 1998 and 1999. I criticize Daston and Galison’s idea of mechanical objectivity
in Chapter 3.
103More precisely, the idea that the lungs could contain a certain volume of oxygen already
existed, but without a proper instrument that actually measured such volume it was impossible
to use lungs capacity as a diagnostic marker.
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index existed long before the invention of its measuring device. Indeed, pulse
has been the first index of bodily function, known both by Western and East-
ern physicians.104 In the second century AD, Galen had developed a complex
doctrine of the pulse, but in the nineteenth century only a few doctors relied
on pulse taking for their diagnoses. It did not depend only on the fact that by
then Galen’s theories had lost currency, but also on the fact that a semiology of
the pulse demanded great sensorial training and experience, in addition to an
exquisite sense of touch, which most practitioners lacked.105
Pulse-feeling machines Attempts to build an instrument that would help
recording the pulse date back at least to 1450,106 but the first eﬀective device was
developed in 1834 by the physician Julius Hérisson, who called the instrument
sphygmometer. It allowed visualizing the intervals between pulse beats, as well
as the duration and force of contractions, by transmitting the impulse of the
heart beat to a column of mercury. In the memoir in which he presented the
sphygmometer to the Institut de France, Hérisson enumerated its advantages,
praising with special emphasis the fact that – besides making possible a more
precise monitoring of the pulse, recorded by a mechanical device rather than by
subjective touch feelings – it enabled “the physician to write down in his note
book, an exact description of the state of the pulse.”107 Pulse feeling, so diﬃcult
to describe in words, could be finally expressed in the clear language of numbers.
This would allow comparing the state of heart and arteries in the same subject
under normal and pathological conditions, as well as during the course of the
disease. Moreover, the numbers on the graduated scale of the sphygmometer
provided a description of the pulse that could be shared by diﬀerent people
simultaneously, or even in diﬀerent places at diﬀerent moments. This was an
advantage not only in medical consultations, but also in medical education:
students could judge pulse motions with their own eyes (as variations of the
mercury’s column), rather than rely on the verbal description of the sensations
of their teachers. Finally, the sphygmometer would create a common language
for describing pulse beat, because, as Hérisson put it: “the instrument being the
same every where, the measure obtained at St. Petersburgh will be perfectly
understood at Paris.”108
104The Chinese Maijing (pulse manual) dating back to the third century AD, classified
twenty-four kinds of pulse. See Cosmacini, 1997, 159 and 160n.
105See Reiser, 1978, 97.
106See Reiser, 1978, 96.
107Hérisson, 1834, 11.
108Hérisson, 1834, 14.
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In a few pages Hérisson sketched some fundamental epistemological prob-
lems: the question of mechanical objectivity versus human sensorial subjectivity;
the possibility of accessing at diﬀerent times and places the same information as
a condition for inter-subjectivity; the creation of a common language among the
members of a scientific community, rooted in the use of the same instruments. In
terms of medical practice these epistemic issues mirrored the problem of defin-
ing a stable, reproducible semiology that could improve diagnosis. Moreover, as
remarked by Dagognet, the sphygmometer allowed the clinician to measure the
force that propels the cardiac wave, without needing to penetrate the vessels,
thus without trespassing the body’s boundaries. It allowed “to know quickly
and from without what was going on within.”109
Pulse-visualizing graphs Although Hérisson’s instrument, too cumbersome
and diﬃcult to use, never entered into medical practice, it gained various sup-
porters and many physiologists worked to its improvement.110 One of the most
notable innovations in the domain of pulse examination was the invention of the
sphygmograph. First designed by the German physiologist Karl Vierodt, it was
perfected by the French physiologist Etienne-Jules Marey, in 1860. This device
provided a graphic representation of the pulse: it measured the frequency of
the blood flow and visualized its rhythm and form (duration and amplitude).
Interestingly, although in the publication in which he presented his invention
Marey warned the readers that the sphygmograph was not ready yet for being
used as diagnostic tool,111 it nevertheless attained a relative diﬀusion within the
medical community. This success probably depended on the fact that, as the
sphygmometer, the sphygmograph provided a visible record of the pulse, but
contrary to Hérisson’s device, Marey’s was small, portable, and relatively easy
to operate. Additionally, the sphygmograph – the first of Marey’s “inscribing
109Dagognet, 1986, 105, my translation.
110Eventually, in 1896, the Italian Scipione Riva-Rocci designed the modern blood pressure
cuﬀ (sphygmomanometer). This instrument was portable of easy application, reasonably
accurate and produced automatic results. Widely used today (often in its computerized
version), this instrument played a pivotal role in defining the semiology of one of the most
common diseases of our time: hypertension. As remarked by Faure, the sphygmometer is a
good example of how a diagnostic technique can go beyond revealing a disease, it can create
one. This phenomenon, he maintains, does not depend on the technique itself, but on social
factors. The sphygmometer has been in use in Paris clinics since the 1860s as physical sign of
several illness, but its use spread widely and contributed to create the notion of hypertension
only by the end of the nineteenth century. By then health insurances, born in England in the
eighteenth century, had about one million clients in France. Health insurances were interested
in foreseeing diseases (predictive medicine), and thus developed diﬀerent methods to estimate
the risk of disease. Measuring arterial tension was one of these methods: hypertension became
first an indicator of risk and in time a full-fledged disease. See Faure, 2005, 24.
111See Marey, 1860, 32.
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Figure 1.6: A direct sphygmograph designed by Marey. E.-J. Marey, La circulation
du sang à l’état physiologique et dans les maladies, Paris, 1881, 214.
devices”112 – capitalized on the growing interest and confidence in measuring
machines and in what Marey himself dubbed “graphic method.”113
As remarked above, if in clinical anatomy the organic lesion was the sta-
ble mark of disease in the dead, for the proponents of functional anatomy the
sphygmograms were permanent, visible records of a transient, on-going activity
(Figures 1.6 and 1.7).
In this regard Marey wrote:
The inscribing devices measure infinitely small lapses of time; the
most rapid and the feeblest movements, the least variations of forces,
cannot escape them. These devices penetrate the intimate functions of
organs where life seems to consist of ceaseless motion. All these changes
in the activities of forces are translated by the graphical method into an
arresting form that we could call the language of the phenomena them-
selves, as it is superior to all other modes of expression.114
As the great majority of his colleagues, Marey believed that mechanical de-
vices provided perfect records of reality. Through his graphic method first, and
with chronophotography later, he tried to probe the continuous motion of inner
life by revealing the invisible.115 Although the sphygmograms never became
part of diagnostic routine, they introduced a very important idea in medicine,
namely that vital functions could leave a trace on a sheet of paper, and this
trace was generally understood as the direct imprint of the phenomenon into
112Marey, 1878, iii.
113Marey, 1878.
114Marey, 1878, iii.
115I discuss this problem in detail in Chapter 3, with specific reference to Marey’s graphic
method and chronophotography in Section 3.3.
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Figure 1.7: Example of sphygmograms. E.-J. Marey, La circulation du sang à l’état
physiologique et dans les maladies, Paris, 1881, 216.
a visual form.116 Marey’s sphygmograms did not record quantitative data, but
they nevertheless managed to “materialize” such an elusive index as arterial
tension.117
1.5.4 Objectivity and the physiological gaze
With the spirometer, the thermometer, the sphygmometer and the sphygmo-
graph mechanical instruments entered steadily into the domain of medical di-
agnosis. These devices were meant to measure bodily functions through vital
indices (e.g., the pulse or the vital respiratory capacity). The vital indices,
in turn, helped to define the “position” of a given person on a physiological
scale that ranged from the normal (health) and the pathological (disease). In
the characteristics of the deviations from the normal states, physicians hoped
to find the natural laws of the disease that would lead to a rigorous, certain
diagnosis. Thanks to physiology, the medical gaze expanded its inventory, frag-
mented more and more its object, and took a radically new perspective on what
116The graphic method reappeared in diagnostic practice in a new form and with a renewed
importance in the first decade of the twenty century, with the invention of the electrocardio-
graph.
117See Dagognet, 1986, 110.
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could be revealed by the inner, living body. Moreover, an articulated idea of
what an objective representation of the body is became operative. All the in-
struments described above measure diﬀerent bodily functions, but they share
a fundamental feature: they make visible through graphs or numbers dynamic
processes of invisible nature, allowing their permanent record. In this way the
vital indices become objective data.
Objectivity here works at diﬀerent levels. On the one hand, it is understood
as the suppression of the subjectivity of the patient’s narrative describing his
or her symptoms and sensations (a process that began with Laennec’s medi-
ated auscultation), as well as the suppression of the sensorial subjectivity of
the doctor that potentially impaired the examination of physiological indices
or the search for symptoms. It is very diﬃcult to describe and note down the
quality of, say, the pulse measured by touch, but its intensity and duration be-
come immediately accessible to diﬀerent people when it is translated into an
increase of mercury on a graded scale or into a line on a sheet of paper. In
this respect, the machine provides objective data in the sense that it produces
data that are open to collective, inter-subjective scrutiny. These records can
travel from place to place, they can be copied and compared. On the other
hand, objectivity is understood as the adequate correspondence between repre-
sentations (graphical or numerical) and phenomena. In other words, objectivity
becomes a synonym for truth, and objective representation is a correct, truthful
representation. Marey believed that his inscribing devices spoke the “language
of phenomena themselves”118 and most of his contemporaries agreed with him.
This idea was certainly reinforced by the development of photography. However,
as I will show in Chapters 2 and 3, the belief that mechanical devices spoke the
very language of natural phenomena was multifaceted and quite more complex
that it might seem at first sight.
118Marey, 1878, iii.
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Chapter 2
The beginnings of medical
photography: visualizing illness
In the previous chapter it was argued that in the course of the nineteenth century
Western medicine conceptualized the human body and its diseases in several dif-
ferent ways, and that these conceptual transformations were intertwined with
the development of a range of diagnostic instruments. All these instruments,
from the scalpel of the pathologist to the measuring instruments of the physiol-
ogist, had the aim to make the inner body and its functions accessible from the
outside, thus in a way or another, visible. Visibility was indeed the imperative
set by clinical anatomy at the outset of modern medicine. And visualization, in
the form of anatomical and microscopy images, endoscopic inspections, as well
as graphs and tables of numbers, became a mark of medical practice well before
the invention of radiography. I went through a analysis of medical diagnostic
techniques and technologies, in order to outline the epistemological background
against which to frame radiography as a diagnostic tool belonging to a avast
and heterogeneous medical tradition. Yet, radiography belongs also to another
line of filiation, namely, medical photography. Hence, in the present chapter I
explore how photography was co-opted in medicine shortly after its invention,
and how it aﬀected the way physicians looked at the patient’s body.
Photography never was a diagnostic instrument proper, yet with its promise
to provide a perfect visual record of reality, it was perceived as the natural
allied of all morphological sciences, including medicine. By outlining the early
development of medical photography I try to understand how the photographic
technology was embedded in medical theories and practices. To this aim, I
draw on Charles Sanders Peirce’s conceptualization of photographs as indices
and icons, because it encapsulates quite well the nineteenth-century discourse on
photography, simultaneously oﬀering conceptual categories that help examining
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that very discourse. I integrate Peirce’s intuitions with Allan Sekula’s analysis
of how early photographic portraits could work according to the indexical or
symbolic mode of signification. I also draw on Walter Benjamin’s considerations
on the optical unconscious and the intrinsic analytic potential of photography,
as well as on his idea (largely borrowed from other theorists such as László
Moholy-Nagy and Béla Balász) that photography works as a prosthetic sense,
which enriches and transforms our sensory experience. I argue that, although
virtually all the scientists and medical doctors of the nineteenth century praised
the mimetic realism of photographic image, they often used the new optical
medium to produce pictures of such abstract entities as pathological conditions.
More precisely, they used photographs to train their ability to extract general,
abstract features of disease from the contingent pictures of singular individuals.
In this sense, we can say that they used photographs to visualize the invisible.
I also maintain that the body represented in these photographs is not the body
as we see it. It is a body reconfigured as part of an experimental apparatus in
which patient, camera and observer are components of a larger structure (which
includes the archive and the medical journal) capable of producing scientific and
medical evidence.
2.1 Londe: medical photography in practice
In the preface of his book La photographie médicale, of 1893, Albert Londe,
pioneer in scientific photography and director of the photographic service of
the Hôpital de la Salpêtrière,1 claimed that photography was “one of the most
beautiful discoveries of mankind.”2 He believed that the photographic labora-
tory would soon become a necessary facility for any hospital, and envisaged the
creation of photography courses in medical schools. Photography, Londe main-
tained, with its ability to keep track of transient states was an invaluable tool for
medical research and practice,3 and he consistently backed this claim by making
1At the time Londe worked there, the Salpêtrière, a female insane asylum, hosted about
5,000 patients, many of whom institutionalized for life (Jean-Martin Charcot, director of the
hospital for many years said that it was a sort of living museum of pathological conditions).
See Sicard, 1995, 19.
2Londe, 1893, ix, my translation. For Londe photography was both a discovery and a
science in its own right. To the contemporary reader, the idea that photography can be
considered a science, rather than a technique (or technology), might sound strange. However,
we should consider that for those who were involved in the development of photographic
instrumentation and practices, photography posed an open problem in applied science. The
very activity of taking pictures was bounded with the problem of understanding how the whole
process functioned. This understanding, in turn, was related to the study of the physical and
chemical phenomena that subtended the working principles of the apparatus.
3See Londe, 1893, 3.
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a list of the actual and possible applications of photography to medicine and
physiology. Photography, he said, was the necessary iconographic complement
of the patient’s file in all those cases in which the morphological presentation and
evolution of the disease were relevant (e.g., deformities and wounds). It could
be used to record endoscopic examinations, as well as surgical and obstetrical
interventions, in a much more precise way than any written description, and the
visual records could be shared and retrieved at any time for further study. In
the same way, photography could improve the much honored tradition of patho-
logical anatomy, by enabling the comparison of the lesions revealed by diﬀerent
autopsies. For what concerns the study of histology and cytology, it would allow
to preserve “authentic and enduring records”4 of tissues that were doomed to
perish in a short time. Moreover, in the case of the study of nervous and men-
tal pathologies, in which the observation of unexpected and quick movements
was paramount, photography could provide access to new fields of knowledge,
while in the domain of physiology it had the great advantage of allowing the
recording of body motions without directly interfering with the subject under
examination (Londe collaborated with Etienne-Jules Marey in the development
of chronophotography).5 Furthermore, Londe contended that photography had
an eminently pedagogical quality because, by facilitating the production of large
collections of images, it fostered observational skills in students and taught both
students and qualified physicians how to recognize permanent and recurrent fea-
tures within the intrinsic variability of the morphological alterations provoked
by pathology. As he put it: “Photography provides diﬀerent ways to multiply
the original picture, without loosing any of its tracts of sincerity and truth”.6
Londe concluded his introductory list of applications of medical photography
mentioning its relevance in the medico-legal context. In this case, however,
rather than praising the evidential role of the photographic image, he empha-
sized its emotional power: put under the eyes of judges and jury, the shocking
pictures of a face disfigured by a lethal wound would discourage any feeling of
pity for the author of the crime.7
Within the list of medical applications of photography expounded by Londe,
I would like to focus on two points: (1) the use of photographic records in the in-
dividual patient’s file, and (2) the pedagogical relevance of collections, or series,
of images. For what concerns the second point, it is important to emphasize
4Londe, 1893, 6, my translation.
5Chronophotographs are pictures taken in extremely rapid sequences, above the tempo-
ral resolution of the eye. The first successful attempts to produce this sort of images were
accomplished by the photographer Eadweard Muybridge in the United States and by the
physiologist Etienne-Jules Marey in France. I analyze in detail Marey’s work in Chapter 3.
6Londe, 1893, 6, my translation.
7See Londe, 1893, 6 and 215.
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that it was through the series, the gallery of images, that photographs acquired
a diagnostic meaning. By training the eye, the photographic series taught to
recognize the facies of a disease at a glance.8 In fact, as Walter Benjamin will
later remark, the series is endowed with two antithetic properties: it gives visi-
bility to the exceptional, and simultaneously fosters our “sense for sameness,”9
our ability to recognize, or extract, recurrent patterns within a variety of sin-
gular phenomena. The series of photographs, collected in specialized journals,
books of case studies or file archives, has the function to stimulate a sort of
inductive process whereby a general visual rule (the facies of the disease) is
derived from a set of individual occurrences. Hence, there is a movement from
the particular to the general.10 In medicine, however, general knowledge needs
always to be referred to an individual case. More precisely, there is always a
tension towards the construction of a science of the individual, because the field
of action of the physician is a specific person. This is why Londe recommended
to keep photographic records of patients in their medical file. In explaining the
rules for the proper making of medical photographs, Londe insisted that it was
always necessary to produce sets of images of the same patient, because this
was the only way to keep track of the evolution of his or her condition over time
and under diﬀerent stimuli.11 Only through sets of images it became possible
“to rigorously establish [pathological] types that corresponded to specific aﬀec-
tions.”12 Photography promised to foster the advancement of medicine because
it oﬀered an opportunity to shift from the general rule to the particular case
with relative ease.
As we will see in this chapter, establishing a human type for specific diseases
was one of the main purposes of early medical photography. We can consider
this endeavor as the visual analogue of the attempts to organize and inscribe
disease within the body pursued by all the diagnostic technologies developed
during the nineteenth century. Similarly to the stethoscope, the thermometer,
the sphygmograph and all the other diagnostic devices discussed in Chapter 1,
medical photography was meant to objectify the body, to turn it into a scientific
object that could be described through the combination of simplified, measur-
able, standard elements. It was thus necessary for medical photography to have
a standard, seemingly neutral aesthetics, corresponding to a specific visual code.
Such aesthetics was summarized by Londe in a few rules: he recommended to
8See Londe, 1893, 74-77.
9Benjamin, 1936, 256.
10This means that the photographic series had not simply a pedagogical value (transmission
and sharing of knowledge), but also a scientific value proper, for it helped to construct new
knowledge by induction.
11See Londe, 1893, 66.
12Londe, 1893, 5.
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photograph the body according to an ordered sequence,13 against a uniform dark
grey background “against which the naked body stands out very clearly,”14 and
with the camera placed right in front of the subject, in order to avoid any de-
formation. Not surprisingly, this was also the aesthetics of ethnography and
criminology, two social sciences that received great impetus between the 1870s
and 1880s. In these disciplines, too, what was at stake was the creation of
objective, scientific portraits of the average man (or woman).
Londe’s book, a reference text written more than fifty years after the intro-
duction of photography in medicine, can be considered a compendium of the
accepted wisdom about scientific photography in the late nineteenth century.
The high value attached to the specific ability of the camera to produce faith-
ful visual records, its eminently documental character, is patent in Londe’s list
of medical applications of photography. For him, as for his contemporaries,
the camera was a “wonderful recording instrument,”15 and photographs were
“truthful images” [images fidèles]16 of the world. Tellingly, even Charles Baude-
laire’s condemnation of photography in the Salon of 1859 was chiefly grounded
in the idea that the camera is a picture-making machine characterized by “an
absolute material exactitude.”17 For the poet, photography was a device that
merely recorded trivial external reality, and therefore it could certainly be the
“very humble servant”18 of the sciences and the arts, but it was divested of any
creative and artistic potential.19
2.2 Photographs as indices and icons
To better understand Londe and Baudelaire’s conception of photography, with-
out limiting ourselves to certify their endorsement of photographic realism, it
is useful to refer to the semiotic conceptualization of photography put forward
by Peirce. Indeed, it seems to me that Londe and Baudelaire, as virtually all
their contemporaries, implicitly subscribed to the Peircean truth-value theory of
photography. According to the American phylosopher, photographs, especially
instantaneous photographs, are simultaneously icons and indices. They are in-
dices because they are physically connected to their referent, as a thumbnail to
the finger or the smoke to the fire. At the same time they are icons, because
13Namely, the whole body view from front, sides and behind, the head alone, the hands,
the feet and the lower limbs, and, finally, detailed images of the skin.
14Londe, 1893, 66.
15Londe, 1893, 6, my translation.
16Londe, 1893, 68.
17Baudelaire, 1859, 261, my translation.
18Baudelaire, 1859, 261, my translation.
19See Baudelaire, 1859, 254-263.
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their meaning depends on their resemblance to the object they represent. More
exactly, in the case of photography the iconic mode of signification of the sign
directly springs from its indexical mode. Peirce wrote: “Photographs [are] pro-
duced under such circumstances that they [are] physically forced to correspond
point by point to nature.”20 And also: “A photograph [...] owing to its opti-
cal connection with its object, is evidence that that appearance corresponds to
reality.”21 That is, the truth-value of photographs is predicated on their phys-
ical mode of production. Indeed, it is interesting to consider Peirce’s idea of
photographs as iconic indices in the light of a description of the photographic
process provided by one of its inventors, Henry Fox Talbot. In 1844, in his
groundbreaking photographic album The Pencil of Nature,22 Talbot wrote:
The idea occurred to me [...] how charming it would be if it were
possible to cause these natural images imprint themselves durably, and
remain fixed upon the paper! [...] Now, light, where it exists, can ex-
ert an action, and, in certain circumstances, does exert one suﬃcient to
cause changes in material bodies. Suppose, then, such an action could be
exerted on paper; and suppose the paper could be visibly changed by it.
In that case surely some eﬀect must result having a general resemblance
to the cause which produced it.23
As a matter of fact, photographs were the product of two distinct processes: an
optical process, that led to the production of an image in the camera, and a
chemical one, that allowed to fix and reproduce on a sensitive surface the image
cast upon it by the lens. This chain of physicochemical phenomena preserved,
through a stream of causal relations, a resemblance between the object that
had produced an image within the camera, and the image that had been finally
fixed on the sensitive plate. The very materiality of the photographic process
bounded the iconicity of the picture to its indexicality, and it was the source of
its perceived realism.
Peirce did not developed a theory of photography in its own right, but he
used photographs as examples of how signs can signify. Although it is beyond
the scope of this dissertation to explore in detail Peirce’s semiotics, I will resort
to his classification of signs into icons, indices and symbols as a conceptual and
methodological tool for part of my analysis of photography and medical imaging
in the following chapters For Peirce, the sign is a unity of what is represented (the
20Peirce, CP 2.281.
21Peirce, CP, 4.447.
22Together with the Frenchman Louis Daguerre, Henry Fox Talbot is credited for being one
of the inventors of photography. The Pencil of Nature was the first book ever published in
which illustrations were printed through a photographic process. The book was composed of
six installments released between 1844 and 1846, and included 24 calotype prints.
23Talbot, 1844, n.p.
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Object), how it is represented (the Representamen) and how it is interpreted (the
Interpetant). More exactly, the Representamen is the sensible form taken by
the sign (it is also called sign-vehicle); the Interpretant is the sense made of the
sign (it can be understood as a translation of the primitive sign into a further,
more developed sign in the mind of the interpreter); and the Object is the
referent, that is, something beyond the sign to which it refers (importantly, the
objects puts constraints on the sign’s possibility to signify). The classification
of signs in indices, icons, and symbols depends on the quality of the relationship
that connects Object, Representamen, and Interpretant.24 This relationship, or
mode of signification, is characterized by diﬀerent degrees of conventionality,
with indices at the bottom of the scale (where, ideally, no convention is involved
in the process of signification) and symbols at the top. Thus, a sign is a symbol
if it is connected to its object by a convention, which, as such, has to be learned
and agreed upon.25 Instances of symbols are language in general, numbers, the
Morse code, and nautical flags. An index, on the contrary, relates to its referent
via a physical or factual connection.26 For example, a footprint is an index of a
person walking on a trail, because it is the physical imprint let by the foot, and
pain can be an index of disease. Finally, a sign is an icon when it has a relation
of resemblance with its referent.27 Similarity is the defining feature of iconicity,
and indeed, Peirce also terms such mode of signification likeness. Instances of
icons are pictorial portraits, scale models, but also metaphors, synthetic aromas,
and imitative gestures.
Peirce’s precise thoughts about the nature of icons, indices and symbols
changed and became more complex overtime, as far as he developed his sign
theory. In particular, he came to realize that it was virtually impossible to
find any pure instance of icons and indices, and that these signs were always
partly symbolic or conventional.28 This alerts us about the fact that not only
we cannot treat photographs as pure indices, but we should not even consider
them as simple combinations of index and icon. Indeed, as we will see in this
chapter and in the following one, the symbolic or conventional component of the
mode of signification of photographs and radiographs plays a fundamental role in
24See Atkin, 2013, and Chandler, 2007, 39-44.
25“A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an
association of general ideas, which operates to cause the symbol to be interpreted as referring
to that Object.” Peirce, CP 2.249.
26“An Index is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being really
aﬀected by that Object.” Peirce, CP 2.248.
27“An Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of characters
of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such Object actually exists or
not.” Peirce, CP 2.247.
28See Atkin, 2013.
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endowing these images with meaning.29 The interplay between the indexical and
symbolic modes of signification is crucial to an understanding of photography
and other forms of scientific imaging technology, especially when it comes to the
visualization of the invisible.
Indexicality and likeness Before exploring at length the problem of the vi-
sualization of the invisible, I task I undertake in this chapter and in the next one,
I want to insist on how powerfully the idea of resemblance was entrenched with
that of indexicality in the earliest conceptualizations of photography.30 For
Londe and his contemporaries, the epistemic authority of photography came
from its indexical nature, from its being a direct imprint of nature. This phys-
ical contiguity was the guarantee of iconic exactitude, of perfect resemblance:
the photographic image was epistemically meaningful because it was identical to
its referent and it was identical to its referent because it was its direct physical
imprint. In other words, the photograph was perceived as scientifically mean-
ingful (that is, objective and endowed with cognitive value) because it was an
icon, but it was an icon only in so far as it was an index (that is, its ontological
status secured its truth-value). This conflation of the indexical and iconic na-
ture of photography was quite productive, for it allowed scientists to use these
images in flexible (sometimes conceptually conflicting) ways.
Embedded in Londe’s apparently naïve photographic realism we can in fact
discern a range of instrumental uses of photography. As highly contingent im-
ages, taken directly from the body of the patient and referring to no one but
that patient, photographs are important complements in the medical file, for
they keep memory of what the doctor saw with his own eyes, with a fidelity and
detail that a written description could not convey. In this case, what was at
stake was the ability of the photograph to be identical to its referent. And it was
still the contingency of the photographic picture that conveyed its evidentiary
and emotional meaning in the murder trial.31 In this instance what mattered
was the indexical nature of the photograph not only in the strictest sense of be-
29In Peirce’s semiotics the meaning of a sign is not contained within it, but arises in its
interpretation. Moreover, the object is crucial to the meaning of the sign (it puts constraints
on the sign). Hence the meaning of a sign includes both its reference and its sense. See
Chandler, 2007, 33.
30Of course, the notion of “resemblance” is very problematic and controversial. It is rooted
in a mimetic-realistic conception of “likeness,” as if this were an intrinsic property of the image,
rather than an anthropological and cultural construct. That is, it is a conception which does
not take into account that what counts as similar to something else is not only species-specific
(what counts as similar for a human being is not recognized as such by, say, a dog or a fly),
but also culture-specific. The need to resort to the symbolic mode of signification to interpret
a photograph can be considered a symptom of the fact that the iconicity of a picture, its
likeness, is not as self-evident and self-contained as one might believe on first thought.
31See Londe, 1893, 6 and 125.
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ing an evidence of the crime, but also in what concerned the emotional cogency
of the index. It was because they knew, by virtue of common sense, that that
slaughtered person was really and necessarily before the camera, and because
they felt that that body was in metonymical relation with the photographic
plate, that the members of the jury would be revolted by the photograph much
more than by any painting or drawing, no matter how realistic.
However, photographs are not only about what we can see with our own
eyes. They are also about what we struggle to see (the elusive movements of the
neurological patient), or what we cannot see at all (the all too rapid movements
studied through chronophotography). In these cases the iconic aspect of the
photograph is taken to a level that goes beyond visual resemblance, and can
acquires a diagrammatic function. Also, the contingent nature of the photograph
fades, or is tamed, once pictures are collected in organized series (in reviews or
atlases). In this case the medical value of the camera resides not so much in its
ability to provide exact records of specific occurrences, but rather in the fact
that it allows to easily multiply images. Hence, it allows to create those visual
galleries, those pathological and teratological collections that ideally would allow
the recognition of general prototypes, the facies of each and any disease.
2.3 A new optical truth
Since its oﬃcial invention, in 1839, photography has been simultaneously an
instrument and an object of research (scientific and artistic alike), but until
the turn of the century photographs continued to be conceived of as the fix-
ation of the image of the camera obscura, thus as an imprint of the visible.
Although in their practice the scientists used photography in very creative ways
and demanded of photographs to reveal much more than the surface of objects,
their conceptual (and rhetorical) discourse on photography essentially revolved
around the idea of “perfect and truthful record”32 of visible phenomena.33 Ben-
jamin, in his Little History of Photography, of 1931, ascribed this lack of concep-
tual variety to the tumultuous development of the new technique, “which long
precluded any backward glance.”34 More specifically, he considered the theo-
rization of photography put forward before the 1920s “entirely rudimentary,”35
32Diamond, 1856, 24.
33We can find some meaningful exceptions in the writings of the physicist and philosopher
Ernst Mach and of physiologist Etienne-Jules Marey. Both were interested in the use of
photography for the study of dynamic phenomena. Mach expounded his ideas on photography
in the article “An account of scientific applications of photography,” of 1893.
34Benjamin, 1931, 507.
35Benjamin, 1931, 508.
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because based on two misconceptions: on the one hand, the conviction that a
photograph was nothing more than a mirror image of the visible world; on the
other hand, the attempt to legitimize (or delegitimize) photography in the face
of traditional painting.36
This vision was challenged by theoreticians and practitioners of photogra-
phy and cinema of the 1920s and 1930s, who developed a broad reflection on the
specific cognitive and analytic power of the new optical media.37 For instance,
for the Hungarian artist and theorist Lázló Mohly-Nagy, Benjamin’s friend and
main exponent of the photographic movement New Vision [Neues Sehen], the
task of the camera was to provide a new, enriched way to perceive and under-
stand the world. Moholy-Nagy emphasized the ability of photography to provide
“an unbiased optical vision” [eine unvoreingenommene Optik], that is, a vision
not bound to the association laws that rule over natural perception.38 The cam-
era allowed to enlarge and frame the field of view in ways the human eye could
not. Indeed, for Moholy-Nagy, the distortions produced by the lens and by all
sort of photographic experimentation, from oblique views to superimpositions,
should not be considered photographic errors, but rather important epistemic
devices that, by severing all habitual connection between vision, imagination
and judgement, would reveal a new “optical truth” [das Optisch-wahre], which
would precede any subjective stance.39 As pointed out by media scholar Antonio
Somaini, Moholy-Nagy’s strong statements about the objectivity of the camera,
which clearly did not take into account the subjectivity and intentionality of
the photographer, are to be understood in the context of the reflection on the
epistemic cogency of photography and cinema that animated the debate about
these media in the 1920s. For the Russian film maker and theorist Dziga Vertov,
for instance, the camera had specific analytic properties that revealed what he
called Kino-Pravda (literally, film-truth), i.e., the reality of life that escaped
common perception. Similarly, the formalist Osip Brik, in the essay What the
36Benjamin maintained that photography could not be judged according to the categories
of painting, for it actually overturned those categories. He particularly criticized what he
considered to be a “fetishistic and fundamentally antitechnological concept of art,” that is,
a concept of art grounded in the idea of divine inspiration, detached from any historical and
material context. Benjamin, 1931, 508.
37See Somaini, 2010, ix-lvi; Pinotti and Somaini, 2012, xxv-xxviii; Landeker, 2005 and 2006.
38See Moholy-Nagy, 1925, 5. In the introduction to the Italian edition of Moholy-Nagy’s
Malerei Photographie Film, Antonio Somaini points out that already in 1844 Henry Fox Talbot
had hinted at the idea of unbiased vision, by stressing that photography does not discriminate
between a chimney sweep and the Apollo of the Belvedere. See Somaini, 2010, xxxix. In
The Pencil of Nature, commenting on the plate with the view of the boulevards at Paris,
Talbot wrote: “The instrument [the camera] chronicles whatever it sees, and certainly would
delineate a chimney-pot or a chimney-sweeper with the same impartiality as it would the
Apollo of Belvedere.” Talbot, 1844, 18.
39See Somaini, 2010, xxxix-xl.
A new optical truth 63
Eye Does Not See, of 1926, maintained that photography and cinema did not
have to imitate the human eye, but rather unveil what the human eye is unable
to see. The same line of thought was hold by French avant-garde film directors
such as Germaine Dulac, who considered cinema a sort of microscope focused on
life, Abel Gance, who challenged traditional vision with multiple projections and
frame superimpositions, and Jean Epstein, for whom cinema, through montage,
slow motion, time-lapse, and reversed projection, could radically reconfigure our
experience of space and time. Within the German speaking context, to which
both Moholy-Nagy and Benjamin belonged, Béla Balász thought of cinema as a
new sense organ, which entailed new sensorial faculties and thus paved the way
to the advent of a new visual culture [visuelle Kultur ]. This new visual culture,
Balász posited, entailed a distinctively modern way to see the world, and over
time would lead to a reconsideration of the epistemic import of human senso-
rial faculties.40 For Balász, as for Moholy-Nagy, the new optical media could
be considered prosthesis of the human sensorium, for they reorganize, integrate
and perfect our senses.41
2.3.1 Pictures from the optical unconscious
Balász and Moholy-Nagy’s intuitions on the epistemic and analytic possibilities
of the camera were condensed by Benjamin in the metaphor of the “optical
unconscious,” expounded in the essays Little History of Photography and The
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction. In the latter he wrote:
With the close-up, space expands; with slow motion, movement is
extended. And just as enlargement not merely clarifies what we see in-
distinctly “in any case,” but brings to light entirely new structures of
matter, slow motion not only reveals familiar aspects of movements, but
discloses quite unknown aspects within them [. . . ]. Clearly it is another
nature which speaks to the camera as compared to the eye. “Other” above
all in the sense that a space informed by human consciousness gives way to
a space informed by the unconscious. [. . . ] Whereas it is a commonplace
that, for example, we have some idea what is involved in the act of walk-
ing (if only in general terms), we have no idea at all what happens during
the split second when a person actually takes a step. [. . . ] This is where
the camera comes into play, with all its resources for swooping and rising,
disrupting and isolating, stretching or compressing a sequence, enlarging
or reducing an object. It is through the camera that we first discover
the optical unconscious, just as we discover the instinctual unconscious
through psychoanalysis.42
40See Somaini, 2010, xl-xliii.
41See Somaini, 2012, 206.
42Benjamin, 1939, 266.
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Figure 2.1: Adiantum pedatum. Maidenhair fern, young rolled-up fronds enlarged
8 times. Photogravure after K. Blossfeld, Urformen der Kunst, Berlin, 1928, Plate
55.
For Benjamin, photography gives access to the optical unconscious, a visual
domain that escapes unaided perception, primarily through the reconfiguration
of space, by means of close-up, enlargement, reduction, isolation, and all the
possible manipulations of perspective, focus, times of exposure, development,
and print. In the review of Karl Blossfeld’s photography book Urformen der
Kunst. Photographische Planzenbilder – a magnificent gallery of black and white
close-ups of plants, whose forms were rendered in the slightest details – Benjamin
noted that the enlargement of what is already macroscopic, for instance a bud
or a leaf, grants access to completely new forms, just as the enlargement of
the microscopic world (Figure 2.1). And he wrote: “These pictures reveal an
unimagined treasure trove of analogies and shapes from the world of plants,
something only photography could achieve.”43
It is worth stressing that, although Benjamin never wrote specifically on
scientific photography, he understood very well the scientific value of the new
optical medium. More than this, he was convinced that – by virtue of its analyt-
ical properties – photography fostered the interpenetration of art and science. In
the essay on the work of art he went as far as to state that one of the revolution-
ary functions of film was to demonstrate that “the artistic uses of photography
43Benjamin, 1928, 350.
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Figure 2.2: A man walking. Photogravure after Eadweard Muybridge, 1887. Well-
come Library, London.
are identical to its scientific uses.”44 This strong claim was accompanied by a
footnote in which Benjamin drew an analogy between photography and Renais-
sance painting. As Renaissance painting had made use of anatomy, perspective,
mathematics, meteorology, and chromatology, and in turn, had contributed to
the development of these disciplines, so photography required the integration
of both scientific and artistic expertise, and had the potential to revolutionize
both science and art.45
A critical aspect of the revolutionary potential of photography laid in the fact
that it opened the way to the manipulation of time. The example of the “split
second when a person actually takes a step”46 in the passage about the optical
unconscious quoted above is clearly a reference to chronophotography, whereby
the continuous flow of time is arrested and decomposed into instants (Figure
2.2). And once set in motion through cinematic projection, photographs can
literally show the impossible: time, and thus the natural course of phenomena,
can be stretched, compressed, or even reversed. In the review of Blossfeld’s
photography book, Benjamin argued: “Whether we accelerate the process of
a plant’s growth using time-lapse photography or whether we present its form
magnified forty times, in either case new worlds of images erupt like a geyser
from points of reality where we least expect to find them.”47 This sentence not
only exemplifies how the time of natural phenomena can be manipulated by
photography, it also helps understand what Benjamin meant when he said that
44Benjamin, 1939, 265.
45See Benjamin, 1939, note 37.
46Benjamin, 1939, 266.
47Benjamin, 1928, 350, original translation modified.
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the nature that speaks to the camera is “other” from the nature that speaks to
the eye, nevertheless it is no less real.48 The world becomes “other” because the
way our perception structures our apprehension of the world and its phenomena
is reinvented: we have new mechanical senses through which we can explore
dimensions of reality that we could not even conceive of before. And through
this new mechanical perception we discover “entirely new structures of matter.”49
Benjamin’s ideas on the optical unconscious and the reconfiguration of the
perception of space and time were grounded in his analysis of photography and
cinema (enlargement, slow motion, time-lapse, and so on).50 In this account,
the ability of the camera to disclose the optical unconscious (the unknown, the
unexpected) seems to depend chiefly on highly conscious processes of photo-
graphic manipulation and experimentation, such as enlargement, time-lapse,
slow motion, and so on. Still, in the early days of photography many were
fascinated by another property of the photographic process, namely, its ability
to capture perfectly visible aspects of everyday life that had not been noticed
by the photographer. Photography theorist Joel Snyder explains that: “the au-
thors of the earliest descriptions of daguerreotypes dwelled on the profusion of
detail carried on the surface of the mirrored plate, noting, for example, puddles
or stray reflections that had gone unnoticed at the time the plate was made.”51
Photography had the surprising ability to show aspects of the visible world, at
the visible scale, and within the range of the eye resolution that the eye did not
catch. In this case we can talk of an optical unconscious revealed by the camera,
not by rearranging space and time, but by bypassing the neuro-psychological
associative laws of natural vision. It is the optical unconscious corresponding
to Moholy-Nagy’s idea of unbiased vision. Such unbiased vision was made pos-
sible by the (partial) independence of the camera from the photographer.52 For
Moholy-Nagy there was a fundamental divide between photography (mechan-
ical images in general) and hand-made representations. In his view, paintings
and drawings always bear traces of the author’s will, or at least of his or her
perceptual schemes. For him, the activity of painting and drawing was inher-
ently limited by the laws of human perception. In representing the world, the
painter cannot show more than he or she has perceived. Even if the artist de-
48Benjamin, 1939, 266. See quote above.
49Benjamin, 1939, 266.
50For a very interesting discussion on how early scientific cinema influenced the space and
time perception of spectators’, and exerted a strong impact on the early theories of cinema,
see Landecker, 2005 and 2006.
51Snyder, 1998, 391.
52Moholy-Nagy considered the camera as completely independent from the photographer.
We cannot forget, however, that it is always a human agent who selects a specific lens, time of
exposure, perspective, and so forth. A photographic image, like any other mechanical image,
can never be completely independent from the human operator.
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picted an imaginary world, this would still be in a way or another linked to
the functioning of the human psychology and neurophysiology. Photography,
on the contrary, seemed to break the bond between the image and the human
producer. The developed plates could show something that might well be in
front of the camera, but that the photographer had not seen for a multiplicity
of reasons (from simple lack of attention to any other form of natural limitation
or impairment of human perception). In this sense we can say that photogra-
phy has an inherent analytic, anatomizing quality, and an enormous potential
to transform perception. Of course, in contrast to the idea that painting and
drawing are heavily limited by the rules of natural perception, one could take a
psychoanalytic stance and claim that every artwork is first and foremost a repre-
sentation of the artist’s unconscious. Or, alternatively, one could maintain that
the hand of the artist is guided by formal and ideal determinants that allow to
reveal aspects of the world that escape ordinary perception. In this respect, art
in itself can transform our way of seeing objects no less than photography and
other optical media. In this dissertation, however, I am specifically interested
in mechanically produced images, thus I do not explore how image production
in general impinges on our perception of the world.
2.3.2 The photographer as anatomist
A suggestive description of how photography and cinema bring about a transfor-
mation of sensory experience is provided by Benjamin in the essay on the work
of art, in the famous metaphor of the cinematographic operator as surgeon:
How does the camera operator compare with the painter? In answer
to this, it will be helpful to consider the concept of the operator as it is
familiar to us from surgery. The surgeon represents the polar opposite
of the magician. The attitude of the magician, who heals a sick person
by a laying-on of hands, diﬀers from that of the surgeon, who makes an
intervention in the patient. The magician maintains the natural distance
between himself and the person treated; more precisely, it reduced it
slightly by laying on his hands, but increases it greatly by his authority.
The surgeon does exactly the reverse; he greatly diminishes the distance
from the patient by penetrating the patient’s body, and increases it only
slightly by the caution with which his hand moves among the organs.
[...] Magician is to surgeon as painter is to cinematographer. The painter
maintains in his work a natural distance from reality, whereas the cine-
matographer penetrates deeply into its tissues. The images obtained by
each diﬀer enormously. The painter’s is a total image, whereas that of
the cinematographer is piecemeal, its manyfold parts being assembled ac-
cording to a new law.53
53Benjamin, 1939, 263-264.
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In the two figures of the surgeon and the magician Benjamin embodied a number
of dialectical antinomies that characterized his reflection on perception, namely,
first vs. second technique; proximity vs. distance; appearance vs. play (Schein
and Spiel); cult value of the auratic artwork (the artwork still invested of its
magic-sacral properties derived from its being unique and inscribed in an au-
thoritative tradition) vs. exhibition value of the non-auratic work, (the work
reproduced in series, freed from any ritual meaning, easily transportable and
accessible to the masses).54 Here, however, I focus on the figure of the surgeon
as exemplification of the analytic, enquiring gaze of the camera.
Unlike the magician-painter, who intervenes on the patient (corresponding
to the object to be represented) from the distance of his sacral authority, the
surgeon-cameraman, from the proximity of his technical competence, penetrates
with his hands and his eyes straight into the body. The painter creates a “to-
tal image,” an image that requires of its author to always keep the necessary
distance from its object in order to be able to see it. Ideally, once the work is
completed, the beholder will see what the painter saw. On the contrary, the lens
of the cameraman, for Benjamin, is like the gaze of the surgeon, a haptic gaze,
a gaze in action. This is so because in the making of a film the cameraman has
the option to zoom in and out, to chose diﬀerent planes, to stop time or to make
it move faster. Moreover, the frames must be further edited (the film is liter-
ally cut into sections that are subsequently reassembled or discarded), so that
the final stream of images will appear to the eye of the spectator not as it had
been seen by the cameraman,55 but as it was manufactured by a team of people
working under a film director. The cinematographer creates an image which is
“piecemeal” because it is necessarily the output of the composition of “many-
fold parts” (the diﬀerent shots) “assembled according to a new law,” namely
the laws of cinematographic narrative. Similarly, the surgeon, in the lineage of
the anatomist and the clinician, does not contemplate the body from without,
he literally cuts and stitches its parts according to the rules of anatomy and
physiology. Thus, the cinematic gaze is much more akin to the scientific way of
looking at the world than to artistic contemplation, or even to natural vision. It
is a structured, analytic way of seeing that dissects and recombines the elements
of reality according to its own rules, dictated by the purpose of investigation.
In the Little History of Photography, Benjamin hinted again at the proximity
between photography and medicine when he claimed: “Details of structure, cel-
lular tissue, with which technology and medicine are normally concerned – all
54See Pinotti and Somaini, 2012, 11.
55As a matter of fact, at the time of shooting the cameraman sees no image stream at all,
but rather a number of individual events.
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this is, in its origins, more native to the camera than the atmospheric landscape
or the soulful portrait.56 And he immediately added:
Yet at the same time, photography reveals in this material physiog-
nomic aspects, image worlds, which dwell in the smallest things – mean-
ingful yet covert enough to find a hiding place in waking dreams, but
which, enlarged and capable of formulation, make the diﬀerence between
technology and magic visible as a thoroughly historical variable.57
That is, getting closer and closer to its object, in accordance with its specific
analytic habit, photography has stripped the world of its magic (which does
not mean that it has stripped it of its beauty) and replaced “waking dreams,”
by definition elusive and impalpable, with enlarged images, from which we can
pick up the smallest details. The surgeon has finally overruled the magician,
for technology has shortened the distance between object and observer, between
the invisible and the visible, the unknown and what is “capable of formulation.”
In Benjamin’s terms, photography has “suck[ed] the aura out of reality.”58
2.3.3 Image series and the aura of the body
Benjamin’s concept of aura is a complex one, and he elaborated on it from dif-
ferent perspectives. In The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction
the notion of aura encapsulates a node of intertwined properties of the artwork
before the age of its mechanical reproducibility. It is the here and now of the
work of art, that is, “its unique existence in a particular place,”59 which deter-
mines its distinctiveness and authenticity, but it is also its permanence in time,
which entails its transmissibility and the related value as historical testimony. In
the same text Benjamin also defines the aura as an irreducible distance between
the artwork and the observer.60 An unbridgeable distance created by the fact
that the work of art belongs to a tradition whereby it derives an authority and
a cult value that set it beyond the reach of the beholder. Mechanical reproduc-
tion, and the mass-production that goes with it, strips the artwork of its aura,
because through the proliferation of cheap copies it obliterates its here and now,
jeopardizing simultaneously its uniqueness, authenticity, historical meaning and
cult value. The aura, however, is not just a property of the works of art. Nat-
ural objects can be auratic too. Benjamin defined the aura of a natural object
as “the unique appearance of a distance, however near it may be.”61 But if the
56Benjamin, 1931, 512.
57Benjamin, 1931, 512.
58Benjamin, 1931, 518.
59Benjamin, 1939, 253.
60See Benjamin, 1939, 255 and 1931, 253-256.
61Benjamin, 1939, 255, see also Benjamin, 1931, 518.
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aura of a natural object is the irreducible distance between the object and the
beholder, then, just as the works of art, natural objects loose their aura when
we get very close to them, and look at them with the analytic, anatomizing gaze
of science.
Now, if we try to apply the concept of aura to the domain of medical repre-
sentations, we find that the whole endeavor of Western medicine since the birth
of the clinic can be seen as a laborious attempt to peel the aura away from the
human body. The anatomist not only obliterates the distance of the observer
and cuts directly into the body, but thanks to all the techniques put in place
to explore the inner organs from without, the human body has entered a spe-
cific domain of mechanical visibility and reproducibility. With the stethoscope
Laennec put the body of the patient at a distance by interposing an instrument,
but he did so in order to gain a deeper access into the heart and lungs (the
same happened with the endoscopic devices, meant to visualize other inner or-
gans). With the microscope cellular pathologists pushed their senses down into
the cell. With the thermometer, the sphygmometer and all the other measuring
instruments, records from the inner body could be easily taken, copied, and sent
from one doctor to the other, so that, ideally, there was no longer the need to
be in the presence of the original (the patient) to make a diagnosis. Of course,
this whole process was progressively enhanced by the subsequent development
of imaging technologies that replicate our body, or parts of it, in countless sam-
ples. However, unlike the work of art, which loses its unique existence due to
the proliferation of its reproductions, the uniqueness of the human body is not
undermined by its copies (a human body does not lose its uniqueness just be-
cause its portrait can be reproduced indefinitely). The uniqueness of a human
body fades instead in the repetition of the series, more precisely, when it be-
comes just one picture among many other pictures of human beings (similarly,
as human beings we lose our singular identity when we become part of a crowd,
a multitude, and as such we can be studied in statistical terms).
We have seen in Section 2.1 that Londe recommended to take patients’ pic-
tures in sets, because it was the best way to bring to the fore the facies of the
disease. Within the pathological series, in fact, each singular body becomes the
rough copy of an inexistent original. Interestingly, Benjamin wrote the following:
The destruction of the aura is the signature of a perception whose
‘sense for sameness in the world’ has so increased that, by means of
reproduction, it extracts sameness even from what is unique. Thus is
manifested in the field of perception what in the theoretical sphere is
noticeable in the increasing significance of statistics.62
62Benjamin, 1939, 256, see also Benjamin, 1931, 519.
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The creation of series of images made possible by mechanical reproduction spurs
our quest for similarities, our tendency to make associations, to discover analo-
gies and common patterns. Because of the proliferation of images of each and
any object, we can exercise our “sense for sameness” on a virtually endless visual
domain, and therefore we are able to standardize even what is unique. Just as
statistics extracts averages and distribution trends by collecting and analyzing
singular events, so our perception, trained by the continuous flux of images,
learns to extract resemblances between individual visual instances. And is it
not the systematic, methodic and organized search for “sameness” in what is
unique, a mark of the scientific way of organizing the world?
In Benjamin’s reflexion on the perception of sameness it is possible to estab-
lish an interesting parallel with the anatomo-clinical perception as described by
Foucault. For Foucault, the clinical gaze became possible in the hospital, were
the eye of the doctor could easily encompass endless series of diseased bodies,
which in some cases would be eventually anatomically dissected. In the wards of
the clinic the unique, individual patient became a public and visible body that
would be compared to other bodies in order to find out similarities and diﬀer-
ences, and thus organize disparate signs, symptoms and anatomical lesions into
taxonomical categories. In a way, the mechanical production and reproduction
of images impinged on everyday life perception as the hospital had impinged on
medical perception. It normalized the world, and made it accessible in a way
similar to the way in which clinical anatomy had normalized the human body
and gained access to it.
Benjamin’s analysis of photography and cinema provides relevant conceptual
tools for understanding the epistemic value of these optical media: the idea of
an analytical potential proper to the technology itself, the idea of optical uncon-
scious, the notion of aura, and its connection with the issue of the recognition
of similarities within a series of images. In considering the photographic appa-
ratus as inherently analytic and aimed at the invisible, Benjamin oﬀers a firm
ground to understand how the technology works and how it impinges on hu-
man perception. Yet, we still have to ask ourselves how photographs were made
meaningful. We have to understand how the potentiality of the technological
medium was actualized in the decades that followed the invention of photogra-
phy. In particular, within the scope of this dissertation, we aim at understanding
how photographs acquired their epistemic relevance, and thus their usefulness
in the context of medicine. In other words, taking for granted the ontological
properties of photography put forward by Benjamin, we must now understand
how they were made operative and meaningful by early medical photographers.
To this aim I turn to Sekula’s idea that the physiognomic and phrenological
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paradigms played a fundamental role in defining the meaning of photographic
portraits in the nineteenth century, and that the photographic realism professed
by the beholders of the time was connected to specific archival practices that
operated according to the indexical or to the symbolic modes of signification.
2.4 Bodies, archives, and the photograph as
symbol
In the work “The Body and the Archive,” of 1986, photographer and theorist
Allan Sekula defended the view that if we are to understand how photogra-
phy became epistemically relevant in the nineteenth-century scientific discourse
about the body, we need to take into account two factors. First, we have to
consider that by the mid of the century physiognomy and phrenology worked
as a unified hermeneutic paradigm, which governed both scientific and artistic
portrayal.63 Second, we have to understand the photographic realism professed
by the scientists of the time in terms of “instrumental and technical realism,”64
embedded in specific scientific and technical practices.
This means that we cannot really understand the emergence of photography
as a truth-apparatus, if we think of it only as a product of the optical empiri-
cism provided by the camera. It is fundamental to take into account that the
outputs of the camera were integrated into a pre-existing theoretical framework
(physiognomic and phrenological theories), as well as into an archive, that is,
into a theoretical and material system that allowed to collect, organize, and
retrieve each photograph whenever necessary.65 Sekula summarizes the spe-
cific properties of the photographic archive as follows: “In structural terms, the
archive is both an abstract paradigmatic entity and a concrete institution. In
both senses, the archive is a vast substitution set, providing for a relation of
general equivalence between images.” And still: “The capacity of the archive
to reduce all possible sights to a single code of equivalence was grounded in
the metrical accuracy of the camera.”66 Hence the archive, as the specialized
journal or the case studies collection, was a material institution that organized
series of photographs. At the same time, it was the embodiment of a theoretical
paradigm (phrenology and physiognomy), which allowed to select, organize and
63Sekula, 1986, 11.
64Sekula, 1986, 16.
65Sekula claims that: “Since physiognomy and phrenology were comparative, taxonomic
disciplines, they sought to encompass an entire range of human diversity. In this respect,
these disciplines were instrumental in constructing the very archive they claimed to interpret.”
Sekula, 1986, 12.
66Sekula, 1986, 17.
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interpret individual pictures within the series. Working as a “substitution set,”
it allowed to substitute images for real bodies. In this way it helped finding out
visual equivalences and relations among individuals. It did not simply fostered
what Benjamin called our “sense of sameness,”67 but it imposed a quite strict
code of vision and classification. This code bounded the viewer to interpret
the photograph in a univocal way, and at the same time it dictated how the
actual bodies should be. To put it diﬀerently, physiognomy was the conceptual
framework that justified and required the constitution of the archive, and the
archive, in turn, provided physiognomy with a standard gauge whereby it could
position each single body within a larger ensemble.68
“Realist” and “nominalist” approaches to photographic meaning Yet
this project of photographic classification of human types was made diﬃcult by
the “messy contingency”69 of photographs. Such contingency could be tamed
following a realist or a nominalist approach, each approach corresponding to a
specific way of endowing photographs with meaning.70 Within the realist ap-
proach, which posited the real existence of species and types, the circumstantial
and idiosyncratic features of each picture could be distilled, as it were, into
one typical or characteristic image (through a process of visual abstraction and
synthesis). On the contrary, within the nominalist approach, which denied the
reality of generic categories (if not as mental constructs), it was necessary to
develop a filing system that allowed to retrieve a concrete individual picture
whenever needed. Sekula exemplifies the nominalist stance with the work of
the French criminologist Alphonse Bertillon, and the realist position with the
composite portraitures by the British statistician and pioneer of eugenics Fran-
cis Galton. Through these examples he links the nominalist approach to the
indexical mode of signification, and the realist approach to the symbolic mode.
In the 1880s, Bertillon created a practical signaletic system (known as Bertillon-
age) for keeping a record of criminals (Figure 2.3). Each oﬀender was identified
by photographs showing frontal and profile views of the face and whole body,
in addition to the details of individual markings, such as tattoos and scars.
An attached written file specified the salient characteristics of the personality
of the individual. According to Sekula, Bertillon, with his accurate morpho-
logical measurements and classifications, “reinvent[ed] physiognomy in precise
nonmetaphysical ethnographic terms.”71 The body reproduced in the signaletic
67Benjamin, 1939, 256. See also Section 2.3 above.
68See Sekula, 1986, 17.
69Sekula, 1986, 17.
70See Sekula, 1986, 18.
71Sekula, 1986, 30-33.
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Figure 2.3: Example of signaletic photograph, A. Bertillon, Instructions signalé-
tiques. Album, Melun, 1893. Wellcome Library, London.
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photographs expressed nothing but its own appearance, and it was this ap-
pearance that allowed to recognize each specific criminal. On the contrary,
Galton firmly believed that the body revealed the true nature of the individual,
and in fact he developed his composite portraits within the scope of a larger
eugenic project, aimed at defining typical classes of human beings.72 His pe-
culiar photographic technique was an attempt to merge optical and statistical
procedures, in order to create a mechanical and statistical method that would
allow to identify the real physiognomy of diﬀerent groups of individuals. It
consisted of re-photographing portraits of subjects belonging to a given group
on a single photographic plate. Each photograph received a fractional exposure
corresponding to the inverse of the total number of images in the sample. As
a consequence, the individual idiosyncratic features faded away, due to under-
exposure, and what remained was a blurred configuration of the features which
recurred in all the subjects. This mechanical method was meant to replace hu-
man judgement in the recognition of the fundamental features of a human typus
(Figure 2.4).
Drawing on Peirce, Sekula describes Bertillon’s endeavor as grounded in
the indexical order of meaning of photography, whereby each photograph is the
physical trace of a contingent, material referent that actually exists in the world.
Galton’s, on the contrary, was based on an attempt “to elevate the indexical
photographic composite to the level of the symbolic, thus expressing a general
law through accretion of contingent instances.”73 Yet, since Galton believed that
physiognomy revealed the true metaphysical nature of the individual, he did
not understand his technique of composite portrayals as a mere mechanization
of visual pattern recognition; he took it as a mechanization of the inferential
reasoning that leads to the formulation of general laws. Thus, in Peircean terms,
the composite portraits were meant to work as symbols, because they referred to
their object by virtue of a universal category.74 On the contrary, in Bertillonage,
each photograph literally corresponded point by point to its referent (the body
of the criminal), and was intended to always refer to that and only that referent.
In the system of composite portraits, the final photograph embodied a synthesis
72As most social scientists of his time, Galton was obsessed with the idea of establishing
the physiognomy of the insane, the criminal and the Jew, but he also searched for the typus
of the consumptive.
73Sekula, 1986, 55. In Peirce’s semiotics, a symbol is defined as “a sign which refers to
the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which
operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object.” Peirce, CP, 2.249.
74Galton certainly did not conceive of his general physiognomic laws as conventional corre-
spondence rules. He was firmly convinced of the reality and correctness of the laws he could
extract by operating the process of composite portraiture.
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Figure 2.4: Specimens of composite portraiture, F. Galton, Inquiries into Human
Faculty and It’s Development, London, 1883, Frontispiece illustration. Wellcome
Library, London.
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of the images of many referents, and it was intended to refer to an indefinite
number of individuals on the basis of their resemblance to the synthetic image.
Sekula’ analysis is particularly useful because Bertillon and Galton’s work
are extreme examples of two opposite, yet complementary forms of making
sense of and using photographs not only in the social sciences (and pseudo-
sciences), but also in medicine. Bertillonage can be taken as the epitome of the
nominalist approach (which denies the reality of generic categories and focuses
on singular, actual instances). Here the photograph works as an index and
the archive is used to properly assign an individual to his or her signaletic
picture, in order to check and certify his or her identity. In this case, the task of
photography is to ratify a univocal correspondence: one criminal-one picture.75
There is no hidden truth beyond this correspondence, or more precisely, the
photograph cannot say anything that goes beyond such correspondence. We
could say that in this case the contingency of the photographic image prevailed
over the theoretical ambitions of the physiognomic paradigm. And in fact,
Sekula argues that Bertillon’s reinvention of physiognomy in nonmetaphysical
terms had the ambition to constitute a real science of the individual. That is, a
science that established for each individual the idiosyncratic rules of his or her
appearance and behavior. This science, however, could only be a descriptive,
ethnographic endeavor, since it would not allow to (it was not meant to) infer
universal laws about the countenance and actions of all human beings. Yet, used
in this way, the photograph and the archive would help the criminologist, as well
as the ethnographer or the physician, to carefully follow the transformations
occurring on the body of a singular individual. Photography identified the
individual. When Londe recommended to keep photographic records in the
patient’s file, he had in mind this specific use of photography.76
Galton’s endeavor went in precisely the opposite direction to Bertillon’s. If
for Bertillon the fundamental function of the archive was to associate one por-
trait to one and only one individual, for Galton a collection of photographs
became useful and scientifically meaningful as far as it allowed to make abstrac-
tion of particular instances and generate the universal face of the mentally ill,
the consumptive, the criminal, or any other possible group of human beings.
Through the technique of the composite portrayals, Galton collapsed several
photographs of the archive into one, so that the contingency of each singular
portrait could literally fade away to give way to the typus. Composite por-
trayals were not portraits of human beings, they were portraits of conceptual
75This function of photographs and of the photographic archive perfectly fits Peirce’s def-
inition of photographs as signs that are “produced under such circumstances that they [are]
physically forced to correspond point by point to nature.” Peirce, CP 2.247.
76See Section 2.1 above.
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categories, general ideas. Galton, however, believed that such categories were
as real as the bodies that were classified. He worked in strict accordance with
the physiognomic framework, and the originality of his work resides in the fact
that he tried to automate the abstract thinking that leads from the particular to
the universal. He did so by attempting to treat visual information in statistical
terms. In this sense, he literally conceived of his photographic technique as a
nomological machine, a mechanical device that reproduced the laws of human
nature.
Although physicians did not necessarily subscribe to Galton’s purpose of
mechanizing clinical judgement, they nevertheless shared with him a fundamen-
tal assumption, namely, that working on series of photographs one could perform
the same kind of observations, apply the same patterns of reasoning and judge-
ment, and reach the same conclusions, as if one was working with series of actual
individuals. In other words, it was possible to substitute the body of the actual
person for its photographic image. This implies that it was necessary to believe
in the indexical nature of photography in order to believe that the archive could
reveal a universal truth. For Galton the individual photograph per se could not
point to a universal human typus, and this is why he had to develop a system
to produce a composite image. The individual photograph would just contain
the truth of the individual instance it represented. For a universal truth to
emerge, it was necessary to combine diﬀerent pictures. Galton and Bertillon
shared the same beliefs about the ontology of the photograph (it was a perfect
imprint of the real object, burden with contingency), but they diverged on the
epistemology of the archive. Galton worked according to a realist stance, while
Bertillon followed a nominalist approach. Galton wanted to develop a science
of the individual in the sense of a science of typical classes of human beings
(identification and definition of human categories). Bertillon, on the contrary,
aimed at a positivist science of the individual as ethnography of the particular,
which withdrew from any generalization. Accordingly, Galton’s endeavor was
envisaged as science (criminology), while Bertillon’s was deemed a technique
(criminalistics). The former looked for the criminal (or the consumptive, the
insane, etc.), the latter looked for this or that oﬀender.
Now, if in the enforcement of law criminalistics could do without criminol-
ogy,77 in medicine the analysis of a single photographic portrait acquired diag-
nostic cogency only when it could be referred to a general image of the disease.
Hence, in medicine the two epistemological approaches concerning the archive
77In this case the aim was to verify the identity of the suspect and to check if he or she had
already been charged, in the past, for other crimes. The photograph said who the person was,
not how he or she was.
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had to work in tandem, and if a physician was to use photographs as diagnostic
devices he had to continuously shift between the general (realist) and the par-
ticular (nominalist) approach. In the following sections I analyze how these two
instances were realized in actual medical practice, taking into examination the
work of diﬀerent pioneers of medical photography.
2.5 Physiognomic laws and therapeutic portraits
As shown above, the phrenological and physiognomic theories provided a fun-
damental epistemic paradigm for making sense of photographic portraits, hence
it does not come as a surprise that psychiatry was one of the first clinical disci-
plines that tried to put photography in the service of diagnostics. In fact, if the
human character and mental faculties expressed themselves through facial con-
figuration and in the form and measures of the head (the tenets of physiognomy
and phrenology, respectively), then photographs would be the ideal diagnostic
and nosological instrument. The photographic portrait could be the empirical
evidence of the visual symptomatology of psychosis.
The first attempt to systematically use photography to record the physiog-
nomy of the mentally ill for clinical use was carried out by the British psychi-
atrist Hugh Welch Diamond, superintendent of the Female Department of the
Surrey County Asylum. Importantly, he was also a founding member of the
Royal Photographic Society. In 1852, Diamond produced a photographic series
of types of insanity, and four years later he gave a talk at the Royal Society in
which he expounded what he considered to be the three functions of photogra-
phy in the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness.78 Photography, Diamond
maintained, could record the appearance of the insane for study (physiognomic
paradigm); it could be used in the treatment of patients, by presenting them a
strikingly accurate self-image; and it could be valuable in case of re-admission
(the photographic portrait would confirm the identity of the patient and recall
to the doctor’s mind the case and its treatment).79 Hence, the photograph was
simultaneously embedded in a gnoseological structure (the physiognomic the-
ory), a therapeutic protocol, and a controlling apparatus. For what regards the
diagnostic function, it was conceivable because, by catching the expressions and
countenance of the patient with perfect accuracy, it allowed the psychiatrist to
evaluate the corresponding mental state with the highest precision. However,
78Historian Jennifer Tucker remarks that Diamond used his photographic albums not only
for medical purposes, but also to promote scientific photography. His work circulated among
photographers, beyond the medical community. See Tucker, 2005, 18-19.
79See Diamond, 1856.
80 The beginnings of medical photography: visualizing illness
the individual portraits could work as diagnostic tools only by looking at them
against the universal and normative physiognomic framework. Hence, Diamond
had to believe that there existed a physiognomic typus for each mental condi-
tion, and that the photographic series, by gathering together several individual
instances, would allow to distill general, universal features that identified dif-
ferent groups. In this respect he subscribed to what Sekula has identified as
the symbolic meaning of photographs, epitomized by Galton’s composite por-
traitures. On the contrary, when he suggested that the inmates’ portraits could
be used as a reference in case of re-admission, Diamond was clearly thinking
of photographs in indexical terms, as Bertillon would do some decades later.
More importantly, it was within that conception of photographs as indices of
individual identities and histories that Diamond could envisage the use of pho-
tography as diagnostic and therapeutic tool. The photographic portrait could
have a therapeutic eﬀect as far as both the physician and the patient believed
in the perfect realism and truth-value of the camera (I will elaborate more on
the therapeutic use of Diamond’s photographs below).
As most scientists of his time, Diamond was bold in his claims about pho-
tography. In the paper delivered to the Royal Society he stated:
The Photographer secures with unerring accuracy the external phe-
nomena of each passion, as the really certain indication of internal de-
rangement, and exhibits to the eye the well known sympathy which exists
between the diseased brain and the organs and features of the body. [...]
The Photographer catches in a moment the permanent cloud, or the pass-
ing storm or sunshine of the soul, and thus enables the metaphysician to
witness and trace out the connection between the visible and the invisi-
ble in one important branch of his researches into the Philosophy of the
human mind.80
In this quote Diamond summarizes his convictions on both psychiatry and pho-
tography. In accordance with the physiognomic paradigm, he firmly believed
that there was a correspondence between the physical appearance and counte-
nance of a person and her psychological state. Mental disease, which is in itself
invisible, became visible on the surface of the body. Hence the metaphysician,
that is, the thinker who tried to understand phenomena of intangible nature such
as human nature, had to look at the slightest bodily manifestations if he was
to accurately map, classify, and eventually understand, psychiatric disorders.
In this physiognomic framework, photography played the same role that neuro-
imaging currently plays in neuropsychiatry, which tries to map mental disease
into functional areas of the brain. Photography, with its purported “unerring
80Diamond, 1856, 20.
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Figure 2.5: Patient at Surrey Asylum, case identified as “religious melancholy.”
Calotype by H.W. Diamond, 1852.
accuracy,” had the ability to catch even the slightest manifestation of the soul,
being it a lapse of anger or an instant of joy. And through the attentive analysis
of these superficial manifestations, the psychiatrist could trace the thread from
the visible surface (the body) to the invisible source of disease (the psyche).
Diamond hoped that through the creation of image repositories of patients
with diﬀerent psychiatric conditions, it would be finally possible to define and
classify mental diseases on the firm grounds of the “silent but telling language of
nature,” which is more powerful than any “laboured description.”81 Each por-
trait would function as an exemplar of the disease, a characteristic typus, which
embodied the fundamental and recurrent features of the pathological state. Here
the individual was again obliterated, it became an occurrence within a series, or
the impersonal, characteristic specimen of a disease. As epistemic instrument
at the service of the physiognomic theory, each portrait could function at two
levels. On the one hand, it worked as an exemplar of the disease, as a dried leaf
or flower in the herbarium of a botanist. It represented a characteristic typus,
which embodied the fundamental and recurrent features of a given mental con-
dition, e.g., mania or melancholia (Figure 2.5). On the other hand, it could be
embedded in two diﬀerent series of images: (1) a sequence of portraits of various
patients aﬀected by diﬀerent mental illness, and (2) a sequence of portraits of
81Diamond, 1856, 19-20.
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the same patient at diﬀerent stages of the disease. In the first case, by putting
in contrast characteristic representatives of a variety of mental pathologies, the
photographic series was meant to make more visible the idiosyncratic features
of each exemplar, thus making the individual picture more eloquent and rein-
forcing its meaning. In the second case, the series showed the transformations
that might occur within the same patient, thus adding a temporal, dynamic
dimension to the study of the disease. From this multiplicity of uses of patient’s
portraits emerges, once again, the unresolved tension between the will to rep-
resent the universal features of a disease (to identify a typus) and the need to
deal with singular, idiosyncratic individuals.
As seen above, in the discussion of Londe’s ideas on medical photography and
Sekula’s analysis of archival strategies, it seems that early medical photographers
(and, more generally, scientists) tried to come to terms with the problem of
the relation between the general and the particular by creating diﬀerent forms
of photographic series. On the one hand, they produced series of pictures of
diﬀerent patients aﬀected by the same ailment, in order to visualize the general
(universal) morphology of a disease; on the other hand, they gathered series of
pictures of the same patient, in order to reconstruct the history of the disease
in that specific individual. These two movements correspond to the realist and
nominalist modes of signification, respectively. They show how, in medicine, two
irreconcilable philosophical positions are forced to come to terms. Medicine, as
a practice, has to treat idiosyncratic unique individuals, hence, it must work
according to a nominalist approach. However, medicine, as a science, has to
extrapolate universal features from individual cases, and is thus forced to work
by induction, according to an ultimately realist mode of signification.
2.5.1 Clinical cases: articulating pictures and words
The search of a typus for a group of patients, corresponding to the facies of the
disease, was certainly the main core of the use of photography in medicine in the
nineteenth century, and the most common and widely available form of archive
was the collection of photographically illustrated clinical cases. The publication
of clinical cases in journals and atlases was meant to train the sort of reason-
ing and intuitive judgement that Galton tried to automate with his composite
portraits. A fundamental aspect of clinical cases, however, is that images are
wedded to a text, sometimes as mere examples, sometimes as non verbal argu-
ments. In this case, in order to understand the functioning of photography as
epistemic device, we must look also to its relation with the accompanying text.
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Figure 2.6: Patient at Surrey Asylum, case identified as “melancholia passing on to
mania.” Calotype by H.W. Diamond, 1852.
John Conolly, a major figure in the reform of the British asylums system (he
introduced the non-restraint system in the Hanwell Asylum), used Diamond’s
photographs in a series of essays on clinical cases published in 1958. In the
clinical case Melancholia passing on to Mania, he referred to the portrayal of
one patient (Figure 2.6) as follows:
[I]n the present instance the patient, after being insane some months,
and then falling into utter despondency [...] was in transition towards
mania. [...] Her story is but one in a larger chapter of such which London
furnishes. She gained a small livelihood by the occupation of a sorter
and folder of paper, and lived but poorly. After a confinement she had
an attack of puerperal mania, lasting about six months; her conversa-
tion was generally incoherent, and her actions were sometimes impulsive
and violent. [...] The photograph, taken when the state of melancholy
was passing into that of excitement, retains something of the fixedness
of attitude and expression in the first state; as in the arms held close to
the body, and the position of the lower extremities, and in the downward
tension of the cheek. The body is thin, and the hair is lank and heavy.
[...] The forehead is wrinkled with some strong emotion, and the eye-
brows, although corrugated, have not the tense contraction toward the
nose which is observable in many cases of melancholia [...].82
82Conolly, 1858, 47-48.
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This long quote shows well how the photograph, together with its description
and interpretation, was embedded in a narrative structure that encompassed the
life history of the patient (she was working-class, poor, she had a baby), and her
clinical history (she had been previously confined, she had suﬀered from puer-
peral mania). Through the physiognomic paradigm, these discursive elements
were mirrored and literally embodied in the expression and countenance of the
woman, and the possibility of a correspondence between image and text was
warranted by the existence of a standard physiognomic vocabulary. Fixed atti-
tude, contracted arms and hands, tense cheek and wrinkled forehead were the
signposts of mental illness: madness expressed itself on the body by clamping it
through the contraction of all the muscles. Conolly, just like Diamond, believed
that the photographs spoke the telling language of nature, but that language
would make sense only to those initiated to the nuances of the physiognomic de-
scriptive vocabulary and its system of correspondences. It was because Conolly
knew the clinical history of the patient, and he possessed a necessary and exact
lexicon, that he could extract the signs of a specific form of mental derange-
ment from the photograph. The meaning of the picture was deeply entrenched
with the written discourse that surrounded and sustained it. Images and words
confirmed and reinforced each other, constituting a continuous and coherent
epistemic structure.
2.5.2 Ambiguous, intimate portrayals
As mentioned earlier, however, for Diamond the portraits of his patients were
not only nosological instrument, they were also therapeutic resources. Antic-
ipating by more than a century some of the intuitions of the psychodynamic
approach, the psychiatrist-photographer defended that by looking at the accu-
rate self-image provided by the photographs, the patients would be encouraged
to undergo the necessary treatment. In the communication delivered at the
Royal Society in 1856, Diamond reported that the photographic portraits had
produced a positive eﬀect on some of the women under his care. Confronted
with such realistic images of themselves, patients were impelled to react to their
condition. Diamond also claimed that once cured, they showed amazement, and
sometimes amusement on seeing the pictures taken during the unfolding of their
disease. He believed that those very images might serve as a reminder of passed
suﬀering and would engender “the most lively feelings of gratitude”83 for the
recovery. The photographic image became an instrument of self-knowledge and
reflexivity.
83Diamond, 1856, 21.
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According to the historian of medicine Sander L. Gilman, the rationale of
Diamond’s course of treatment was directly grounded in the shocking impression
of reality that photography arose in the patients (and, more generally, in all the
earlier viewers of photographs). The photographic plate confronted the patient
with a new, startling perception of herself, and this perception seemed so unnat-
urally real that it was supposed to put in motion a process of self-reflexivity.84
“The nineteenth-century alienist” Gilman claims, “saw the patient-observer as
sharing the implication of the photographic image, the startle eﬀect that accom-
panied the introduction of this new medium of representation.”85 Hence, the
patient was not merely an object of study. On the contrary, she was supposed
to partake the gaze of the clinician and turn it upon herself, not in the sense
of perceiving herself as an anonymous object of scientific inquiry, but rather in
the sense of developing a form of self-reflexivity. In other words, Diamond’s
therapeutic program broke with the dichotomy between observer and observed
established by clinical anatomy, and acknowledged the patient’s competence to
directly interact with her own image. Of course, the way these women inter-
acted with the photographs and with their meaning was deeply influenced by
the medical setting, and it is hard to say if the sort of self-reflexivity promoted
by Diamond was normative or liberating (we might reasonably assume that this
depended on the singular case). Yet, it was certainly an approach that presup-
posed a degree of psychological autonomy and self-awareness in the mentally
ill, a presupposition that was clearly absent in the so-called visual psychology
developed twenty years later by Jean-Martin Charcot, at the Salpêtrière. Here
the patients were used as actual experimental specimens and thus asked, or even
forced, to perform their hysteric attacks in front of Charcot, his assistants and
the public who crowded his Tuesday lectures (I discuss the iconography of the
Salpêtrière later in this chapter).
Diamond’s double protocol, nosological and therapeutic at the same time,
implied an inherent tension between the objective and subjective meaning of
the photograph, because the patient was asked to observe her subjectivity made
visible, hence objectivized, by the photographic apparatus. In this sense we can
say that the pictures from the Surrey Asylum are ambiguous and unsettling,
for they occupy a middleground between the portrayal of a unique individual,
invited to self-reflexivity, and the scientific evidence.86 We will never know
84See Gilman, 1993, 355-356.
85Gilman, 1993, 355.
86It is interesting to note that physicians were concerned about the dangers of letting
circulate medical photographs outside the hospital. In 1863, the psychiatrist Legrande du
Saulle envisaged the creation of photographic records of the kind implemented by Diamond,
but he stressed the importance of destroying the images once the patient was discharged from
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Figure 2.7: Patients at Surrey Asylum. Calotypes by H.W. Diamond, 1852.
what these portraits really meant to the women represented in them, what they
really saw in those carefully composed images. To the untrained contemporary
observer, they are quite quizzical pictures. The brow of the young woman
described by Conolly is certainly furrowed. She looks perplexed, preoccupied,
and resigned, all at the same time, but the intensity with which she stares at
something going on outside our field of view drags us outside of the photograph,
rather than into the intimacy of her emotional state.
Even more enigmatic is the image of a girl with a laurel wreath and a blanket
(Figure 2.7, left). The wreath was a common adornment in early photographic
portraits, but it was normally associated with a corresponding scenario and
clothes. Here, however, it stands out in stark contrast with the dark blanket,
which could be a mark of the hospital as well as a fake cape for a bizarre
theatrical scene. The girl seems to look attentively at someone outside of the
photographic set, as though waiting for instructions, and unless we assume that
the eccentric attire was a mark of her behavior, we have no clue about the
reasons for her admission into an insane asylum. The lady with a white ribbon
(Figure 2.7, right) seems to get closer to our current idea of psychiatric patient:
her eyes wide open look somewhere beyond us, and her tightened lips – together
with the crossed arms that enclose her body in a large shawl and the lace that
fastens the straight motionless hair – seem to keep at bay an inner sorrow. In
figure 2.8, the uncombed hair and the crumpled clothes of the patient might
possibly reveal her alleged hysteria, and yet, the mix of sadness, weariness and
irony that shows through her face remains indecipherable. Our attention is
the asylum. He was afraid that photographs could end up on the market with a potentially
disrupting eﬀect on both the diseased person and his or her family. See Sicard, 1995, 18.
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Figure 2.8: Patient at Surrey Asylum. Calotype by H.W. Diamond, 1852.
caught by the ring on her left hand (what Roland Barthes would identify as the
punctum of this photograph), which points to her life outside the asylum, her
family, her private history.
There is a decorous calm in the bodies of these women, which contrasts
starkly with the spectacular bodies of the hysterics depicted by Charcot in col-
laboration with his assistants and photographers. Unlike Charcot’s patients,
captured in the uncontrolled agitation of their seizures, Diamond’s ladies stand
still, posing for the photographer in profound concentration, whether they look
into the camera or to some invisible event removed from our field of view.
Art historian Martin Kemp has remarked that Diamond’s pictures were staged
within the aesthetics (framings, backgrounds, posing) of the photographic por-
trayal of his time,87 and indeed, most of them could find their place in a family
album. Looking at these photographs we do not see clinical cases, we rather have
a feeling similar to that described by Benjamin in relation to David Octavius
Hill’s portrait of the Newhaven fishwife. Benjamin wrote:
In Hill’s Newhaven fishwife, her eyes cast down in such indolent, se-
ductive modesty, there remains something that goes beyond testimony to
the photographer’s art, something that cannot be silenced, that fills you
with an unruly desire to know what her name was, the woman who was
87See Kemp, 2006, 292.
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alive there, who even now is still real and will never consent to be wholly
absorbed in ‘art.’88
As the Newhaven fishwife, the women from the Surrey Asylum tell us that they
were “alive there.” They assert their presence, their life. It is a life that has
passed away for long now, and yet it left its sparkle there, indisputable. The
photograph captured that instant of life that cannot be erased, because it has
already happened, it is accomplished, and nothing can un-make it. As in the case
of the Newhaven fishwife, the presence of the women from the Surrey Asylum
in front of the camera goes beyond the photographer’s art (and the scientific
categories of the psychiatrist), imposes the sheer reality of their existence, and
make us wonder about their names, their real lives.
2.6 Dermatology: the struggle for realism
Together with psychiatry, the other clinical specialty that immediately sized
upon photography was dermatology. As discussed in Chapter 1, clinical anatomy
revolutionized medicine by positing the internal, hidden lesion as the origin of
any disease. In the case of dermatology, however, there was no hidden lesion to
look for: the lesion was at the surface, consequently its very visibility was the
symptom, the sign and the diagnosis at the same time. Accordingly, photog-
raphy was immediately perceived as an ideal recording and diagnostic tool for
dermatologists. Dermatology is a discipline of total visibility, hence, for the der-
matologist, the superficial gaze of the camera perfectly fitted with the eye of the
clinician. The closeup, the selection of details on the very surface of the body,
was the clinic. Not surprisingly then, it was a dermatologist, Albert Hardy, who
coined the expression “photographic clinic” [clinique photographique], in 1867.
With its ability to carefully record what the eye of the doctor saw, photog-
raphy was an ideal means of communication and knowledge sharing: pictures
circulate easily, and rare skin diseases started to travel in eﬃgy across coun-
tries. Moreover, thanks to its capacity to keep record of what is unnoticeable,
it fostered the observation of new phenomena. Therefore it was thought that
it could help in both diagnosis and nosology. Yet, media theorist Monique
Sicard points out that with the introduction of photography in dermatology un-
certainty tended to prevail over knowledge. In the absence of well established
taxonomical frames, in fact, the accumulation of scattered visual data lead to
the proliferation of painstakingly detailed descriptions, which had little use for
actual medical practice.89 For some years discussions about the proper identi-
88Benjamin, 1931, 510.
89See Sicard, 1995, 15, and 1998, 149.
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fication of papules, pustules, spots and the like burgeoned, in the attempt to
establish an ever more specific terminology. The debate went as far as to raise
Hardy’s preoccupation that the proliferation of images could paradoxically lead
to an arid nominalism, with dermatologists more preoccupied in labeling the
manifestations of the diseases rather than understanding and treating them.90
Hardy, in collaboration with his intern A. de Montméja, was the men-
tor of the first photographically illustrated medical review, the Clinique pho-
tographique de l’Hôpital Saint-Louis, which was published in fourteen issues
between 1867 and 1868, when all the installments were collected in a single
volume atlas.91 This work had an explicit pedagogical intent. In the preface
Hardy explained that the objective of the publication was to provide medical
students and practitioners with a visual aid to train the eye in the recognition
of skin diseases. To this aim each pathology was sketched out in a short verbal
description and exemplified by a photograph. Photographs, with their alleged
realism, were supposed to have a higher degree of exactitude, compared to other
forms of illustration, and leave a stronger mnemonic impression. In order to as-
sure his readers about the accountability of the images, Hardy specified that all
the pictures had been skillfully created by his assistant, “who combine[d] an in
depth knowledge of skin diseases to an indisputable talent as photographer and
colorist.” The plates, he insisted, “represented nature caught in the act.”92 Yet,
in spite of the absolute visibility of skin diseases, to catch them in the act, that
is, to represent them faithfully, was a real challenge for photography. Actually,
the attempt to truthfully depict the skin called into question the very axiom of
photography’s fidelity to nature. The most obvious diﬃculty came from colors.
How much realistic could be a representation that reduced the endless palette
of the real world to a fading scale of grey? Color shadows of the skin lesion are
a relevant diagnostic elements in dermatology, but good quality and aﬀordable
color photography became available only as late as 1950s.
Between fiction and reality Undoubtedly, in terms of realism, photographs
lagged far behind another form of dermatological representation, the so called
moulages. Used as teaching tools and research documents, moulages were three-
dimensional wax models of skin diseases, characterized by the astonishing, hap-
tic naturalism distinctive of wax sculptures. After being casted directly from the
90See Sicard, 1995, 15, and 1998, 149.
91Hardy became familiar with the dermatological applications of photography in 1866,
when he came to know the work of Alexander Belmanno Squire in London. He conse-
quently asked his student de Montméja to work on this new imaging technique and in
a very short time they created the Clinique Photographique. See http://www.bium.univ-
paris5.fr/histmed/medica/dermato.htm (retrieved on Aug 16, 2013).
92Hardy, 1868, n.p.
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patient’s body, these models were painted and, in many cases, real hair, nails
and clothes fabric were added to reinforce the appearance of real life.93 Com-
pared to photographs, however, moulages were cumbersome, fragile, took much
space, and were diﬃcult to transport. Crucially, they were not mechanically
reproducible and could not be produced in large series.
Still, in spite of all the obvious diﬀerences that separate wax models from
photographs, the excessive, disturbing naturalism of the moulages finds an odd
counterpart in the iconography of the Clinique photographique. In fact, in order
to overcome the problem of color, de Montméja had to retouch each photo-
graphic plate with watercolors, a common practice at the time, creating hybrid
images that attempted to merge photographic and pictorial realism. These hy-
brid pictures expose a contradiction that apparently eluded both scientists and
photographers in the nineteenth century. On the one hand, photographs were
trusted on the basis of their indexical nature, more specifically, on the basis
of the belief that the realism of a photograph scored above the realism of a
painting, because the photographic image was the result of a direct imprint of
nature on the sensible plate; the photograph was perceived as a natural object,
the un-mediated appearing of reality on a photographic plate. On the other
hand, those who actually produced the photographs realized that in order to
really look like reality, the photographic image had to be retouched, using tradi-
tional artistic techniques as watercolor. That is, far from being unproblematic
imprints of nature, dermatological photographs required intense labor in order
to become similar to the real objects they were meant to represent.
That notwithstanding, the earliest practitioners of photography did not dis-
cuss or problematize the contradictions arising from their ideas about photog-
raphy (perceived as imprint of nature) and their actual practice (intensive labor
to make photographs look similar to reality). We could say that they were
not disturbed by the ambiguity of the new optical medium. They trusted and
praised its fidelity to nature, even though they were quite aware of its actual
limitations. In this regard, photography theorist Geoﬀrey Batchen has argued
that in the early days of photography the ontological status of photographic
pictures was understood as complex and unstable, wavering between fiction
and reality.94 Through the analysis of Hyppolite Bayard’s Self-Portrait as a
Drowned Man (1940), an ostensibly staged (hence fake) photographic portrait
93Wax moulages were produced and used between the 1890s and the 1950s for clinical
collection and medical training. They were completely let aside only in the second half of the
twentieth century, when the quality of color photograph substantially improved, allowing for
a more powerful visual realism. See Schnalke, 1995 and 2004.
94Batchen, 1999, 202.
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that depicted the photographer as if he had died by drowning,95 Batchen shows
that the photograph was understood as both perfomative and documentary, a
natural object and a cultural artifact.96 In a similar vein, Sabine Kriebel has
pointed out that during the nineteenth century the conception and reception of
the photographic image was “bifurcated.”97 On the one hand, photographs were
perceived as the product of a technical process, and the camera was conceived of
as a picture-machine whose mechanical functioning was a warrant of objectivity.
On the other hand, the language used to refer to photographs was often based
on nature, as if they were quasi-natural objects (common expressions were “sun
pictures” and “impressed by nature’s hand”). They were “taken” from nature
in quite the same way as naturalists took their specimens from the wild.98
The pictures of the Clinique photographique, with their superimposition of
two media (photography and watercolor) produced an involuntary and unset-
tling carnivalesque eﬀect (Figure 2.9), and yet they provided medical evidence.
Used to illustrate the discursive description of the diﬀerent pathologies (in the
pagination of the atlas each image follows its corresponding text), these pho-
tographs were meant to transform living and suﬀering individuals into the rep-
resentative of a disease. Embedded as they are in the structure of the atlas,
the bodies and the faces of the patients became part of a scientific discourse, an
argumentation grounded in an optical empiricism. Nevertheless, if we remove
them from this context and look at them outside of the series of clinical cases,
those images taken almost a century and a half ago, still convey private histo-
ries of suﬀering and shame. They are two-sided. On one side they are scientific
models (of the disease), on the other they are portraits (of the singular patient).
In other words, these photographs embody the problem of the relationship be-
tween a scientific representation which is, by definition, the representation of a
general instance, and the representation of an individual, a particular case, with
its unicity and idiosyncrasies.
95Hyppolite Bayard claimed to have invented photography before Daguerre, and that he
had been persuaded by a friend of Daguerre to postpone the announcement of his findings.
Consequently he missed the opportunity to be recognized as the inventor of the medium. In
1840 he reacted to this injustice by creating a portrait of himself as a drowned man. He
accompanied the photograph with the following caption: “The corpse which you see here is
that of M. Bayard, inventor of the process that has just been shown to you. As far as I know
this indefatigable experimenter has been occupied for about three years with his discovery.
The Government, which has been only too generous to Monsieur Daguerre, has said it can do
nothing for Monsieur Bayard, and the poor wretch has drowned himself. Oh the vagaries of
human life...!”
96Batchen, 1999, 202.
97Kriebel, 2007, 8.
98See Kriebel, 2007, 8.
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Figure 2.9: Female patients aﬀected by impetigo (left) and pemphigus foliaceus
(right). A. Hardy and A. de Montméja, Clinique photographique de l’Hôpital Saint-
Louis, Paris, 1868.
Educating vision and emotion Spurred on by the success of the Clinique
photographique, in 1869 de Montméja together with another intern, J. Rengade,
improved the equipment of the Saint Louis’ photographic studio and created
the Revue photographique des hôpitaux de Paris. In the introduction to the first
issue of the new publication, the two physician-photographers wrote that they
had “the honor to publish the most baﬄing cases collected in Paris hospitals,”
and they defined their photographic station “the meeting point of what is more
interesting and rare in pathology.”99 Indeed, the Revue photographique was a
collection of clinical cases of the most striking and upsetting dermatological and
teratological diseases of the time, carefully documented and illustrated. Com-
menting on the work of de Montméja and Rengade, Robert Pujade, philosopher
and theorist of photography, has argued that looking at this kind of publica-
tions (the Revue photographique was quickly followed by similar journals) one
has the impression that photographs replaced the ancient cabinet of curiosities,
with their collections of exotic specimens, whose nature and classification was
uncertain.100
In Renaissance Europe, cabinets of curiosities were assortments of objects
of all kinds. They might include stuﬀed animals, horns, skeletons, minerals,
99de Montméja and Rengade, 1869, n.p.
100See Pujade, 1995.
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herbaria, as well as artworks, religious and historical relics, automata, ethno-
graphic specimens, and so forth. Some cabinets of curiosities were precursors
to museums, but often the most bizarre biological specimens found their final
destination in freak shows. Freak shows, which started to be popular in Europe
already in the second half of the sixteenth century, put on display all kinds
of biological oddities, with particular emphasis on unusual human beings (e.g.,
very large or very small persons, hermaphrodites, siamese twins). As a matter
of fact, medical teratological photographs, with their visual violence, look more
like freak shows than cabinet of curiosities. This is probably the reason why
Cartwright has argued that early medical photography, with its hideous iconog-
raphy, fed the voyeuristic pulsions of the medical community.101 Pujade, too,
wonders in what these catalogues of deformities could help the advancement of
the medical science. Yet, his answer is quite diﬀerent from Cartwright’s. He
suggests that teratological photographs were actually meant to train doctors’
perception. This training was not aimed at recognizing recurrent patterns of a
disease, but rather at getting used to the horror and revulsion aroused by the
deformity of the human body, in order to become able to accomplish the task of
the scientist, that is, to observe with detachment.102 For Pujade, it was not a
matter of voyeurism or of de-humanizing the doctor or the patient, it was rather
a methodological, pedagogical necessity of transforming “a catastrophic body
into an observable phenomenon,” carrying out a transition “from a fantastic
dimension of appearances to an observable reality.”103 The clinical glance, to
be eﬀective, had to get used to obliterate the instinctual impulse of pity and
disgust, so that the underlying medical phenomenon could come to the fore.104
The education of the eye became an education of emotions.
The expressive dimension of the dermatological portrait acquires its full ex-
tent in the photographs of Félix Méheux. This photographer, employed at the
Hôpital Saint-Louis between 1884 and 1904, was at the same time praised and
criticized for his pictures.105 Trained as a painter and not as a clinician, he cre-
101See Cartwright, 1995. For an interesting analysis of the relationship between the
nineteenth-century freak shows and contemporary medical documentaries, see van Dijck, 2005,
20-40.
102See Pujade, 1995, 92.
103Pujade, 1995, 93, my translation.
104The problem of the medical freak show is not just a concern of modern scholars in visual
studies. Already at the time when pathological photography appeared critics from within the
medical domain pointed out that many of the pictures that were published had no scientific
relevance. As early as 1865 the British Medical Journal charged the editors of The Lancet with
obscenity, for publishing a photograph of a man with two sets of genitals, and in 1886 another
author questioned the avail of taking photographs of morbid specimens which, compared to
the corresponding drawings, seemed to show nothing but morphologic chaos. See Kemp, 2006,
279.
105See Pujade, 1995, 90-91, and Sicard, 1998, 150-151.
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Figure 2.10: Syphilitic alopecia (left). Pigmentation probably caused by photo-
sensitization due to a cosmetic product (right), F. Mehéux, ca. 1884-1893.
ated his images from the perspective of the visual artist. Through a skillful work
with light, shadows, and framing, he deliberately composed photographs which
did not just exemplify the pathology, but were first and foremost portraits of
the diseased individual, conveying a personal history and an intimate suﬀering
(Figure 2.10). As noted by Pujade: “[In the work of Méheux] the artistic gaze
puts on stage the simple presence of subjects who pose for the ‘alopecia areata
decalvans’, the ‘herpetic diseases’, or the ‘fetal ichthyosis’, with the result of bur-
dening with beauty the image of their catastrophic condition.”106 Like allegoric
figurines, the women and men of these portraits stand for something else than
themselves, they pose as images of a disease, but the choice of focus and fram-
ing, the darkness that surrounds them, the small details (a ring, a curl), direct
our look towards a human being, not a clinical case. It is not a matter of aes-
theticizing the disease, there is neither morbid voyeurism in these photographs,
nor moralizing intentions. What happens is that the narrative, personal dimen-
sion of the portrayal overrules its informational content. Not surprisingly, then,
physicians acknowledged and appreciated the uncanny beauty of Méheux’s por-
traits, but some of them accused him of not being scientifically sound, because
his pictures were not produced according to standardized protocols (the rules
summarized by Londe in his book of 1893), but rather according to artistic
106Pujade, 1995, 91, my translation.
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canons.107 The shattered humanity of Méheux’s portraits was perceived as apt
for contemplation and emotion, not for scientific observation and examination.
Photography might well be endowed with an inherent analytic or dissecting
quality, but in order to be scientifically meaningful and acceptable, photographs
had to be inscribed within a proper aesthetic canon, a visual code which imposed
standardized protocols of framing, lighting, exposure, pose and distance between
camera and sitter. This visual code had the aim to produce an eﬀect of aesthetic
neutrality, that is, to convey the feeling that photographs were blank from the
stylistic and interpretive point of view. This, however, was a paradoxical project,
because at the very moment in which such visual rules were implemented, a
specific style of depiction was born. A style that possibly responded to specific
needs of clarity, standardization, and reproducibility, but that was also aimed
at displaying its objectivity.
2.7 Duchenne de Boulogne: electricity meets
photography
In the same period in which de Montméja dealt with the diﬃculties of repro-
ducing the surface of the body and Diamond developed his physiognomic pro-
gram, the neurologist Guillaume Duchenne, known as Duchenne de Boulogne,
was experimenting with what he called “electrophysiological photographs,”108
in search of the the laws that govern the muscular underpinning of both motion
and emotion. A founding father of clinical medicine, Duchenne, who worked at
the Salpêtrière, specialized in muscular and neurological disorders. He was the
first to describe pseudo-hypertrophic muscular paralysis (which today is known
under the name of Duchenne muscular dystrophy) and he studied extensively
progressive muscle atrophy and atrophic paralysis in children. His study of emo-
tions was in part a consequence of his research on muscular conditions, since the
muscles of the face, the place where human emotions show through, are often
aﬀected by amyotrophic diseases.
Scientific observation through photography It is important to note that,
as pointed out by Sicard, Duchenne’s method was simultaneously electrophys-
iological and photographic.109 The electrophysiological protocol required the
application of a low intensity current to a circumscribed area of the body, in
107See Sicard, 1998, 150.
108Duchenne, 1862a, n.p.
109See Sicard, 1998, 133.
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order to elicit the contraction of a single muscle. By provoking controlled con-
tractions within an experimental setting, it became possible to disentangle the
mechanisms that underly muscular syndromes and their morphological and func-
tional manifestations. The electrophysiological experiment, however, required
the support of photography in order to produce adequate scientific observa-
tions. Both visual expressions and the movements and positions characteristic
of muscular diseases often last just a glimpse, thus, if one is to study them sys-
tematically, it is necessary to fix them in an enduring image. In his Album de
photographies pathologiques, of 1862, Duchenne wrote: “These are deformities
that appear and disappear only when performing certain movements. Often
the patients have diﬃculties in carrying out the movements [...]. I had to, so
to say, seize upon these deformities and abnormal movements by means of in-
stantaneous photography.”110 Photography, with its ability to grasp and fix
fleeting phenomena, and with its reproducibility, made possible to collect and
compare the visible eﬀects of the invisible contraction of the muscles of the face
and limbs. Without the photographic record it would have been impossible to
develop electrophysiology: the production of a transient phenomenon acquired
experimental relevance only as far as it could be fixed in a permanent image.
Thus, the documental character of photography, its ability to preserve the
“honesty and truth” of the temporary phenomenon, as Londe put it,111 made
the electrophysiological experiment relevant. Still, although he professed an
unconditional trust in the recording powers of photography, Duchenne was also
well aware that the technology in itself had little epistemic relevance if it was
not coupled with a trained eye and embedded in a larger medical knowledge.
In the introductory note to the Album he claimed that only photography could
show the true nature of the deformities and the incoherent movements caused by
the disease. However, he warned that photography would speak the language of
nature only if who was representing the pathological phenomenon understood
it, and he held explicitly that the photographer had to be physiologist and
pathologist (this was actually the reason why he had become a photographer
himself).112
Duchenne’s pathological photographs show naked bodies, often seen from the
back. Accompanied by a detailed caption and by a description of the medical
case, they demand of the observer an analytic attitude, in search of the signs,
more or less dramatic, that bear testimony of the disease and that, to the trained
eye reveal a physiological mechanism, a diagnosis and a prognosis. Unlike in the
110Duchenne, 1862a, n.p, my translation.
111Londe, 1893, 6.
112See Duchenne, 1862a, n.p.
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Figure 2.11: Muscular atrophy, Duchenne de Boulogne, Album de photographies
pathologiques, Paris, 1862, Figure 9. Public domain.
case of Diamond’s portraits, these pictures the context of production is explicitly
scientific. Naked and deformed, set against a neutral background, framed within
the information of the captions, these bodies are clinical cases. Of course, in
the instances in which we see the faces we still wonder who that person really
was, when we see a striking deformity we might feel overwhelmed, but before
a slightly asymmetric back we look for the details, analyze the form, and ask
ourselves what might be the clinical meaning of those rounded marks at the
base of the column (Figure 2.11).
Construction of an aesthetic canon for medical photography With the
pictures of the Album de photographies pathologiques, Duchenne contributed to
define the aesthetic code of medical photography, characterized by naked bodies
against neutral backgrounds. As mentioned above, it was an aesthetic canon of
ostensible visual neutrality, similar to that of ethnographic research and criminal
records, also aimed at establishing a metric of the human body. However, it
was with the plates of the grimacing faces of Le Mécanisme de la physionomie
humaine, also published in 1862, that he left an indelible mark in the history
of scientific iconography (Figure 2.12). As the title explains, in this work –
divided in two parts, the first addressed to scientists, the second to visual artists
– Duchenne set out to describe the mechanisms of human physiognomy, that is,
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Figure 2.12: The facial expression of profound attention on the human face being in-
duced by electrical current. Duchenne de Boulogne, Le Mécanisme de la physionomie
humaine, Paris, 1862, Plate 1, figure 9. Wellcome Library, London.
to understand the physiological rules that govern the expression of emotions. His
method consisted of triggering muscular contractions with electrical probes and
recording the resulting grimaces by means of photography. He thus created an
extensive visual gallery of what he considered to be the mechanical expressions
of inner emotions.
Art historian Martin Kemp has defined Le Mécanisme de la physionomie
humaine “the most remarkable of all the photographically illustrated books in
medical science before 1900,” and he has remarked that the portraits of the old
shoemaker of the Salpêtrière, who was Duchenne’s favorite model, “are visually
striking as the often exaggerated portrayals in the drawn manuals of expres-
sion.”113 Yet, although Duchenne mentions the painter Charles Le Brun among
the predecessors of his visual research, he does so just to stress in what re-
spect his endeavor was diﬀerent. Namely, he insisted on the fact that while the
artist merely represented the diﬀerent physiognomical conformations produced
by passions, he, as a neurologist, wanted to understand the physiological mech-
anisms that ruled the movements of the face that made emotions visible.114 He
stated: “By tracing the pathway from the expressive muscle to the soul that
puts it into action, I was able to study and discover the mechanism, the laws
113Kemp, 2006, 289.
114See Duchenne, 1862b, 2.
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of human physiognomy,”115 and “[by means of electrophysiological experiments]
we understand how each passion is always delineated on the face by the same
muscular contractions, and neither fashion nor whim can make them change.”116
For Duchenne, the laws of the expression of emotions coincided with their
mechanism of motion. In this respect I think that Kemp misses the point when
he writes:
[Duchenne’s] instrumental analysis of the expression of emotions achieves
compelling visual results, yet the definition of the subject’s emotional
state remains that of the observer, because the ‘sitter’ was not actually
experiencing that particular emotion at the time of the making of the
image.117
Here Kemp implies that Duchenne failed to represent the true emotion of the
subjects of his experiments, because they were not feeling that emotion when
the picture was taken. This was not, however, what Duchenne was attempting
to achieve. He was not concerned with exploring the real nature of emotions.
He had no doubt that emotions reside in the soul, and that it is the soul which
under natural circumstances triggers the muscular movements that lead to the
expression of emotions. Tellingly, he did not talk of “emotional states” but
rather of “motions of the soul.” Working within the framework of positivist and
mechanist philosophy, Duchenne understood the laws of nature, including the
expression of emotions, in terms of mechanical laws. He did not question the
idea that emotions spring from the soul. His point was that through electrostim-
ulation one can activate the muscles just as the soul does. And this is exactly
the reason why under electrostimulation a person can express an emotion even
though he or she is not actually feeling that specific emotion. Duchenne’s work
revolved around the idea that, given that the soul needs the muscles to find a
visible expression on the surface of the body, then by studying the muscles one
can understand the mechanical laws that underpin the expression of emotions.
Kemp comments on Duchenne’s photographs as if they were artistic portrayals,
but they were not.
A more pertinent criticism to Duchenne’s approach came from Charles Dar-
win. In The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals (1872), Darwin re-
peatedly mentioned Duchenne and reproduced some of his electrophysiological
photographs. He acknowledged the importance of the work of the French neurol-
ogist and praised his research, but he pointed out that Duchenne had overstated
the relevance of the contraction of a single muscle in the expression of emotion.
115Duchenne, 1862b, xii.
116Duchenne, 1862b, 51.
117Kemp, 2006, 290.
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More importantly, Duchenne had not understood that expressions had not been
inscribed on the human face by God at the moment of Creation, they were
rather the result of an evolutionary process. For Darwin, Duchenne’s pictures
were relevant in that they allowed the comparison of human and animal expres-
sions. The laws of these expressions, however, were to be found in their common
ancestor and not in muscular activity.
Models not portraits As aptly observed by Sicard, Duchenne’s mechanical
faces – like Marey’s human machines that appeared a couple of decades later
– are models not portraits.118 They are “experimental creations of a series of
photographs that mimic reality without necessarily being similar to it, but that
allows understanding its operating principles.”119 This is an extremely impor-
tant point, an essential feature of all modern medical imaging. If in Diamond’s
portrayals patients were still endowed with their here and now, their aura, their
unique humanity, Duchenne started a process of visual abstraction and analysis
of the human body by means of photography. On the one hand, the patient’s
body became part of the experimental setting and was integrated into the imag-
ing apparatus, in order to constitute a scientific object proper (the patient, the
electric devices, and the photographic studio are bound together to form the
experimental setting). On the other hand, the mimetic properties of mechanical
images, although routinely praised, became secondary, or disappeared altogether
in the context of more and more complex experimental forms of photographic
visualization such as those discussed by Benjamin and the other theorists of his
generation (enlargement, slow-motion, and so on).
2.8 Charcot: the aesthetics of hysteria
Duchenne’s innovative approach to photography and photographic experimen-
tation was taken on by his most famous student, Jean-Martin Charcot, who
became director of the Salpêtrière in 1862. Charcot, considered the founder
of modern neurology, was the first to describe multiple sclerosis and a number
of other neuro-degenerative pathologies. Convinced that hysteria (one of the
most elusive mental diseases since the times of Hippocrates), was also a neu-
rological disorder, he developed the most famous and debated iconography of
hystero-epileptic patients ever. Images were fundamental in Charcot’s research
and teaching. His anatomo-clinical method consisted of two steps: the first
focused on the clinical description of the neurological condition, complemented
118See Sicard, 1998, 34.
119Sicard, 1998, 134, my translation.
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by drawings or photographs that documented the static deformities of chronic
diseases, as well as the evolving signs of acute illnesses. The second focused on
anatomical and microscopic analysis, and here, too, visual representation was
widely used to document his findings.120 Working from within the tradition of
clinical pathology, Charcot considered visual documentation a pivotal element
to his eﬀort to describe and categorize neurological disorders. As Gilman puts
it: “To describe was to understand, to describe in the most accurate manner
meant to avoid the ambiguity of words, and to rely on the immediate, real image
of the suﬀerer.”121
Under Charcot’s direction the Salpêtrière enrolled several artists, sculptors
and photographers (he appointed Londe as superintendent of the photographic
station of the hospital).122 At the Salpêtrière patients were regularly pho-
tographed as part of their neurological evaluation, and as Charcot’s clinical
interests moved increasingly towards the study of dynamic disorders, with hys-
teria ranking in the first place, in the 1880s his photographers developed se-
quential and time-lapse photographic methods. This was a major break in the
history of photography. Photographs, whose main characteristic was that of
freezing time, were now used to record the duration of movement, with the
result of transforming motion and time in a sequence of self-contained instants.
Several thousands of photographs of mentally deranged and geriatric pa-
tients were taken between the 1870s and the 1910s, and they were collected in
two diﬀerent publications, the Iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière and
the Nouvelle iconographie de la Salpêtrière. The first, published between 1875
and 1880 was a limited edition of hand-pasted photographs that documented
various disorders, but had a strong emphasis on epilepsy and hysteria. The
second, appeared between 1888 and 1918 was a large circulation journal that
reported neurological case studies based on pictorial documents (photographs or
drawings). In the introduction of the first volume of the Nouvelle iconographie,
the editors (Paul Richer, Gilles de la Tourette, and Albert Londe) wrote:
With the aid of this immediate record [drawings and photographs],
we are able to freeze the abnormality, to decompose the various abnormal
movements one by one, and thereby capture the disorder with precision.
[...] We can also say that with the aid of instantaneous photography, we
are able to capture and dissect on the sensible plate abnormal movements
that were impossible to analyze with all the desirable precision using the
clinical examination only.123
120See Coetz, 1991, 241.
121Gilman, 1993, 352.
122See Goetz, 1991; Pujade, 1995, 91-92.
123Richer, de la Tourette, and Londe, 1888, i-ii, my translation.
102 The beginnings of medical photography: visualizing illness
This insistence on the ability of photography to freeze and dissect movement
is symptomatic of the methodological problems that Charcot and his assistants
met in their research on neurological diseases in general, and hysteria in partic-
ular. They wanted to use photographs to see what the eye could not catch.
The malleability of the symptoms of hysteria made it a very diﬃcult ob-
ject of study, and already in Charcot’s time many physicians questioned its
very status as real disease. In order to be recognized as such, hysteria had to
show observable symptoms, and since its symptoms were fleeting, they needed
photography to be stabilized. Frustrated in his search for the organic, neuro-
logical substrates of hysteria, in fact, Charcot had been forced to fall back on
an epiphenomenalist, clinical account of the regularities of this disease, focusing
on its external manifestations. In this way he believed he could find the rela-
tionships that would place hysteria within the taxonomy of an extended family
of related deficits, all governed by known physiological laws, such as hemilat-
eral anesthesias, grandes paroxysmes, palpitations, Saint Vitus dance, tertiary
neurosyphilitic infections, and so on.124 In this project photography became
a taxonomic as well as diagnostic instrument. As noted in an early review of
the Iconographie photographique, the camera was as necessary for the study of
hysteria as the microscope was for histology.125
While Diamond had tried to understand and classify insanity as a psycholog-
ical disorder, on the basis of the patients’ facial expression, posture and attire,
Charcot was committed to a comprehensive clinical scrutiny of hysteria, which
included motor and sensory symptoms, tics, epileptiform seizures, somnambu-
lism, contractures, and a range of other pathologic behaviors.126 Accordingly,
if at the Surrey Asylum patients were represented within the boundaries of the
decorum of the bourgeois portrayal, at the Salpêtrière they were captured in
their crises (often instigated by the medical staﬀ) in hallucinated and halluci-
nating instant pictures, at moments in which they looked out of control, both
mentally and physically. As a consequence, Charcot created his own image of
hysteria, made of twisted bodies, contracted limbs, ecstatic figures and crying
faces (Figures 2.13 and 2.14).
This iconography inevitably shocks the viewer, and it is diﬃcult not to per-
ceive it as voyeuristic. The women of the Salpêtrière have been described both
as victims of relentless medical misogyny and violence,127 and as protagonists of
a mute resistance to institutional power, brought about by simultaneously se-
124See Porter, 1993, 258.
125See Gilman, 1993, 352.
126See Porter, 1993, 257.
127See Didi-Huberman, 1982.
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Figure 2.13: Passional attitudes (ecstasy). Photograph by Bourneville and P. Reg-
nard, Iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière, Paris, 1878, Plate 23.
Figure 2.14: Hystero-epileptic seizure. Photograph by Bourneville and P. Regnard,
Iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière, Paris, 1879-1880, Plate 3.
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ducing and duping the doctors through theatrical enactments of the disease.128
These two interpretations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Blanche, Au-
gustine, and the other “star hysterics”129 of the Tuesday Lectures were victims
of a controlling and repressive apparatus, not exempt from misogynist and vi-
olent overtones, and they protected themselves and asserted their agency with
the instruments at their disposal, by seducing and duping their doctors. Medical
historian Roy Porter writes:
The hysteria that Charcot studied - or, better perhaps, that he and
his patients co-produced - was a palimpsest of a performance, many lay-
ered with meanings. It bespeaks the utter docility of the body, under
the charismatic authority of mind (above all, the robot behavior of the
hypnotized). It marks deflected, oblique protest - a resistance that, inca-
pable of verbalization, was converted into somatic signals of violence and
burlesque.130
To be studied, to become scientific evidences, these “somatic signs of violence
and burlesque” had to be captured on the photographic plate. That is to say,
Charcot and Londe had to find a way to make the still photographic image
move. And they needed to convey not simply motion (even though dissected
in its instantaneous still sequences), but a violent motion charged of scientific
meanings, since these pictures were meant to be instruments for the study and
the diagnosis of hysteria.
In a commentary on the aesthetics of Charcot’s photographic enterprise,
Kemp maintains that the iconography of the Salpêtrière was consciously in-
scribed within the tradition of the history of art, and relied on the rhetorical
and theatrical resources developed in painting over the centuries. He states that:
“This is particularly true of the depiction of women, who express emotions in
ways familiar through generations of paintings and sculptures of sensually ec-
static martyrs.”131 It is well known that Charcot had a broad artistic culture,
and he explicitly relied on art as a form of scientific evidence.132 That notwith-
standing, to reduce the aesthetics he developed throughout his photographic
128See, for instance, Gilman, 1993, 346-349, and Porter, 1993, 255-260.
129Porter, 1993, 257.
130Porter, 1993, 256-257.
131Kemp, 2006, 293.
132To address the criticism of the numerous physicians who contended that the dramatic
manifestations of hysteria going on at the Salpêtrière were feigned, or even created by mental
suggestion, Charcot published Les démoniaques dans l’arts (1887), and Les diﬀormes et les
malades dans l’art (1889). In these works Charcot attempted to demonstrate that behaviors
similar to those observed at the Salpêtrière could be found in medieval and mannerist artworks
(mostly paintings and bas-relief) depicting demonic possession or spiritual ecstasy. Charcot,
however, failed at convincing the skeptics. One of the reasons was that he relied exclusively
on religious art, and was not able to find any equivalent in historical and genre painting. See
Goetz, 1991, 423-424.
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Figure 2.15: Hysterical woman yawning. Photograph by A. Londe, Nouvelle icono-
graphie de la Salpêtrière, Paris, 1890. Wellcome Library, London.
endeavor to the inscription within the artistic tradition of the (mostly religious)
iconography of ecstatic or possessed figures, is to belittle the epistemic ambition
and meaning of that very aesthetic. Charcot complied with the methodological
choice to focus on a range of pathological movements rather than on more subtle
facial expressions. Through his photographs of uncontrolled bodies he defined a
specific aesthetics of hysteria, which, in turn, reinforced and influenced the defi-
nition and recognition of the characteristic symptoms he wanted to track down.
Hence, there was a very tight connection and bidirectional influence between
the aesthetic qualities of the pictures and their epistemic dimension. Tellingly,
the iconography of the hysteric body produced at the Salpêtrière progressively
moved from more or less conventional, recognizable portraits (Figure 2.15) to
pictures of floundering naked bodies twisted against the black curtains of the
photographic studio (Figure 2.16). As in the work of Duchenne’s, there was
a shift from the mimetic dimension of the photograph to its abstract, analytic
function, which entailed a transition from the portrait to the scientific model.
As his teacher, in order to accomplish his project Charcot had to reconfigure
the body of his patients into a component of the experimental photographic
apparatus.
The idea that medical imaging embeds the human body into a larger ex-
perimental apparatus is a key concept of this dissertation, and will be further
developed in the remaining chapters. Also, I will expand on the idea that
106 The beginnings of medical photography: visualizing illness
Figure 2.16: Episode of male hysteria. Photograph by A. Londe, Nouvelle icono-
graphie de la Salpêtrière, Paris, 1888.
medicine, like biology and physiology, deals with the problem of creating im-
ages of invisible objects and phenomena (Chapter 3); that the mimetic images
provided by photography are routinely transformed into diagrammatic repre-
sentations (Chapter 4); and that photography has an analytic potential, which
exploded with the introduction of digital technologies (Chapter 5).
Chapter 3
Photography, radiography, and
the visualization of the invisible
As discussed in the previous chapter, since its origins medical photography has
dealt, one way or another, with the problem of producing pictures of something
that is not directly visible. In some cases, namely in psychiatry and neurol-
ogy, the problem laid in the fact that the visual dimension of the disease under
study was elusive. Consequently, a form of visibility had to be actively produced
through predefined theoretical constructs (for instance, phrenology and phys-
iognomy in psychiatry), or by developing devices that could produce a specific
expressivity of the body (as in the case of electrophysiology). Even in derma-
tology, the clinical discipline devoted to the surface of the body and therefore
to eminently visible diseases, the aim of photographic collections was less to
record the individual, idiosyncratic condition of a specific patient (what Sekula
calls the “nominalist” mode of signification),1 than to establish a human type,
an abstract entity, corresponding to a disease (“realist” mode of signification
in Sekula’s account). More precisely, photographic series were meant to re-
veal the facies of a pathological condition, that is, its characteristic yet general
features. In the photographic series the uniqueness of the patient’s body was
ideally obliterated, and illness showed itself as an objective, visible fact.
In the present chapter I discuss how photography was used to deal with
other forms of invisibility, namely, the invisibility of extremely small objects (mi-
crophotography), very fast phenomena (chronophotography), and macroscopic
objects concealed inside the body (radiography). My main goal is to discuss
the semiotic and epistemological problems encountered by the late-nineteenth-
century physicians and scientists who used photographic processes to create
images of diﬀerent invisible objects and phenomena. The questions I address
1See Sekula, 1986. See also Section 2.4.
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are: what kind of pictures were these? Through which modes of signification
were they made meaningful? Could they be considered iconic images, taking
into account that in many cases it was impossible to corroborate their “likeness”
with an actual referent? What sort of photographic realism could be endorsed
by the photographers of the invisible? This set of questions is coupled with
another one: could all these scientists genuinely rely on mechanical objectivity,
as has been influentially defended by the historians of science Lorraine Daston
and Peter Galison?
Drawing on the theoretical analysis of photography developed in Chapter 2,
I show how the iconic, indexical and symbolic modes of signification were com-
bined in order to make sense of microscopic, chronographic and radiographic
pictures. As in the previous chapter, this theoretical approach is intertwined
with a historical one. That is, I sustain my conceptual analysis and epistemo-
logical arguments with the examination of historical literature (both primary
and secondary sources) concerning representational and experimental practices.
Starting from a critical appraisal of Daston and Galison’s claims about the late-
nineteenth century discourses about mechanical images, I demonstrate that the
idea of mechanical objectivity is far too poor to account for the richness of prac-
tical and conceptual strategies put in place to produce and make sense of the
photographs of the invisible. In the light of this historical analysis, I suggest
that the notion of mechanical objectivity should be replaced, on the one hand,
with that of intersubjectivity sustained by operational conventions; on the other
hand, with the idea of mechanical sensibility. Finally, closing the circle with the
claims I made in Chapter 1 about the relationship between X-ray diagnostics
and clinical anatomy, I show how the process that led to make sense of radio-
graphs was indebted to Bichat’s conceptualization of the cadaver as proxy of
the living body, and to the clinical gaze that was born in the hospital at the
dawn of the nineteenth century.
3.1 Truth-to-nature, mechanical objectivity, and
trained judgment
A relevant part of the discussion developed in this chapter is built against the
concept of mechanical objectivity put forward by Daston and Galison in a series
of works published between 1992 and 2007.2 Consequently, the first thing to do
is to provide a brief outline of the ideas of these authors.
2See Daston and Galison, 1992; Galison, 1998; Galison, 1999; Daston and Galison, 2007.
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18th to
early-19th cent.
Late-19th to
early-20th cent. 20th cent.
Danger to
knowledge
Drowning in
details
Altering a fact to
support a theory
Being
straitjacketed by
mechanical
procedures
Epistemic virtue
(epistemology) Truth-to-nature
Mechanical
objectivity
Trained
judgment
Images Reasoned images Mechanicalimages Expert images
Scientific persona Genius
Will-abnegating
worker
(manufacturer)
Trained expert
Table 3.1: Daston and Galison’s historical taxonomy of epistemic virtues and their
corresponding images.
Daston and Galison have developed the concept of mechanical objectivity in
the scope of their attempt to demonstrate the historical character of objectiv-
ity. They defend that objectivity is not a transhistorical feature of science, but
rather one among many possible epistemic ideals. Epistemic ideals can change
over time because they emerge in reaction to what, at a given moment in his-
tory, is perceived as an obstacle to the acquisition of knowledge, or a “danger
to knowledge.”3 In Daston and Galison’s view, epistemology, understood as the
normative discipline that prescribes how to attain reliable knowledge, is insep-
arable from ethics, the discipline that prescribes how to form and control the
self. Accordingly, epistemic ideals, or virtues, are guiding principles that shape
how scientists work, how they build their scientific identity (scientific self or
persona), and how they define the goals and methods of science.4 Building on
these premises, the two authors construct a historical taxonomy of the epis-
temic virtues from the eighteenth to the twentieth century (Table 3.1). They
support their assertions with an analysis of how scientists produced images for
atlases and other reference books, and what they claimed about such images.
They justify this methodological choice by arguing that atlases are systematic
compilations of scientific working objects. Atlases, they remark, are meant to
guide generations of observers, and thus they set standards for scientific practice
(what to look for, how to look at it, how to describe and represent it). More-
over, atlases are the result of the collaboration among researchers distributed
over time and space, hence they exemplify believes and practices of a scien-
3Daston and Galison, 376-377.
4Epistemic virtues are “norms that are internalized and enforced by appeal to ethical
values, as well as to pragmatic eﬃcacy in securing knowledge.” Daston and Galison, 2007, 40.
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tific community.5 Daston and Galison’s taxonomy of epistemic virtues can be
summarized as follows:
1. The ideal of truth-to-nature emerged in the late-eighteenth century as a
weapon against the danger to be overwhelmed by the details of the mon-
strous variability of nature. In accordance with Enlightenment sensa-
tionalist psychology, the self was perceived as fragmented and excessively
receptive. Hence, in order to secure knowledge, the savant – who worked
in strict relationship with the artist-illustrator – had to actively control
sensations, by selecting and interpreting them. The scientific persona cor-
responding to the virtue of truth-to-nature was the genius.
2. The ideal of mechanical objectivity, on the contrary, aimed at the sup-
pression of subjectivity. It appeared around the 1830s and seemingly
guided scientists until the 1920s, acting against the hindrances of the post-
Kantian self, perceived as too active and eager to impose its interpretations
and hypotheses on the world. The core demand of mechanical objectivity
was to “let nature speak for itself,”6 which implied that images had to be
produced according to strict mechanical protocols.7 Photography was not
a precondition for the emergence of mechanical objectivity, but it never-
theless played a seminal role as paradigmatic form of mechanical imaging
technology. The scientific persona corresponding to the epistemic virtue
of mechanical objectivity was an automaton, a will-abnegating worker.
3. Finally, by the 1930s the ideal of trained judgement emerged, partly in re-
action to mechanical objectivity. Drawing support from the many theories
of the unconscious that blossomed at the turn of the twentieth century,
trained judgment downplayed the importance of the unbending applica-
tion of procedural routine proper of mechanical objectivity, and put high
values on educated intuition, the “physiognomic sight”8 that comes with
training and a long acquaintance with an object. The scientific persona
shaped by trained judgement was the trained expert, a self-confident pro-
fessional who trusted his or her own intuitions, which could be educated
5See Daston and Galison, 2007, 19-27. In my view, it is dubious that one can take the
rules which prescribe how to make, compose, and present images in atlases as proxies for the
epistemic ideals that govern the making of science as a whole. I develop this criticism in
Section 3.4.3.
6Daston and Galison, 1992, 81.
7“Objectivity in its mechanical guise emerges as a ferociously austere, self-denying virtue,
a virtue present when all the special skills, intuitions, and inspirations of the scientist could be
quieted and nature could be transferred to the page without intervention or interpretation.”
Galison, 1999, 19.
8Daston and Galison, 2007, 314.
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and refined by studying and working in renowned schools and scientific
institutions.
In opposition to both truth-to-nature and trained judgment, self-erasing was the
characterizing feature of mechanical objectivity. In Daston and Galison’s words:
“In the making of images, the taking of measurements, the tracing of curves, and
many other scientific practices of the latter half of the nineteenth century, self-
elimination became an imperative.”9 They base this strong claim in the textual
analysis of the introductions of a considerable number of nineteenth-century
atlases, and in the discussion of a few debates about scientific images whose
right to claim objectivity was contentious.10 Yet, historical and conceptual
analyses of the same period provided by other authors show that if mechanical
objectivity as suppression of the observer ever existed, it was far from being an
overarching ideal, and that a much more nuanced approach to the mechanical
production of images was actually in place. In the following pages I criticize
the notion of mechanical objectivity and the alleged divide between mechanical
objectivity and trained judgment through the analysis of three case studies: the
use of photography in microbiology, chronophotography, and radiography.
3.2 Microphotography: intersubjectivity vs. me-
chanical objectivity
Microphotography was one of the earliest applications of photography in science.
Indeed, it was through the microscope that photography entered the domain of
medicine.11 Both bacteriologists and cellular pathologists, who in the second half
of the nineteenth century promoted new conceptions of disease and new ways of
practicing medicine, relied on the combination of an old and a new technology
(the microscope and the photographic camera) to back their discoveries. As
Sicard puts it: “At the edge of knowledge, microscopy met photography.”12
3.2.1 The myth of the faithful record
In February 1840, just a few months after François Arago’s oﬃcial presentation
of the invention of photography at the Académie des Sciences, Alfred Donné,
a physician and bacteriologist who gave microscopy classes in Paris, showed to
9Daston and Galison, 2007, 196.
10For example, the diatribe between Camillo Golgi and Santiago Ramón y Cajal about the
individuality of neural cells. See Daston and Galison, 2007, 115-120, and 183-184.
11See Sicard, 1995, 11-12.
12Sicard, 1998, 122, my translation.
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Figure 3.1: Blood corpuscles. Etchings produced after the original daguerreotypes.
A. Donné and L. Foucault, Cours de microscopie complémentaire des études médicales.
Atlas exécuté d’après nature au microscope-daguerréotype, Paris, 1845. Detail of Plate
II. Public domain.
the same distinguished audience the first microphotographs (or better, microda-
guerreotypes)13 of diﬀerent natural specimens, ranging from organic sediments
to sections of bone and tooth tissues.14 Shortly after, his assistant and ama-
teur photographer Léon Foucault took microdaguerreotypes of other biological
samples like blood cells, mucus, and zoosperm (Figure 3.1). Donné’s work in
medical photography was trailblazing. In the introduction to the first edition
of his Cours de microscopie complémentaire des études médicales, of 1844, he
remarked that while the natural sciences, such as botany and entomology, had
been quick in taking up microscopy as a relevant research tool, medical doctors
had rejected it for a long time, considering microscopic observations a form of
“chimeric vision,”15 a pure illusion. Thus, for Donné, photography was first of
all an invaluable instrument for persuading physicians of the reality of what
appeared under the microscope. He wrote:
How, indeed, could anybody refuse to acknowledge the reality of the
images provided by the microscope, [...] when the object imprints itself , it
13The daguerreotype process, invented by Louis Daguerre, was the first successful photo-
graphic process, and consisted of fixing the image of the camera obscura on iodine-sensitized
silver plate. Daguerreotypes were fragile, expensive objects and could not be reproduced in
series. Shortly after the announcement of Daguerre’s invention, in England W.H. Fox Tal-
bot presented the calotype process. Unlike daguerreotypes, calotypes are produced through a
negative-positive process on paper (a paper negative and a paper positive), they are less prone
to deterioration, more easily reproducible and aﬀordable. However, it was only in the twen-
tieth century, with the introduction of 35-millimeter celluloid film, that the positive-negative
process became really eﬃcient and thus photographic images became endlessly reproducible.
14See Sicard, 1995, 11 and 1998, 121.
15Donné, 1844, 3.
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fixes itself on the plate without the help of the art, without any interven-
tion of the human hand, by the only eﬀect of light, and always identical
up to the smallest details to the image perceived by the observer under the
microscope?16
Donné, as virtually all his contemporaries, considered photography a direct im-
print of nature, “a material image printed by nature itself.”17 This does not mean
that he was not aware that both the microscope and the daguerreotype create
artificial visual eﬀects. Sicard reports that Donné and Foucault – both preoc-
cupied with the pedagogical diﬃculties of training physicians in microscopy –
knew very well the practical diﬃculties related to the use of microdaguerrotypes,
and actually asked themselves how to sensibly use these images as tools for par-
taking knowledge.18 As a matter of fact, daguerrotypes have a good definition,
but they have a low sensitivity for red, and this, at a time in which the most im-
portant histological dyes were cochineal and carmine, carried a major technical
limitation. Moreover, in order to look at the silver plate properly, one had to
incline it at a specific angle, and therefore for the untrained eye proper observa-
tion could be quite diﬃcult.19 That notwithstanding Donné was confident that
what the daguerreotype showed was “identical” to what the microscopist saw,
and this would allow sharing microscopic vision. In spite of all the actual divide
between reality and its photographic representation – a divide that was partic-
ularly deep in the early days of photography – photographs were immediately
perceived as “the evidence of the present or past existence of a reality that re-
sembles to them.”20 For Donné, photography produced representations that were
as accurate as the quantitative methods used in physiology and, accordingly, he
believed that it could be extremely useful for medical diagnosis.
Still, regardless of Donné’s pioneering work, microphotographs became an
accepted tool within the scientific community only in the 1880s, thanks to the
work of Robert Koch. As the historian of science Olaf Breidbach has shown,
Koch conceptualized and used photographs as an instrument to cross-check mi-
croscopists’ observations, rather than an unquestionable imprint of reality, and
in so doing he fostered the creation of experimental standards and a common
way of seeing among bacteriologists. It was ultimately on these grounds that
microphotography became a fundamental instrument for bacteriology.21
The problem of sharing microscopic observations was one of Donné’s main
concerns, and before turning to photography, he had developed a sun microscope
16Donné, 1844, 36-37, my translation.
17Donné, 1845, 10.
18See Sicard, 1995, 12.
19See Sicard, 1998, 124.
20Sicard, 1995, 12, my translation.
21See Breidbach, 2002, 222
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which projected the image of the specimen under analysis on a screen. This inge-
nious system, however, was hampered by its dependence on the availability and
quality of natural light. As seen above, Donné thought that microphotographs
granted the solution to his search for a shared microscopic sight, but, according
to Breidbach, until well into the 1880s, the majority of microscopists did not be-
lieve that photography could provide reliable representations of their specimens.
Paradoxically, such distrust was a consequence of the excessive enthusiasm pro-
fessed by some of the early defendants of microphotography. Breidbach explains
that those arguing in favor of microphotography saw photographs as a reality
in their own right. The consequence was that pictures, and not the original
samples, became the primary object of microscopic analysis. Instead of trying
to optimize the photographic processes, these practitioners set out to dissect
the hidden qualities of the images, because they assumed that what they saw
on the photographic plate was a perfect reproduction of the world, or more
emphatically, the world itself captured by the camera.22 Many introductions
to scientific microphotography were published in the 1860s, and in general they
were not devoted to a specific subject. As Donné’s atlas, they were collections
of photographs of diﬀerent microscopic objects, and their aim was to demon-
strate what microphotography could show, rather than to tackle a well defined
scientific problem. Breidbach points out that in the manuals published in this
decade, three main arguments were put forward in favor of the new imaging
technology: (1) microphotographs allowed better measurements of the sample;
(2) they showed details which were invisible when looking through the micro-
scope; and (3) they were free from the bias of the observer.23
The rationale underlying the first claim was that microphotographs, more
practical to handle than actual microscopic preparations, granted precise mea-
surements even in the case of complicated objects. Critics of photography, how-
ever, stressed that this putative advantage could be very well attained by em-
ploying a camera lucida, an optical device widely used by microscopists at the
time, which required much less technical eﬀort than early photography.24 The
second argument, namely that photography showed more than the microscope,
derived from one of the properties of photography largely praised by Benjamin,
i.e., the possibility of enlargement. In this respect, Breidbach reports that in
a publication of 1868, the naturalists Oscar Reichard and Carl Sturenburg ex-
plained that they obtained high magnification by re-photographing a micropho-
tograph put under the microscope. The process was repeated twice and this
22See Breidbach, 2002, 222.
23See Breidbach, 2002, 230-231.
24See, Breidbach, 2002, 231.
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allowed to allegedly attain magnifications of 8000x/30,000x, at a time in which
the best microscope could provide a maximum enlargement of 2000x. Through
this procedure granularity and other physical properties of the photographic
negatives became salient, but Reichard and Sturenburg – as many of their col-
leagues fascinated by photography – did not take these elements for artifacts
produced by the enlargement. On the contrary, they assumed that they were ac-
tual properties of the biological specimen made visible by microphotography.25
In their approach, it was the photographic camera, and not the microscope, that
provided relevant information about nature. As Breidbach explains: “The pho-
tograph gave the world its own quality, set apart from those things actually seen
in the microscope.”26 Photography was the ultimate scientific instrument, the
one which set the paragon of truth and reality. On this very ground was founded
the third claim, according to which photographs were objective because inde-
pendent from the photograph maker’s subjectivity. For the proponents of this
idea of objectivity, microphotographs were the proper representation of what
actually existed in nature, for the details of the image were not restricted to
those deemed relevant or particularly important by the observer.27
3.2.2 The problem of the invisible referent
This conception of photography, founded on the assumption that the photog-
rapher is a passive agent in the production of pictures, fits the definition of
mechanical objectivity as suppression of subjectivity proposed by Daston and
Galison. As seen above, according to Daston and Galison, the ideal of me-
chanical objectivity emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century and
was characterized by the scientists’ strenuous attempt “to eliminate the mediat-
ing presence of the observer.”28 In the account provided by the two historians,
mechanical images, of which photographs represented the most accomplished
example, granted objectivity for two reasons. On the one hand, they by-passed
human judgement, which tended to select the details of objects or phenomena
to be represented; on the other hand, they overcame the limitations of human
senses and drawing abilities, which undermined the accuracy of observations
and representations, respectively. Mechanical objectivity was clearly predicated
on the indexicality of the photographic image, because its independence from
the photographer and its pictorial accuracy (iconic mode of signification) were
25See Breidbach, 2002, 233.
26Breidbach, 2002, 234.
27See Breidbach, 2002, 231. This is the conception of photography that was later theorized
and brought to the artistic arena by Moholy-Nagy, with his idea of unbiased vision and his
experimentation with the photographic medium. See Section 2.3.
28Daston and Galison, 1992, 82.
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a consequence of the fact that the image was produced through an automated
process that physically forced, to use Peirce’s words, a correspondence between
sign and referent. And yet, this account of the objectivity of photography (and
mechanical images in general), which Daston and Galison present as an overarch-
ing scientific ideal and guiding principle for the scientists of the late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth centuries,29 was far from being unanimously endorsed by
bacteriologists. In fact, when it came to the study of the microscopic world, the
epistemic authority of photographs could no longer rely on the combination of
indexical and iconic modes of signification, because, being the referent invisible,
it was impossible to certify any resemblance. Indeed, Breidbach shows that the
idea that microphotographs were objective simply by virtue of being a mechan-
ical imprint of nature had little currency among the majority of microscopists.
Evidence of this, he maintains, comes from the fact that microphotographs
were almost completely absent from micro-morphological and histological pa-
pers prior to the late 1880s, even though inexpensive methods for photographic
production and printing became available in the 1850s and 1870s, respectively.30
Objectivity from operational conventions As a general rule, the scien-
tists who worked with microscopes were very much aware of the many variables
involved in their observations. They knew that the selection, preparation, fixa-
tion, and staining of the specimen, together with the optical properties of each
microscope, played a seminal role in determining the results of any observation
of the invisible world. Accordingly, they would not subscribe easily to the idea
that a microphotograph showed the objective, true features of a microscopic
entity (e.g., a bacterium or a plant cell) merely by virtue of being mechanically
produced. The act of looking at a specimen under the microscope was just the
last of a chain of actions that started with the very complex tasks of selecting,
collecting and preparing a sample suitable for microscopic observation. Hence,
for those who studied the microworld, the ideal of objectivity had to be by ne-
cessity much more specific and elaborated than the ideal of suppression of the
observer described by Daston and Galison. For the majority of microscopists,
as Breidbach shows, an objective representation was not simply a mechanical
image, but rather “a reliable reproduction of a microscopic preparation,”31 and
it could be attained “by the extent to which the image seen in the microscope
[could] be accurately reproduced and its reproduction technically controlled.”32
This implied not only that the photographs had to be taken under controlled
29See Daston and Galison, 2007, 174-190.
30See Breidbach, 2002, 226 and 234.
31Breidbach, 2002, 235.
32Breidbach, 2002, 235.
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conditions, but also that the whole process of sample fixation, staining, han-
dling, and conservation had to be in line with explicit rules and standards.
In other words, objectivity was not an eﬀect of the use of a mechanical tech-
nology, but rather the result of operational procedures. The whole process of
microbiological investigation had to be carried out within a set of operational
conventions.
Now, signs that signify by virtue of learned conventions are symbols. Peirce’s
definition, however, refers to the conventions entailed in the process of signs’
interpretation, not production (although he stresses that the object puts con-
straints on the sign’s ability to signify). This is probably the reason why the
authors who suggest that microscopic imaging has to be understood in terms
of symbols rather than icons, emphasize the fact that one has to learn the con-
ventions that allow to interpret the images (conventions related to the way of
seeing), and do not elaborate much on the topic of the relevance of conventions
in the very production of such images.33 I think, however, that if we pay atten-
tion to the fact that in the processes of image making conventions are embodied
in standard procedures and methodologies, we are in a better position to under-
stand how the symbolic and indexical orders of signification are entangled when
it comes to assign truth-value to an image of invisible entities. In other words,
we have to keep in mind that the meaning of a microphotograph depends on the
fact that we trust it as an index (mechanical imprint), only as far as it has been
produced according to well defined conventions, that is, experimental standards.
The application of operational conventions in the phase of image production is
an essential component of the scientists’ trust in images, and creates the ba-
sis, both material and epistemological, for the definition of a symbolic mode of
signification in image interpretation.
It was this specific version of objectivity grounded in operational conventions,
put forward by Koch in the 1880s, that led to the acceptance of microphotog-
raphy as a meaningful scientific tool in bacteriology.34 Koch did not explicitly
contest the idea that photographs provided an accurate reproduction of reality.
However, he understood the epistemic potential of photography in strict relation
with the specific characteristics, problems, and needs of his field of research. In
a paper published in 1886, he wrote:
It must be remembered that [in bacteriology] we have to do entirely
with microscopic objects, and that two observers with the microscope
cannot see the same object simultaneously and form a joint opinion with
regard to it [. . . ]; and as all microscopists know, even the slightest turn
of the fine adjustment causes so small an object as a bacterium either to
33See, for example, Serpente, 2011.
34See Breidbach, 2002, 243.
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disappear entirely from the field, or to appear with diﬀerent markings and
shadows. Agreement will always be facilitated when the observations are
made with the same instrument, that is to say, with the same illumination,
the same objective, and the same magnifying power. But if the conditions
under which the microscopic object is seen are very diﬀerent, [. . . ] if
the preparation and staining of the object is dissimilar , if moreover it is
mounted in fluids of diﬀerent degrees of refrangibility, how can anyone
wonder when one microscopist asserts that the object as seen by him is
quite diﬀerent from that described by another? [. . . ] Photography, on the
contrary, gives the microscopical picture once and for all, and reproduces
it without the slightest error, in exactly the same focus, magnification,
and illumination as when it was taken.35
For Koch, photography was capital to investigation in microbiology, because it
warranted that two or more researchers, even if working with diﬀerent micro-
scopes in diﬀerent places, could observe the same thing, under the same exper-
imental and observational conditions. They would see the same cellular culture
under the same focus, magnification, and illumination. In other words, they
would construct the same image and, consequently, the same scientific object.
Objectivity from intersubjectivity Photography provided a permanent
record of a phenomenon that otherwise could be observed by only one person
at the time. It allowed intersubjective evaluations, by assuring that all subjects
were looking at the same micro-organism or, more precisely, to the same picture
of a given microscopic sample, produced and handled under standard condi-
tions. Such a picture could be retrieved at any moment for later comparisons
and could travel long distances, reaching new observers. In a field like microbi-
ology, that in the second half of the nineteenth century was still immature but
burgeoning, microphotographs were invaluable means for communication within
the scientific community. Bynum has remarked that: “Koch’s pioneering pho-
tomicroscopy [...] helped in the search for standards, which were so important
in the last, heady decades of the [nineteenth] century, when new pathogenic
organisms were being announced every few months.”36 Microphotographs were
paramount in creating a common practice and a common vision among micro-
scopists. These photographs could not rely on the likeness with the referent
(iconicity) to secure their epistemic authority, because there was no way to di-
rectly assess any similarity. Neither could such authority come exclusively from
their indexicality. As shown by Breidbach, the indexical mode of signification
was not enough to make mechanical images meaningful, useful, and accepted in
the microbiologists’ community. To meet this goal, microphotographs had to be
35Koch, 1886, 20.
36Bynum, 1994, 129.
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embedded in a specific set of conventional practices that created the conditions
for a symbolic mode of signification grounded in indexical premises. This means
that for microbiologists, the idea of objectivity of photography bore a profound
relation with the notion of intersubjectivity. The sharing of conventions can be
in fact considered a precondition for intersubjective evaluations. A photograph
was objective in the sense that it was intersubjective, and it was intersubjective
because it was produced according to well defined standards. Importantly, it
was acknowledged that the photograph did not necessarily show the real object
(e.g., a bacterium), since it could show artifacts as well. That is, the notion
of photographic objectivity was severed from that of photographic realism as a
mark of truth. To better understand this point it is useful to resort to Patrick
Maynard’s distinction between depiction and detection, and the further elabo-
ration of such distinction put forward by Laura Perini.
3.2.3 Depictions and detections
Maynard defines photography as a technology that exploits light and other radi-
ations to mark surfaces.37 A fundamental feature of his theory of photography
is that photographic images can be used as depictions or to make detections.
We use photographic images as depictions when we rely on their mimetic prop-
erties in order to imagine that we see the object through the image; we use
photographic images to make detections when we use them as sources of infor-
mation. For Maynard, the depictive and detective functions can be separated,
but in most cases we rely on the depictive character of photographs to make
detections: “Photography might be most simply characterized as the site of his-
torically the most spectacular interaction of depictive and detective functions.”38
For instance, when I look at a photograph of my sister or of the Tour Eiﬀel, I
detect my sister or the Parisian monument via the depiction provided by the
photograph. I imagine that I am seeing that person or that object through the
picture. However, what is depicted does not always coincide with what can
be detected. Maynard uses the example of King Kong to clarify this point. A
photograph of King Kong is a photographic depiction of a giant ape, but one
cannot use it to detect an ape, because the colossal gorilla known under the
name of King Kong never actually existed. In this case one can use the photo-
graph to detect a disguised actor, a big puppet, or a virtual reality animation,
but not the subject-matter depicted in the photograph or in a movie.39 This
37Maynard defines material images as physical states of a surface, and he calls them “mark-
ings” or “marked surfaces.” See Maynard, 1997, Ch. 1
38Maynard, 1997, 120.
39See Maynard, 1997, 114.
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means that what can be detected in a photograph, and the level of accuracy of
such detection, depends to a large extent on the background information that
the observer possess.
This is why the philosopher of science Laura Perini argues that Maynard’s
distinction between photographic depiction and detection can help us under-
standing scientific imaging only if we think of detection as independent from,
or at least problematically related to, depiction. In fact, although scientists
largely rely on photographic evidence in their experimental work, they are often
in the situation of possessing very little background information about the de-
picted object.40 Perini remarks that when knowledge about an object is scant,
“using photographs as depictions is often a threat to detection, because it fos-
ters a way of working with the image that needs have no connection with the
kind of information it actually presents.”41 Seeing (recognizing) something as
depicted incorporates a number of assumptions, and what appears as depicted
does not always correspond to what should be detected. A typical instance in
which depiction is detrimental to detection is that of microscopy artifacts. Perini
discusses the concrete example of an electron microscope photograph showing
a putative mesosome (dense structure) inside the bacterium Bacillus subtilis,
published in the Journal of Bacteriology in 1964.
The problem of artifacts When the authors of this article on B. subtilis
observed a dense structure inside the bacterium, they thought that it was an
organelle with some biological function, whose presence was related to the pro-
toplast state of the bacterial cells, and they named it mesosome. Subsequent
analyses, however, demonstrated that the alleged bacterial organelle was, in
fact, an artifact. The biologists had used the micrographs as a depiction of B.
subtilis and this had led them to make a wrong detection: they took an artifact
for a real organelle. In this case, to use the photograph to imagine to see the real
object through this picture was not the right path to detection. In order not to
be mistaken it is necessary to keep in mind that when our knowledge about an
object is limited, extracting information about such objects from depictions can
be misleading. To avoid the pitfall, the researchers should have taken the micro-
graph simply as a depiction of the structure of a sample specifically prepared for
electronic microscopy, rather than a direct depiction of the bacillus they were
studying. Under this caveat, they could just claim that the image allowed to
detect small dense regions inside the prepared specimen, because this was in-
deed the only information that one could extract from the micrograph. To know
40See Perini, 2012, 151-152.
41Perini, 2012, 153.
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something about the origins and function of that dense region – whether it was
material that clumped up during sample processing, or an actual organelle in
the cytoplasm of B. subtilis – required a number of additional observations and
experiments. Only in this way, and not simply relying on the perceived realism
of the electron microscope image, it becomes possible to clarify the relationship
between what is depicted in the micrograph and which structures really belong
to the natural specimen.42 The biologist can certainly imagine that he is looking
at a bacterium, but he must be aware that he is looking at it through the electron
microscope and through the sample. It is a depiction that is twice removed from
its object. Accordingly, if one is to extract reliable information from microscopic
images, one has to approach the depiction in a quite restrained way, keeping in
mind that it shows a processed specimen, and not the ultimate object of one’s
research (the microscopic entity). If one looks at an object through the double
mediation of the microscope and of the treated sample, then both the condi-
tions of operation of the optical device and the conditions of preparation of the
specimen must be standardized, otherwise we could never replicate and share
our observations. This leads us back to Koch’s insistence on the standardization
of both samples’ preparation and microphotography procedures, which allowed
him to develop an operational notion of photographic objectivity, independent
from general claims of photographic realism.
The nineteenth-century bacteriologists who endorsed Koch’s vision of mi-
crophotography did certainly believe in the reality of the microorganisms they
studied, yet their belief was not primarily grounded in photographic depiction,
but rather in a complex set of laboratory practices concerning the isolation,
growth, and preparation of the samples. Ultimately, it was this set of practices
that allowed them to make detections (i.e., to extract information) from pho-
tographic images. In this respect, it is worthy to remember that according to
Koch’s famous “postulates” for the demonstration of the parasitic nature of a
disease, a microorganism had to be: (1) “constantly present in characteristic
form and arrangement in the diseases tissue;” (2) it should also be “isolated and
grown in pure culture;” and (3) it had to be “shown to induce the disease exper-
imentally.”43 Microphotographs could play an important role in the first step,
but they had little or no relevance in the second and in the third. I will come
back to the relationship between images and laboratory practices in Chapter
4, where I discuss Ian Hacking’s idea that scientific representations are deeply
entrenched with a larger range of experimental interventions.
42See Perini, 2012, 155.
43F. Loeﬄer, quoted in Bynum, 1994, 128. Loeﬄer was a pupil of Koch’s. Koch took his
postulates from his teacher Friedrich Henle, who had expressed them in an implicit form in
his essay De miasmata et contagia of 1840.
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3.3 Chronophotography: revealing the optical
unconscious
Chapter 2 ended with an image from the Nouvelle iconographie de la Salpêtrière
that shows a naked body in the grip of convulsive movements against a black
background. Commenting on this picture I pointed out that in his attempts
to capture motion, Charcot followed in the steps of his teacher Duchenne de
Boulogne, who used photography to produce models in order to study the me-
chanical principles of movement rather than produce portraits of the human
body. However, the definitive transformation of the human body into a di-
agram by means of photography was accomplished by another French physi-
cian, Etienne-Jules Marey, with his studies on animal locomotion. Importantly,
Marey was a physiologist not a clinician. His preoccupation was to understand
movement in general, rather than as a specific symptom of some pathological
condition. He was not involved in diagnosing specific patients, and thus he could
give up altogether the personal, individual dimension of medical photography,
its dimension of portrait, so to say. He wanted to understand the general func-
tioning of the human machine, and to this end he needed to set aside all its
contingent idiosyncrasies.
An important analysis of Marey’s chronophotographic method has been pro-
vided by Snyder, in the article “Visualization and Visibility,” of 1998, written in
response to Daston and Galison’s idea of mechanical objectivity. I showed above
that the ideal of mechanical objectivity paid a very poor service to the credi-
bility of microscopys during the 1860s. Microphotographs were widely accepted
as valuable scientific evidence only when Koch replaced the idea of mechanical
objectivity (conceived as the suppression of the subjectivity of the observer and
mimetic realism) with the idea of intersubjectivity supported by shared labora-
tory practices that summed up to operational conventions (microphotography
provided a common controlled vision of the microscopic world). Snyder shows
that also in the case of chronophotography the idea of mechanical objectivity is
completely misleading. Chronophotographs, he notes, were not meant to sup-
press any subjectivity, for the simple reason that that they showed something
that no human observer could ever see (this observation holds true also for
microphotography, because it shows an invisible referent).
3.3.1 Subjectivity superseded
At the outset of “The Image of Objectivity,” Daston and Galison quote a passage
from Marey who, in the book La Méthode graphique dans les sciences expérimen-
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tales, after surveying the countless visual instruments available to the scientist
of the late nineteenth century, concluded:
There is no doubt that graphical expression will soon replace all oth-
ers whenever one has at hand a movement or a change of state – in a
word, any phenomenon. Born before science, language is often inappro-
priate to express exact measures or definite relations. [Images recorded
by mechanical instruments, on the contrary, speak] the language of the
phenomena themselves.44
Daston and Galison comment on this quote as follow:
“Let nature speak for itself” became the watchword of a new brand of
scientific objectivity that emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. At issue was not only accuracy but morality as well [. . . ]. Marey and
his contemporaries turned to mechanically produced images to eliminate
suspect mediation.45
Here “suspect mediation” stands for the inevitable amount of idealization, inter-
pretation, or lack of precision that a human observer introduces in any descrip-
tion, verbal or visual of a phenomenon. For Daston and Galison, the scientists
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries praised mechanical rep-
resentation, because they saw in it a way to suppress the subjectivity of the
observer. In the case of Marey’s images of movement, however, the suppression
of subjectivity was not an issue. As Snyder puts it:
Most of Marey’s work does not fit the mold Daston and Galison make
for it. [. . . ] For the most part, Marey did not conceive of his precision
instruments as impartial mediators substituting for and improving upon
an observer’s eye or an illustrator’s hand. His mechanically originated
graphs and photographically generated pictures are visualizations of dis-
placements charted against precisely determined units of time. These
movements fall outside the scope of human detection and accordingly,
their inscriptions cannot be characterized as especially accurate visual-
izations of what might otherwise have been registered by an illustrator or
scientist.46
When the machine records and displays something that falls squarely outside
the realm of human sensibility (for example, vectors of motion as in the case
of many of the works of Marey’s), then the act of observing is fully displaced
44Marey, 1878, iii.
45Daston and Galison, 1992, 81. It should be noted that the discussion of Marey’s texts,
which in the article of 1992 had a prominent role in the argumentation of Daston and Galison’s,
disappeared from their book of 2007. Although in the book the idea of mechanical objectivity
is presented in a much more articulated and nuanced form than in the article, the authors do
not touch upon, hence do not provide any answer to, the objections raised by Snyder.
46Snyder, 1998, 379.
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Figure 3.2: Examples of chronophotographs by E.-J. Marey.
from the subject to the machine. Hence it makes no sense to talk of objectiv-
ity as suppression of subjectivity. In this case the subjectivity of the observer
cannot be at stake, simply because there is no way in which he or she could
access the phenomenon under study with the unaided senses, no matter how
patient and accurate he or she might ever be. The machine does not merely
show with inhuman precision what a human observer would see anyway through
his or her subjective (and unaided) senses. Under these circumstances the ma-
chine completely substitutes for the human subject, and thus the activity of the
mechanical apparatus takes part in the very construction of what can be seen.
In Snyder’s words: “In Marey’s program, the visualized data produced by the
inscribing mechanisms have no existence apart from their realization.”47 That
is, they only exist as mechanically generated data (Figures 3.2 and 3.3).
When Snyder says that the visual data produced by Marey’s machines have
no existence apart from their realization, he means that they would not exists
qua visible entities if there were not a machine capable of producing them. This
happens because the data produced by certain instruments (e.g., a sphygmo-
graph or a high speed camera) make visible phenomena that are not visible in
their own nature. Of course, this does not mean that the phenomenon itself
(e.g., arterial tension or rapid motion) does not exist, but that it becomes visi-
ble only by means of a machine. What is at stake here is the source, or origin, of
the image, that is, the object or phenomenon represented. If I make a drawing
or take a photograph of, say, a leaf, the origin of the image I produce is visible
in its own right, it exists as a visible entity in the world independently from my
47Snyder, 1998, 383.
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Figure 3.3: Images of a runner reduced to a system of bright lines for representing the
positions of the limbs (geometrical chronophotograph). Photograph by E-J. Marey,
1886.
representation. On the contrary, if I measure blood pressure with a sphygmo-
graph I make visible a phenomenon that could not be seen otherwise (although
it could be perceived by the sense of touch). The blood tension graph is an
image originated by a non visual process (the pressure exerted by the blood
flow on in the arteries’ walls) by means of an instrument (the sphygmograph).
Yet another case is that of rapid movement. Movement in itself is a visible phe-
nomenon, but I can see the instantaneous position of a limb only by means of
chronophotograph or slow motion film. In what follows I explore the problems
and implications of these forms of visualization.
Mechanical diagrams and chronophotography In the course of his re-
search career Marey worked with two kinds of “instant diagrams,”48 as he some-
times called his images of motion: mechanical diagrams and chronophotographs.
We have already seen in Chapter 1 that he was the inventor of one of the first
sphygmographs, in 1860, and that in the following years he invented a num-
ber of other recording devices, developing a complex graphical method for the
study of almost any physiological activity.49 He put mechanical diagrams aside
only in 1882, when he turned to chronophotography. Among the instruments
that constituted the armamentarium of the graphical method, Snyder makes a
distinction between the sphygmograph, used to measure the pulse, and the ex-
48Marey, 1878, iv.
49Among Marey’s inventions we can mention the myograph, which measures muscular con-
traction, the dromograph, for the monitoring of blood flow, the cardiograph, and the poly-
graph, an instrument that measured diﬀerent physiological functions at the same time.
126 Photography, radiography, and the visualization of the invisible
Figure 3.4: Man with experimental shoe. E.-J. Marey, Le Movement, Paris, 1894,
Engl. translation, New York, 1895, Figure 4.
perimental shoe (figure 3.4) used in the study of animal locomotion. In the first
case, we have a device that actually replaces a human sense (i.e., touch),50 while
in the second we deal with an instrument that simultaneously detects, trans-
mits and charts specific aspects of movement, namely, the duration, phases and
intensity of the pressure exerted on the ground by each foot during walk. These
features of locomotion could never be perceived by a human observer. The ex-
perimental shoe and the graphs it produced allowed the French physiologist to
empirically study the walk of a man or the gallop of a horse in terms of levers,
fulcrums, forces and positions – i.e., in terms of mechanical work.51 Snyder
makes an important point about these graphs when he says:
Marey’s method might seem to introduce, in the case of rapid an-
imal locomotion, the possibility of finding novel graphic expression for
phenomena that had always been conceived in visual terms, but he was
50It should be noted, however, that the functions of the sphygmograph went beyond the
mere replacement and improvement of the subjective sense of touch, for it made the measuring
of pulse quantifiable, retrievable and publicly available, independently from the presence of
both the patient and the doctor. See Section 1.5.3.
51See Snyder, 1998, 386-388.
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Figure 3.5: Diagram of the sequence and duration of the footfalls during four dif-
ferent forms of walking. The contact of the right (left) foot is represented by a white
(diagonally shaded) line. E.-J. Marey, Le Movement, Paris, 1894, Engl. translation,
New York, 1895, Figure 5. Public domain.
not, in fact, interested in determining, for example, what a horse at full
gallops looks like; he wanted, rather, an accurate analysis of the mechan-
ics of animal locomotion. [. . . ] Marey’s machines produce data about
phenomena – about the highly qualified subject of investigation (e.g., the
relation of forces at specific instants of a full gallop), but these data are
entirely artifactual, the products of machinery and a conceptual scheme
– mechanics – that give intelligibility to the inscribed curves. Whatever
the charts may be, they are not illustrations of the movements of horses’
legs; when properly deciphered, they are records of work performed by
them.52
What Marey was visualizing in his experiments was not an unqualified, natural
expression of motion, but rather motion according to some specific parameters of
mechanics. Animal locomotion was transalted into diagrams that gave informa-
tion about work, forces, distances, displacement vectors and so on, and these are
concepts, not visible forms. The natural phenomenon was broken down into arti-
factual analytical data (corresponding to specific mechanical concepts) in order
to become accessible to the sensorium of the physiologist. Animal locomotion
is certainly a visible phenomenon, and Marey’s graphs and chronophotographs
are certainly visual inscriptions of movement, yet they do not work according to
any mimetic principle, that is, they do not show what we see or could see if we
paid enough attention. They give visible form to something that falls beyond
human visual perception, but these forms do not look like what we see when we
look at a man or a horse moving (Figures 3.5 and 3.6). They do not mimetically
represent movement, they gauge it.
52Snyder, 1998, 387, italics in the original. In a note Snyder stresses that the adjective
“artifactual” refers to the data charted in the graphs, not to movements themselves. Move-
ments are facts independent of the observer even though we can study them only by way of
visualizations generated by an experimental device. See Snyder, 396, note 6.
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Figure 3.6: Diagram of the sequence and duration of the footfalls of a horse at a
full trot. E.-J. Marey, Le Movement, Paris, 1894, Engl. translation, New York, 1895,
Figure 7. Public domain.
What referent for chronophotography? Snyder points out that, if it is
unproblematic to say that charts, graphs and diagrams do not look like any
physical object (as a matter of fact they are not meant to represent physical
objects),53 it is more diﬃcult to accept the claim that a chronophotograph does
not look like anything. A chronophotograph is a photograph, and photography,
by definition, produces pictures of objects that stand in front of the camera.54
Hence, the question is: if one claims that photography shows with unerring pre-
cision the visible world (as we have seen, this was a common conception in the
nineteenth century, and Marey subscribed to it), how can one also claim that it
shows things that cannot be seen, because they do not exist as material objects
in the world? In the discussion of dermatological photography (Section 2.6), we
have already seen that the early proponents of photography understood the on-
tological status of the new optical medium as complex and malleable. Similarly,
Snyder argues that contradictory views on photography had large currency in
53See, for example, figure 3.5. It is a diagram of the sequence and duration of the footfall
during four diﬀerent forms of walk. White lines represent the contact on the ground of
the right foot, while diagonally shaded lines represent the contact of the left foot. It is a
representation of human steps that does not look like a person walking. It represents the
sequence and duration of footfalls, two concepts (sequence and duration), which have no
corresponding physical object. A diﬀerent example might be that of a graph representing the
increase of unemployment over the last five years. There is no physical object corresponding
to unemployment, and the graph cannot look like it.
54See Snyder, 1998, 389.
Chronophotography: revealing the optical unconscious 129
the nineteenth century, and he considers Marey an “ideal commentator”55 ex-
actly because the French physiologist held nearly all the conflicting positions
on photography maintained by his contemporaries.56 In one page of his book
Movement, of 1894, referring to the problem of perspective, Marey could claim
that photography reproduces “the appearance of natural objects, as seen by
looking with one eye only,” and a few pages later, discussing the chronopho-
tographs of a rotating brass band (Figure 3.7) he could state: “In reality we
are dealing with a hypothetical figure, which finds no counterpart in Nature.”57
How to reconcile these seemingly contradictory positions? Part of the answer
suggested by Snyder impinges on the technical evolution of the photographic
medium. Early photography, he argues, with its long times of exposure helped
to corroborate the cognitive primacy of vision: the image on the photographic
plate displayed what a bystander or the photographer would have seen from
behind the camera at the time of exposure, “if only he or she had carefully
attended to the scene.”58 Until the 1880s, when instantaneous photography be-
came widely available, every photograph was a still life, and it was perceived
as a mirror reflecting a static superficial reality. The sensible plate would fix
what the eye could see. With chronophotography the reciprocal corroboration
of photography and human vision no longer applied. In Snyder’s words:
Such pictures work against the conception of photographs as repro-
ducing the appearance of objects. And so here we enter another new
domain of mechanical sensibility, which permits us to see, though only in
pictorial form, what happens in front of us – before our eyes. [...] [With
chronophotography] the observer is left wobbling between what is visible
to the naked eye and photographically depictable and what is unseeable
by the eye but nonetheless reproducible by chronophotographic means.59
Chronophotographs confront the viewer with the paradox of a photograph that
shows something that is right in front of him, and yet remains invisible. This
paradox belongs to the domain of the optical unconscious theorized by Benjamin
and exemplified by the famous pictures of galloping horses. For ages equestrian
painters had pictured “flying gallop” with the horse completely detached from
the ground when its four legs are extended. And this is indeed what we believe we
see when we look at a galloping horse. In 1878, however, Eadweard Muybridge
published the photography sequence Silhouettes of Horses in Motion, which
revealed that, during gallop, horses are detached from the ground when the
55Snyder, 1998, 390.
56See Snyder, 1998, 390.
57Marey, 1894, 19 and 31, quoted in Snyder, 1998, 391.
58Snyder, 1998, 391.
59
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four legs are bent. Moving horses are certainly visible objects, and yet there
are aspects of their motion that deceive our eyes. Imaging machines endow us
with “mechanical sensibility,”60 that is, they allow us to explore objects and
phenomena that fall beyond the reach of unaided human senses.
3.3.2 Mechanical sensibility
By conceptualizing photography in terms of mechanical sensibility we adopt
a perspective that is diametrically opposed to Daston and Galison’s idea of
mechanical objectivity as suppression of subjectivity. Within the framework
of mechanical objectivity, the image produced by the machine is a mechanical
copy of the visible word, and the scientist is the passive recipient of such image.
On the contrary, if we think in terms of mechanical sensibility, the imaging
apparatus acquires creative properties. It produces images that can reveal the
invisible, rather than merely reproduce what is already visible, and it engages
the scientists in a productive relation. In fact, it is the scientist (or a collective
of scientists) that designs and operates the imaging apparatus and, in turn,
through such apparatus his senses are improved. With chronophotography the
camera is no longer a picture-machine that produces likenesses, it becomes an
instrument wedded into an experimental setting and a theoretical structure,
that gauges the world and its phenomena going beyond the experience provided
by unaided senses.
Yet, I think that it is important to note that this paradox of a photograph
that shows the invisible was already implicit in the endeavors of all the medical
photographers discussed in the previous chapter. All of them, from diﬀerent
perspectives and with diﬀerent photographic strategies, used the superficial eye
of the camera to disentangle a range of non visual phenomena. In the context
of clinical medicine, Duchenne looked for the laws of emotions, Charcot tried
to track down the neurological underpinning of hysteria, and Diamond claimed
that in the search for the causes of mental illnesses, photography would enable
the metaphysician “to witness and trace out the connection between the visible
and the invisible.”61 Even in dermatology, the domain of the surface of the
body and therefore of total visibility, photographs deeply influenced nosology,
by taking permanent track of details that went usually unnoticed.
Microphotography, by coupling the camera to the microscope, entered the
realm of the extremely small, but with the work of Marey’s, photography de-
parted from the tradition of photographic realism in an unprecedented way. He
60Snyder, 1998, 393.
61Diamond, 1856, 20.
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claimed: “Although chronophotography represents the successive attitudes of
a moving object, it aﬀords a very diﬀerent picture from what is actually seen
by the eye when looking at the object itself,” and added: “[these] images ap-
peal rather to the imagination than to the senses.”62 As seen above, Marey was
not bothered by the brisk divide between the idea of photography as producer
of perfect visual correspondences with what we can see, and photography as
a device that produces imaginary pictures. According to Snyder, this lack of
problematization was a sign of the little theorization undergone by photogra-
phy in the nineteenth century. This may well be the case, but I think that
the contradiction disappears if we recall Peirce’s idea that the iconic status of
photographs is predicated on their indexicality.
Symbolic indices and prosthetic senses If a photograph is an icon by
virtue of its being an index (in Peirce’s definition a photograph is physically
forced to correspond point by point to nature),63 there is nothing that prevents
us from accepting that it can correspond to nature in points that are not di-
rectly visible to the human eye. To put it diﬀerently, if the epistemic authority
of photography lies primarily in its indexical relation with nature, then resem-
blance with the represented object becomes an ancillary feature. Consequently,
it is not contradictory to take photography as a medium that shows the appear-
ance of things (icon), and that can also show phenomena that fall beyond the
scope of natural vision. While in the former case the photograph is a sign that
works as index and icon, in the latter it can work as index and symbol. In the
case of microphotography, I inscribed the symbolic mode of signification of the
image within the operational conventions of laboratory practice. In the case of
chronophotography, the symbolic dimension of the picture depends chiefly upon
a specific theoretical framework that conceives of continuous movement as the
sum of instantaneous components, and thus allows to study motion through the
visual fragments of a continuum. In the geometrical chronophotograph shown
in Figure 3.3 we see an index of the position of moving limbs, but the image
that we see is not an icon, because it does not look like a man running, at least
not according to a criterion of similarity with what we can see with the naked
eye. Yet, for Marey it was a valuable tool for studying human locomotion ac-
cording to the principles of mechanics.64 Another example is provided by the
62Marey, 1894, 304, quoted in Snyder, 1998, 391.
63See Peirce, CP 2.281. See also Section 2.2.
64Marey subscribed to positivist philosophy and was a firm opponent of biological vitalism.
He nevertheless criticized traditional mechanistic accounts of life, maintaining that they had
failed because they used as models machines such as pumps, levers, and ropes, that do not
rely on an integrated engine as source of motive force. On the contrary, modern machines,
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Figure 3.7: Chronophotograph of a semicircular arc of polished brass rotating around
a vertical axis. The rings visible on the opposite portions of the sphere are produced
by the reflection of sunlight by a specific point of the rotating arc. E.-J. Marey, Le
Movement, Paris, 1894, Engl. translation, New York, 1895, Figure 24. Public domain.
chronophotograph of a rotating brass band shown in Figure 3.7. Here we see a
sphere with two bright rings at each pole, but the actual object is a semicircular
arc of polished metal in fast rotation. What we see in the picture is an optical
illusion, a trace of the band movement. In this case, if we analyze the image
according to the criteria of mechanics, we can say that the photograph produces
a map of the trajectory of the rotating body and the reflection of light at specific
points of such trajectory, but it would make little sense to say that it resembles
the movement of the brass arc and the reflection of sunlight.
What is problematic, then, is not to accept that the photograph can show
what we see and also what we cannot see. The real diﬃculty at this point, as
we have seen in the case of microphotography, is to set the terms of comparison
to evaluate the meaning and correctness of what the photographic plates shows.
And since there is no way to asses the resemblance of the image with its actual
referent, we need to rely on the indexical and symbolic modes of signification.
With microphotography it was a matter of establishing standards of sample
preparation, conservation, and observation. In the case of chronophotography
it was necessary to embed the image in a specific theoretical framing of motion,
namely, mechanics, which allows to decompose motion into velocity vectors.
As remarked by Snyder, chronophotography was an analytic device that split
with their engines that demand specific sources of energy are eﬀective proxies of the “animal
machine.” Marey, 1873. See also Dagognet, 1987.
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movement in its instantaneous components, and reduced the body to a system
of fulcrums and levers. In this sense, it required of the observer an eﬀort of
imagination to recompose movement as a synthetic continuous process.65 More
generally, it assumed a way of looking that was diﬀerent from natural vision,
which relies on the iconic mode of signification, and required instead a way of
looking that had to be learned (symbolic mode).
To make his point Snyder brings to our attention a comment of Marey’s
on Muybridge’s equestrian chronophotographs. Marey wrote that although the
positions of gallop revealed by the American photographer at first appeared un-
natural, they eventually “have taught us to discover attitudes in Nature which we
are unable to see for ourselves, and we begin almost to resent a slight mistake in
the [traditional] delineation of a horse in motion.”66 As Benjamin, Moholy-Nagy
and the avant-garde film directors of the 1920s, Marey envisaged chronophotog-
raphy as a prosthesis of natural perception, an instrument that would reconfig-
ure, improve and transform our vision and, accordingly, our understanding of
the world. Photography, according to Marey, would teach us to see in a diﬀerent
way. As Benjamin put it three decades later, it would grant us access to the
optical unconscious, by making visible those aspects of the world that escape
the bare senses. The education of the eye foresaw by Marey had nothing in
common with the suppression of the subjectivity of the observer. It implied, on
the contrary, an active training of imagination and, in the last instance, a deep
transformation of our sensory apprehension of the world.
3.4 X-rays and the transparent body
When radiography was invented, at the end of 1895, it was perceived as a further
innovation in an already rich domain of scientific images, optical technologies
and experimental practices. In his book on the medical technologies of the
nineteenth century, Reiser wrote that radiography “catapulted medicine into a
visual age.”67 Yet, it should be stressed that this transformation capitalized on
an already existing and extremely rich visual culture. The century had started
with a new way of looking at the inner body, promoted by clinical anatomy.
By its end doctors could visualize the human body (from the outside and from
the inside), its functions, and its impairments in completely new ways that
ranged from endoscopy to physiological tables, passing through the lenses of
the camera and the microscope. With the invention of radiography a new form
65See Snyder, 1998, 394-396.
66Marey, 1894, 395, quoted in Snyder, 1998, 391.
67Reiser, 2009, 14.
134 Photography, radiography, and the visualization of the invisible
of clinical anatomy became possible. X-rays dramatically improved medicine’s
diagnostic capability and, unlike what happened with many of the previous
medical innovations, the diagnostic potential of this discovery, which in fact
occurred outside the realm of medicine, was instantly realized.
Wilhelm Roentgen discovered X-rays quite serendipitously, and invented ra-
diography in the process of testing and documenting his unexpected findings.
Like many other physicists of his time, he was engaged in exploring the proper-
ties of electrical discharges and cathode rays using Crookes’ tubes. The accepted
history goes that one evening, while operating a tube covered by black card-
board, he noticed that some rays escaped the apparatus, leaving a faint glow
on a fluorescent screen that somebody had forgotten on the bench nearby the
Crookes’ tube. Surprised by this phenomenon, he replicated it several times,
placing a number of objects between the tube and the photographic plates.
Some of these objects, as books, blocks of wood, and rubber bands, left the
rays pass through and sensitize the photographic screen; some others, as leads
and other metal objects, blocked them. These properties were definitely not the
properties of cathode rays: Roentgen had found a new kind of rays, which he
dubbed X-rays with the X of ignoramus.68
In the days following his discovery Roentgen took radiographs of many other
objects, including the left hand of his wife Bertha, which became a real icon of
the time. It should be noted that Roentgen did not actually use the term
“radiograph.” He dubbed his images skiagraphs or skiagrams, which literally
means an image formed by the shadow of an object.69 Indeed, shadows, and
not well delineated and contrasted figures, were what one could see in the X-
ray photographs. The terms radiographs and radiography quickly appeared in
the literature, together with many others, such as shadowgraphs, roentographs,
katographs, electrographs, fluorographs and so forth. Such variety of names
remained in use for many years, and it is symptomatic of the novelty of X-ray
images. These images were so new that they did not even have a proper name,
although many referred to them as new photography. The instability of the
terminology went hand in hand with the provisional nature of the knowledge that
surrounded radiographs.70 Within the scope of physics and technology it was not
clear how radiographs were produced: on the theoretical hand, physicists who
studied the composition and behavior of matter did not know exactly what X-
68See Kevles, 1997, 17-21; Reiser, 2009, 21; Friedman and Friedland, 1998, 115-132.
69Roentegen, 1896.
70It has been noted that as doctors grew comfortable interpreting X-ray images, they were
less prone to refer to them as shadows. By 1900 the British journal Archives of Clinical
Skiagraphy had changed its name into Archives of the Roentgen Ray. The terms skiagram and
skiagraph disappeared altogether after the 1920s. See Lerner, 1992, 387.
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Figure 3.8: The bones of a hand with a ring on one finger, viewed through X-rays.
Roentgen, W.K., 1895. Photoprint from radiograph. Wellcome Library, London.
rays were and which physical principles underlined the appearing of radiographic
images; on the practical hand, it took much eﬀort and time for the radiographic
technology to stabilize. Within the scope of medical activity, although the
usefulness of radiographs seemed obvious, it was not evident how they should
be actually used, that is, interpreted and integrated within clinical practice.
3.4.1 X-ray vision
When Roentgen published the results of his research, radiographs were received
as the heralds of a sensorial revolution. They were astonishing pictures, which
represented a triumph for science and a challenge to the conventional notion of
vision and visibility. The X-ray photograph of Frau Roentgen’s living skeleton
wearing her wedding ring (Figure 3.8) was published all around the world, in
physics and medicine journals, as well as in popular magazines, causing great
excitement inside and outside the scientific circles. Until the 1920s, when the
hazardous nature of radioactivity became clear and safety rules for the produc-
tion of radiographs were endorsed, instructions to build a radiographic appa-
ratus were available in both engineering and photography journals. Virtually,
any interested person, amateur or professional, could work with X-rays, and the
most enterprising photographers added radiographs to their gallery of portraits.
Educated ladies oﬀered X-ray pictures of their hands or chest to their lovers,
and at amusement parks and fun fairs, people could see their own bones in real
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time through a fluoroscope. As a whole, radiographs were perceived not just as
powerful medical devices, but as actual portraits.
Thomas Mann’s novel The Magic Mountain, of 1924, provides interesting
insights into the socio-cultural but also emotional impact of X-ray imaging.
Dr. Hofrat Behrens, the director of the sanatorium in the Alps where the
story takes place, explained to his bewildered patients that radiography was
“anatomy by the means of light,”71 but for Hans Castorp, the young hero of the
novel, radiographs were both omens of death and romantic keepsakes. When
he was invited to take a look at the radiograph of his cousin’s chest, Hans
had the uncomfortable feeling of being intruding into his intimacy and peering
into his imminent death, but later on in the story, he kept a radiograph of
Clavdia Chauchat as a fetish of his love for her.72 Far from being perceived only
as objective medical records, X-ray images were endowed with several extra-
scientific meanings. Indeed, as described by the historian of science Bettyann H.
Kevles, radiography had a great impact on both popular and high culture in the
early twentieth century. Kevles points out that the X-rays’ ability to turn visible
what was hidden by the skin was quickly associated to the notion of X-ray vision,
the power to peer not only through the skin, but also through clothes and walls.
The idea of transparency associated to the human body triggered voyeuristic
imagination, as if transparency meant nudity. Several humorous cartoons on
this theme appeared in the popular press, and some manufacturers advertised
their radiographic products with pictures of naked ladies standing in front of
an X-ray screen, as if they stood in front of a mirror.73 A more sophisticated
version of the idea of X-ray vision can be found among modernist artists. Kevles
quotes from the Technical Manifesto of Futurist Painting, published in 1910:
Our growing need of truth is no longer satisfied with Form and Colors as
they have been understood hitherto. [. . . ] Who can still believe in the
opacity of the bodies, since our sharpened and multiplied sensitiveness
has already penetrated the obscure manifestation of the medium? Why
should we forget in our creations the power of our sight, capable of giving
results analogous to those of the X-rays?74
71Mann, 1924, 225.
72Media scholar José van Dijck argues that The Magic Mountain can be considered an
ante litteram cultural analysis of the tremendous social impact of the new visual system
inaugurated by the X-rays. On the one hand, Mann reflects on the use of radiography in the
diagnosis of tuberculosis, inducing the reader to reconsider the dichotomy between instrument
and observer, object and representation, science and art. On the other hand, he piercingly
describes the erotic imaginary associated to X-ray imaging. See van Dijck, 2005, Ch. 5.
73See Kevles, 1998, 17-30; Cartwright, 1995, Ch. 5.
74Quoted in Kevles, 1998, 130. The manifesto was signed by the Italian painters Umberto
Boccioni, Carlo Dalmazzo Carrà, Giacomo Balla, Gino Severini and Luigi Russolo.
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For avant-garde artists, radiography was a metaphor of the mathematical and
scientific achievements that since the final quarter of the nineteenth century
had shattered the positivist view of knowledge and reality, as well as a formal
model for expressing their novel conceptions of vision and space, matter and
force, visibility and invisibility.75 In the hand of these artists, X-rays became a
formal device whereby the human body was dissolved into lines of force, trans-
parent surfaces, and dissected volumes. They deployed the analytical functions
described by Benjamin in relation to photography and cinema.
3.4.2 Oculis subjecta fidelibus
Roentgen himself was never interested in the medical potential of radiography.
It seems that he discussed the issue only once, on occasion of a lecture given to
the Würzburg Physical-Medical Society, shortly after his invention. He reached
the conclusion that the avail of X-rays for medicine was very limited, because
he thought that since all the soft tissues of the body have the same density,
they would leave a uniform, uninformative shade on the radiographic plate.76
On the contrary, the very first comment published in the lay press (Die Presse,
Wien, January 5, 1896), showed considerable optimism about the diagnostic
potential of X-rays imaging. The journalist wrote: “we can foresee that one
day these rays will be so perfect that [...] they could be of immeasurable help
for the diagnosis of countless diseases other than those of the bones.”77 The
enthusiasm of the Austrian reporter was shared by a handful of physicians who
started to make radiographs as soon as the discovery went public. Roentgen
published his preliminary report on X-rays on December 28, 1895, and within
a few days the first medical radiographs appeared. At the technical level, the
transition from photography to radiography was smooth. As an imaging device,
radiography was considered a special kind of photography, one that exploited
X-rays rather than visible light to create images on a sensible surface. Indeed,
in the early years of radiology, photographers contributed to the development
of the new technology as much as physicists, engineers, and physicians. Medical
photographers were very quick at learning how to make radiographs. Londe,
for example, set up a radiographic laboratory at the Salpêtrière as early as
January 1896, and shortly after he was appointed director of the Department
of Radiology of the Parisian hospital.78
75See Lamata Manuel, 2010.
76See Friedman and Friedland, 1998, 125-126.
77Quoted in Posner, 1971, 233.
78See Sicard, 1998, 211. Since so many diﬀerent professionals were involved in the making of
radiographs, an important debate arose about who was entailed to make (and interpret) them.
In France, for example, the issue was raised already in December 1896 by Antoine Béclère,
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In April 1896, the British Medical Journal began to publish the Archives of
Clinical Skiagraphy and appointed a “special commissioner for investigation of
the application of the new photography to medicine and surgery” (a Mr. Sydney
Rowland). In the first issue of the Archives Rowland wrote:
The progress of this new Art has been so rapid that, although Prof.
Roengen’s discovery is only a thing of yesterday, it has already taken
its place among the approved and accepted aids to diagnosis. At the
first moment, the statement that it had been found possible to penetrate
the fleshy coverings of the bones, and to photograph their substance and
contour, seemed the realization of almost an impossible scientific dream.
[...] At the present time, we are in the position to obtain a visible image
of every bone and every joint in the body. [...]
Whatever may be the scientific explanation of the exact character of
the X rays, the value of their discovery to surgeons and physicians is in-
estimable. By means of the new radiation it is now possible to render
visible certain of the interiors structures of the living body, and their pre-
cise conditions of disease or of health can be objectively demonstrated, and
facts which heretofore could not be known or guessed at by a complicated
system of inference, are now oculis subjecta fidelibus.79
This quotation captures quite well the enthusiasm with which the medical world,
or at least part of it, received the discovery of the X-rays. As Rowland put it, it
was a scientific dream that came true. It was finally possible to gain a definitive
visual access to the inner body, and thereby attain objective demonstrations of
conditions that the traditional inferential method of medicine could never re-
veal. For Rowland, radiography was objective because it oﬀered visual evidence
of something that, under natural conditions, was hidden to the human senses.
His idea of objectivity was explicitly rooted in the sheer equivalence between ob-
jective and visible (oculis subjecta fidelibus), therefore his trust in the objectivity
of radiography depended implicitly on the fact that X-rays made available to hu-
man perception something that otherwise would be strictly concealed, namely,
the bones and joints of a living person.
For Rowland, objectivity was related with the very possibility of seeing some-
thing and of sharing such vision, rather than with the sheer automatization of
the process of image production. However, although his excitement was widely
shared within the medical community, the integration of radiography in routine
clinical practice was neither uncontroversial nor instantaneous. The new tech-
nology was almost immediately adopted in surgery, especially in the domains of
the virologist-immunologist founder of French Radiology. Béclère, as many other physicians,
argued that both radiography and radiotherapy should be controlled by medical specialists,
but the conflict of competences went on until 1934, when a law established that a medical
degree was needed to use X-rays for diagnostic and therapeutic aims. Similar measures were
adopted in all countries where hospitals had radiographic facilities.
79Rowland, 1896, 3 and 9.
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military medicine80 and dentistry, but it took a few years before it could make
some impact on internal medicine. This is not surprising if we consider that,
as Roentgen had warned, soft tissues are scarcely opaque to X-rays and that,
given the poor quality of the early radiographs, it was much easier to identify
bullets, bones and teeth than soft organs, such as the lungs and the heart.
The diﬃculties in visualizing the lungs were particularly compelling, because
lungs were the most important seat of tuberculosis, one of the most common
and deadly diseases of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, med-
ical historian E. Posner has shown that the attitude of the medical community
in respect to such hindrances was not uniform. In an early comment on the
Roentgen rays, the British scientific journal The Electrician, reported: “with
the stethoscope it has become possible to listen to the working of the human
frame, with the new radiation it is to be hoped that the human frame will
become – to skilled vision – something akin to transparent.”81 Thus, radio-
graphy, with its ability to reveal the inner body, was immediately associated
to the stethoscope, which was the leading diagnostic technology of the time,
at least for chest diseases. Commentators in the medical press, however, were
quite cautious, and in the issue of the British Medical Journal that appeared
on February 1, 1896 a doctor wrote that only “the uneducated imagination” of
lay people could dream of immediate benefits from the X-rays in the domain of
tuberculosis and thorax diseases.82 At the beginning of the 1920s some medical
textbooks still expressed skepticism in relation to the ability of X-rays to re-
veal pulmonary tuberculosis before the manifestation of symptoms and physical
signs. As a telling example, Posner reminds that in the eight edition of The
Principles and Practice of Medicine, of 1920, the renowned clinician William
Osler (one of the founding professors of the Johns Hopkins Hospital School of
Medicine) maintained that a careful clinical examination would normally say
more than any radiograph, and disparagingly wrote: “radiographers need the
salutary lesson of the Dead House to correct their Visionary interpretation of
shadows.”83 To Osler, radiographs were mere shadows, and the only way to gain
true knowledge of disease remained pathological anatomy.
French doctors, in general, seemed more optimistic. Already in 1897, the
Revue de la Tubercolose et de Pneumologie reported on the work of L. Douchard
and colleagues, at the Hôpital Charité in Paris, saying that thanks to their “belles
80Italy was the first country to use X-rays on the battlefield: in May 1896 field hospitals
in the east Africa war were equipped with X-ray units. In the following year the British sent
field-type X-ray apparatuses to the Balkans and Afghanistan. See Kevles, 1997, 39.
81The Electrician, 1896, 36:448, quoted in Posner, 1971, 233.
82See Posner, 1971, 233.
83Quoted in Posner, 1971, 234.
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radiographies” they had been able to detect tuberculous lesions that had been
missed by percussion and auscultation. And although Bouchard himself thought
that the new method had limitations similar to those of physical examination,
the author of the article was much more confident and expressed no doubt that
radioscopy would have allowed for earlier diagnosis of tuberculosis.84
3.4.3 Radiography and the challenges of internal medicine
Tuberculosis, a leading cause of death until the discovery of penicillin (1929),
was since the beginning a major field of investigation for radiographers, but it
was only by the beginning of the First World War that X-ray technology was
stable enough to allow for a significant advance in chest radiology. Until then,
the work of doctors and technicians had been hampered by relevant technical
shortcomings. Indeed, technical problems were a strong limiting factor. In 1949,
a radiologist wrote: “For the first five years X-ray apparatus was more an in-
teresting toy than a weapon of value in medicine [...] looking back, it seems
remarkable that any results could be obtained with such makeshift and unre-
liable apparatus – still more remarkable the range of examinations attempted
and their comparative success.”85 As a matter of fact, especially when it came
to soft tissues, it is surprising that physicians could see something at all in early
radiographs. Not only the image quality was very low, but most physicians,
even among those actively engaged in the development of the new technology,
did not always know what they were looking for when they looked at a radio-
graph. A telling example of such diﬃculties is provided by the frontispiece of
the book Practical Radiography, published in 1896. It proudly displayed “The
Human Heart in situ” (so went the caption), but the heart it showed was upside
down, and so it remained in consecutive reprints for twenty years.86
So, how do we explain the faith of the early proponents of radiography in
those blurred, distorted images? What could justify their stubbornness, their
will to see something relevant in images that very often proved to be quite de-
ceiving? To answer these questions we have to take into account two factors.
One is that radiography was automatically granted the same epistemic author-
ity as photography; the other is that radiography joined a field, instrumental
diagnostics, that was in full development (as shown in Chapter 1), and col-
lected the enthusiasm of the youngest and most dynamic part of the medical
community. As remarked by Rowland, radiographs transformed the invisible
structures and hypothetical impairments of the inner body into something that
84See Posner, 1971, 234.
85Barclay, 1949.
86See Posner, 1971, 234; Kevles, 1998, 92.
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was “oculis subjecta fidelibus.”87 For medicine, which had long been struggling
to become a full-fledged empirical science, the possibility of transforming indi-
rect evidence into visible facts looked like a very reliable way to acquire secure
and well founded knowledge. Additionally, we can speculate that for physicians,
used to deal with ambiguous signs and symptoms, the lack of clarity in radio-
graphic images did not represent a strong argument against the possibility of
gaining useful knowledge through them. This does not mean, of course, that
there was unanimous agreement among doctors about the evidentiary power of
X-ray imaging. As mentioned above, although surgery and dentistry were very
quick at integrating radiography in daily practice, in internal medicine the pro-
cess was longer and much more complex. Those clinicians who engaged in the
diagnosis of diseases with undefined morphology, or characterized by functional
rather than morphological features were often skeptical about the diagnostic
relevance of radiography.
In internal medicine, similarly to what had previously happened with mi-
crophotography and chronophotography, the corroboration of the content of the
image was a complex issue, because it was necessary to endow with meaning
images whose iconic dimension was problematic. It goes without saying that
it was relatively easy to verify the similarity between an X-ray image and a
broken rib, but in which sense could one say that a shadow in the radiographic
plate looked like a tubercular lesion or an aortic aneurysm? For radiographs
too, a number of cognitive strategies ranging from technology stabilization and
standardization to the development of interpretive ability had to be put in place
to produce clinical meaning.
3.4.4 On the interpretation of X-ray images
The visual appearance of radiographs gave an immediate impression of trans-
parency, and yet one had to learn to see before one could see something mean-
ingful in these images. In 1903, J.F. Halls Dally, one of the British pioneers of
clinical radioscopy, wrote in The Lancet:
A good radiograph in some respects may be said to resemble a painting
by Turner. Without intuition or previous study the one is almost as
incomprehensible as the other, but as we gaze the wealth of detail rises
before our vision, until finally we are able to interpret the meaning of
streaks and shadows that to the untrained eyes are meaningless.88
In 1905, C.L. Leonard, an American surgeon who used radiography to improve
the diﬀerential diagnosis of ureteral calculus argued:
87Rowland 1896, 9. See quotation above.
88Halls Dally, 1903, 1806.
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Figure 3.9: J.M.W. Turner (1775-1851), Rain, Steam and Speed – The Great Western
Railway, 1844. National Gallery, London.
In considering the accuracy of this method [radiography] the personal
equation of the individual operator must be taken into account. Although
this diagnosis depends for its accuracy upon its mechanical method of
obtaining results, those results will not be accurate unless it is employed
properly. The skill and experience of the individual operator with this
method must be taken into consideration in every case and his percentage
of error estimated. [...] [It is] clinical experience that renders the operator
capable of translating the diagnosis accurately from a radiographic plate.89
These two quotes help understanding what it means, exactly, that one had to
learn to see in order to find something clinically relevant in radiographs. Halls
Dally explicitly talked of the need to learn to interpret the “streaks and shadows”
that appear on the radiographic plate. To him, the content of the image was
neither self-evident nor self-explanatory. One had to actively and accurately
interpret the radiographic shadows in order to recognize meaningful shapes. To
put it diﬀerently, one had to reconstruct the right forms within the mists of
the radiographic plate, and to reach this end one had to put in relation the X-
ray shadows with other images (material or mental) of normal and pathological
anatomy. If one was to interpret an image, one had to mobilize a wealth of
explicit and implicit knowledge, which Halls Dally called “previous study” and
“intuition,” respectively.
By comparing a radiograph to a painting by J.M.W. Turner (Figure 3.9),
Halls Dally not only oﬀers a vivid visual metaphor of the diﬃculty of seeing well
delineated objects in a radiograph, he also points to the fact that interpreting
89Leonard, 1905, 1634 and 1636.
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is by necessity a creative activity, open to qualitative nuances.90 This entails
that as far as the observer becomes more experienced he or she can learn to
see more details. At the same time, it implies that diﬀerent observers might
pay attention to diﬀerent elements. In this case, their interpretations will diﬀer
without this necessarily entailing one of them to be wrong. Another possibility
is that diﬀerent beholders can understand the same visual elements in distinct
ways, while the same observer could revise his or her interpretation over time.
Halls Dally had no doubts about the possibility to establish a correct, stable
interpretation of a radiographic image. In fact, he went as far as to claim that:
“Although observers may diﬀer widely as to the interpretation of evidence based
on tactile and auditory impressions, ocular evidence in most cases admits of no
diﬀerence of opinion.”91 In this, he partook in Rowland’s assurance about the
objective nature of vision. Yet, he was aware that vision was inextricably linked
to interpretation, and that the process that led to the proper understanding
of the streaks and shadows on the radiographic plate was not an automatic,
merely optical operation. He knew that without training pattern recognition
and clinical judgment one could see nothing but elusive shapes.
The skillful operator Leonard, too, was conscious of the fact that the mean-
ing of radiographs was neither explicit nor transparent, and he resorted to the
metaphor of translation to warn the reader that the making of a diagnosis from
an X-ray plate was not a passive task. One does not read the diagnosis straight
into the image, one has to carry on an accurate translation (which is always
an interpretative process), in order to transform what is seen in the radiograph
into knowledge of what is happening within the patient’s body. But, how does
one learn to perform such translations? For Leonard, as for Halls Dally, one
90J.M.W. Turner (1775-1851) was an English Romantic painter whose style is regarded
as an anticipation of Impressionism. He was known by his contemporaries as “the painter of
light.” The artist and curator Lawrence Gowing has described Turner’s work as “the indefinite
transmission and dispersal of light by an infinite series of reflections from an endless variety
of surfaces and materials, each contributing to its own color that mingles with every other,
penetrating ultimately to every recess, reflected everywhere.” Gowing, 1966, 21.
91Halls Dally, 1903, 1803. Halls Dally optimism about diﬀerences of opinion concerning
ocular evidences was somewhat unjustified. Already in the 1920s doctors started discussing
the problem of errors in the interpretation of radiographs, and a radiologist wrote that one
source of error was the “thoughtless belief in the infallibility of the roentgen ray by the medical
profession as a whole.” Musser, 1923, 252, quoted in Reiser, 1978, 189. And in 1947, the first
systematic study on the magnitude of variation in the interpretation of X-ray films showed
that in about one-third of cases diﬀerent doctors diﬀered with their interpretations, and even
the same doctor watching the same radiographs at diﬀerent times diﬀered in his interpretation
about a fifth of the time. See Reiser, 1978, 189-190. The advancement of technology has not
solved the problem, as shown by the rich literature that deals with the problem of error in
radiography. See, for example, Sabih, et al., 2011; Alexander, 2010; Kundel, 2006; Griscom,
2002.
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needed clinical experience, with its combination of practical skills and theoreti-
cal knowledge. Still, if one is to rely on radiographs to make a medical diagnosis,
to formulate the right interpretation or to establish the right translation is not
enough. In the first place one has to produce the right image. Halls Dally im-
plicitly hints at this problem, because he talks of a “good radiograph,” but it is
in the quote from Leonard that we find an explicit reference the process of image
production. In fact, he insists on that the accuracy of the radiographic method
depends chiefly on the “skill and experience of the individual operator,”92 be-
cause the mechanical system of image production can be accurate only as far
as it is “employed properly.”93 As the image has to be interpreted in order to
acquire meaning, so the mechanical apparatus has to be skillfully operated in
order to produce a trustworthy image. This was particularly true at a time in
which the technology was still under development, and doctors and technicians
worked by trial and error, dealing with the unpredictable behavior of new in-
struments and processes. As Posner put it, the early history of radiography was
“a story of erratic electric supplies, nitrous fume-producing cell batteries, inef-
fective electrolytic rectifiers, and temperamental gas tubes.”94 The technology
to produce radiographs was as novel as the images themselves, and as such it
required the same ingenuity and critical judgment. The apparatus was mechan-
ical, but it was not a self-operating agent. Images did not emerge passively from
machines, they had to be actively produced, and they had to be produced in
the right way.
3.4.5 Mechanical images and trained judgment
Halls Dally’s and Leonard’s clear awareness of the need to use clinical experience
and critical judgment both in the production and interpretation of radiographs
is at odds not only with Daston and Galison’s idea of mechanical objectivity,
but also with their claim that another epistemic virtue, namely trained judg-
ment, emerged after mechanical objectivity and as a backlash against it.95 As
explained in the introductory section of this chapter, according to Daston and
Galison, mechanical objectivity was the overarching ideal that regulated the
making and use of scientific images between the second half of the nineteenth
and the first decades of the twentieth centuries. It prescribed to suppress the
intervention of the scientist in the process of image production and reproduc-
92Leonard, 1905, 1634. It should be noted that when Leonard talks of an “operator” he
means the physician himself, who took the radiographs with the help of an assistant technician.
93Leonard, 1905, 1634.
94Posner, 1971, 238.
95See Daston and Galison, 2007, 18 and 377.
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tion, since the ultimate goal of the scientific endeavor was to represent the exact
appearance of the object as recorded by the mechanical apparatus. Any hu-
man interference with the photographic camera, the radiographic machine, or
any other recording device had to be minimized, so that the subjectivity of
the observer-operator would not aﬀect the direct imprint of nature on a sheet
of paper or any other sensible support. Mechanical objectivity also imposed
rigorous self-restraint in the interpretation of images. Ideally, Daston and Gal-
ison say, images had not to be interpreted at all, and in those cases in which
interpretation was unavoidable, it should be performed according to rigid and
standardized procedures.96
According to Daston and Galison’s chronological taxonomy of epistemic ide-
als, by the third decade of the twentieth century, partly in reaction to me-
chanical objectivity, the principle that governed science became one of trained
judgment. To use their own words: “[By 1920s] the edict of mechanical ob-
jectivity to abstain from all interpretation turned out to be sterile.”97 Unlike
mechanical objectivity, trained judgment prescribed to produce, reproduce, and
interpret images by resorting to the tacit knowledge acquired through practi-
cal training. Interpreted images, the form of representation corresponding to
trained judgement, were still produced by mechanical devices and respecting
good laboratory practices, but subjective interpretation, fed by accurate train-
ing, was no longer seen as standing in stark opposition with scientific rigor and
objectivity.98 Comparing mechanical objectivity and trained judgment, Das-
ton and Galison maintain that for the scientist who subscribed to the ideal of
trained judgment, judgment was “an act of cultivated perception and cognition
was associated with a picture of reading that was both anti-algorithmic and
antimechanistic.”99 And they specify:
Scientific image judgment had to be acquired through a sophisticated
apprenticeship, but it was a labor of a very diﬀerent sort from the re-
hearsed moves of the nineteenth-century mechanical objectivist. Inter-
preted images got their force not from the labor behind automation, self-
registration, or absolute self-restraint, but from the expert training of the
eye, which drew on a historically specific way of seeing. Scientific sight
had become an ‘empirical art.’100
Now, the articles from Leonard and Halls Dally clearly show that even at the
time of alleged mechanical objectivity, clinicians who worked with radiographs
96See Daston and Galison, 2007, 315, 321, 328, 344.
97Daston and Galison, 2007, 344.
98See Daston and Galison, 2007, 314.
99Daston and Galison, 2007, 331.
100Daston and Galison, 2007, 331.
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were clearly aware of the many variables the operators had to take into consid-
eration when making a radiograph, of the ambiguity of the shadows they had to
make sense of, and of the complexity of the conditions they wanted to diagnose.
This is to say that they did not believe that radiographs were imprints of reality
sic et simpliciter. Even when they praised radiography as being more objective
than other diagnostic instruments, Halls Dally and Leonard did not claim that
objectivity was the suppression of the judgment either of the observing subject,
or of the image maker. They did not recommend the blind application of proce-
dures in the process of image production, quite the contrary, and they did not
take objectivity for self-evidence. They explicitly acknowledged that the skill
and experience of the operator were paramount, and invited their colleagues to
learn to interpret radiographs, to translate images into diagnosis on the basis
of study, educated intuition, and clinical experience. Importantly, they were
not innovators in this respect. Their predecessors, the pioneers of photography,
had followed the same approach. As pointed out in Chapter 2, Duchenne de
Boulogne became a photographer himself because he was convinced that pho-
tography would let nature speak for herself only if the image maker was well
acquainted with the phenomenon that was to be recorded,101 and the whole
point of all medical photographic publications of the nineteenth century was to
train the eye of the observer, in order to improve his physiognomic sight and his
clinical judgment.102 Contrary to Daston and Galison’s claims, scientific sight
has always been, by necessity, an empirical art, and possibly no one was more
conscious of this than physicians, whose commitment to intuitive medical judg-
ment not only long predated the twentieth century, but was also constitutive of
the very authority of medical profession.103
Legitimization of scientific photography in the nineteenth century It
is true, as Daston and Galison stress, that in the introductions to photographic
atlases the nineteenth-century authors reiterated over and over again that they
had let nature imprint itself, without intervening on the photographic plate.
However, it should be remarked that they also praised the skill of the photog-
rapher. Hardy, for example, eulogized de Montméja’s “indisputable talent as
photographer and colorist,”104 and Donné emphasized that the results attained
101See Section 2.7.
102In this same line of criticism, in a review of Daston and Galison’s book Theodor Porter has
pointed out that: “If all the confusing details of a real photograph are preserved [complying
with the edict of mechanical objectivity] – if seasoned judgment in its preparation is disbarred
– the need for expert discernment among those who consult the images becomes all the more
pressing.” Porter, 2008, 644.
103For a criticism to Daston and Galison along similar lines see Porter, 2008.
104Hardy, 1868, n.p.
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by his photographer Léon Foucault were “remarkable.”105 In an essay on the
role of photography in science, published in 1882 in the journal Photographic
News, the anonymous author not only highlighted the relevance of technology
and of the photographer’s technical skill, he also stated that the making of a
scientific photograph inevitably involved aesthetic choices, judgments and inter-
ventions.106 Moreover, one should not forget that, as remarked by the historian
of photography Jennifer Tucker, the expression “judging eye” was coined by
Victorian photographers to refer to the great skill and diﬀerent kinds of knowl-
edge that one had to develop in order to make good photographs.107 All these
documental evidences contradict Daston and Galison’s claim that the work of
scientists in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries was governed by
the ambition to attain mechanical objectivity, and that only during the twenti-
eth century “the espousal, celebration, and cultivation of trained judgment”108
imposed itself as a new regulative ideal that supplemented objectivity.
Objectivity was never purely mechanical, neither in the practice nor in the
discourses of scientists. In her book Nature Exposed. Photography as Eyewit-
ness in Victorian Science, of 2005, Tucker has convincingly disputed the strong
assumption, common among historians, that in the nineteenth century the au-
thority of photography was unchallenged. By examining scientific, technical and
popular nineteenth-century literature on scientific photography, she provides
plenty of evidence that concepts of skill (both visual and manual), judgment,
and human agency informed what counted as objective and subjective during
the Victorian era. Referring explicitly to Daston and Galison’s article of 1992,
Tucker argues that: “Although nineteenth-century faith in photography was
powerful, the idea that people over a hundred years ago accepted photographs
at face value is exaggerated and misleading.”109 Gathering testimonies from dif-
ferent sources (scientific journals and congress reports, but also popular lectures
and magazines), Tucker demonstrates that Victorians – both scientists and the
general public – were keenly aware of the manufactured nature of photographs.
Most of them also knew that the production of mechanical images required in-
tense skilled labor. Indeed, in the process of professionalization of scientific
photography, those who promoted this new medium as a scientific tool stressed
the importance of qualified knowledge that had to be coupled with artful craft.
How to make proper data with a scientific instrument, Tucker remarks, was a
topic of great concern at the time photography emerged.
105Donné, 1844, 36.
106See Tucker, 2005, 259.
107See Tucker, 2005, 60.
108Daston and Galison, 2007, 321.
109Tucker, 2005, 4.
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A paradigmatic case is provided by spirit photography, because it proved
how misleading the unconditional association of mechanical representation to
objective and scientific evidence could be. Defendants of spiritualism, in fact,
tried to draw on the claims about the mechanical objectivity of photography to
reinforce their contention that spirit photographs were direct proofs of an oth-
erwise unseen reality. Thus, in order to reject the belief that it was possible to
photograph spirits and ghosts, scientists were forced to explicitly argue that me-
chanical objectivity was not ipso facto scientific and trustworthy.110 “Through-
out the nineteenth century,” Tucker notes “people debated truth claims based on
photographs and, in the process, established the criteria by which a photograph
could be accepted as scientific evidence. These debates erupted in laboratories,
observatories, and scientific meetings as well as at world’s fairs and in court-
rooms, illustrated periodicals, and spiritualist séances.”111 Indeed, as shown in
Chapter 2 and in the discussion of Marey’s ideas about photography in Section
3.3, people in the nineteenth century held quite contradictory views about me-
chanically produced images. They maintained that photography was the pencil
of nature and that one had to be a skilled photographer to produce pictures
that looked like the original object; they were ready to say that photography
faithfully reproduced the appearance of objects and that it created hypothetical
images. This ambiguity, however, is less a testimony of a lack of sophistication
in the understandinhg of photography, than a symptom of the complex nature
of photography itself.
Recognizing the unknown Another important aspect overlooked by Das-
ton and Galison is that early photographers and early radiographers, as well as
those who developed other technologies for visualization, such as cloud cham-
bers or stellar spectrographs, were creating images that no one had seen before.
They were literally creating new phenomena and, accordingly, they had to learn
to see anew. Now, how could they produce anything new, and learn to see
anything at all, if they had restrained themselves from applying judgment and
interpretation? How could they have invented and perfected a panoply of imag-
ing technologies, if they had been afraid to intervene? How could they have
ventured in the wide range of examinations they performed with erratic appa-
ratuses and blurred images, if they had been the shy, will-abnegating workers
afraid to interfere with machines and images described by Daston and Gali-
110See Tucker, 2005, Ch. 2. In Ch. 3 and Ch. 4 Tucker analyses the case of photography
in meteorology and bacteriology, respectively, and in Ch. 5 she focuses on the question
of scientists’ disagreement in the interpretation of images, drawing on the specific case of
planetary photography (Mars, in particular).
111Tucker, 2005, 6.
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son?112 They argue that the fact that under mechanical objectivity scientists
did actually resort to intervention and judgment cannot be used as a counter-
argument against the claim that mechanical objectivity was an epistemic ideal.
Ideals, they rightly argue, are never fully accomplished, nevertheless they regu-
late people’s behavior.113 This is quite obvious, since it directly proceeds from
the definition of ideal. However, it seems to me that it cannot be used as an
argument to refute strong historical and conceptual counter-evidences, as those
put forward by Breidbach, Snyder and Tucker concerning photography, and by
my examples from radiography.
Some problems with Daston and Galison’s methodology In a review
of Objectivity, the philosopher of science Martin Kusch has noted that Daston
and Galison exemplify mechanical objectivity on the basis of the analysis of
about seventy non-geographical atlases114 (although they say that almost two
thousand were published between 1830 and 1930), but they do not provide any
quantitative data about the alleged rise and fall of the various epistemic virtues,
or their role in diﬀerent disciplinary fields. They select and synthesize their
sources in ways that are not transparent, and “a critical reader might well feel
that she is asked to take a lot – perhaps too much – simply on trust.”115 The very
choice to use as primary sources scientific atlases and manuals is problematic.
As a matter of fact, atlases are supposed to fix knowledge and consolidate
scientific practices. This is why they work as references or guides. Atlases
and manuals have, in general, an eminently pedagogical function. However,
the ideas and practices involved in the production, selection and presentation
of images aimed at stabilizing knowledge are not necessarily the same as the
ideas and practices involved in the production and handling of images aimed at
generating new knowledge. Atlases, and particularly what scientists write in the
introductions to these atlases, are not necessarily the best route to understand-
ing how images actually work in the construction of new knowledge.116 Tucker
remarks that Daston and Galison’s choice to focus on atlases, letting aside other
112Porter makes a similar criticism. He comments that it is quite surprising to see the period
between 1850 and 1920, the golden age of public science and of scientists’s public role, depicted
as an era of mechanical objectivity. In Daston and Galison’s construal, mechanical objectivity
prescribed absolute self-restrained from making assertions that could not be demonstrated
impersonally (mechanically). The regulatory ideal of mechanical objectivity, by Daston and
Galison’s own admission, summed up to intellectual timidity and an ethos of self-abnegation.
Porter ironically wonders: “Were Huxley, Helmholtz, and Bernard paralyzed by anxieties
regarding the validity of their own insights and interpretations?” Porter, 2008, 645.
113See, for example, Daston and Galison, 2007, 321.
114Namely, atlases of anatomy, bacteriology, neurology, pathology, physics, and zoology.
115Kusch, 2009, 129.
116For similar criticisms see Porter, 2007 and 2008.
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scientific media, hampers from the outset the possibility to make general claims
about what scientists really thought, and how they actually worked. She points
out that, exactly because atlases serve as descriptive guides to idealized scien-
tific identities, a sort of conduct books for scientists, they cannot help to shed
light on crucial questions about actual scientific practice, which is related less
to atlases’ production than to their reception and use. To make her point she
ironically comments: “We do not really accept that nineteenth-century women
lived according to prescriptive literature.”117
The aim of this extensive critique of Daston and Galison’s notion of me-
chanical objectivity was not to deny that in the second half of the nineteenth,
and well into the twentieth century, scientists, artists and the lay people were
utterly fascinated by machines and automation. I do not dispute that in many
cases mechanization of data recording was associated to the idea of objectivity
as suppression of the subjective idiosyncrasies of a human observer or measurer.
I rather wanted to stress that Daston and Galison make too strong a case for
mechanical objectivity, as if it were a uniform and universal dogma. We fail
to understand how automation and the development of measuring and imaging
devices transformed science and scientific practice during the nineteenth cen-
tury, if we do not take into account that the struggle to adhere to standards of
mechanical objectivity was deeply entrenched with an equally important strug-
gle for intersubjectivity, the development of a mechanical sensibility (prosthetic
senses), and the acute awareness of the importance, in the empirical sciences,
of skilled operators and educated interpreters.
This completes my critical remarks concerning the relationship between me-
chanical objectivity and trained judgment. Now it is necessary to understand
how radiographers faced the problem of image corroboration, and through what
specific strategies and practices they endowed radiographs with diagnostic mean-
ing and relevance.
3.4.6 Making sense of shadows
As seen above, the integration of radiography in clinical medicine was a complex
and relatively long process. Bernike Pasveer, a scholar in Science and Technol-
ogy Studies, has convincingly argued that the fact that internal medicine was
much slower than surgery in making sense of radiography depends only in part
on technical diﬃculties and image poor quality. This was just one aspect of the
problem. Equally important was the fact that X-rays did actually open a new
visual world, and traditional anatomical knowledge (normal or pathological)
117Tucker, 2008, 655.
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gained through autopsies could only partly help making sense of the shadows
on an X-ray plate. Pasveer suggests that if surgery, dentistry and orthopedics
were quicker than internal medicine at taking on radiography, it was not only
because shrapnels, teeth and bones are more radio-opaque than the lungs. It
was also because recognizing the anatomical look of the skeleton in a radiograph
requires a less radical sensorial and cognitive transformation than connecting the
anatomical image of dead body organs to the shadow of living ones.118 As she
puts it: “The X-ray images were trusted for their ability to represent reality, but
in the pre-Roentgen era reality looked enormously diﬀerent from the shadows
that were now said to be mirroring the inner parts of patients.”119 One telling
example of this transformation of what reality should (or could) look like, is that
of the stomach and intestine as represented in anatomy atlases or seen through a
skiagram. In 1910, in fact, the use of bismuth, an X-ray opaque substance that
can be safely ingested, showed that the stomach, often horizontal and curved in
the cadaver, is generally vertical in the living, while the intestine, which in the
dead occupies a relatively fixed position, in the living can occupy almost any
place in the abdomen.120
As argued in Chapter 1, clinical anatomy and the localizationist paradigm it
entailed was a necessary precondition for making sense of radiology, neverthe-
less anatomical knowledge gained through cadavers’ dissection did not always
smoothly overlap with the anatomy revealed by the X-rays. As Laennec had
needed a highly educated ear to be able to use the stethoscope, radiographers
needed a highly educated eye. One had to develop a skilled vision, as many com-
mentators of the time asserted. This process of education of the eye was much
more than sensorial training. Pasveer distinguishes four phases in the process
that turned the shadows of X-ray plates into meaningful and useful diagnostic
images: (1) Technology control and stabilization; (2) Validation of the visual
content of radiographs by comparing them with real organs; (3) Comparison
of the information acquired through X-ray images with that provided by other
diagnostic techniques; (4) Comparison of diﬀerent X-ray images. These steps
partially overlap both in time and content (problems to be solved), but each of
them corresponds to a specific method for shaping the content and meaning of
shadow images.
Technology stabilization The first step in the process of X-ray imaging
signification involved experimentation with technology. This phase occupied
118See Pasveer, 1989, 361.
119Pasveer, 1989, 361.
120See Reiser, 1978, 65.
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about twenty years since the discovery of Roentgen rays, and was meant to
stabilize and standardize machines and practices. X-ray workers (physicians,
physicists, engineers, and photographers) experimented with photographic ap-
paratuses, materials, procedures, and X-rayed a wide range of objects, so that
the whole system could be finally controlled, black-boxed (the radiologist would
no longer need to know how the technology worked in order to use it) and rou-
tinely operated without major problems. In other words, the aim of this phase
was to warrant the liability, reproducibility and comparability of X-ray images,
distinguishing the shadows produced by the object under examination, from
the artifacts introduced by the machine or the procedure.121 Pasveer points out
that the early articles on the use of Roentgen rays in medicine reflected the
exploratory character of the work of physicians and technicians at that time.122
Before describing clinical cases and discussing the diagnostic meaning of the im-
ages, they specified what tubes had been used, the amount of current, the length
of the exposure and the respective positions of tube, photographic plate and pa-
tient. At the beginning these descriptions did not have prescriptive functions,
but in time they became sets of operational rules: how to use an apparatus with
certain characteristics; to position the patient in a specific way; to accustom
the eyes to darkness if one was working with fluorescent screens rather than
photographic plates, and so on.
As already mentioned, one of the advantages of producing medical visual
data was that they provided information that could be easily retrieved, shared,
and compared. The production and use of these data, however, demanded
standardization of objects and actions. It also demanded a proper language to
describe the new reality that had entered the medical domain. Patients had
to be positioned “screen to back”, “screen to chest”, “lateral oblique;” and a
normal thorax would present a “well-defined median opacity” with a lateral
“transradiant area.”123 Pasveer remarks that all these sentences could simply
not exist in the medical vocabulary before the discovery of X-rays. There would
have been no meaning attached to them.124 This was true not only for internal
medicine, but also for surgery and orthopedics. Radiographs enabled surgeons
to view, for the first time, preoperative bony fragments and the postoperative
opposition. In the long run these visual criteria replaced older methods of
121Of the more than 1,000 articles and fifty books published on X-rays in 1896, more than
two thirds treated technical issues, while the remaining third was on clinical and surgical
subjects. See Pasveer, 1989, 379.
122See Pasveer, 1989, 369.
123Halls Dally, 1903, 1801.
124See Pasveer, 1989, 365.
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physical examinations in the evaluation of fractures and of the success of the
intervention.125
Image external validation The second moment described by Pasveer con-
cerned the validation of the X-ray image by comparison with organs’ direct
observation. During this phase, which overlapped chronologically with the tech-
nological experimentation, the iconic dimension or radiographic imaging, that
is, the resemblance between shadows and organs, was secured. Radiologists
checked their interpretation of a radiographs through direct observation of the
organs during a surgical procedure or at the autopsy, in a process which clearly
followed the logic of Laennec’s validation of the stethoscope and, more gener-
ally, of pathologic anatomy since Morgagni. Very similarly to how Laennec had
checked the diagnosis he made by auscultation with the results of post mortem
examinations, radiologists assessed their vision by comparing what they saw in
the X-ray plate with what they saw in the actual body. It should be noted,
however, that the task of radiologists was comparatively easier, because while
Laennec had to match auditive with visual perceptions, they had to connect dif-
ferent visual objects, consequently it was relatively simple to find firm points of
reference to link the image to the cadaver. Additionally, while auscultation was
a solitary endeavor diﬃcult to share at the intersubjective level (only one listener
at the time could use the stethoscope), radiographs allowed diﬀerent observers to
watch simultaneously the same objects, so that the process of matching organs
and their X-ray shadows had an overtly collective dimension. Radiographers
used the organs to cross-check the images, and the images to cross-check their
own vision. Pasveer remarks that, as anatomists and pathologists already knew,
the cadaver was not always a faithful model of the living body. In the case of
the lungs, for example, it was sometimes diﬃcult to compare the shadow images
of the living lungs with their anatomical appearance in the dead, because these
organs tend to collapse when ventilation is interrupted. In this respect it should
be highlighted that, as in the case of the visualization of the digestive system,
the comparison of X-ray images with anatomical specimens was not only valu-
able in educating the eye and validating the content of radiographs, it also led
to a reassessment of previous anatomical knowledge.126
As a general rule, it was soon clear that there were systematic mismatches
between macroscopic anatomy and radiological images. In the X-ray images
denser structures would screen the soft tissues, some elements that appeared in
125See Lerner, 1992, 388.
126Physiological facts were also questioned. In his article of 1903 Halls Dally contested, on
the grounds of fluoroscopic observations, the widespread belief that the diaphragm flattened
on inspiration.
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the photographic plate did not correspond to anything that could be directly
observed in the real body and, obviously, there was the problem of collapsing
a three-dimensional complex structure in a multilayered bidimensional image.
Moreover, according to the relative positions of cathodic tube, photographic
plate and patient’s body, some shadows came to the fore and others receded. To
overcome these problems of visualization diﬀerent solutions were implemented.
On the one hand, procedures for taking the radiographs were standardized,
in order to ensure images’ reliability and comparability. On the other hand,
to check the correspondence between organs and shadows, two methods were
adopted. One consisted of tagging organs with metal coils before taking the
radiograph; the other consisted of removing in a sequence diﬀerent anatomical
structures (e.g., visceral pleura and pericardium) from the cadaver and taking
successive X-ray pictures, so that it became possible to recognize which shadow
corresponded to which structure.127 Furthermore, to teach visual skills and
create a common way of seeing, radiographic atlases, manuals, and handbook
were published, so that it could be possible to systematically compare images
(the first radiology atlases and handbooks were published as soon as 1896). As a
whole, an articulated complex of activities was put in place in order to guide the
eye of the physician in the passage from the actual body to its shadow-image,
so that anatomy and radiography could check on each other.
Comparison of diﬀerent diagnostic techniques In order to transform ra-
diographs into diagnostic instruments relevant to clinical practice, it was also
necessary to show that it was possible to translate the information acquired with
other, well established, diagnostic tools into the shadows of the X-ray plate. This
was the third moment in the process of X-ray imaging signification. To illustrate
this problem and the solutions that were put forward, Pasveer resorts to the ex-
emplary case of the diagnosis of pulmonary tuberculosis. At the turn of the
nineteenth century, this disease was diagnosed by the anamnesis of the patient
and his family, by physical examination, and by bacteriological analysis. So, in
order to give meaning to the shadow images of the lungs, it was necessary to
integrate the new visual information into this pre-existing body of knowledge.
But how to relate images with clinical data and levels of infiltration by bacte-
ria? A common solution, Pasveer explains, was that of reporting in a sequence
the clinical case (patient’s anamnesis, symptoms, physical signs, bacteriology)
and a description of the images, often accompanied by pictures. She specifically
refers to the article of 1903 by Halls Dally mentioned above,128 in which the
127See Pasveer, 1989, 371.
128See Section 3.4.3.
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clinician-radiologist made a direct comparison between the visual appearance of
a chest radiograph and the signs collected through traditional physical exams.
For example, brightness in the X-ray image corresponded to hyper-resonance in
percussion, trans-radiancy to normal resonance, dense shadow to a dull sound.
Physical signs already had a well established diagnostic meaning, which was
transferred to radiographs through these correspondences. That is, the diagnos-
tic significance of X-ray images was built upon a symbolic mode of signification,
by resorting to a conventional – although not arbitrary – system of correlations
among diﬀerent signs. I elaborate further on this point in Chapter 4, where I
put forward a semiotic analysis of Halls Dally’s article.
Image internal validation The final step of the epistemic authentication
of radiography defined by Pasveer was the comparison of diﬀerent radiologi-
cal images. In my view, this process should be considered an act of internal
validation. It warranted the inherent coherence of the new visual system and
sanctioned its relative autonomy from other diagnostic strategies (subjective
symptoms and physical signs). This passage could be accomplished by capi-
talizing on the amount of knowledge acquired in the earlier phases, which at
a certain point of the process became implicit. That is, radiologists came to
a point in which they were reasonably confident that the apparatus they used
was reliable, that a regimen of correspondences between radiological images and
normal and pathological anatomy subsisted, and that radiological images had
proper clinical relevance. It became fundamental to learn to recognize healthy
organs, normal variations, and pathological states by simply looking at the ra-
diograph. This process required the comparison of images. In this task, as
we have already seen in Chapter 2, collections of images gathered in journals
and atlases were extremely valuable tools. Pasveer points out that in medical
journals of the first decade of the twentieth century the description of a normal
chest “for the sake of comparison”129 was standard, but by 1910 the specialized
readers were expected to be already familiar with it.130 Once the boundaries be-
tween normal morphological variability and overt pathological states had been
settled, normal and pathological variability did not need to be verified over and
over again, it became part of the given knowledge of radiology.131
On these premises it can be said that X-ray images acquired an inherent
cognitive content, reaching the status of autonomous epistemic objects. It was
on the basis of this relative autonomy that radiographs became what Reiser
129Pasveer, 1989, 376.
130Pasveer, 1989, 376.
131See Pasveer, 1989, 374-377.
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has called “the transcendent instrument of visualization in medicine.”132 Tran-
scendent because, at least virtually, a whole, self-contained system of visual
knowledge about the body could be built comparing images: images of the
same person at diﬀerent stages of a disease, as well as images of diﬀerent pa-
tients aﬀected by the same disease (all radiographs were produced following
roughly the same protocols).
3.4.7 Radiography and the legacy of clinical anatomy
The lesson of Bichat on how to use a cadaver as a trustworthy representation of
the living body was implicitly recovered in this crossed comparison of images.
Tellingly, it was with the First World War that radiography made a major step
forward. As the hospitals for the clinicians at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, the war provided an enormous field of experimentation and study on
X-rays from both the technical and medical point of view. At the technical
level, the need of operating the X-ray apparatus in the war field demanded the
development of portable, reliable and easy to handle instruments, as well as
the training of a large number of technicians;133 at the clinical level, the war
gave doctors the opportunity to submit to radiological scrutiny a very large
and relatively uniform population of young men. In doing so they did not only
trained their eyes to recognize hidden bullets and shrapnel, they actually gained
cumulative experience in looking into the human body by means of radiological
images. Once again thorax examination and the diagnosis of tuberculosis was of
particular importance. As noted by Kevles, war doctors submitted to radiolog-
ical examination hundreds of thousands of recruits, in a sort of unplanned mass
screening, and discovered that almost half of them suﬀered from some form
of chest disease.134 The very idea of mass screening became possible, some-
thing that would have been quite implausible with the stethoscope and other
techniques of physical examination. Radiography, in fact, allowed examining
and comparing images rather than real people, and this provided considerable
practical advantages. Pasveer argues:
The comparison of the shadow-images with each other was an activity
that violated the nineteenth-century romantic view of the uniqueness and
wholeness of disease and patients. Patients had to become interchange-
132Reiser, 1978, 58.
133In France, Marie Curie designed an apparatus for the battlefront and created a school
where she trained hundreds of X-ray operators (more than 150 were women). Similarly, in the
United States the Roentgenological division of the Army Medical Corps was strengthened,
Radiology schools were set up in several cities and American physicians were sent to attend
special classes in Paris and Tours. See Kevles, 1997, 72-74.
134See Kevles, 1997, 72-79.
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able, reproducible, quantifiable, and the disease had to be “isolated” from
its bearer.135
Yet, as we have seen in Chapter 1, the “romantic view of the uniqueness and
wholeness of disease and patients” had already been largely eroded all along the
nineteenth century. Beginning with clinical anatomy, which equated disease and
histological lesion or cell degeneration (cellular pathology), and passing through
physiology, with its proliferation of vital indexes, medicine had carried on an
enormous eﬀort to objectivize the human body and its illnesses.
From bodies to images and back At the very beginning of the nineteenth
century, the medicine of the individual started to be translated into hospital
medicine. It was then that the hospital became, as Foucault wrote: “a neutral
domain, one that is homogeneous in all its parts and in which comparison is pos-
sible and open to any form of pathological event, with no principle of selection
or exclusion. In such a domain everything must be possible, and possible in the
same way.”136 The standardization of images had exactly the same function: to
circumscribe a neutral visual space against which the pathological could emerge
within the variations of the boundaries of the normal, and within the variations
of the pathological itself. It was at the intersection of these two sets of varia-
tions that the trained expert could recognize, at a glance, an individual disease.
If the gaze of the clinician travelled from body to body in the hospital wards,
the gaze of the radiologist travelled from image to image. This became possible
because a vast system of references had been set. It was a composite system,
made of methodological and technical standards, scientific societies, specialized
journals, handbooks, and atlases. In this way a bulk of new implicit and ex-
plicit knowledge spread out within the scientific community of X-ray workers
(physicians and technicians). With clinical radiography, the anatomizing power
of photography and its ability to foster our “sense of sameness”137 merged into
tangible objects, which fixed on a celluloid plate the shadows of our living inner
body.
Radiography, the younger surprising daughter of photography transformed
the inner body into a seemingly transparent, portable and reproducible object.
X-ray images stripped the aura of the human body for good. They did not get
simply closer and closer to it, they entered it. As a true analytic and dissecting
device, they became a full-fledged medical medium of the body. To clarify this
135Pasveer, 1989, 374-375.
136Foucault, 1963, 109.
137Benjamin, 1936, 256. See Section 2.3.
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point it is useful to compare X-ray vision with the salient features of Laennec’s
mediated auscultation that were expounded in Chapter 1.
1. While in mediated auscultation the stethoscopic sounds convey indirect
evidence of the histological lesion, with the X-rays the diagnostic instru-
ment seems to directly show the lesion, that is, the disease (from this point
of view the conceptual dependence of radiography on clinical anatomy is
patent).
2. With radiography, the senses of the physicians are not just enhanced. To
see a lung distended by air or a moving diaphragm is simply beyond the
possibilities of the human eye. These images do not exist in the realm
of natural vision. The X-ray machine is a medium of human vision not
in that it improves it, but in that it supersedes it. The stethoscope,
too, helped hearing better and provided a finer spectrum of sounds that
went beyond those perceivable by the naked ear. However, a well trained
clinician can do without the stethoscope and gather comparable sensory
information by unmediated auscultation. X-ray imaging, on the contrary,
shows something that no naked eye could ever see. In a sense, the X-
ray machinery has its own way of seeing, independent of the human one,
and yet in a continuum with it. It brought photography and cinema to a
further degree of revelation of the optical unconscious.
3. Like mediated auscultation, traditional diagnostic imaging makes sense
only within a localizationist medical paradigm, in which the disease is
strictly associated to the anatomical lesion. However, while in clinical
anatomy the cadaver became the medium of the living body, because it
was the material support on which the disease presented itself as a mark, a
lesion, with the introduction of radiography and its further developments,
the corpse could be finally set aside, since the disease presented itself
directly on the photographic plate. As a consequence, the image became
a medium of the body because it stood in the place of the body and, even
more importantly, because it took to the surface what the body concealed.
In some cases, it could also reveal a disease which had not yet expressed
itself through symptoms and signs. The capacity of the image to act as
an absolute medium of the living body has been taken to its full potential
by contemporary digital imaging. Digital technologies allow performing
on the image manipulations that would be impossible in the real body,
as well as in traditional analogical imaging. With MRI, for instance, it is
possible to manipulate image parameters, so that fat content is excluded
and the biological structures of diagnostic interest become more visible.
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4. Finally, as was anticipated by the stethoscope, with the introduction of X-
ray imaging the experience of illness in itself could be potentially mediated,
anticipated, reconfigured. In fact, one of the main advantages attributed
to radiography by practitioners was that it enabled the doctor to make
earlier diagnosis, if compared to physical examination and microbiological
tests.
Proponents of mediated auscultation had made very similar claims about the
stethoscope in relation to the diagnosis based on general symptoms. In the case
of mediated auscultation, the doctor could become the medium of the patient’s
experience because, thanks to his trained senses and clinical knowledge, he could
perceive signs of the disease of which the patient was still unaware. Nevertheless,
the patient had to suspect that something was wrong, otherwise he or she would
not even call for the doctor. However, since the invention of preventive medicine
in the 1960s, people who undergo mass screening are all apparently healthy, that
is, potentially ill. The diagnostic image will establish reasonable evidence for
suspecting that one is sick rather than healthy, bypassing and anticipating any
suspicion of disease that might be raised by the patient or the doctor.138
In the medicine of symptoms, the perception of disease was necessarily the
subjective experience of the patient. With clinical anatomy we passed to a
medicine of physical examination, with signs experienced by the doctor. With
laboratory tests and diagnostic imaging, medicine tries more and more success-
fully to identify the disease at its very beginning or, better, before it even begins.
This takes us back to Dagognet’s observation that diagnostic technologies are
aimed at pushing medicine to its ideal limit, that of a medicine without patient,
without doctor and, in its ultimate development, without disease.139 An ideal
state in which medicine deals with perfectly transparent objects, in which body
and disease are no longer individual, fluctuating experiences, but objective, ob-
servable, quantifiable, and foreseeable facts. In other words, medicine tries to
bridge the gap between the real, lived body and the body constructed by science
as an object of scientific research.
138The passage from being a healthy person to being a sick one is always frightening, some-
times disrupting. Susan Sontag captured very well the dramatic implications of this transition,
which could occur at any moment of our life, when she wrote: “Illness is the night-side of life,
a more onerous citizenship. Everyone who is born holds dual citizenship, in the kingdom of
the well and in the kingdom of the sick. Although we all prefer to use only the good passport,
sooner or later each of us is obliged, at least for a spell, to identify ourselves as citizens of
that other place.” Sontag, 1978, 3.
139See Chapter 1, Section 1.2.
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Chapter 4
Scientific images are tools
In the previous chapter I examined the problem of the visualization of the invis-
ible in nineteenth-century science by analyzing the cases of microphotography,
chronophotography, and early radiographic imaging. I showed that the three
Peircean modes of signification – indexical, iconic, and symbolic – were all co-
opted to endow those images with meaning, and that the problem of corrobo-
rating the truth value of signs that represent invisible referents was tackled by
standardizing experiments, imaging practices, and the rules for image interpre-
tation. Part of my argument was built against Daston and Galison’s notion of
mechanical objectivity, which, as I demonstrated, is too poor to provide a sat-
isfactory account of the theoretical frameworks and actual practices developed
by nineteenth-century scientists and physicians in order to visualize invisible
objects and processes. My arguments were mostly, although not exclusively,
historical. In the present chapter, which is divided in two parts, I move to a
more general, theory-oriented discussion of what it is to work with scientific
images. In the first part I engage with the longstanding problem of visual rep-
resentation, arguing that to represent is a poietic activity and not an act of
mimesis or passive repetition. As in Chapter 3, I define my position in contrast
with Daston and Galison’s. By the end of their book Objectivity, in fact, it be-
comes clear that their theory of scientific images is built on a passive conception
of representation, conceived of as reproduction and copy of reality. Hence, I use
the discussion of such position as a heuristic path to sustain an opposite view,
one which takes representation as a creative endeavor that engages image mak-
ers and observers in a range of sensorial and cognitive activities. In the second
part of the chapter I further develop this idea along two axes of argumentation.
Firstly, I discuss David Gooding’s account of scientific visual thinking, because it
provides a sound description of the trans-historical cognitive strategies adopted
by scientists when working with images. Secondly, I argue that scientific and
medical images must be understood as signs within semiotic networks, as well as
161
162 Scientific images are tools
components of empirical practices. Here, again, my approach is twofold. On the
one hand, I resort to textual and visual semiotics to analyze how images acquire
meaning by referring to other pictures and written signs. On the other hand,
I draw on works from laboratory ethnography and philosophy of experiment to
show that the signification of images is a process entrenched with experiential
knowledge, that is, a form of cognition which demands an interplay of people,
objects, instruments and experiments.
4.1 Representation as presentation
In the last chapter of Objectivity, Daston and Galison introduce the epistemic
ideal of the twenty-first century, which they call “presentation.”1 Compared
to the previous epistemic virtues (truth-to-nature, mechanical objectivity, and
trained judgment), presentation entails a very deep transformation in scien-
tific imaging, namely, the shift from a practice of mirror-like copy of objects
(old-fashioned representation) to a practice of objects and images manipulation
(presentation). Daston and Galison bring up their concept of presentation, as
opposed to representation, by comparing traditional atlases, made of diﬀerent
sorts of printed images, with contemporary image repositories, based on digital
archives of manipulable interactive pictures. According to the authors, two great
divides separate the images collected in traditional atlases from those contained
in digital archives: the former are to be looked at, and re-present something
which already exists (they are copies, as accurate as possible, of reality); the
latter, on the contrary, are to be used, and they present something that was
not already there.2 This account of how digital technologies impinge on the
very nature of atlases entails an implicit theory of (scientific) images, accord-
ing to which the development of digital technologies produced a fundamental
transformation in the domain of images from both the phenomenological and
epistemological perspective. Before computer graphics, images were something
to be looked at, and they provided more or less accurate copies of something
that already existed (representation). After computer graphics, images became
something to be used, devices that can show to our eyes something that cannot
exist outside of the image (presentation).
The conceptual pairs representation-presentation and looking-using are deeply
entangled. However, for the sake of clarity I try to discuss them separately: first
I explore and criticize the diﬀerence between images that re-present and images
1Daston and Galison, 2007, 383.
2See Daston and Galison, 2007, 382-385.
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Traditional or printed
atlases
Digital atlases
printed images computer-based images
reasoned images, mechanical
images, expert images
virtual images, haptic images
images cannot be manipulated
by the observer-user
images can be manipulated by
the observer-user
re-presentation presentation
images to be looked at images to be used
images-as-evidence images-as-tools
Table 4.1: Daston and Galison’s classification of atlases based on the technology of
image production and display.
that present; subsequently I analyze the divide between images that are to be
looked at and images that are to be used.
4.1.1 Traditional, virtual, and haptic images
For Daston and Galison, in traditional atlases one can find images produced
according to the epistemic ideal of truth-to-nature, mechanical objectivity or
trained judgment, but in any case one deals with images that are not supposed
to be materially manipulated. They refer to these publications as traditional or
printed atlases. The images displayed there can be, of course, reasoned images
(produced according to the criteria of truth-to-nature), mechanical images (me-
chanical objectivity), or expert images (trained judgment), but in all cases they
are static, untouchable representations. In digital atlases, on the contrary, one
can find two kinds of images: virtual images and haptic images. A virtual image
is any kind of digital image coupled to a software that allows the observer-user
to zoom in and out, excise, rotate, or fly through the image, while a haptic
image is an image produced by means of a technology that allows to actually
manipulate the object under observation during the very process of image pro-
duction (Table 4.1). I have already discussed at length traditional images in
the previous chapter, thus here I focus on virtual and haptic images, with a
particular emphasis on the latter.
An example of digital atlas based on virtual images is the Visible Human
Project. Started in 1989 under the auspices of the American National Library of
Medicine, the Visible Human Project is a collection of virtual, interactive images
that oﬀer a complete, anatomically detailed, three-dimensional representation
of the normal male and female bodies (Figure 4.1). To create this atlas, the
dead bodies of a woman and a man were first scanned by CT and MRI, they
were subsequently cut into thin slices, and finally each slice was properly dyed
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Figure 4.1: Examples of images produced using the Visible Human Project
dataset. Left: Whole body reconstruction (muscular system and body surface), from
escience.anu.edu.au/lecture/cg/CGIntroduction/medical.en.html. Right: Screenshot
of a virtual, navigable image of the thorax, abdomen, and part of the pelvis. The
original caption specifies that it contains more than 650 objects, it can be viewed from
any direction, cuts may be placed in any number and direction, and objects may be
removed or added. From Pommert, A. et al., 2000.
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and photographed. These diﬀerent sets of images (photographs, TC scans, MRI
scans), associated to image reconstruction and simulation algorithms, became
the constitutive items of a digital database. They can be virtually manipulated
for didactical purposes, e.g., in the study of anatomy, or for professional simula-
tion of surgical interventions. Haptic images are not collected in proper atlases,
but rather in image galleries available in universities, research centers, and in-
dustries’ websites. A haptic image is, literally, an image that elicits the sensation
of touch, or that can be actually perceived through touch. Daston and Galison
use this term to refer to images produced resorting to nanotechnological imaging
techniques. The peculiarity of these images is that in order to produce them, it
is necessary to interfere with the nanostructure of the portion of matter that is
visualized. In other words, in order to produce haptic images (or nanoimages),
one has to manipulate the structure of matter at the nanoscale. Nanoimages
are the only example of haptic images provided by Daston and Galison, and
they use the terms haptic images and nanoimages interchangeably. So, what is
so special about these images? How are they produced?
Scanning Tunneling Microscope (STM) and Atom Force Microscope (AFM)
were among the first nanotechnologies to be developed. In STM the tip of a
conductive tiny probe is used to scan a surface very closely. During this process
the voltage diﬀerence applied between the probe and the surface produces a
tunneling current (a flow of electrons) which is a function of the probe position,
the applied voltage, and the local density of states of the sample. Thus, by
measuring the current, we acquire information that can be displayed in visual
form and that provides an image of the surface of the sample.3 Daston and
Galison put great value on the fact that the tip of the scanning probe can be
used to manipulate nanostructures by literally interacting with one atom at a
time. While looking at the image, one can move the atoms of the sample by
using the very same instrument that is used to produce the image. Hence, one
does really touch the object (although by means of a very particular probe)
and manipulate the image simultaneously, for the manipulating and imaging
processes coincide.4
For Daston and Galison, unlike other scientific images, whose function is
to reproduce nature as faithfully as possible, haptic images create something
that was not already there, hence they present something rather than merely
re-present it. In their own words:
3The AFM works according to the same principles of the STM, but intead of monitoring a
current, it measures the force caused by the interaction between the probe tip and the sample.
4See Daston and Galison, 2007, 383.
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In the context of the more engineering-inspired, device-oriented work
that surrounds much of nanotechnology, images function less for repre-
sentation than for presentation. [...] [B]ecause nanomanipulation is no
longer necessarily focused on copying what already exists – and instead
becomes part of a coming-into-existence – we find it makes more sense to
drop the prefix re-, with its meaning of repetition.5
This is to say that what makes haptic images presentations rather than rep-
resentations is the fact that with nanotechnology the interest of scientists and
engineers has shifted from observation to manipulation. The activities of ob-
serving and manipulating a given object have merged into a single action, they
occur at the same moment and using the same apparatus, and we assist to a
move from the reproduction of reality to the production of a new reality. Haptic
images, instantiated by nanoimages, are presentations rather than representa-
tions because they are images in which observation and manipulation of the
imaged object coincide.
Daston and Galison, however, provide also another definition of presentation,
which applies to virtual images. They say:
Epistemically, these virtual atlases [created by the Visible Human
Project] diﬀered from the old medical atlases such as those of Jean Cru-
veilhier, Albinus, and William Hunter: using the navigation and image-
modifying capability of the program, they could produce in a moment an
image that no one had ever seen – this was not, sensu stricto, a matter
of re-presentation.6
This means that for Daston and Galison an image can be considered a presenta-
tion not only if it allows to manipulate the specimen during the imaging process,
but also if no one has never seen that specific image before (because it has been
reconfigured by the viewer-user), or it presents objects or phenomena that no
one has ever seen before.
However, once the definition of image-as-presentation is formulated in this
way, it becomes diﬃcult to understand, by Daston and Galison’s own stan-
dards, why printed images such as drawings and analogical photographs do not
count as presentations. On the one hand, if an image is a presentation if no
one has never seen it before, then all original images could count as presenta-
tions independently from the technique of production and the material support
of the image. In this case, speaking in rigorous terms, one should apply the
term re-presentation, as synonymous of repetition, only to identical copies and
reproductions of already existing images (I will develop the idea that each repre-
sentation is a presentation in the following pages). On the other hand, if images
5Daston and Galison, 2007, 383.
6Daston and Galison, 2007, 390.
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are presentations when they make visible obejcts and phenomena that could not
be seen without the mediation of the image, then it is not clear why Donné’s da-
guerreotypes, Koch’s microphotographs, Marey’s chronophotographs, or Halls
Dally’s radiographs cannot count as presentations, provided that all of them
showed something that no one could have seen before the development of an
adequate imaging instrument. This is what scientific images are supposed to
do: to present us a world that we could not see otherwise.
4.1.2 Image manipulation before the digital era
What about the point, rightly stressed by Daston and Galison, that virtual
images can be manipulated by the observer-user in very specific ways? To
discuss this issue I will resort to a brief analysis of the same example used by
the authors, the Visible Human Project. As stated in the website of the National
Library of Medicine, the aim of this project is to provide an extremely faithful
representation of the human body, so that medicine students can learn anatomy
reducing as much as possible the need to dissect actual human corpses.7 This
has been, in general, the aim of all traditional anatomical atlases and of their
three-dimensional elder cousins: anatomical wax or wooden models.8 Being a
virtual atlas, the Visible Human Project has transferred to the computer screen
the third dimension which, in the past, could be aﬀorded only by resorting to
expensive, cumbersome, and fragile sculptures. Still, it is interesting to note
that in Juan Valverde de Amusco’s anatomical atlas Vivae imagines partium
corporis humani aereis formis expressae, printed in 1566, there was an attempt
to make printed images manipulable. Bound at the end of the atlas we find
a pair of male and female figures composed of paper flaps that, when lifted,
revealed the internal organs (Figure 4.2). What I want to emphasize here is
that draughtsmen and painters have always dealt with the problem of rendering
the multiple layers of three-dimensional reality in bidimensional representations,
and the anatomical fugitive sheets were an ingenuous means developed to allow
the atlas user to enter the body, by providing a rudimentary form of image
navigation and manipulation. The Flemish engravers who produced the atlas
illustrations were really pushing to the limit the possibilities of printed images
to function as three-dimensional haptic objects. Valverde’s example is by no
means an isolated case, and it testifies to a conception of images – well before
7See www.nlm.nih.gov/research/visible/, retrieved on Jun 13, 2012.
8For a study of the role of wax anatomical models in medical education see Ballestriero,
2010; Hopwood, 2004; Schnalke, 1995 and 2004. Riva et al., 2010, explore the relationship
between anatomical illustration and wax modeling in Italy between the sixteenth and the
early-nineteenth centuries.
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Figure 4.2: Anatomical fugitive sheet bound at the end of Valverde, Vivae imagines
partium corporis humani aereis formis expressae. Antwerp, 1566. Wellcome Library,
London.
computer simulation – as something that had to be used, handled, by the atlas
reader. There is no doubt that the material medium, paper, did not allow true
manipulations, and its fragility made handling more a virtual possibility than an
actual practice. Yet, it seems to me that the very existence of paper flaps attests
to an active conception of both images and atlases. It is exactly because image
manipulation was so limited, that at least since the mid-eighteenth century a
great eﬀort was put in the production of three-dimensional models for research
and education. In this respect, a particularly interesting case is the work of the
Italian anatomist and physiologist Felice Fontana.
Appointed director of the Florentine museum La Specola in 1775, Fontana
supervised for many years the creation of a collection of anatomical wax models,
whose production lasted for more than a decade. The collection soon acquired
the status of international scientific reference, due to its aesthetic quality and
anatomical accuracy. By the end of the 1780s, however, Fontana had become dis-
satisfied with wax models, which due to their fragility could not be manipulated
by students. Consequently, he embarked in the construction of wooden models,
which could be dismounted and put back together. Influenced by Étienne Bon-
not de Condillac’s theory of knowledge, which posited that three-dimensional
vision is acquired through tactile experience,9 Fontana thought that one could
gain knowledge of the parts in relation to the whole body only by disassembling
and reassembling it, because these activities gave sensible content to the cog-
9de Condillac, 1754.
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nitive activities of analysis and synthesis.10 He claimed: “[wooden body parts]
can be handled, rotated into any position, and inspected at leisure. Plates,
wax [models], or a cadaver lend themselves to these operations only with diﬃ-
culty and unsatisfactorily.”11 Fontana wanted to build a fictional human body
which, as the virtual body of the Visible Human Project, would allow students
to navigate inside artificial viscera and manipulate them at leisure, overtaking
the limits of both bidimensional representations and real, corpse-based anatomy.
The project proved unattainable. The prototype life-size statue made of 3,000
independent wooden parts turned out to be extremely complex to build. More-
over, most of Fontana’s colleagues, as well as his patron and employer, Peter
Leopold, Grand Duke of Tuscany, did not concur with him about the necessity of
replacing wax models, characterized by astounding realism, with wooden mod-
els, apparently less artistic or sophisticated. Fontana’s project was visionary.
Nevertheless, it provides a clear example of a form of anatomical representation
that attempted to provide the viewer the illusory, yet tactile, experience of en-
tering the body and observing it from the inside. Even more importantly, it was
meant to give the opportunity to take the model’s pieces apart and carry out
an artificial dissection. This historical example corroborates my claim that ma-
nipulable representations are not a product of computer technology. The need
to handle objects, or their reproductions, in order to understand their structure
and functioning appears to be a fundamental, trans-historical feature of the
human cognitive system. What is historical is the way in which such need for
manipulable representations can be satisfied.
4.1.3 Aesthesiological considerations
The contrast between images that re-present and images that present is con-
nected to the distinction between images one looks at, and images one uses.
Daston and Galison call the former “images-as-evidence” and the latter “images-
as-tools.”12 In their taxonomy, haptic images are tools par excellence, because
they are produced using a technology that allows to literally touch atoms with
the tip of a probe. Now, it is interesting to note that the polarity haptic-optic,
translated into its spatial constituents proximity-distance, had already been used
by Benjamin to discuss the tendency of photography and cinema to bring the
beholder closer and closer to objects and people, stimulating a scientific, anato-
mizing gaze.13 As we have seen in Section 2.3.2, for Benjamin, the photographic
10See Mazzolini, 2004, 56.
11Fontana, quoted in Mazzolini, 2004, 61.
12Daston and Galison, 2007, 385.
13See Benjamin, 1932, 519; 1939, 255.
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gaze metaphorically touches and dissects objects and phenomena. It does so by
enlarging what is small, sectioning what is continuous, accelerating what is slow,
and slowing down what is too fast for human perception. Benjamin borrowed
the concept of haptic image from the Vienna School of Art History, in partic-
ular from Alois Riegl. For Riegl, a history of artistic styles entailed a history
of the way each style stimulates and organizes human perception. Accordingly,
to write a history of styles was to analyze the distinct ways in which diﬀerent
images aﬀect the observer and his corporeal relation with the work of art. Some
styles, e.g., Impressionism, put the beholder at a distance, because only from
the distance one can properly perceive the painting. In this case Riegl talks of
a style that produces optical images. Other styles, e.g., Egyptian hieroglyphics,
force the observer to get closer to the images and invite to close-up view. These
are haptic images: the eye goes along the contours of the figures as if it was a
finger.14
On the poietic function of representation Indeed, the topic of the en-
trenchment of optical and tactile sensations in aesthetic fruition is a classical
theme in both aesthetics and art criticism. Art history is rich in anecdotes
that illustrate how the phenomenological body, with its ability to grasp objects,
to get close to them and to manipulate them, is mobilized by visual images.15
Pliny the Elder in his Naturalis Historia described a contest between the Greek
painters Zeuxis and Parrhasius: Zeuxis painted some grapes so perfectly that
birds flew down to peck them, but Parrhasius painted such a realistic curtain
that his adversary tried to draw it aside.16 It goes without saying that in Pliny’s
history Parrhasius was honored as the best artist, because his work was so realis-
tic that it had baﬄed not just animals, but also a fellow painter. In more recent
times, the art historian and critic Michael Fried, describing Adolph Menzel’s
Cemetery Among Trees, with an Open Grave (1846-1847), wrote: “It leads us
to project ourselves as if corporeally onto the nearest portion of the scaﬀold [...],
or at least loose firm hold of the distinction between our implied situation [...]
and the depicted scene.”17 And another art critic, Bernhard Berenson, ascribed
Giotto’s greatness to his ability to stimulate “the tactile consciousness”18 of the
beholder. Berenson maintained that: “Every time our eyes recognize reality, we
14See Pinotti and Somaini, 2012, xvi-xix.
15In recent art history and aesthetics the relationship between images and the phenomeno-
logical body is studied mostly in connection with the question of emotion and empathy. See,
for example, Elkins, 1999 and 2001; Freedberg, 2007; Freedberg and Gallese, 2007.
16Naturalis Historia, XXXV, 15. I took this example and the followings from Cappelletto,
2010.
17Fried, 2002, 34.
18Berenson, 1896, 5.
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are, as a matter of fact, giving tactile value to retinal impressions,” and sug-
gested that the artist’s main duty “is to rouse the tactile sense, for I must have
the illusion of being able to touch a figure, I must have the illusion of varying
muscular sensations inside my palm and fingers corresponding to the various
projections of this figure, before I shall take it for granted as real, and let it
aﬀect me lastingly.”19 For all these authors the realism of the image appeals to
an embodied reaction and not to just a cognitive one: the beholder does not
recognize the object represented by the image, he corporeally experiences it. In
Pliny’s story Zeuxis is moved to touch and draw aside Parrhasius’ curtain, Fried
feels like he is entering Menzel’s drawing moved by empathetic impulsion, while
Berenson makes a normative statement, claiming that art has to elicit tactile
sensations if it is to produce lasting impressions.
These examples show how the sense of reality conveyed by images draws
more on the poietic value of mimesis than on its mimetic function.20 In this
perspective, the image is productive because it engages the observer in the
experience of a sensible object, not merely in the vicarious experience of the
subject-matter of the representation. The experience of looking at an image
is the experience of a human body that encounters the material body of the
image and enters in a relation with it. Indeed, we can say that images are tools
involved in the production of knowledge because they lay in between material
reality and abstract thought. An image, notes the philosopher Jean-Jacques
Wunenburger, is an ambivalent object, which occupies a middle ground between
reality and thinking, the pure datum of sensible experience and its concept. An
image is a real object in its own right, and at the same time it is the fiction
of something that is there only in eﬃgies, or that has simply left a trace on a
sensible surface. An image, Wunenburger maintains, allows to reproduce and
internalize the world in a plastic way: it can attempt to mirror it, but at the
same time it modifies and transforms reality, creating fictional worlds. An image
is a place of mediation and a point of convergence between a thing and a thought,
it is an intermediate construction that partakes in the production of knowledge
about the world and in its dissolution into imagination.21
Image perception and mirror neurons The aesthesiological intuitions present
in art literature, from Pliny to Fried, passing through the Vienna School of Art
History and Benjamin, seem to find empirical corroboration in recent neurolog-
ical theories about the so called mirror neuron system. In apes and in humans
19Berenson, 1896, 5.
20See Cappelletto, 2010, 11.
21See Wunenburger, 1997, i.
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the mirror neuron system occupies distinct cortical regions, which are activated
when an action is observed, as well as when it is actually executed. This means
that our brain reacts in the same way when we perform an action and when
we observe it, and this simulation occurs even when we look at static images of
actions. In fact, the same neurons are involved in the recognition of facial ex-
pressions, and they seem to underpin not only the understanding of actions, but
also the comprehension of the intentions that underlie an action.22 Moreover,
brain imaging studies have shown that the observation of images of manipula-
ble objects leads to the activation of canonical neurons in a cortical region that
is assumed to be responsible for action control, rather than for visual objects
recognition.23 This neural mechanism has quite an intuitive explanation: to get
hold of an object, one needs to be informed about its shape (one grabs a ball
diﬀerently than a pen), thus the function of the sensory input is to enable us to
perform the appropriate grabbing gestures. As a whole, these experimental data
on mirror and canonical neurons corroborate an embodied approach to vision
and spatial perception, and they suggest that there is nothing passive in the
fruition of images, because images involve the observer in an active process of
embodied imagination, a process of corporeal simulation. Within this perspec-
tive, vision becomes a function of the kinetic body, not an act of disembodied
cognition. This does not mean, of course, that cognition and culture are not
involved in the understanding and interpretation of images. To be aware of
the biological, embodied dimension of image perception just adds another layer
of complexity to our understanding of how we relate to, and interact with vi-
sual representations. In other words, the biological, cognitive, and cultural axes
of perception should not be seen as mutually exclusive, but as interlocked in
dynamic interaction.
Even without endorsing a neuro-reductionist epistemological stance, I think
that we can find in experimental data insights relevant to the elucidation, enrich-
ment, and possibly reformulation of some longstanding philosophical questions.
The idea that spatial awareness is linked to motion and touch has a long history
in philosophy of knowledge. For example, in his New Theory of Vision of 1710,
George Berkeley argued that humans develop tridimensional vision only after
they learn what it is to move around the world. According to Berkeley, in fact,
our retinal vision is originally bidimensional, and it becomes three-dimensional
only through a cognitive process whereby we learn to correlate tactile sensations
22See Freedberg and Gallese, 2007; Urgesi et al., 2006; Johnson-Frey et al., 2003.
23See Freedberg and Gallese, 2007; Ponseti et al., 2006; Boronat et al., 2005; Martin et al.,
1996.
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with vision.24 Similarly, in the Treatise of Sensations of 1754, Condillac main-
tained that the awareness of external objects, as well as the ideas of extension,
distance, magnitude, and solidity depended on the sense of touch, and that the
attribution of form and color hinged upon the motion of the eyes and the hand:
to learn to see was to learn to coordinate sight and touch25 (as seen above,
Fontana translated Condillac’s ideas on perception into a pedagogical theory).
Vittorio Gallese, one of the proponents of the mirror neurons theory, remarks
that there are many points of contact between recent neurological claims con-
cerning the motor nature of spatial awareness, and the theories developed by
diﬀerent philosophers of knowledge. He mentions Hermann von Helmholtz, who
tried to substitute the Kantian notion of space as an a priori with the notion
that this a priori consists of the manifold of possible orientations in space, which
means that it is generated by exploratory behavior.26 Gallese also highlights the
aﬃnities between the mirror neuron theory and the views on space perception
elaborated in phenomenology by Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
Merleau-Ponty clearly linked space perception to motion and intentionality when
he wrote that space is “[. . . ] not a sort of ether in which all things float [. . . ].
The points in space mark, in our vicinity, the varying range of our aims and
our gestures.”27 In a similar fashion, for Husserl, we see things as tactile ob-
jects directly related to the lived body (Leib). It is the tactile lived body that
provides the constitutive foundations of our cognitive self-referentiality, of our
determination of reality. Yet, while Husserl considered the physiological body
a material object, not directly involved in the phenomenological awareness of
the lived body’s relation with the world, contemporary neurophysiology sug-
gests that this is not the case.28 It seems, in fact, that at the neurological level
there is no clearcut distinction between motion and cognition, because the same
physiological processes that underpin the functioning of our body in the world
(the sensory-motor system), also contribute to our awareness of the objects that
the world contains, and of our own lived body as part of it. The world is not
out there, we are intertwined with it. According to Gallese’s theory of embodied
cognition, which goes under the name of embodied simulation, action simula-
tion integrates visual and auditive stimuli within a specific neural circuit. He
24Ian Hacking refers to Berkeley’s theory of vision in the discussion of his idea of scientific
observation as acquired skill. I present Hacking’s position in Section 4.2.2.
25In his previous work, the Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge of 1746, Condillac
defended a less radical position. Though he already maintained that the cognitive faculties
are developed as a consequence of sensation, he took sensation itself largely for granted and
not as a learned skill. See Falkenstein, 2010.
26See Patton, 2012; Gallese, 2005, 26.
27Merleau-Ponty, 1945, 243.
28See Gallese, 2005, 27.
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explains: “The sight of an object at a given location, or the sound it produces,
automatically triggers a ‘plan’ for a specific action directed toward that location.
What is a ‘plan’ to act? It is a simulated potential action.”29 This means that
when a visual stimulus is presented to our perception, it evokes the inner simu-
lation of the corresponding motor schema, which maps position in motor terms,
independently from the existence of an actual action or movement. Gallese
clarifies his conception of embodied simulation as follows:
Simulation is not conceived of as being confined to the domain of
motor control, but rather as a more general and basic endowment of
our brain. It is mental because it has content, but it is sensory-motor
because its function is realized by the sensory-motor system. I call it
‘embodied’ – not only because it is neurally realized, but also because
it uses a pre-existing body-model in the brain, and therefore involves a
non-propositional form of self-representation.30
Through embodied simulation we literally, although not materially, enter in
contact with the world around us by moving within it and touching it. Accord-
ingly, an image is not merely seen by the eye, it is experienced by the lived body.
The lived experience, with its intertwining of visual and motor reactions is a
pre-condition for any cognitive apprehension of the image content and meaning.
Some problems with the mirror neurons theory of image perception
This neurological account of embodied cognition is quite compelling especially
because, by positing that lived experience is a precondition for the cognitive
elaboration of images, it is congruous with our basic intuition that some sort of
sensorial and physiological apprehension of the world must necessarily precede
any cognitive-cultural operation. Still, intuitive as it might be, this assumption
is problematic. The mirror neurons theory seems to fit nicely to our empa-
thetic response to artworks, where we recognize bodies that could be our body,
movements that could be our movements, and emotions that could be our emo-
tions. However, it is much more diﬃcult to understand how the neuro-motor
system could be involved in the apprehension of scientific images which, at least
in principle, are emotionally neutral. Even more importantly, we should re-
member that in the majority of cases scientific images show something that we
cannot recognize as part of our ordinary world and of our lived experience. It
could be claimed that in this case, as in the case of conceptual art, the neuro-
motor system is involved at the level of canonical neurons that, as seen above,
29Gallese, 2005, 27.
30See Gallese, 2005, 41-42.
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underpin shape recognition and our capacity to manipulate objects.31 Indeed,
in medical images we might see objects that we recognize as something that
can be actually touched (a bone, a vein, the liver). However, most scientific
images show objects that cannot be grabbed as we grab a pen or a ball. Do we
recognize a cell under the microscope as a seizable object? Or do we perceive
it as undistinguished patches of colors, which acquire the shape of a cell only
within a well-defined cognitive framework? In front of the image of an object
that can be recognized only by someone provided with specific knowledge, the
neuro-motor reaction of the competent observer will not be diﬀerent from that
of the naïve viewer? To put it diﬀerently, could not the neuro-motor reaction be,
in this case, post-cognitive rather than pre-cognitive, through a sort of ricochet
eﬀect of the cognitive dimension on the neural dimension?
To the inexperienced patient, an arterial angiogram shows something akin to
filaments, to the radiologist, it shows a pervious or occluded pipe (the artery), to
the surgeon, an artery that, if occluded, can be stripped. Will the neuro-motor
reaction of these three subjects be the same? Gallese and colleagues would
probably answer that these diﬀerent conscious perceptions come after a primor-
dial embodied reaction, whereby both expert and inexperienced observers see
something that can be grabbed. Yet, we do not grab in the same way a spread-
ing filament, a pipe-artery, or an artery that we know to be firm or slippery
under the lancet. So, it is diﬃcult to organize an order of temporal priorities
between cultural and embodied perceptions, and this might not even be the
most relevant or instructive question. It might turn out that a more interesting
philosophical and scientific challenge is to understand the entanglements of bio-
logical and cultural domains, rather than splitting them in sequential operations
(theories about neuroplasticity and epigenetics seem to move in this direction).
Thus, problematic as they might be, neuroscientific theories of embodied pre-
cognition oﬀer interesting arguments for thinking visual representation, because
they blur the boundaries between cognitive-visual experience and bodily-haptic
experience.
4.1.4 Manipulating images and objects
Although I rise objections to Daston and Galison’s views on the divide between
print and digital images, it is important to stress that, by emphasizing the em-
bodied dimension of image fruition as a universal and fundamental aspect of
our interaction with all kind of pictures, I do not intend to downplay the po-
31For the putative role of canonical neurons in the fruition of conceptual art see Freedberg
and Gallese, 2007.
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tential transformative eﬀect of digital images on our sensorial perception; on
the contrary. I think that digital technologies produce extremely powerful ef-
fects on our perception, and this happens for two reasons. On the one hand,
digital images can stimulate to a very high degree the haptic dimension of im-
age’s perception (but this dimension concerns the perception of all images, not
only of computer-generated images). On the other hand, they strengthen our
ability to relate to virtual reality, by taking advantage of the fact that images,
independently from the technology used to produce and display them, occupy
a middle-ground between reality and imagination. It seems thus reasonable to
posit that virtual images and the interactive devices that support them work
by reproducing and amplifying our innate processes of embodied simulation. It
would be unreasonable to deny that virtual images can be manipulated by both
their producers and final users in unprecedented ways, and that virtual images
manipulation provides us with novel sensorial and cognitive experiences. Yet,
this does not mean that images could not be, and were not, manipulated be-
fore the digital era. Indeed, as Benjamin expressed so well with his metaphor
of the camera operator as surgeon, photography and cinema brought to life a
very specific practice of image manipulation. Zooming in and out, strong mag-
nification, slow and fast motion were exactly the features of photography and
cinema that compelled Benjamin to argue that they brought to light “entirely
new structures of matter,” and made us “discover the optical unconscious.”32
As mentioned in Section 3.2, a common practice in the early days of photomi-
crography was to re-photograph a microphotograph put under the microscope,
in order to attain magnifications beyond the technical possibilities of the mi-
croscope optics.33 This procedure proved scientifically unappropriate, because
it magnified artifacts rather than the real specimen, nevertheless it attests to
the intrinsic manipulability of images. Indeed, one of the reasons why scientists
produce images is that one can perform operations on an image that could not
be carried out on the real object.
Time-lapse cinema and image malleability If photography allowed to
manipulate images in the spatial dimension, cinema allowed temporal manipu-
lation. The historian and philosopher of media Hannah Landecker has shown
that time-lapse microcinematography played a capital role in making possible
the study of life phenomena and it contributed to the emergence of the idea
that, at the microscopic level, life is characterized by relentless, frantic activ-
32Benjamin, 1939, 266.
33See Section 2.3.
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ity.34 This happened because many life phenomena, such as the movement of
bacteria, the division of a cell or the blossoming of a flower have a temporal
resolution well below the human sensory threshold or possibility of continuous
observation. That is, they are too slow to be directly observed in their becoming.
With time-lapse cinema this problem is solved by projecting an image sequence
at a much faster frequency than that used to capture the individual frames.
In other words, while with chronophotography and slow-motion cinema we can
slow down very fast phenomena, with the time-lapse technique we can accelerate
very slow processes in order to see their sequential unfolding, rather than the
discrete stages of the process. We can visualize the motion of the stretching
petals, rather than a bloom and, a few days later, an open flower. Through this
technique one can manipulate the time of experiment, observation, and demon-
stration, condensing the long hours, or even days, of real-time observation into
a very short film (acceleration through projection). Unlike chronophotography,
which was meant to dissect movement into its instantaneous components, time-
lapse cinema was meant to reconstruct a continuous phenomenon on the basis
of instantaneous images. One of the first time-lapse microfilms was made by
the Swiss biologist Julius Ries in 1907, to study the fertilization and develop-
ment of a sea urchin. Ries made these two events visible by condensing the
fourteen hours of the natural process (documented through photographs taken
every seven minutes) into a two minutes film. The time of the living process was
readjusted to the time of observation: through the careful manipulation of the
time of static and dynamical modes of imaging, a morphological transformation
that was too slow to be observed as continuous process, was brought within the
range of human senses.35
These examples of photomicrography and microcinema show that imagemal-
leability largely predates digital technology. Indeed, we could say that malleabil-
ity, or plasticity, is probably one of the reasons why images are so ubiquitous in
science.
Nanoimages and objects malleability In making their case about images-
as-tools, Daston and Galison state the following:
In [...] haptic images, seeing and making entered together – unlike the
more familiar image making that marked so many generations of science,
holding fast to a two-step sequence. The older method meant first smash-
ing a proton against an antiproton in an accelerator, then imaging the
detritus for analysis in a bubble-chamber photograph or digital display.
Or, in a very diﬀerent domain of science, first preparing a tissue sample,
34See Landecker, 2005, 918-920.
35See Landecker, 2005 and 2006.
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then imaging it in the electron microscope. For early twenty-first-century
nanoscientists, such after-the-fact representations were often entirely be-
sides the point.
Frequently, the nanographers want images to engineer things. In the
first instance, these were images-as-tools, entirely enmeshed in making,
much more than images-as-evidence to be marshaled for a later demon-
stration.36
Although these paragraphs can be easily subscribed for what concerns the defi-
nition of what makes nanoimages diﬀerent from other microscopic images (they
can be used to engineer things), it is quite problematic in its implications about
images that do not belong to nanoscience. What does it mean that non-nano
images are after-the-fact representations? Is it a technical statement or an epis-
temological one? If it is a technical statement, it simply means that when we
use an imaging apparatus which does not involve nanotechnology, we have to
prepare the sample first, and then we can make a picture of it. But is it true?
To microinject a sample during observation is a common practice in microscopy
(even with simple optical microscopes). Also, moving to a completely diﬀer-
ent scale, in Duchenne’s photographies éléctrophysiologiques the patient’s body
was embedded in the experimental machinery, and literally wired to the elec-
trostimulator. Was this not a form of physical manipulation, although not at
the nanoscale, that occurred during the process of visualization of a specific
phenomenon? (In this case, human expression of emotions).37 So, in techni-
cal terms, the claim that only nanotechnology allows to manipulate the object
during observation is not strictly correct.
Things become even more problematic if we take Daston and Galison’s sen-
tence about after-the-fact representations as an epistemological statement. They
say that such representations are “images-as-evidence to be marshaled for later
demonstration.” I interpret their use of the term “demonstration” as referring
to the fact that – unlike in the case of images-as-tools, where images are use to
produce new phenomena – in the case of images-as-evidence, the image is used
as a demonstration, an evidence, of the existence of a given phenomenon. For
example, the existence of a bacterium with some morphological characteristic.
But why should such demonstration occur later? Later in relation to what? The
use of this temporal adverb conveys the idea that images-as-evidence (which,
in this context, correspond to all images that are not nanoimages) are used as
illustrations of something that has already been discovered or understood by
other means. It is true that physicians suspected the existence of microorgan-
isms already before they were able to see them with a microscope, and physicists
36Daston and Galison, 2007, 384-385, italics in the original.
37See Section 2.6.
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had already made many observations and developed many theories about sub-
atomic particles before they came out with the idea of smashing protons against
antiprotons and visualize the result. Yet, in both cases visualization was part
and parcel of the experimental process, not a subsidiary activity. Particle ex-
periments would be incomplete, or better, useless without visualization, because
they would be experiments whose results are concealed and inaccessible. Koch
could not have developed his germ theory of disease without the images he saw
under the microscope, which he fixed in drawings and photographs. Roentgen
would have not discovered the X-rays if they had not left a trace on a sen-
sible plate. He used those marks as evidences of his discovery, and he also
used them as an instrument to study the behavior of the rays when passing
through diﬀerent objects and materials. Physicians and surgeons used radio-
graphs as evidences of disease, and as means for entering with their eyes into
the patient’s body. And outside the domain of technology-mediated images, well
before the development of computerized molecular modeling, the immunologist
Paul Ehrlich used pictorial diagrams as real heuristic tools in the development
and defense of his controversial side-chain theory of antibody formation.38
Daston and Galison put great emphasis on the fact that in nanoimaging
object manipulation and vision occur simultaneously, and that the technology
used for manipulation coincides with the technology for visualization. However,
they do not provide compelling reasons to justify their claims about the allegedly
unique epistemic status of nanoimages in relation to other scientific pictures.
Most objects, independently from their scale and from the imaging technology,
have to be manipulated in order to produce a scientific image. In my view, in a
theory of scientific images this is more relevant than whether the visualization
and manipulation occur synchronically or diachronically. Cells, microorganisms,
and all sorts of living tissues have to be properly prepared to become visible
under the microscope and in microphotographs;39 an object has to be bombarded
with X-rays to produce a radiograph; and a patient has to ingest bismuth for
the radiologist to see the shape of the digestive system, in real time, on the
fluoroscopic screen.
How are we to understand these practices if not as manipulations, inter-
ventions on natural objects aimed at turning them into objects for scientific
visualization and analysis? Even images that do not reach the technological so-
38Ehrlich made his drawings public in the 1900 Croonian Lecture “On immunity with special
reference to cell life,” later published in the Proceedings of the Royal Society and widely cited.
For a study of Ehrlich’s pictures and their role in the development of immunological theory,
see Cambrosio et al., 1993 and 2005. Among studies of scientific images and the ways they
are used by scientists, see Dagognet, 1986; Lynch and Woolgar, 1990; Baigre, 1996; Pombo
and Di Marco, 2010.
39See Section 2.3.
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phistication of nanomanipulation command some sort of actual handling of the
object of study, and this happens because images are part of an experimental
praxis, a complex set of activities whose aim is not merely to copy objects in the
most accurate way, but to learn something about them. We can thus conclude
that, even if we accept Daston and Galison’s definition of images-as-tools as im-
ages that allow to manipulate the object of study during the imaging process, we
cannot concur with them in applying this definition only to nanoimages. Many
scientific images produced by means of some technological apparatus allow or
require the manipulation of the sample during the making of the image. More
exactly, the preparation of the sample should be considered part of the process
of visualization. Still, I have to clarify first both the semiotic and experien-
tial processes entailed in scientific images signification, in order to reinforce and
make more precise my claims on the poietic nature of scientific representation.
To say that representing is an active endeavor is not enough. An account of how
this activity is brought about is necessary. To put it diﬀerently, it is necessary
to explore how representation and meaning are interlocked.
4.2 From vision to meaning
As seen above, Daston and Galison’s technology-driven dichotomy between im-
ages that present and images that re-present entails a passive understanding of
representation. This way of conceiving representation not only overlooks the
questions posed by disciplines as diverse as art theory, philosophy, and neu-
roscience; it also makes diﬃcult to understand how the images that merely
represent – allegedly burdened with passivity and repetition – can produce new
knowledge as they actually do. In contrast with this view, I have defended
the idea that scientific representations always entail some form of presentation.
On the one hand, they command specific manipulations of the object of study;
on the other hand, images themselves can be manipulated in order to better
understand the represented object; finally, the viewer, too, is activated, so to
speak, by the image both at the sensory and cognitive level. In the remainder of
this chapter, I back my claims through the analysis of how images are used and
endowed with meaning in actual scientific practice. My account is organized
along three lines: first, I briefly summarize David Gooding’s theory of scientific
visual thinking, which has the merit of highlighting the trans-historical aspects
of visual cognition without neglecting the cultural and local character of actual
practices of visualization; second, I propose a semiotic analysis of the processes
of image signification; finally, I introduce the idea that scientific images must
be understood as essential components of experimental practices.
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4.2.1 Six general features of scientific representations
Gooding, an historian and philosopher of science who has worked on the cog-
nitive theory of scientific images and models, describes scientific representation
as a practice where cognition and culture meet.40 He remarks that, although
many philosophers and scientists (physicists and mathematicians in particular)
are convinced that science proceeds by eliminating sense experience in order
to produce abstractions that can be formally manipulated, the growing impor-
tance of data visualization attests to our cognitive need to translate abstract
or invisible data into objects or forms that can be manipulated and interpreted
resorting to non-formalized visual skills.41 For Gooding, it is possible to identify
a distinct scientific “visual method” of thinking, whereby “images, narratives,
meanings, arguments and objects” converge.42 Such visual method, he argues,
is trans-historical, in spite of the diversity of the local contexts of practices
(diﬀerent scientific disciplines and diﬀerent imaging technologies). He states:
“The existence of common features behind the diversity of visual representa-
tions suggests a common dynamical structure for visual thinking, showing how
visual representations facilitate cognitive processes such as pattern-matching
and visual inference through the use of tools, technologies and other cultural
resources.”43 Gooding identifies six general persistent features of scientific visual
representation:
1. Representations are hybrid, that is, in scientific visualization diﬀerent
modes of representation (visual, verbal, numerical, symbolic) are brought
together to display an interpretation. The simplest and most straightfor-
ward example is the use of captions that describe explicitly what is to be
seen in the image, but we can also think of the pointers and letters that are
often superimposed on microscopy images to guide the gaze of the viewer,
or the lines and points traced on bubble chamber photographs to clarify
the trajectory of the tracks.
2. Representations are multimodal, that is, they combine information that
comes from diﬀerent sources and appeal to diﬀerent sensory modalities.
For instance, in maps color codes can be used to visualize temperature
or altitude, while the functional diﬀerentiation of an anatomical structure
could be displayed using diﬀerent symbols.
40See Gooding, 2006.
41See Gooding, 2003, 263-268.
42Gooding, 2004a, 280.
43Gooding, 2004b, 551.
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3. Representations are plastic, because they can be subjected to a wide range
of variations that externalize, but also guide mental operations, and ac-
commodate interpersonal communicative needs. For instance, a represen-
tation can be manipulated materially or mentally through operations such
as rotation or color change, a photograph can be cut and worked in several
ways, or it can be translated into a diagram. Although digital technologies
enable specific forms of image plasticity, the plasticity of representation is
primarily related to our cognitive needs, and not to the technique of image
production.
4. Representational variation takes often the form of recursive transforma-
tions between bidimensional forms (patterns and diagrams), three- dimen-
sional forms (structures) and four-dimensional representations (temporal
transformations). For example, to reconstruct an extinct animal from fos-
sil imprints, paleontologists typically take several imprints’ pictures. From
the photographs they will extract bidimensional diagrammatic represen-
tations that serve as a basis for three-dimensional modeling. However,
the information provided by the bidimensional diagrams is not enough to
reconstruct the morphology of the original specimen. It must be com-
plemented with ecological, physiological, and biological information from
diﬀerent sources (e.g., knowledge about the physiology and behavior of
similar organisms, or about the processes of mineralization of specific
structures). Importantly, the process is not linear, but dialectical, be-
cause the knowledge generated at each step of visualization can lead to
a reassessment of the previous passages and thus open new possibilities
of representing, i.e., understanding, the object of study. Transformations
can be informal or formalized.
5. Representational plasticity is constrained, because it has to respect trans-
formation rules which might be explicit and articulated verbally, or em-
bodied in representational techniques and technologies. Verbal rules are
predicated on the background knowledge of the specific scientific discipline
and on information derived from diﬀerent sources. Representational rule
encompass, for example, geometrical methods of image transformation, or
computational methods for image reconstruction.
6. Representations are distributed in three diﬀerent ways: (1) between minds
(individuals) and machines, because researchers use instruments to pro-
duce and work with diﬀerent kinds of images; (2) between the mental and
the material (sensory) domain, because of the very double nature of im-
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ages; and (3) among individuals, machines, and organizations, because of
the collective dimension of scientific knowledge.44
For Gooding, it is through the distributed character of visualization that the
trans-historical cognitive domain intersect the socio-cultural dimension of ev-
ery human endeavor. He argues that studies on practices of representation
and visual thinking help to elucidate our comprehension of science as a dis-
tributed system under diﬀerent perspectives. By providing information on how
researchers produce, manipulate, and communicate with and about visual im-
ages, they undermine the traditional distinction between internal (mental) and
external (public) representations. In doing so they foster the idea that sci-
ence constitutes a “truly hybrid cognitive system,”45 wherein the boundaries
between collective and individual knowledge are blurred. Mental and material
images work through a continuous interplay: material images can be generated
by machines (their production does not involve a human agent), but they can-
not be manipulated without engaging in mental processes. Mental processes, in
turn, are proper of individuals, and nevertheless they are influenced by collective
knowledge and communication. Additionally, studies in scientific visual think-
ing show that “representations are neither cognitively nor socially neutral.”46 At
the social level, representations have to respect the conventions of a discipline
and are necessarily inscribed in a wider cultural tradition (e.g., artistic styles),
at the cognitive level, they have to accommodate diﬀerent cognitive capacities
and goals.
In the following sections I discuss how these general features are instanti-
ated in specific cases of scientific representations. First, I analyze images in
the context of the semiotic network of a scientific paper, examining the 1903
radiology article by Halls Dally already mentioned in Chapter 3.47 I chose this
article because it was published at a time in which the very meaning of X-ray
imaging was still in the making, thus it oﬀers a privileged vantage point to un-
derstand the processes of image signification. Subsequently, I look at images as
components of experimental practices, extending my considerations from med-
ical imaging to visualization technologies in molecular biology and microscopy,
in order to highlight the instrumental, embodied, and collective dimension of
scientific representation and visual thinking.
44See Gooding, 2006, 689-692; Gooding, 2004b.
45Gooding, 2006, 694.
46Gooding, 2006, 695.
47See Section 3.4.3.
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4.2.2 Images as part of semiotic networks
According to the semiotician Françoise Bastide, a scientific article is, as a whole,
“a technique of visualization for the public, for the scientific community con-
cerned [with the problems of a field of knowledge].”48 Through an article, the
first-hand visual experience of one scientist, or of a limited group of scientists,
becomes a larger, shared experience that can be discussed and related to a sys-
tem of collective knowledge. This idea applies quite well to Halls Dally’s paper,
because the author, in his attempt to validate X-ray imaging as an eﬀective diag-
nostic technology for pulmonary diseases, described quite accurately the actions
and cognitive processes involved in chest radiographs signification, and made
explicit a number assumptions that were subsequently internalized in medical
knowledge through formal education and routine medical practice. Hence, by
analyzing in detail this document we can have an idea of the processes that led
to the definition of a wide range of conventions and cognitive strategies that
made radiographic imaging meaningful for the doctors of the early twentieth
century. In Halls Dally’s article, the radiographic and fluoroscopic images are
systematically translated into words, diagrammatic pictures, and tables, thus
creating an elaborated semiotic network that accomplishes two functions. On
the one hand, it transforms the streaks and shadows that appear on the radio-
graphic plate or the fluorescent screen into anatomical images (the lungs and the
heart) and physiological activities (respiration in the form of diaphragm move-
ment). On the other hand, by putting in relation X-ray images with physical
examination and the description of clinical cases (patient histories), images are
invested with a concrete medical meaning. Thus, throughout the article we see
at work the hybrid, multimodal, plastic character of representation, as well as
the definition of the constraints for image interpretation, and the distributed
nature of the whole endeavor.
Conditions of visibility Halls Dally’s paper can be divided in two parts:
one is aimed at establishing the primary conditions of visibility of the X-ray
images of the thorax, while the other deals with the construction of their diag-
nostic meaning. Halls Dally’s first concern was to clearly define the position of
radiographic imaging within the context of respiratory medicine. He wrote: “In
addition to the established methods of medical investigation of disease of the
chest comprised under the headings of inspection, palpation, percussion, aus-
cultation, and mensuration we now have at our disposal the Roentgen rays, a
newer yet no less potent factor in diagnosis.”49 In a single sentence he stressed
48Bastide, 1990, 189.
49Halls Dally, 1903, 1800.
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Figure 4.3: Table of correspondences between X-ray imaging and physical examina-
tion of the thorax. In the upper part of the table, diﬀerent methods of radiographic
imaging (radiography and radioscopy, also called fluoroscopy) are equated to phys-
ical examination; in the lower part, the visual characteristics of X-ray images are
put in specific correspondence with the sounds elicited in physical examination by
percussion. From J.F. Halls Dally, 1903, 1800.
the novelty of the X-ray technology and put it in the context of, and in relation
with, well known means of clinical diagnosis. Immediately after, he announced
that he had the need to introduce a new terminology, so that “conceptions of
new facts [might] find their adequate expression.”50 This point is fundamental,
because a proper terminology is necessary not only to facilitate communication
among physicians, but also, and primarily, to clarify and stabilize the very visual
content of the images. It is easier to recognize a shape from blurred shadows if
we have a name for it. On the one hand, to have a name is to have something
specific to look for; on the other hand, to name what we see is to give it a
meaning, to suggest and interpretation. However, before moving to the descrip-
tion and proper naming of the “shadow show”51 of the normal and pathological
thorax, Halls Dally laid bare the cognitive and material preconditions of sig-
nification of the images. For what concerns the cognitive level, he compared
radiographic imaging with physical examination (Figure 4.3), resorting to the
multimodal strategy of visual validation described by Gooding; for what con-
cerns the material level, he presented in detail the apparatus and procedures for
the production of the images, thus oﬀering a good example of the distributed
character of image making and visual cognition.
50Halls Dally, 1903, 1800.
51Halls Dally, 1903, 1800.
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The comparison between radiographic imaging and physical examination al-
ready points to the diagnostic meaning of the images and locates them in a
specific domain of knowledge. On the contrary, the technicalities about image
production concern the very possibility to use mechanical images as reliable
representations of the object of study (this section in Halls Dally’s article cor-
responds to the the phase of technology control and stabilization described by
Pasveer).52 For instance, Halls Dally warned that if the patient’s exposure was
too long, or if the current intensity in the vacuum tube too high, then the
anatomical structures that should appear dense would look transradiant (trans-
parent). If the tube was placed too close to the patient’s body, the shadows of
the inner structures near to the tube would appear larger and more indefinite
than those which were far.53 The importance of these technical details lay in
the fact that to use diﬀerent technical parameters means to produce diﬀerent
images. That is, the image is not an unqualified copy of nature: it shows what
it shows because it has been produced under specific conditions, and if those
conditions vary, the image also changes. Mechanical images are highly con-
tingent objects, whose variability can be tamed by setting technical standards
(operational conventions).54 Consequently, the definition, discussion and imple-
mentation of such standards for image production plays a fundamental role in
the process of mechanical images signification.
Having settled the general preconditions for X-ray images signification, Halls
Dally moved to the description of the radiograph of the normal, healthy thorax
according to the new terminology he had previously mentioned. He suggested
the adoption of the term “pleuro-pericardial lines” to refer to ill-defined streaks
that appear alongside the mediastinal area and follow the outline of the heart.
He remarked that in earlier publications those lines had been taken for lower
bronchi and bronchioles, mediastinal glands, or visceral pleura, and referring
directly to both the descriptions and images published by his colleagues, he ex-
posed the shortcomings of their interpretations. The streaks, he argued, cannot
be bronchi and bronchioles because of their position, and they cannot be caused
by either mediastinal glands or the visceral pleura because they are still visible
after removing part of the organ for post mortem radiography. The tentative
nature of his own interpretation, however, was explicitly acknowledged by the
radiologist. He wrote: “I venture to suggest (under correction) the term ‘pleuro-
pericardial lines’ as being more expressive of what I take to be the origin of these
52See Section 3.4.4.
53Halls Dally, 1903, 1800.
54I discussed this topic at length in Chapter 3. In particular, in Section 3.2 I showed how
the setting of experimental standard played an essential role in the process of signification of
microscopy images.
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shadows.”55 At the dawn of diagnostic imaging, to learn to see something into
radiographs was envisaged as a collective process of iterative corrections, and
the definition of what could be seen went hand in hand with the development
of the terminology that allowed to discuss the new knowledge. By discussing
alternative interpretations, radiologists checked on each other’s ability to see,
developed a specialized language, and built a collective way of seeing. This
strategy, in more or less formalized forms is enacted each time a new imaging
technique is introduced in medicine or in other fields of science.56
Building clinical meaning In the second part of the article, Halls Dally
dealt with the problem of how to use radiographs as diagnostic tools. How
to recognize pathological states by means of images? For the clinicians of the
early-twentieth century the pressing question was: how to diagnose tubercu-
losis promptly and correctly using X-rays? Halls Dally suggested that early
signs of pulmonary disease could be detected only by fluoroscopy, because this
real-time visualization technique allowed to see the movements of the internal
organs. A reduction in the mobility of the diaphragm, he maintained, was the
earliest indication of tubercular lesions in the lungs. He explained: “Diminution
in the extent of the excursion of the diaphragm will be noted in the great ma-
jority on the side most aﬀected, the general rule being that in quiet and normal
breathing the excursions are equal on the two sides, but on maximum respi-
ration they are slightly greater in extent on the right than on the left side.”57
This description was accompanied by a table (Figure 4.4) that displayed the
reference number of the clinical cases described in the article, the sex and age of
the patient, the measurements of diaphragmatic mobility, and some qualitative
55Halls Dally, 1903, 1801.
56The problem of defining a shared language to describe images and their diagnostic meaning
is still paramount in medicine, and various thesauruses and taxonomies have been developed
to tackle this issue. RadLex (Radiology Lexicon), for example, is a general controlled vocab-
ulary developed by the Radiology Society of North America, DICOM (Digital Imaging and
Communications in Medicine) is an industry-driven standard for the production of medical
imaging files, their storage and their transmission over networks, while BI-RADS (Breast
Imaging-Reporting and Data System) is a standard way to describe breast imaging findings
and results developed by the American College of Radiology (it exists in specific versions for
mammography, ultrasound imaging, and MRI). More recently there have been attempts to re-
place thesauruses and taxonomies with ontologies, which are more dynamic and are meant to
retain multiple layers of relationships between diﬀerent terms (for an overview of the problems
encountered in the integration of diﬀerent lexicons and the development of an ontology see
Overton et al., 2011). The main objective of all these standards is to improve communication
among health professionals an researchers, and to allow data retrieval for both clinical and
research purposes. I think, however, that it would be interesting to analyze if and how these
standards, by putting limits to the language, also influence the possible interpretations of an
image. Does the definition of a standardized lexicon prescribe a specific form of seeing? Does
it push medical vision from the qualitative to a semi-quantitative domain?
57Halls Dally, 1903, 1802.
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Figure 4.4: Part of the table showing the range of mobility of the diaphragm in
twenty cases of pulmonary tuberculosis described by J.F. Halls Dally (here only the
lines concerning fourteen cases are represented). From Halls Dally, 1903, 1803.
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annotations concerning diaphragmatic movements. In this case, the imaging
device (the fluoroscope) was used as a measuring tool (because it allows to mea-
sure the movement of the diaphragm during respiration), and the table became
a surface on which to visualize and organize diﬀerent cognitive elements. More
precisely: (1) quantitative information, corresponding to the measurements of
diaphragmatic excursion (diagnostic indicator); (2) qualitative description of
the diaphragm’s movement, which re-connects the contents of the table to the
visual nature of the original information provided by the fluoroscope; (3) qual-
itative information, indirectly provided through the numbers corresponding to
the patient histories described in the text of the article. In turn, that verbal
description referred to the corporeal dimension of physical examination, which
engaged the bodies of the patient and of the physician, since the latter had to
touch, tap, and literally listen to the body of the former. As a whole, through
the table of diaphragmatic mobility, the visual dimension of diagnosis was ex-
plicitly and systematically put in relation with its narrative and quantitative
dimensions.
A similar semiotic operation was performed with radiographs. The author
did not compare X-ray imaging and physical examination only verbally as shown
in Figure 4.3. He also provided a diagrammatic representation of the clinical
cases, in which the results of physical examination were displayed visually along-
side drawings of the radiographic images (Figure 4.5). As in the table analyzed
above, where Halls Dally organized and endowed with meaning the measure-
ments of diaphragmatic movement measured through fluoroscopy, in the di-
agrammatic drawings of Figure 4.5 diﬀerent cognitive elements were brought
together, namely: (1) the narrative, temporal dimension of the clinical case, to
which each image explicitly refers through the indication of the case reference
number; (2) the pictorial rendering of auscultation, based on a visual codifica-
tion of the sounds perceived during auscultation (“impaired note”, “dull note”,
“dry crepitation”, etc.); (3) the pictorial simplification of the radiograph, where
the diagrammatic representation of the shadows is accompanied by a verbal
description (“faint shadow”, “dense shadow”, “opacity”). In this way the ra-
diographic image was fully embedded in, and articulated with, the pre-existing
knowledge about pulmonary diagnosis. At this point the complex relation be-
tween representation and meaning seems quite clear. However, we need to say
more about these images.
From photographs to diagrams The choice of using drawings rather than
prints of the X-ray images possibly depended on editorial and typographical
reasons, but it also answered specific needs in terms of elaboration and trans-
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Figure 4.5: Examples of Halls Dally’s diagrammatic drawings representing physical
and radioscopic (fluoroscopic) examinations. From J.F. Halls Dally, 1903, 1805.
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mission of information. At the outset of the article the author insisted on that
radiographs are shadows, not maps.58 Accordingly, they could not be read em-
ploying a univocal, fully formalized procedure, they had to be interpreted, and
the proper interpretation could be brought about “only by careful and repeated
observations.”59 Careful and repeated observations allow the radiologist to learn
to recognize patterns which, coupled with other knowledge about the disease,
can be translated into a diagnosis. To recognize patterns in the shadows is a skill
that has to be learned. Using drawings with captions rather than radiographic
images, Halls Dally provided a quasi-map, a clarification of the shadow-image,
which in this way could be more easily integrated in, and articulated with the
semiotic network of the article. This operation attest to the hybrid and con-
strained plasticity of scientific images (a very rich visual source is resolved into
patterns that correspond to an interpretation). By selecting, reorganizing, and
integrating with other sources of knowledge the visual content of the original
image, the diagrammatic representation of the radiograph reduces its complex-
ity and at the same time improves its explanatory power, because it displays
a possible interpretation. In this regard, Bastide remarks that published scien-
tific images tend to avoid the proliferation of meanings cherished by artists, and
channel the reader into a codified (although not necessarily explicit) significa-
tion.60 This codified signification, that we can call guided interpretation, can
be made explicit through the association of a diagram to the original image. In
this case, the diagrammatic depiction prevents the proliferation of meanings. It
restricts the number of possible interpretations of the original image, because it
contains and reveals the interpretation of the author of the image. Such interpre-
tation can subsequently work as reference for other observers in the signification
of other images in the same domain.61 Compared to indexical images, such as
photographs or radiographs, a diagram is a simplified representation. However,
Bastide points out that, unlike indices, diagrams can integrate information from
an elevated number of sources, adding a diﬀerent kind of complexity to the orig-
inal visual sign without reducing its cognitive accessibility. As she puts it: “[A]
graph is probably more ‘convincing’ because it economizes the time and atten-
tion of the reader. If we compare it to a photograph, we see that a graph can
58See Halls Dally, 1903, 1800.
59Halls Dally, 1903, 1800.
60“The reading of the signification of a [scientific] photograph (with scarcely any relation
to its aesthetic character) relies on the use of systems that semiotics calls ‘semi-symbolic.’
They couple a diﬀerence at the level of the signified to a marked diﬀerence at the level of the
signifier.” Bastide, 1990, 201.
61Bastide provides a detailed semantic analysis of the passage from photograph to diagram
in Bastide, 1990, 213-220.
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support many more dimensions than a photograph while remaining readable.”62
Halls Dally’s composite drawings of physical and radioscopic examination oﬀer
an example of this semiotic process, whereby the confusing shadows of the origi-
nal X-ray image are turned into a diagrammatic representation which is simpler
than a radiograph and at the same time richer, because it gathers additional
information from the physical examination.63
Paired representation The question of scientific images interpretation as a
process whereby simplification and addition of complexity are not mutually ex-
clusive has been further explored by the sociologist of science Michael Lynch.
According to Lynch, the idea that diagrammatic renderings are simplifications
of more dense images is useful, but it fails to account for the actual intricacies
of the processes of transformation that lead from one representation to another.
In the article “The externalized retina: Selection and mathematization in the
visual documentation of objects in the life sciences” he states: “Instead of re-
ducing what is visibly available in the original, a sequence of reproductions
progressively modifies the object’s visibility in the direction of generic pedagogy
and abstract theorizing.”64 That is, diagrammatic drawings and other pictorial
renderings of complex images such as radiographs or microphotographs do not
simply select and show in a simplified way the visual content of the original im-
age, they transform the very visibility of the original object to accomplish some
pedagogical or theoretical aim. Lynch elaborates on his argument by examin-
ing how biologists make sense of, and teach novices to make sense of, pictures
produced by electron microscopy. He remarks that they systematically resort to
paired representation, which consists of placing diagrammatic renderings along-
side an electron microphotograph, in order to orientate the viewer towards a
particular interpretation of the raw image.65 He separates such diagrammatic
renderings in two categories: tracings (that he also calls diagrams) and models.
Tracings are pictorial renderings of specific photographs, while models rep-
resent general entities, by synthesizing what can be seen in various photographs,
and by assigning visual codes to features, such as biochemical properties, that
cannot be seen under any microscope. In other words, the model summarizes
62Bastide, 1990, 213-214.
63An additional level of complexity emerges if we consider the number of the clinical cases
as part of the diagrammatic representation (see Figure 4.5). This would be consistent with
the idea that it is the scientific article as a whole that works as visualizing device, and not
just its individual components. We have to acknowledge, however, that the drawings remain
intelligible even if we eliminate the case study reference. Indeed, the textual part of Figure
4.5 that is inherent to the intelligibility of the image is the caption, which provides the key to
the symbolic mode of signification.
64Lynch, 1990, 181.
65See Lynch, 1990. On paired representation in electron microscopy see also Serpente, 2011.
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visual, experimental, and theoretical information collected not only through dif-
ferent techniques, but also in diﬀerent research projects.66 Hence, while in the
case of tracings we are in the domain of selection and simplification (Lynch uses
the metaphor of the filter), in the case of diagrammatic models things are much
more complex. Lynch emphasizes that such pictorial renderings are essential
to how “scientific objects and orderly relationships are revealed and made an-
alyzable.”67 Diagrammatic models do not simply entail the selection of some
elements of the raw image, they also require the synthesis of new forms and the
display of diﬀerent sorts of information, because the model “strives to identify
in the particular specimen under study the ‘universal’ properties which ‘solid-
ify’ the object in reference to the current state of the discipline.”68 This goal
is reached, according to Lynch’s analysis, putting in place two representational
operations: selection and mathematization.
The notion of selection (simplification and schematization of the original
image) gathers four transformative practices that lead from one representation
to another: filtering, uniforming, upgrading, and defining.
1. Filtering is the operation whereby the diagrammatic picture reduces the
amount of visual elements present in the raw image. As Lynch puts it:
“Unused visibility is simply discarded out of the picture.”69 Hence, this
is a process of simplification which contains an implicit interpretation,
because it is based on the selection of elements that are deemed important
according to the aims of the research.
2. Uniforming entails the application of visual conventions in order to group
elements that share some characteristic (morphological or functional), even
if in the original image such elements might have variable dimensions, het-
erogeneous shapes, or occupy distant positions. Uniforming is an explicit
form of interpretation, because it requires the decision to aggregate - by
using the same pictorial code - diﬀerent parts of the image.
3. Upgrading consists of highlighting certain shapes visible in the original
image, in order to assign them a specific identity (i.e., the borders between
distinct areas are made artificially clear and distinct), therefore it works
in complementary opposition with uniforming.
66See Lynch, 1990, 168.
67Lynch, 1990, 154.
68Lynch, 1990, 157, italics in the original.
69Lynch, 1990, 161.
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4. Defining consists of assigning linguistic labels and pointers to the dia-
grammatic image, so that the identity of each element is unambiguously
established.70
All these operations are functional to mathematization, that is, they prepare the
object (the original image, and through it, the original specimen), for mathe-
matical operations. In Lynch the notion of mathematization has two interlocked
meanings. On the one hand, it refers to the generalization from the specific fea-
tures of an individual image (or set of images) to the general morphological and
functional properties of a natural object. On the other hand, it refers to the set
of geometrical and quantitative analyses that can be performed on images once
they undergo the diﬀerent processes of selection. In fact, once visual objects
are properly coded, they can be aggregated, examined and compared in relation
to a variety of features, such as line slopes, points distribution, recurrence of
specific patterns, and so forth. Throughout this process “specimen materials
are ‘shaped’ in terms of the geometric parameters of the graph, so that mathe-
matical analysis and natural phenomena do not so much correspond as do they
merge indistinguishably on the ground of the literary representation [provided
by a textbook or a scientific article].”71 In other words, the diagrammatic rep-
resentation is not a pale mirror of the original image, or even of the natural
object, it is not merely constituted by progressively reducing chaos. It is rather
the product of an articulated set of operations that produce multiple forms of
visibility.
Lynch encapsulates this idea in the expression “eidetic image.”72 The term
is clearly adapted from Husserl’s philosophy, but in Lynch’s use it is stripped of
its transcendental dimension and refers “concretely to the generalized or ideal-
ized version of an object portrayed in a visual document.”73 Hence, by eidetic
image Lynch does not refer to a mental picture, but to material visual docu-
ments that synthesize and publicly display the knowledge and assumptions of
a scientific domain. Importantly, he stresses that an image is always eidetic in
relation to another image. That is, while the diagram is an eidetic image in
relation to the microphotographs, a microphotograph can be considered eidetic
in relation to the image one sees when peering through the microscope, because
the photograph fixes a choice of magnification, framing, and so on. In turn,
the microscopic slide (the prepared sample) is eidetic in relation to the original
specimen, because it is prepared according to criteria for fixation and staining
70“Entities are not only made more like one another, they are more clearly distinguished
from unlike entities.” Lynch, 1990, 161.
71Lynch, 1990, 181, italics in the original.
72Lynch, 1990, 162.
73Lynch, 1990, 183.
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that depend on the aims of the research. This leads us back to the idea of semi-
otic network, in which each isolated figure and form of representation acquires
meaning within a system of internal and external comparisons that bound dif-
ferent images and, through them, vision and thinking. It also leads us back to
the issue of the material preparation of the scientific image, which entails the
transformation of the natural object into a scientific object.
4.2.3 Images as part of experiments
I used the idea of semiotic network to describe how the process of signification
of scientific images (including diagnostic images) is related to the production
and connection of diﬀerent images and other print signs, such as words and
tables of numbers. However, in the analysis of the first part of Halls Dally’s
article, I pointed to two moments in which the possible meaning of the image is
connected not to other images or signs, but to material objects and activities:
(1) when Halls Dally describes the machinery and the procedures for image
production; (2) when in discussing the meaning of the alleged “pleuro-pericardial
lines,” he makes reference to other radiographs produced after removing from the
corpse part of the organs under study. In both cases experiential knowledge is
summoned to sustain visual and theoretical knowledge, and the two operations
point to the distributed nature of scientific representation. In the first case,
representation is distributed between instruments and operators; in the second
case, between the radiology cabinet and the morgue, the living body and the
corpse.
In order to interpret an X-ray image, the doctor has to know how it has
been produced, and in those cases in which a mark on the radiographic plate
cannot be unequivocally associated to an anatomical structure or a pathological
state, he has to go back to the real body and manipulate it to make sense of the
image.74 This necessity to get out of the domain of images and enter the domain
of material objects is particularly strong in the stages of development of a novel
imaging technology. It tends to fade away once instruments and procedures
have been black-boxed, and once the points of correspondence between images
and bodies have been secured. However, the need to resort to the domain of
material objects re-emerges each time an image obtained with a well known
technology shows something unexpected. In the case of medical diagnostics the
physician possesses a reasonable amount of knowledge about the imaged objects
(human anatomy and physiology as well as pathological states). Thus, after
74The manipulation of the patient’s body might consists in a biopsy, if the uncertainty con-
cerns the diagnosis, or even in post mortem autopsy, if the uncertainty is about morphological
and anatomical elements, as in the case described by Halls Dally.
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excluding possible artifacts, he will try to make sense of the unexpected marks
by searching some clue in the patient history. For example, the lung radiograph
of a patient with mild symptoms of pneumonia might show lesions that look
more serious than the symptoms would make one think. This could mean that
the pneumonia is actually worse than it seems from the symptoms, that there is
another pulmonary disease besides the pneumonia, or that the patient already
suﬀered from pneumonia or another lung disease in the past and this left scars
on the lungs after remission. In any case, the physician has at his disposal a
number of additional tests to solve the doubts posed by the image. Things are
even more complicated in basic research, where background knowledge about the
object of study is scant and the range of possible interpretations much wider
than in clinical medicine. Here the experiential and experimental dimension
of image interpretation appears more clearly than in the case of the images
produced in contexts in which the correspondence between the image and its
referent is well defined.
Visual and experiential knowledge In a seminal ethnographic study con-
ducted in a German laboratory of molecular biology in the late 1980s, Karin
Knorr-Cetina and Klaus Amann have shown that the interpretive process carried
out by biologists to make sense of DNA and RNA autoradiographs involves a
whole “repertoire of chunks of visual and experiential knowledge.”75 Autoradio-
graphy, associated to gel electrophoresis, is used in molecular biology to analyze
nucleic acids macromolecules (DNA and RNA) on the basis of their size and
electrical charge. The electrophoresis gel is a thin layer of agarose with holes
(called wells) at one end. To produce an autoradiograph, samples of macro-
molecules digested and marked with radioactive labels are loaded in the wells,
and an electric current is turned on, creating an electric field that makes the neg-
atively charged molecules move through the gel. Since smaller molecules move
more easily through the pores of the agarose matrix, they are faster and thus
migrate farther than the larger ones. As a consequence, after a given lapse of
time molecules of diﬀerent size will form distinct bands on the gel. Because the
molecules have radioactive labels, if a sensible film is exposed to the gel, it will
be marked producing the autoradiograph of the fragments of RNA and DNA
arrayed on the matrix (Figure 4.6). It is important to note that the size of the
molecule is not related to the dimension of the bands, but to their position on
the gel, which is a direct function of the distance travelled during electrophore-
sis. This is why in order to calculate their dimension, it is necessary to analyze
the location of each fragment in relation to a marker, a built-in visual reference
75Knorr-Cetina and Amann, 1990, 263.
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Figure 4.6: Example of gel electrophoresis autoradiograph (DNA fingerprint).
Credit: Alec Jeﬀreys, Wellcome Images.
consisting in a mixture of molecules of known size which is run in one of the gel
lanes.
Molecular autoradiograph is indeed quite a peculiar form of visualization:
it is a measuring device (it is used to measure the size of macromolecules) in
which only the relative positions of the traces left by the nucleic acids (and not
their shape, thickness, or color) convey relevant information. Knorr-Cetina and
Amann describe the interpretation of a problematic autoradiograph in which the
bands were much more blurred than those shown in Figure 4.6. They illustrate
it as a collaborative activity in which scientists analyze and discuss the image by
referring to several sensory and cognitive objects and events, namely: (1) other
autoradiographs produced in their own laboratory or published in journals; (2)
diﬀerent diagrammatic representations of DNA or RNA; (3) conceptual recon-
structions of molecular processes; (4) technical design maps of the experiment
of electrophoresis; (5) recollections and sensory impressions from the events oc-
curred during the experimental procedures.76
In particular, commenting on points (4) and (5), Knorr-Cetina and Amann
state: “Each data spot on a display is a mark from which invisible threads lead
to particular occurrences in experimental processes – threads that participants
76Knorr-Cetina and Amann describe the talks in which biologists recollect sensory impres-
sions from laboratory activities as “scenic descriptions,” and they describe them as having a
“curious ‘gestural’ quality.” They remark: “Scientists rarely argue in image-attached conver-
sations. In dissecting the object [the image], they prefer to point.” Knorr-Cetina and Amann,
1990, 263, italics in the original.
198 Scientific images are tools
[scientists] pursue in image dissection.”77 That is, when an image is particularly
resistant to interpretation, when its very visual content is diﬃcult to decipher,
scientists tend to retrace the whole process of image production. They look out-
side of the image, into a whole range of objects and activities that are part of the
experimental setting. Indeed, the autoradiograph does not simply visualize the
results of the experiment (which entails samples preparations and electrophore-
sis), it contains a range of information about various steps of the laboratory
process. It says, for example, if the electrophoresis worked properly, or if the
samples were treated adequately. It literally bears a trace, or a “signature,” as
Knorr-Cetina and Amann call it, of all those steps. An autoradiograph, they
say, “is the result of an imaging technology that creates visible traces of invisible
reactions.”78 Accordingly, although the goal of the electrophoresis is to measure
the length of nucleic acids fragments, what the autoradiograph shows is a com-
pound of information that points back to all the invisible reactions that preceded
the impression of the X-ray film. As a consequence, in order to interpret the
image one has to be able to reconstruct at least in part the wider experimental
domain in which those reactions occur (for instance, to know if the amount of
nuclease used to process RNA and DNA before the electrophoresis was enough,
if the time of exposure of the X-ray film was adequate, and so forth).
As Knorr-cetina and Amann aptly put it: “[Biologists] treat images as self-
contained subjects that carry the analysis of an event within them.”79 The
autoradiography of gel electrophoresis is an example of a sophisticated imaging
technique in which the problem of image signification is twofold. On the one
hand, it is impossible to directly compare the information provided by the image
with the object of study. On the other hand, due to the complexity of the whole
experimental process that leads to the production of the autoradiograph, the
causal relationship between object and image has not warranted stability and
reproducibility.
Representing and intervening The analysis provided by Knorr-Cetina and
Amann supports Ian Hacking’s well known claim that, in science, represen-
tation and intervention are deeply enmeshed activities. In order to represent
something, one has to manipulate instruments and the object of study.80 Hack-
ing’s argument, rooted in the debate on scientific realism vs. anti-realism, is
aimed at contrasting what he calls “the spectator theory of knowledge,”81 that
77Knorr-Cetina and Amann, 1990, 274.
78Knorr-Cetina and Amann, 1990, 263.
79Knorr-Cetina and Amann, 1990, 262, italics in the original.
80See Hacking, 1983.
81Hacking, 1983, 130.
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is, the idea that scientific knowledge is an abstract theoretical representation of
the world. He criticizes this stance, claiming that any doctrine of knowledge
based on the “contemplation between theory and the world” is doomed to lead
to “an idealist cul-de-sac.”82 In order to avoid this dead end, he puts forward
an instrumentalist theory of knowledge, according to which we can have a firm
grip on reality, and get to know something about it, only when we intervene in
nature, when we create new phenomena,83 for example by spraying positrons
and electrons on niobium droplets to increase or decrease their charge.84
Hacking’s instrumental theory of knowledge informs his theory of observation
and of scientific images. Images, he maintains, become intelligible not because
we look at them very carefully and with a well defined preconceived theory
about what we are going to see, but because we perform on and around them
a number of interlocked diﬀerent activities. He uses the example of microscopy
images, and makes two fundamental, interrelated claims: (1) “You learn to
see through a microscope by doing, not just by looking,”85 and (2) “We do
not in general see through a microscope; we see with one.”86 In both sentences
Hacking points to the fact that seeing something under a microscope, that is,
recognizing something meaningful and scientifically relevant, is not simply a
matter of watching, it entails a range of bodily and instrumental activities.
When we look for the first time through a microscope, all we see are patches
of colors. Students in high school and university learn to recognize what they
are seeing by exercising with reference microphotographs and drawings duly
captioned. This is a good basic training for routine work, but it is not how we
discover something new. If we are to learn something new about a specimen we
are observing under a microscope, we will have to use several microscopes and
several ways to prepare the specimens. We will need diﬀerent images of the same
sample, or of diﬀerent samples of the same object, in order to compare them. The
researcher interested in finding something new or in sorting out structures from
artifacts has to learn to produce diﬀerent images with a suitable instrument,
under suitable conditions. Hacking draws a parallel between his idea that we
see with and not through a microscope, and Berkely’s theory of vision, according
to which three-dimensional vision is an acquired skill correlated with the sense
82Hacking, 1983, 130.
83Curiously enough, Hacking never mentions the work of Gaston Bachelard who, in the
1930s, coined the term “phénoménotechnique” to refer exactly to the fact that modern science
creates its own phenomena. I discuss the concept of phenomenotechnique in Chapter 5.
84“Now, how does one alter the charge on the niobium ball? ‘Well, at that stage,’ said my
friend, ‘we spray it with positrons to increase the charge or with electrons to decrease the
charge.’ From that day forth I’ve been a scientific realist. So far as I’m concerned, if you can
spray them then they are real.” Hacking, 1983, 23, italics in the original.
85Hacking, 1983, 189.
86Hacking, 1983, 207.
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of touch and with actual tampering with the world. He writes: “Whether or
not Berkeley was right about primary vision, new ways of seeing, acquired after
infancy, involve learning by doing, not just passive looking.”87
Hacking works this idea through the example of the discovery of dense bod-
ies in red blood cells. Dense bodies are small spots visualized in erythrocytes
observed using low power electron microscopy. They are called “dense” simply
because they are electron dense, which means that they appear at the elec-
tron microscope without any staining or preparation. When they were noticed
for the first time, nobody knew if they were actual biological structure or just
artifacts. To discriminate artifacts from real objects is a common problem in
microscopy, and in visualization technologies in general. So, how do scientists
know that what they are seeing is real and not just an erratic creation of the
imaging apparatus? We have already encountered this problem in Chapter 3,
discussing the question of depiction and detection in photography. We saw that
Perini considers microscopy artifacts as paradigmatic stances in which depiction
hampers detection, because they provide an example of how we can be mistaken
by the apparent mimetic properties of an image. In Perini’s analysis, scientists
can overcome this pitfall by granting microscopy images a well circumscribed
meaning, that is, by seeing them not as more or less indirect depictions of the
real microscopic entity, but as depictions of the visual features of a sample pre-
pared and visualized under specific conditions.88 On the basis of this restraint
and cautious vision, as it were, the biologist is motivated and entitled to carry
on a range of diﬀerent activities aimed at establishing if the forms observed
under the microscope correspond or not to some actual quality of the natural
object. In this respect, Perini’s position overlaps with Hacking’s. Still, in her
account the epistemic warrant of mechanically-produced images relies primarily
on the causal interaction between the object under study and the detector.89
Hacking, on the contrary, tends to downplay the relevance of the microscope as
mapping device.90 He rather insists on the fact that when it comes to distin-
guish artifacts from reality, scientists implement diﬀerent practical strategies:
(1) they check if the same structures appear under diﬀerent microscopes that
work on the basis of unrelated – and well understood – physical processes;91 (2)
they construct objects with specific known features and they observe them with
87Hacking, 1983, 189.
88See Section 3.2.
89See Perini, 2006, 868.
90The microscopy image can be conceived of as “a map of interactions between the specimen
and the imaging radiation.” Hacking, 1983, 207.
91In the case of dense bodies the results of the electron microscope were checked with a
fluorescence microscope.
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a microscope;92 (3) they manipulate the objects they want to observe, for ex-
ample, by microinjecting them, and look at how these manipulations aﬀect the
image; (4) they cross the observations done with the microscope with the results
from other sciences, namely biochemistry and crystallography, which can con-
firm if the structures that are visualized might correspond to specific chemical
and physical properties.93 This means, again, that scientists endow instrument-
mediated observations with meaning not merely by looking at the mechanical
record provided by the machine, but through a range of activities that combine
theoretical and experimental work. Scientists are not remote spectators, they
are hand-on sense-makers.
When doctors look at what might be a lesion revealed by a diagnostic scan,
they judge their findings and weigh them against an idea they have formed
about the lesion, a mental image which is the product of previous experience.
The experiences on which this mental process is based relate to medical educa-
tion (anatomy, physiology, pathology, and so forth), experiential knowledge of
the inner body (direct observation of intraoperative findings or corpse dissec-
tion), comparison between images produced with the same imaging modality,
and comparison between images and the results of other tests. In other words,
the diagnostic meaning of a particular lesion in a particular image emerges from
previous experience, which is constructed at both the historical-cultural (knowl-
edge developed within the scientific community) and individual level (knowledge
acquired and developed by the single practitioner). Books, articles, dissecting
room and surgical table, images form the same patient or from diﬀerent subjects,
laboratory tests, discussions at ward meetings or conferences, all these objects
and events enter the process of image interpretation. In the case of well known
pathologies, black-boxed technologies, and experienced radiologists, the image
becomes a self-contained epistemic object, and the doctor can see at a glance
the disease in the radiographic plate (or, more likely, on the computer screen).
Still, each time doubts arise, the practitioner can get outside of the image and
consult other objects, machines, events, and people involved in the distributed
process of signification and interpretation. Doctors work with images in order
92Hacking calls this argument “the argument of the grid,” because he uses as example the
metal grid employed by biologists to compare a specimen under an electron and a fluorescence
microscope. Back in the 1980s, the procedure consisted of drawing on a paper a grid with
a letter in each square, and then to photographically reduce it. The biologist, who knew
exactly the characteristics of the grid, fixed the specimen on it and mounted the slice on the
microscope. Through the microscope he would see exactly the grid he had constructed, with
its lines and letters. Hacking concludes that, in this case, we have good reasons to believe that
what we see under the microscope is a feature of the specimen and not an artifact because:
we made the grid, we know that the manufacturing process is reliable, and we can check the
result through diﬀerent microscopes. See Hacking, 1983, 202-204.
93Hacking, 1983, 209.
202 Scientific images are tools
to produce a specific visibility of the body and of the disease. This visibility is
a presentation of the body and the disease under experimental conditions. It
turns such complex entities into objects amenable to medical comprehension and
practice. Images are tools pertaining to the larger toolbox of medical practice
and they allow the physician to work on the human body and treat its diseases.
Resorting to Lynch’s notion of eidetic image, we could say that doctors produce
an eidetic image of the human body not only because the radiograph fixes spe-
cific choices in terms of image production (radiation intensity, time of exposure,
reciprocal position of body and machine, etc.), but also because it fixes a specific
way of understanding (theorizing) both the body and disease.
In this chapter I approached the notion of images as tools by covering a long,
somewhat heterogeneous route. I went through the discussion of the haptic, em-
bodied dimension of image perception, engaged in the semantic analysis of how
scientists make sense of photograph-like images, and finally dealt with the expe-
riential and collective dimension of image production and signification. In the
background always lingered the tension between material and mental represen-
tation, representations and objects, pictures and language, vision and gesture,
images and laboratory practices. This unresolved tension is due, I think, to the
ambiguous nature of images themselves. It depends on the fact that they are
a go-between that links material and mental dimensions, presence and absence,
sensible experience and concept. In the following chapter I engage more deeply
with the idea that scientific images are experimental tools. More precisely, I
expound the thesis that diagnostic images are to be understood as experimental
devices because they present the body under experimental conditions, through
a process that entails a specific reconfiguration of both body and illness. I do
so by drawing on Gaston Bachelard’s idea of phenomenotechnique. I apply the
concept of phenomenotechnique to both medical images and bodies, in order
to show how the lived experience of illness is eﬀectively turned into a visual
scientific object.
Chapter 5
Medical imaging as
“phenomenotechnique”
Bachelard coined the concept of phenomenotechnique in the article “Noumène
et microphysique,” of 1931, to describe the activity of mature sciences. In this
text the philosopher claimed that the science of his time, characterized by the
theoretical revolutions and empirical successes of quantum mechanics and space-
time relativity, was no longer a phenomenography [phénoménographie].1 That
is, it was not a representation of the world based on the observation and analysis
of natural phenomena. It was a “phenomenotechnique, whereby new phenom-
ena are not simply found, but invented, created anew.”2 This concept, further
developed in Le nouvel ésprit scientifique, of 1934, became a fundamental cat-
egory of Bachelard’s epistemology. To him, non-Euclidean geometry, relativity
theory, quantum mechanics, and quantum chemistry are the outcomes of a sci-
ence that has broken any relation with the data of our everyday experience.
Referring to modern chemistry, Bachelard remarked that it had completely bro-
ken with ancient natural history, which described all sorts of natural matter
(mineral, vegetal, animal) on the basis of collections of facts rooted in sensible
data and connected through ambiguous relations of similarity. To study matter,
Bachelard claimed, one has “to make profession of facticity,”3 that is, one has
to produce substances that do not exist in nature, and to re-make those that
exist, in order to analyze them under the proper degree of purity.4 He wrote:
[In science] phenomena must be selected, filtered, purified, shaped by
instruments; indeed, it may well be the instruments that produce the
phenomenon in the first place. And instruments are nothing but theories
1Bachelard, 1931, 18.
2Bachelard, 1931, 18, my translation.
3Bachelard, 1953, 22, my translation, italics in the original.
4See Bachelard, 1953, 22.
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materialized. The phenomena they produce bear the stamp of theory
throughout.5
Modern science does not find its objects in nature, it realizes them in the form
of new physical eﬀects (e.g., Zeeman eﬀect),6 purified chemical substances, syn-
thetic molecules. It has broken with the primacy of primitive sense data proper
of naïve realism and praised by positivist philosophers, and has turned into a
“realization of the rational,”7 characterized by the integration of theory and
experiment, bounded in a dialectical relation.8 For Bachelard, “science realizes
its objects without ever just finding them ready-made. Phenomenotechnique
extends phenomenology. A concept becomes scientific in so far as it becomes
a technique, in so far as it is accompanied by a technique that realizes.”9 In
other words, science must replace a phenomenology that describes natural phe-
nomena10 with a phenomenotechnique that inscribes the natural phenomenon
within scientific rationality. To quote Bachelard again:
A truly scientific phenomenology is [...] essentially a phenomeno-
technology. Its purpose is to amplify what is revealed beyond appear-
ance. It takes its instructions from construction [Elle s’instruit par ce
qu’elle construit]. Wonderworking reason designs its own miracles. Sci-
ence conjures up a world, by means not of magic immanent in reality
but of rational impulse immanent in mind. [. . . ] Scientific work makes
rational entities real, in the full sense of the word.11
In his eﬀort to elaborate a philosophy of science situated beyond the received
traditions (positivism vs. formalism, empiricism vs. conventionalism, realism
vs. idealism), which he considered the product of unjustifiable abstractions and
generalizations,12 Bachelard developed an original brand of rationalism that
pointed towards an absolute mathematization of the world, but at the same
time commanded the reification of reason into artificial material entities. In a
text written in 1936 for the first and only issue of the Surrealist review Inquisi-
tions, he wrote that human reason has to be turbulent and aggressive, in order
5Bachelard, 1934, 13.
6The Zeeman eﬀect, named after the Dutch physicist Pieter Zeeman, is the eﬀect of splitting
a spectral line into several components in the presence of a static magnetic field. It was first
produced by Zeeman in 1896, by holding a flame between strong magnetic poles.
7Bachelard, 1934, 5.
8Rheinberger aptly defines this relationship between theory and experiment as a dialecti-
cally constituted material-discursive circle. See Rheinberger, 2005, 316.
9Bachelard, 1938, 70, italics in the original.
10It is not clear if when Bachelard uses the term phenomenology in opposition to that
of phenomenotechnique he is referring to the Husserlian tradition, or if he simply means
“phenomenography,” that is, the observation and description of natural phenomena based on
primary sense data. I incline to the latter interpretation, but this is a problem open to debate.
11Bachelard, 1934, 13.
12See Bachelard, 1949, 5.
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to found a surrationalism. It has to establish “an experimental reason capable of
surrationally [surrationellement] organize the real, just as Tristan Tzara’s exper-
imental dream organizes poetic freedom in a surrealist way.”13 Rationalism must
be untamed and experimental at the same time, it has to break with the real,
in order to create new material objects and phenomena that are the only pos-
sible scientific reality. Based on a dialectical relation between rationalism and
materialism, Bachelard’s epistemology is quite complex, and it would deserve
a detailed discussion that I cannot put forward here (it would require another
dissertation). What is important to stress in the scope of my work is that the
technical realization of the rational was so relevant to Bachelard epistemology,
that he was not afraid to call his rationalism realism. Of course, Bachelard’s
realism, just as his rationalism, is of a peculiar sort. And indeed he uses the ex-
pressions “educated realism,”14 “realism at one remove,”15 or “technical realism”
[réalisme téchnique]16 in opposition to common scientific realism. Bachelard’s
realism concerns a reality that can be grasped only through the technical real-
ization of the rational.17 In Le Nouvel esprit scientifique, he explained:
[Technical realism] has nothing to do with traditional philosophical
realism. It is rather realism at one remove, conceived in reaction to the
usual notion of reality, as a polemic against the immediate; it consists
of realized reason, reason subject to experimentation [un réalisme fait
the raison réalisée, de raison expérimentée]. The ‘reality’ to which this
realism corresponds is not transferred into the realm of the unknowable
thing-in-itself . It has a noumenal richness of quite another order. The
thing-in-itself is a noumenon by exclusion of phenomena, whereas scien-
tific reality, I would argue, consists in a noumenal context suitable for
defining axes of experimentation.18
This idea of a non-Kantian noumenon appeared also in the 1931 article on
microphysics where the notion of phenomenotechnique was first introduced:
We could therefore say that mathematical physics corresponds to a
noumenology quite diﬀerent from the phenomenography to which sci-
entific empiricism condemns itself. This noumenology implies a phe-
13Bachelard, 1936, 8, italics in the original, my translation.
14Bachelard, 1937, 3.
15Bachelard, 1934, 5.
16Bachelard, 1934, 5.
17Jean Gayon has called Bachelard’s scientific realism an “unprecedented realism” [réalisme
inédit]. He remarks that during the development of his epistemology, Bachelard moved com-
pletely away from idealism, while submitting realism to a profound reformulation, through
the separation of the concept of reality from that of thing. In Bachelard’s epistemology reality
belongs to the realm of the noumenon technically materialized, not of nature. See Gayon,
1994, 22-23.
18Bachelard, 1934, 5-6, italics in the original.
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nomenotechnique whereby new phenomena are not simply found, but
invented, that is, created anew.19
For Bachelard, the noumenon is not the unknowable thing-in-itself that lies
beyond the phenomenon. It is the deep mathematical structure that shapes
phenomena, the set of relations that inform reality and that are described by
theoretical physics.20 When we study nature at the scale of the infinitely small,
Bachelard says, as in the case of microphysics and quantum chemistry, we can-
not think anymore in terms of reality of things, we must think in terms of reality
of organization, of relations.21 These relations are described by the equations of
advanced physics and, in turn, such equations allow designing the experiments
that materialize the very world they describe.22 It is not simple to provide an
exact definition of the term noumenon as used by Bachelard. However, even
without entering into the details of an exegesis of this concept, we can highlight
the fact that Bachelard conceived the noumenon in a strict relation with phe-
nomenotechnique. Regardless of how one exactly defines the noumenon, it has
to be considered as a rational substratum that defines the lines of thought along
which experiments can be envisaged and brought about. As seen in the quote
above, to Bachelard any “noumenology implies a phenomenotechnique.”23 Ra-
tionality must be applied, in the sense that it has to be technically implemented.
The objects of science are real, yet they are not natural: they are technically
produced and theoretically invested entities.24 Now, if scientific objects are ra-
tional constructs technically reified, then scientific instruments and technologies
are not secondary products of science, but rather part and parcel of scientific
activity.
By integrating technology (technical production of phenomena) into science,
Bachelard drew a line between the reality of science and the reality of the natural
world. In this vision, scientific reality belongs to the realm of the noumenon
technically materialized, not of nature, and the role of phenomenotechnique
is to realize mathematical rationality at the phenomenal level. Reason and
technique enter a dialectical circle of reciprocal shaping. Bachelard gave several
examples of materialization of mathematical rationality. For instance, if one is
to study atomic isotopes, one has to produce them in the mass spectroscope,25
and to study piezo-electric phenomena (i.e., the production of electricity by
compression or dilatation of a crystal) one needs to work with an ideal, i.e. pure,
19Bachelard, 1931, 18-19, my translation.
20See Bachelard, 1931, 18-19.
21See Bachelard, 1931, 13.
22See Bachelard, 1931, 17.
23Bachelard, 1931, 19.
24See Rheinberger, 2005, 316.
25See Bachelard, 1949, 103.
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quartz, which cannot be found in nature and must be produced in the laboratory.
The crystal thus obtained, he explained “is not simply matter provided with
geometrical properties. It is materialized geometry. The crystal created in
the laboratory is not an object, really, it is an instrument.”26 For Bachelard,
this synthetic crystal is a rational device that produces scientific phenomena, it
provides the conditions for proper scientific observation and analysis.
The emphasis put by Bachelard on the creation of phenomena implies an
emphasis on the role of instruments and technology in the production of scien-
tific knowledge. Bachelard did not develop a philosophy of technology, yet, as
already explained, the concept of phenomenotechnique entails a view of science
application not as a mere byproduct of fundamental research, but as a consti-
tutive element of the scientific process. Consequently, technology, in the form
of scientific instruments and artificially produced phenomena, is embedded into
science since the outset, because our scientific understanding of the world is nec-
essarily mediated by instruments and scientific instruments are an embodiment
of knowledge.27 Discussing the processes whereby scientists select the relevant
features of a phenomenon before they set out to study it, Bachelard noted that
the role of technological apparatuses in scientific research is that of reducing
and controlling the richness and interrelation of natural phenomena:
The will to neglect is especially active in contemporary technology.
A piece of apparatus can indeed be described negatively, if we may be
allowed the expression, as well as positively. It is defined in terms of the
perturbations it guards against, the technique isolating it, the assurance
it gives that clearly defined influences can be neglected, in short in terms
of the fact that it comprises a closed system. There is a whole complex of
shields, casing, and immobilisers that fences in the phenomenon. All this
assembled negativism that a piece of apparatus is in modern physics runs
counter to the sloppy aﬃrmations of the possibility of some undetermined
phenomenological interaction.28
The technological apparatus required by advanced physics is a piece of “as-
sembled negativism” because its function is that of remaking the natural phe-
nomenon into a scientific one. Scientific instruments tame natural phenomena
by reducing their variability, their interconnection with multiple related phe-
nomena, and all the contingencies that influence their actual manifestations.
26Bachelard, 1949, 202, italics in the original, my translation.
27It is worth noting that for Bachelard mathematical models and calculus techniques are
scientific instruments just in the same manner as the material instruments used in the labo-
ratory. “Psychologically, tensor calculus is the matrix of relativistic thinking. Contemporary
physical science has been created by this mathematical instrument, much as microbiology was
created by the microscope. None of the new knowledge is accessible to anyone who has not
mastered the use of this new instrument.” Bachelard, 1934, 56.
28Bachelard, 1938, 221.
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The task of scientific instruments and scientific rationality is that of isolat-
ing phenomena, dissecting them into fundamental components, and assuring
their stability and reproducibility. In the laboratory the natural phenomenon
is fenced. It becomes a “closed system” that can be manipulated and examined
at will.
By constructing its own objects, modern science has transformed the very
concept of phenomenon. A scientific phenomenon is no longer a datum, some-
thing exceptional and surprising that one finds in nature, it is rather an eﬀect,
something that is produced in the laboratory. In this way science creates the
circumstances for producing objective knowledge, because a phenomenotech-
nique is a method of objectification of the real, a process whereby well defined
objects and regular phenomena are created.29 The reality of Bachelard’s epis-
temology is a reality in which the world has been dissolved into rationality and
re-materialized into experimental phenomena produced by technological appa-
ratuses.
5.1 Diagnostic images and phenomenotechnique
Having discussed Bachelard’s concept of phenomenotechnique, it is now neces-
sary to explain how it can be applied to medical imaging. How does his vision
of science as an activity that creates its own objects apply to the production
of diagnostic images? According to Bachelard, phenomenotechnique is the pro-
cess whereby science creates the technical entities it can study. In the case of
medicine, the new objects created by the technological apparatus are images
of the human body. Hence, one might claim that if these objects (the images)
are new and artificial, because phenomenotechnically created, they have no cor-
respondence with any real object (the body). In such case the application of
the concept of phenomenotechnique to medical imaging would imply the absurd
proposition that the imaging technology produces human bodies and diseases.
More generally, it would imply that the whole activity of medicine consists of
producing bodies and diseases as technical phenomena. The human body and
its illnesses would thus become inventions of medicine technically implemented.
This would be, indeed, the position of radical constructivists.30 Since I do not en-
dorse this perspective, I have to clarify how the concept of phenomenotechnique
29“In early instrumental knowledge, the same obstacle can be seen to arise as in ordinary
objective knowledge: the phenomenon does not necessarily make its most regular variable
available for measurement. On the other hand, as instruments are improved, their scientific
product will be better defined. Knowledge becomes objective in proportion to it becoming
instrumental.” Bachelard, 1938, 217.
30See, for instance, Latour, 1984 and 1999, Ch. 5.
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can help thinking medical imaging without falling into radical-constructivism.
To this end, it is important to make some distinctions. For what concerns
the application of the concept of phenomenotechnique to medicine, one must
first distinguish between medical research and clinical practice. If we take into
account medical research, in particular that branch of contemporary medical
research based on molecular analysis, we can say that it works quite precisely
according to the idea of phenomenotechnique. In the molecular laboratory,
mechanisms of disease, immunological response, and therapeutical action are
routinely produced as artificial phenomena in a variety of forms. This requires
the manufacturing of a variety of entities, that range from cellular cultures to
genetically engineered viruses, from model organisms, wherein human diseases
are induced,31 to computational simulations. Genes and biological molecules
are the mathematical (or rather biochemical) noumenon of molecular medicine:
genetic and molecular models provide the rational structures along whose lines
new experiments can be conceived and artificial objects and phenomena pro-
duced.
The relationship between the concept of phenomenotechnique and medicine
is less straightforward when it comes to clinical practice and, more precisely,
to the part of clinical practice that deals with diagnosis. Unlike the medical
researcher, the clinician is not engaged in explaining the fundamental mecha-
nisms of health and disease. The daily work of the medical practitioner is not
to produce experimental models of disease, but rather to recognize what disease
aﬀects a specific person. The practitioner does not creates artificial objects, he
has to deal with that natural object which is the patient’s body. Still, his access
to such body and to his illness is by necessity mediated. He has to reconfigure
the lived experience of illness in medical terms and within a medical praxis. His
work is not to create a diseased body as a technical entity, yet he must reframe
the natural phenomenon (the patient’s body and his being ill) within medical
rationality. In this endeavor the physician resorts to a vast array of instru-
ments, including imaging technologies. In clinical medicine, the methodological
imperative of phenomenotechnique to create the scientific object is transformed
into the imperative to reconfigure the object of study under artificial and con-
trolled conditions. This was indeed the founding principle of clinical anatomy,
as articulated by Bichat at the turn of the eighteenth century.
31Model organisms are also called experimental models of disease and belong to a wide range
of species. The most common are Saccharomyces cerevisiae (yeast), Drosophila melanogaster
(fruit fly), Caenorhabditis elegans (roundworm), Danio rerio (zebra fish), Mus musculus
(house mouse), and Rattus norvegicus (brown rat). Animal models employed to study hu-
man disease are usually selected because of their similarity to humans in terms of genetics,
anatomy, and physiology, as well as for their unlimited supply and ease of manipulation. See
Simmons, 2008.
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Bichat set the foundations for the birth of clinical anatomy on the assumption
that the confusion of symptoms presented by the living patient and recorded by
the doctor at the bedside presented nothing but “a train of incoherent phenom-
ena.”32 To impose a coherence on such disorder it was necessary to observe the
cadaver, a proxy of the living body where the confusion of the disease is fixed in
the form of an organic lesion. With the birth of the clinic, the lived experience
of the patient was ideally let aside, and physicians had to learn make sense of
illness on the basis of a newly defined geography of the corpse. It was still a
phenomenography (as opposed to phenomenotechnique), but one that forced the
pathologist to separate the disease from the ambiguity of its symptomatic man-
ifestations. Anatomical dissection itself can be conceived as a technique that
allowed to materialize a specific conception of disease, namely, the idea that
a disease is an organic lesion rather than a train of symptoms. Accordingly, it
commanded the development of countless technologies to explore the inner body
and its functions. Every diagnostic technology introduced in clinical medicine
enhanced the visibility of the body, and our knowledge about it, by introducing
diﬀerent layers of instrumental mediation between the observer (the physician)
and the object of study and intervention (the patient).
It is exactly because the concept of phenomenotechnique emphasizes the
mediated and instrumental character of scientific knowledge, that it can be
useful for thinking medical imaging and diagnostic images. The concept of
phenomenotechnique can provide important insights into the epistemology of
medical imaging because, by highlighting the relevance of instruments in the
production of scientific knowledge, and the indirect, mediated nature of sci-
entific experience, it helps clarifying diﬀerent issues concerning the relationship
between technology and science. Consequently, it helps thinking the relationship
between diagnostic images (the product of a technology), and medical knowl-
edge (a specific form of scientific knowledge). To say that medical imaging can
be thought resorting to the concept of phenomenotechnique does not mean,
of course, that medical imaging is a straight example of phenomenotechnique.
Thus, my aim is not that of fitting radiology into phenomenotechnique, but of
combining this concept with the other concepts I have explored in the diﬀerent
chapter of this dissertation in order to reflect upon the epistemology of medical
imaging. This means that I use Bachelard’s phenomenotechnique as a point of
departure, a stimulus for thinking. An intellectual inspiration rather than a set
of stiﬀ rules that must be applied point by point.
To Bachelard, scientific perception is the opposite of natural perception be-
cause it transcends the immediate and is always polemical in relation to common
32Bichat, 1801, vol. 1, 60. See Section 1.1.
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sense knowledge.33 This is why the scientific spirit has to be formed against
natural mental habits.34 In my appropriation, as it were, of the Bachelardean
concept, I bracket the polemical aspect of scientific perception and highlight its
artificial nature. I stress the fact that scientific experience transcends the im-
mediate because, thanks to mechanical and electronic instruments, the scientist
gains access to a sensorial domain, which is also an intellectual domain, that is
precluded to natural perception. Understood in this way, the concept of phe-
nomenotechnique can be applied to medical imaging and put in relation with
Benjamin’s optical unconscious. Imaging technologies create phenomena that
reveal “entirely new structures of matter.”35 They extend natural perception
and allow analyzing and dissecting reality from novel, unexpected angles.
As a large set of imaging technologies, medical imaging can be conceptualized
in terms of phenomenotechnique because it produces artificial, controlled phe-
nomena – diagnostic images – that help gaining knowledge about what happens
inside the human body. The function of these images is to replace the actual
patient’s body when we need to answer specific diagnostic questions. Also, they
transform the physician’s perception, by providing instrumentally mediated ac-
cess to his object of study, and they simultaneously turn a natural object (the
human body aﬀected by a disease) into a scientific object. Moreover, both the
imaging apparatus and the images it produces can be considered reified theories
for two reasons: on the one hand, especially in the case of digital imaging, they
really materialize mathematical equations; on the other hand, they materialize
a vast array of knowledge from diﬀerent domains and, in turn, influence the
development of this very knowledge. In what follows I argue in favor of these
ideas along four lines of analysis:
1. Diagnostic images act as a technical medium of the human body, thus
mediate the access of the doctor to the patient’s body. By introducing
an experiential and intellectual separation (the doctor looks at the body
by means of the image) they make visible that which is concealed. By
mediating perception they grant cognitive access to objects and processes
that are otherwise hidden within the body.
2. Diagnostic images are a technical reconfigurations of the patient’s body,
in the sense that they selectively display information about the inner body
in a way that is useful for diagnostic purposes. Although they often look
like mimetic representations of the inner body, they are better understood
33See Bachelard, 1934, 12-13.
34See Bachelard, 1938, 33.
35Benjamin, 1939, 266. See Section 2.3.1.
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as visual reconfigurations of non visual data that carry information about
the internal organs and their functioning.
3. Diagnostic images are embodied knowledge, in the sense that they are the
outcome of a technology that relies on theories, hypotheses, concepts, and
material practices produced in diﬀerent scientific fields, such as physics,
chemistry, biology and medicine.
4. Diagnostic images are diagnostically meaningful only if the observer (the
physician) has a proper training and is in command of adequate theoretical
knowledge and practical skills, whereby he is placed at the core of an
epistemic network.
5.1.1 Diagnostic images as a medium of the inner body
The idea that diagnostic instruments in general, and medical images in partic-
ular, are a medium of the patient’s body has been defended repeatedly in this
dissertation. Discussing the introduction of the stethoscope in clinical medicine,
I argued that it marked the beginning of mediated perception in medical di-
agnosis. I showed that such mediation invested diﬀerent levels of perception
and relied on well-defined theoretical assumptions. In particular, the use of
the stethoscope required the creation of a precise correspondence between the
acoustic signals coming from the chest of the living patient and the anatomical
lesions studied on the cadaver. These correspondences had diagnostic import
because the organic lesions had been previously associated to specific patho-
logical conditions. Through the network of correspondences between acoustic
and visual signs, living body and cadaver, the lived experience of disease, which
the patient could express through the narration of his or her symptoms, was
turned into a collection of evidences that could be gathered and interpreted by
the educated ear and eye of the physician. The lived experience of the patient
was, at least in part, put aside in the diagnostic process. Concurrently, the
immediate experience of the doctor was reshaped into a mediated experience
that relied on the conceptualization of disease put forward by clinical anatomy,
and that required a specific training of the ear. On these grounds, I maintained
that the stethoscope was at the centre of an epistemological rupture.36 That is,
it was part of the complex and still ongoing process whereby Western medicine
has attempted to mutate from ars curandi into an empirical science, on the
model of physics, chemistry, and biology. In this respect we can say that clini-
cal anatomy and the stethoscope set the premises for medicine to create its own
36See Section 1.2.1.
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brand of phenomenotechnique. Namely, a phenomenotechnique that reformu-
lates and mediates the way illness is perceived by the patient and the physician,
in an attempt to turn both the body and disease into objective and measurable
– although not mathematical – entities.
With the development of instruments such as the spirometer and the sphyg-
mograph, the technical character of diagnostic mediation was refined through
the definition of quantifiable indices of health and disease. With photography
and radiography it acquired new peculiar features. For what concerns medical
photography, I highlighted that it required the embedding of the patient’s body
into an experimental and theoretical apparatus. This was particularly clear in
the electrophysiological portraits by Duchenne, whereby the human subject was
literally wired to the electrical stimulator, and photographs turned the fleet-
ing motions of the muscles into physiological evidence.37 Similarly, in Marey’s
geometrical chronophotographs, the body of a running or jumping man was re-
duced to a system of fulcrums and levers (see Figure 3.3). This metamorphosis
was achieved by dressing the runner in a black velvet costume, with silver lines
marking the limbs and the key pivots, and by taking pictures with a camera that
shot at a speed of 1/720 of a second. Through a technical expedient, the con-
tinuous movements of a running man were dissected into analytical components
that could be imagined and endowed with meaning only within the theoretical
framework of mechanics.38
Compared to medical photography and to the vast array of diagnostic instru-
ments that preceded its invention,39 radiography has a specific phenomenotech-
nical character, because it produced the first artificial phenomenon that made
the interior of the living body visible. Of course, here the concept of phe-
nomenotechnique is not used in a proper Bachelardean sense. I use it to em-
phasize the artificial nature of X-ray images (a point I develop in detail in the
following Section), and its eﬀects on our sensory perception. With radiographs
the body became partially transparent, reproducible, and transportable. As
a medium of the patient’s body, radiography accomplished the work that had
been started with the stethoscope. If the stethoscope mediated the access to the
sounds from the chest, and through them to the organic lesions, X-ray images,
going beyond the sensorial constraints of human vision, provided visual access
to the signs inscribed by disease on the organs. By fixing such signs on a pho-
tographic plate, radiography turned them into public visual objects that could
be collectively scrutinized and compared. Through an elaborated process of
37See Section 2.7.
38See Section 3.3.
39See Chapter 1.
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signification,40 radiographs became a self-contained system of visual knowledge
about the inner body: that which was concealed by the body, could be revealed
by the radiographic image. In this sense, radiography is a phenomenotechnique
because it diverts the gaze of the physician from the natural object (the pa-
tient) toward an artificial phenomenon (the radiograph) that reconstructs the
inner body on a photo-sensible plate, and this passage from the natural to the
artificial is essential to the construction of new knowledge.
Importantly, the radiological image performs its cognitive function not be-
cause it is a copy of the body, but because it selectively shows some features of
the inner tissues and organs. In the words of a radiologist:
You might suppose that the value of a [radiological] picture increases
with its visual similarity to the part of the body that it examines. But
much of that information content will invariably be medically irrelevant
at best, or detract from or even hide the diagnostically critical features.
[...] A diagnostic imaging system must [...] be able to display the specific,
distinctive aspects of a patient’s anatomy or physiology that are causing
a problem, and be sensitive enough to pick up even very faint signs of
it.41
This means that the diagnostic value of a radiological image does not depend
primarily on its similarity with the natural object (although such similarity
plays an important cognitive role). Indeed, the more details pile up on the
radiographic plate, the less readable the picture is, because much of the infor-
mation it displays is not related to the pathological condition. The diagnostic
meaning of the image depends to a large extent on the fact that it shows only
certain anatomical or physiological features (e.g., soft rather than dense tissues
or clusters of cells with a particularly enhanced metabolic activity) and that it
reveals even the slightest alterations (e.g., a very small lesion). We could say
that the imaging apparatus works as a sort of sieve that makes some information
visible, while neglecting some other. By transforming the visibility of the body,
it enhances its intelligibility.
5.1.2 Diagnostic images as visual reconfigurations of non-
visual signals
Natural vision is based on the ability of our visual system to be stimulated by
visible light42 reflected by objects around us (the retina works as a transducer
40See Sections 3.4.5 and 4.2.2.
41Wolbarst, 1999, 6-7.
42Visible light corresponds to electromagnetic waves in the wavelength between 750 and 400
nm (low energy photons).
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that converts patterns of light into neural stimuli). Similarly, photography relies
on the fact that photo-sensible plates or films are impressed by light bouncing
oﬀ the surface of things. Medical imaging works in an altogether diﬀerent way,
because it exploits non-optical properties of the inner tissues. Radiography
and TC are based on the degree to which biological tissues attenuate X-rays;43
ultrasound imaging relies on the tissues’ echogenicity, that is, their ability to
reflect ultrasound;44 MRI is based on the magnetic properties of the protons
of water molecules distributed within and around cells; and PET relies on the
fact that certain metabolic activities induce the absorption of specific molecules
that can be labelled with radioactive markers. Although each imaging modality
works according to a variety of physical processes, they all share a fundamental
commonality: they create images by measuring non-visual properties of the
biological tissues. As the radiologist Anthony Wolbarst explains:
[Imaging technologies] create medical images by following and recording, by
some means, the progress of suitable probes that are attempting to pass through a
patient’s body. The body must be partially, but only partially, transparent to the
probes. If the probes all slip right through bones and organs without interacting
with them, like light through a pane of clear glass, no diﬀerence among the tis-
sues can be visualized. Similarly, if their passage is completely blocked, nothing
much shows up. But if we choose probes that are only somewhat absorbed, scat-
tered, reflected, delayed, or otherwise aﬀected, we may be able to detect small
diﬀerences in how they interact with diﬀerent biological materials. And these
diﬀerences can then serve as the raw material for the creation of diagnostically
useful pictures.45
Hence, in order to produce a medical image, a selective probe (X-rays, ultra-
sounds, radiopharmaceuticals, and so on) has to be sent into the body. Diﬀerent
probes measure diﬀerent properties of the biological tissues (we can call such
properties biological indicators),46 the interaction between the probe and the bi-
ological indicator produces a signal (e.g., an attenuated X-ray beam or a delayed
ultrasound), and the signal is recorded by a detector. Subsequently a converter
translates this non-visual signal (the “raw material” for the creation of the im-
age)47 into a visual output. More precisely, an increased/decreased value of the
signal produced by the interaction between the biological tissue and the probe is
mapped out as increased/decreased luminosity on a radiographic plate or com-
puter screen. Diagnostic images can be thus understood as maps of luminosity
43X-rays are electromagnetic waves with wavelengths of 10 nm or less (high energy photons).
44Ultrasounds are sound waves with a frequency higher than the upper limit of the human
hearing range (20 KHz).
45Wolbarst, 1999, 8.
46See Bogen, 2002.
47See quote above.
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Figure 5.1: Radiograph showing air-filled trachea and lungs, diaphragmatic domes,
mediastinal structures, and vascular markings. Arrows indicate costophrenic angles.
Source: US Army medical training course. Wikimedia Commons.
values corresponding to the variations of a non-visual signal (in digital imaging
the luminosity value of each pixel on the screen represents the values of the sig-
nal emitted by a corresponding voxel of tissue).48 In contemporary imaging the
whole process of detecting, converting, and mapping the original signal relies on
advanced physics and mathematics.
Images from equations Radiography is the only imaging modality that re-
lies on a straightforward relationship between the passage of the probe (X-rays)
through the patient’s body and the resulting image. X-ray beams are diﬀer-
entially attenuated by biological tissues (the bones absorb almost all the rays,
while soft tissues as the skin let them pass through), and the rays that make
their way through the body directly hit the photographic plate (traditional ana-
logical radiography), or an array of X-ray detectors (digital imaging) letting an
imprint of the body (Figure 5.1). Things a quite more complex in the case of
other imaging modalities, such as Computed Tomography.
Like radiography, CT technology relies on X-ray attenuation. Unlike ra-
diographs, however, CT scans must be reconstructed by a computer, because
the imaging apparatus collects information from a very high number of sections
48For an exhaustive discussion of the relationship of non-visual signals into luminosity values
see Semczyszyn, 2010.
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Figure 5.2: Computed tomography scan of the brain, axial view.
(tomos) of the body (Figure 5.2), revealing much finer details and allowing for
the visualization of organs, such as the brain, that in radiography are almost
completely shaded by the bones of the skull. In order to produce a sequence of
CT images, a calibrated beam of X-rays is rotated and translated around and
along one axis of the slices of the body to be imaged. The attenuated X-rays are
captured by crystal receptors, sent to an amplifier, and then to a converter. The
final images are subsequently reconstructed by equations that map the intensity
of the attenuated beam from each slice of the body in function of its angle. The
amount of data embedded in a CT scan is enormous, and the mathematical
nature of these images was absolutely clear in early publications. A clinical
report published in 1973 in the British Journal of Radiology showed a CT scan
of the brain. Notably, in this image the data were displayed as a bidimensional
array of numbers arranged in the approximative shape of a cerebral section,
and the author remarked that physicians could analyze CT scans in the form
of images or quantitative data.49 In 1976, medical researchers at Mayo Clinic
still wondered if, by opting for images rather than numbers, they were not loos-
ing important information about the tissues they were examining.50 Already
at that time, however, CT numerical data took up a considerable number of
sheets of paper, so they were eventually abandoned in favor of images, whose
cognitive accessibility is much higher than that of lists of numbers.51 Nowadays
49See Ambrose, 1973. See also Delehanty, 2010.
50See Kevles, 1997, 161.
51Data visualization is a burgeoning field of research. The fact that visual representations
of large amounts of data suit our cognitive apparatus better than lists of numbers is uncon-
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the volume of data generated by CT equipments is enormous. These data allow
creating very detailed three-dimensional images, and they pose new challenges
to radiologists, namely for what concerns their manipulation (data processing),
presentation, storage, and interpretation.52
Similar considerations can be made for all contemporary medical imaging
modalities, because algorithms for image reconstruction play a fundamental
role in all of them. In ultrasound imaging, it is necessary to turn into im-
ages several pulses of ultrasound beams that are reflected by bodily tissues.
In MRI, the images are produced resorting to the spatial coordinates obtained
from the magnetic relaxation times of the hydrogen nuclei (protons) of the water
molecules which compose our body. In PET, an image of metabolic activity is
reconstructed on the basis of the spatial coordinates of the gamma-rays emit-
ted by radioactive molecules previously injected in the patient’s blood.53 This
means that when the radiologist looks at a medical image, what he really sees
are non-visual signals translated into areas of diﬀerent luminosity. Of course,
he perceives this information in the form of a visual object, and thus uses the
depictions to make detections. That is, he relies on the mimetic features of
the image to extract non-visual information, namely, information relevant for a
medical diagnosis.54 Being an expert observer, however, the radiologist is aware
of the problematic relation between depiction and detection. He knows, for in-
stance, that certain features of the image might refer to artifacts produced by
the imaging apparatus, rather than to actual properties of the biological tissue.
He also knows that there is no univocal correspondence between what appears
in the image and the actual health conditions of the patient.55 It is also worth
noting that the more sophisticated the imaging technology, the higher the pos-
sibility of producing artifacts during the imaging process, and thus the greater
the expertise required to correctly acquire and interpret the images.
This concise and simplified description of how medical images are produced
provides the background for some reflections about their phenomenotechnical
nature. First of all, if we focus on the idea that these images are produced “by
following and recording, by some means, the progress of suitable probes that are
troversial. What is not always clear is if semi-naturalistic, photograph-like images hold any
special advantage compared to other visual formats such as graphs (see Delehanty, 2010). In
medical imaging the advantage of highly naturalistic visual displays is quite obvious when one
wants to visualize morphological and structural elements, or locate an event (e.g., blood flow
rate) in a specific area of the body. The advantage of naturalistic renderings is less clear when
imaging is used to quantify metabolic processes, as in the case of PET and functional MRI.
52See Pisco, 2009, 33.
53See Wolbarst, 1999; Pope, 1999.
54See Maynard, 1997, 119-120. I discuss the distinction between depiction and detection in
Section 3.2.3.
55See Perini, 2012. See also Section 3.2.3.
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attempting to pass through a patient’s body”56 we can start to understand them
in terms of experimental practice. To produce a diagnostic image is to create an
artificial, controlled phenomenon whereby specific signals are elicited from the
biological tissues, and subsequently converted into visual outputs. A diagnostic
image is really a representation of the body and disease under experimental
conditions, for three reasons:
1. An appropriate probe has to be sent into the patient’s body in order to
emit the desired signal;
2. The patient has to adhere to specific protocols before and during the
imaging process to optimize the quality of the output signal (the body is
part of the imaging apparatus, not just an object of representation);57
3. It is possible to properly compare diﬀerent images only if they are pro-
duced with the same imaging modality and following the same operational
standards.58
Another observation that we can make in relation to the phenomenotechnical
nature of radiological images is that they are not conventional images: they
are mathematical reconstructions of quantitative data derived from non-visual
signals. This unconventional, counterintuitive feature of diagnostic images was
already present, although to a lesser degree, in analogical imaging. In fact,
although traditional radiography does not depend on a mathematical recon-
struction of the original signal (X-ray attenuation), it nevertheless creates an
image by exploiting non-visual properties of the biological tissues. It produces
a phenomenon (the X-ray image) that can only exist as far as it is technically
produced. This character of novelty is one reason why the process of significa-
tion of radiographs was complex and involved a combination of technical and
cognitive operations that helped create and consolidate new visual skills. Com-
pared to analogical imaging, in digital medical imaging the phenomenotechnical
56Wolbarst, 1999, 8.
57Depending on the technology employed, a patient might be asked not to eat previously to
the examination, to drink a contrast liquid, or to undergo other forms of bodily preparations.
During the imaging process, one will be typically asked to stand still, to hold one’s breath, to
breath deeply, and so forth.
58In order to elaborate a diagnosis it can be useful to combine diﬀerent imaging modalities
(e.g., ultrasound and MRI) because they allow to collect diﬀerent information. However, to
study the evolution of a disease in a single patient, or to compare the radiological presentation
of the same disease in diﬀerent patients, one has to compare images of the same modality
produced under the same conditions (e.g., instruments with identical, or very similar, technical
characteristics, same time of exposure, same physical preparation of the patient, and so on).
For the relevance of operational standards to the creation of scientific objectivity see Section
3.2.2.
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nature of images is taken to a more sophisticated and accomplished level.59 The
reconfiguration of quantitative data into images is performed by mathematical
algorithms that embody a specific epistemic context: the pre-existing knowledge
about the object under study; the questions that need to be answered (the diag-
nostic problem); the working hypothesis; the expected outcomes; and so forth.
We could say that contemporary medical images entail the materialization of
mathematical noumena. This does not mean that medical images are math-
ematical inventions, because there is a counterfactual causal chain that links
biological indicators, probes, and images (if the tissue were diﬀerent, the signal
emitted would be diﬀerent, and therefore the image would be diﬀerent). Yet,
diagnostic images are not copies of the human body. They are rather simula-
tions of the real object, because they can be manipulated in order to increase
the visibility of specific aspects of the body or of the disease, and to erase those
elements that are irrelevant to the diagnosis and would provide only visual noise.
For instance, in MRI, by selecting specific sequences of radio frequency pulse
in the phase of image acquisition, it is possible to selectively enhance the bright-
ness of soft tissues (e.g., fat or brain matter), and neglect watery tissues (diseased
areas) or liquids (e.g., urine or cerebrospinal fluid). Similarly, in the phase of
image reconstruction, the selection of specific parameters allows to better visu-
alize certain areas rather than others. Moreover, the final user (the radiologist
who interprets the scan) can manipulate several parameters, such as color, while
looking at the image.60 The mathematical substructure of these images allows
for an increased representational plasticity, and thus enhances their cognitive
eﬀectiveness. In this respect it is important to stress that the selection of pa-
rameters in the phase of image acquisition determines the kind of information
that can be extracted from the final output. For example, if an MRI image was
acquired according to parameters that neglect watery tissues, it will not be pos-
sible to retrieve information about such tissues from the final image, no matter
how many software-based manipulations one performs on it. These manipula-
tions only aﬀect the way the information gathered during image acquisition is
presented to the observer.
Blurred boundaries As the great majority of contemporary scientific images,
todays’ diagnostic images are image-data, that is, they are lists of numbers cor-
59This is not, of course, an instance of teleological progress, but rather the result of scientific
and technological development. I use the adjective “accomplished” to point out that new
diagnostic images are better suited to carry out the task of medical imaging, which is to
extract information from the patient’s body by reconfiguring its visibility.
60For an informative study on software-based interaction between radiologists and images
see Friedrich, 2010.
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responding to physical quantities which are displayed in the form of a bidimen-
sional visual object.61 They are hybrid objects that blur the boundaries between
quantitative data and qualitative representation: we use quantitative data to
produce the image, and we resort to the qualitative features of the image to in-
terpret the data. As all mechanical images of invisible referents, contemporary
diagnostic images also blur the diﬀerence between the indexical and symbolic
modes of signification. We are justified in trusting the indexical nature of these
images as far as they have been produced according to well defined operational
conventions, because these protocols assure the stability of both the causal and
counterfactual relationship between the referent and its image. In turn, the
application of the operational standards lays the foundations for the symbolic
mode of signification of the images (it creates the material preconditions to de-
fine the rules according to which the image must be interpreted).62 In digital
imaging, however, an important role in the process of image making is played
by the iconic mode of signification, too. Icons are signs that signify by virtue of
similarity, by sharing some quality with the referent.63 In morphological medical
imaging, the mathematical algorithms for image reconstruction have precisely
the aim to create images that resemble the original object by preserving its ge-
ometry. In the same way, in functional imaging the original signal is processed
so as that the intensity of the physiological phenomenon under study is visually
rendered in terms of intensity of the luminosity of a specific area of the image.
The preservation of a resemblance between the image and its referent is thus
a principle built into the mathematical equations that determine the aspect of
the image. This means that the interpretation of the original data (the non
visual signal) begins during the very production of the image, on the basis of
the knowledge used to design the algorithms for image reconstruction.
5.1.3 Diagnostic images as reified knowledge
Bachelard claimed that instruments, in modern science, are “reified theorems”64
and that the phenomena produced by scientific instruments “bear the stamp of
theory throughout.”65 For him, Millikan’s oil drop experiment or Stern and
Garlach’s space quantization experiment were “conceived directly as a function
of the electron or the atom.”66 That is, they were specifically designed to test
a well defined theory, they materialized the theory. A common interpretation
61See Prasad, 2005; Israel-Jost, 2011.
62See Section 3.2.2.
63See Peirce, CP 2.247. See also Section 2.2.
64Bachelard, 1971, 137; 1949, 103; 1934, 13.
65Bachelard, 1934, 13.
66Bachelard, 1971, 137.
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of these statements is that they point to the self-referentiality of theory, thus,
to the theory-ladenness of observation and the underdetermination of scientific
theories.67 However, considering the importance attributed by Bachelard to
experiment, and taking into account that he saw science application as a con-
stitutive element in the creation of scientific concepts, we can regard his claims
on instruments as reified theorems as a general statement concerning the fact
that scientific instruments materialize a large body of pre-existing knowledge,
and that they help produce the object under study as a technophenomenon.68
If instruments materialize diﬀerent bodies of knowledge (not only well defined
theories about the object of study), and if they help recreate the object of
interest as a technophenomenon, then we can really think of technology not as
a mere application of science, but as an active constituent of it. Accordingly,
we can understand medical imaging not simply as the application to medicine
of technologies based on physical theories, but as the reification of knowledge
(both theoretical and practical) developed in diﬀerent domains, such as, physics,
chemistry, pharmacology, biology, physiology, pathology, and so forth. This
implies that medical imaging technologies embody and blend together theories,
concepts, hypotheses and practices concerning the machinery that produces the
image as well as the human body that through those images is examined. By
reconfiguring natural objects and by creating totally new phenomena, imaging
technologies extend the scope of our sensory experience, and at the same time
they extend the domain of what can be thought and how it can be thought.
They extend the scientific mind.69 Conversely, for a technology to become part
of a given scientific domain it must accommodate the pre-existing knowledge of
that domain, or at least part of it.
In the specific case of medical imaging, I have shown in Chapter 1 that
physicians could be receptive to the possibilities open by radiography because
they conceptualized disease in terms of organic lesions. However, the creation
and stabilization of proper clinical knowledge based on radiographs was a long
and complex process. It entailed:
67See Galison, 1997, 18.
68See Rheinberger, 2005, 320. Bachelard wrote: “The instrument is the necessary interme-
diary in the study of a definitely instrumented phenomenon [un phénomène vraiment instru-
menté] that has been designed as an object of a phenomenotechnique.” Bachelard, 1949, 2-3,
my translation.
69Castelao-Lawless makes a similar point when she says that Bachelard’s claim that in-
struments are reified theories refers to the fact that, for him, both mathematical models and
scientific instruments were extensions of the scientific mind. See Castelao-Lawless, 1995, 50.
In La formation de l’esprit scientifique Bachelard wrote: “A measuring instrument always
ends up as a theory: the microscope has to be understood as extending the mind rather than
the eye.” Bachelard, 1938, 240.
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1. Technology control and stabilization (an operation that brought together
physicians, physicists, engineers, photographers, and other professionals).
2. The matching of what was shown by radiographic images and what could
be directly observed in the cadaver (an operation that led to the revision of
some well entrenched assumption about human anatomy based on autopsic
observations).
3. The comparison of the information provided by radiographs and infor-
mation collected through other diagnostic techniques (an operation that
required the development not only of new visual skills, but also of a new
language).
4. The comparison of diﬀerent images among them (an operation whereby
images were turned into a medium of the patient’s body).70
Indeed, the history of the discovery of X-rays and their subsequent introduc-
tion in medicine shows that instruments are less a direct reification of a single,
well-defined theory, than the embodiment of complex dynamics of practices, the-
ories, hypotheses and concepts. Roentgen discovered X-rays by chance. While
exploring the properties of cathode rays, he inadvertently set the conditions for
the appearance of a new phenomenon that seemed anomalous in the context of
what he knew about the electromagnetic waves. It took several years to develop
a proper physical theory of X-rays, but this did not prevent the development of
a more eﬃcient radiographic technology for medical purposes. Such improve-
ment was brought about on empirical bases, not as the direct application of
better theories. In turn, the refinement of the technology for X-rays produc-
tion and manipulation contributed to the growth of theoretical knowledge about
radiation, as well as about human anatomy and disease. At each step of their
development X-ray machines and the related practices of image making were the
materialization of a heterogeneous body of knowledge distributed among diﬀer-
ent professionals. This included, for example, theoretical and empirical knowl-
edge about X-rays production, image fixation, use of contrast agents, tissues’
densities in healthy and diseased tissues, and so forth. The imaging apparatus
emerged at the intersection of diﬀerent domains of knowledge.
An exemplary case of knowledge crossing The intersection of knowledge
coming from diﬀerent disciplinary fields is particularly marked in positron emis-
sion tomography. While X-ray, ultrasound, and magnetic resonance imaging
70See Sections 3.4.5, 3.4.6, and 4.2.2.
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provide morphological information, PET allows visualizing the physiological ac-
tivity of the inner tissues, by showing the variation of concentration of certain
molecules in specific areas of the body over a given amount of time. It has sev-
eral applications: it helps diagnosing cancer and monitoring possible metastases
by detecting the elevation of glucose uptake by cells in rapid division; it allows
tracking the levels of oxygenation of diﬀerent areas of the heart or the brain;
and it can be used to measure the activity of specific neural receptors. This kind
of imaging is possible thanks to so called radiotracers or radiopharmaceuticals.
These are molecules in which an atom of carbon, oxygen, nitrogen or fluorine
has been replaced by a correspondent radioactive isotope. To produce a PET
image, the radiotracer, selected according to the physiological process that one
wants to monitor, has to be injected into the patient’s blood. At this point it
flows through the body as a normal molecule, but after a precise span of time
(the isotope half life)71 it emits radioactivity in the form of a positron that, after
colliding with an electron, produces two γ-rays that shoot oﬀ the body almost
180º apart. These two γ-rays are the signal detected by the imaging apparatus,
and they are used to map the flow rate of the labelled molecule. As in the
case of CT scans, the machinery delivers a set of images corresponding to the
slices in which the original volume (the human body) has been divided. And as
in the case of CT, the production of the images entails complex mathematical
operations which require considerable computing power.
This means that for PET technology to be possible, many branches of knowl-
edge have to converge: physiology, medicine, biochemistry, nuclear chemistry,
physics, electronic engineering, and mathematics. PET as a technology, and
PET images as the material output of such technology materialize knowledge
about normal and pathological physiology, physiological modeling, tracers ki-
netics, radioactivity production and detection, image processing, image recon-
struction, and so forth. Indeed, PET images are particularly complex for what
concerns both their production and interpretation. The information they present
is both quantitative (they are meant to literally measure biological activity) and
qualitative (they show the spatial distribution of the phenomenon under study).
Consequently they demand complex physiological modeling. Moreover, to be
medically relevant, they have to be processed in terms of relationships between
molecular circulation in the organism, radioactive decay, and specific properties
of the physiological process under examination (e.g., the relationship between
glucose concentration in the cells, cells’ proliferation, and tumor malignity).72
71The half life is the length of time required for half of any given amount of an element to
decay into another element. It is specific for each isotope.
72See Dumit, 2004, 30.
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In his study on the role of PET imaging in neuropsychiatry, the anthro-
pologist of science Joseph Dumit has shown that the diﬀerent researchers that
contributed to the invention of PET conceptualized this technology in diﬀerent
terms. For one of them, the physicist Michel M. Ter-Pogossian, PET was not
exactly an invention, it was rather a “recognition.”73 That is, it was the result of
noting that certain positron emitting radionuclides have physiological properties
and thus can be used to image biological processes. Once the imaging potential
of these molecules was realized, it was just a matter of finding a way to take
advantage of them. This was possible thanks to the insights and instruments
produced by the researchers in the area of CT scanning. For Ter-Pogossian,
designing the first PET machine was essentially a matter of putting together
“diﬀerent building blocks”74 from diﬀerent scientific areas. The building blocks
to which Ter-Pogossian refers are both ideas (theories, hypothesis, kinetic mod-
els, and so on) and material objects (such as the cyclotron for the production
of radioisotopes, the imaging apparatus, and the radiopharmaceuticals). All
these elements converge in the technology that goes under the name of positron
emission tomography. Ter-Pogossian’s account of the invention of PET points
in the direction of a conceptualization of technology as materialization of dif-
ferent strands of knowledge, yet it provides a picture of medical imaging as an
application of technology to medicine. In his account, first came the realization
that specific radiotracers could be used to monitor physiological activity, then it
was developed into an apparatus that could take advantage of these molecules,
and finally physicians embraced the new technology for diagnostic and research
purposes.
The physician Henry N. Wagner, another contributor to the invention of
PET,75 oﬀers a diﬀerent perspective. For him, the development of PET “was a
chain of events”76 that started in the nineteenth century with Claude Bernard’s
conceptualization of disease in physiological terms.77 The other fundamental
events in the chain were Georg von Hevesy’s success in using radioactive isotopes
to study metabolic processes, in 1923, and the medical measurements of thyroid
activity by scintigraphy, the first technology for functional imaging, developed
some twenty years before PET. For Wagner, “thyroid scanning started because
73Dumit, 2004, 43.
74Ter-Pogossian in an interview with Dumit. Dumit, 2004, 45.
75The attribution of an invention is a classical problem for history of science. Given the
multidisciplinary nature of PET, it is consensual that many people contributed to its invention.
Ter-Pogossian himself claims that “there are masses of fathers of PET.” Dumit, 2004, 40.
76Wagner, in an interview with Dumit. Dumit, 2004, 47.
77Note that the idea that the preconditions for functional imaging were set by Bernard’s
conceptualization of body and disease in terms of physiological functions is specular to the
idea that clinical anatomy set the preconditions for morphological imaging.
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of nodules in the thyroid,”78 not because there was a technology that made
functional scanning possible. This shift of perspective is important, because it
highlights the fact that medical technologies embody the need to solve medical
problems, medical questions. Physicians needed to know whether the nodules
in the thyroid were functional or not. They needed to measure blood flow and
to associate it to a variety of problems, from the eﬀects of anesthesia to the
diagnosis of schizophrenia. To solve these problems they did what they could
with the tracers and detectors they had at their disposal at any given time.
The diagnostic questions and problems were not simply an external force that
provided the practical goal which demanded the development of a technology.
Rather, they were the core around which successive technologies acquired their
specific form, within a number of constraints posed by all the other factors at
stake (tracers, detectors, image reconstruction models, and so on). But there is
more than this.
By integrating the medical problem, the technology can reshape the way
the problem itself is posed. Wagner gives the example of the development of
single photon emission radiopharmaceuticals that simulate somatostatin, a pep-
tide with a wide range of inhibiting eﬀects on various organs. Single photon
emission tracers are akin to those used in PET, and they started to be used in
the 1980s to study and diagnose neuroendocrine tumors through single photon
emission computed tomography (SPECT).79 Such studies showed that in certain
tumors there are specific metabolic alterations, a discovery that played an im-
portant role in directing cancer research towards a molecular approach. SPECT
and single photon emission tracers were part of the solution to the problem of
diagnosing cancer, in turn they helped rethinking cancer in terms of cellular
growth and communication, and this led to the development of new molecular
approaches and technologies in oncological research.80 A medical imaging tech-
nology materializes the techniques, practices, problems, hypotheses, concepts
and theories of diﬀerent domains, and that by changing the kind of information
available, it can redirect the approach to the medical questions it addresses.
Transparent and visible theories The interweaving between medical the-
ories, instruments, and images can be more or less complex. It depends on
what must be visualized (it is easier to visualize a structure than a process);
78Wagner, in an interview with Dumit. Dumit, 2004, 47.
79SPECT is an imaging technology akin to PET, but it uses a diﬀerent family of tracers
(single photon emission rather than positron emission radionuclides), and a diﬀerent scanner.
Its spatial resolution is significantly lower than that of PET’s, but it is considerably less
expensive.
80See Dumit, 2004, 48; Pepe et al., 2012.
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how it is visualized (some technologies are more theory-loaded than others);
and for what specific reason (some diseases are better understood than oth-
ers). As discussed in Chapter 3, the visualization of teeth and broken bones
by X-ray imaging was uncontroversial and relatively straightforward, while the
same technology demanded a much more complex process of image signification
in order to acquire meaning in clinical medicine.81 In the case of tuberculo-
sis, such process implied, among other things, the construction of a semiotic
network that bounded radiological images with already established diagnostic
techniques.82 Contemporary imaging oﬀers even more compelling examples of
how theories and images influence each other. It also shows that the theory
embedded in an imaging apparatus and in the interpretation of the images it
produces becomes transparent when the approach to the problem at stake is
consensual. On the contrary, in contested domains, where the conceptualiza-
tion of a medical problem is not settled, the theory beyond images production
and interpretation becomes visible because controversial. PET images provide
a good example of both situations.
The use of PET scanning to monitor cancer, to verify cardiac perfusion, or
to evaluate brain disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease and epileptic seizures,
is uncontroversial. Our medical understanding and conceptualization of these
conditions, although not static, is suﬃciently settled to render unproblematic
the idea that we can visualize information about them by means of PET. This
signifies that, although there might be doubts whether in specific cases PET is
the best option compared to other diagnostic modalities, there is no disagree-
ment upon the fact that PET images provide information actually related to
the disease under study. In this case the theory (or theories) that binds patient,
apparatus and images is transparent in virtue of being well corroborated and
generally accepted, it becomes implicit and thus almost invisible.
This is not the case when PET is used to study and diagnose psychiatric
disorders.83 At present, in spite of the great amount of studies carried out in
this field, there are no validated brain imaging techniques to diagnose psychiatric
diseases. This is so not only because of technical reasons,84 but also because
there is no agreement upon whether what we can visualize through cerebral PET
(the relative oxygenation or the metabolic rate of glucose in diﬀerent areas of the
brain) does correlate to specific psychiatric conditions.85 Hence, if a psychiatrist
81See Section 3.4.
82See Section 4.2.2.
83Together with PET, the other brain imaging technologies used to study and diagnose
psychiatric conditions are SPECT and functional MRI (fMRI).
84See Farah and Gillihan, 2012.
85The discussion over the neural correlates of psychiatric disorders occurs at two levels.
On the one hand, the very existence of such correlates is contested, especially by scholars
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resorts to brain imaging to study such conditions, he is explicitly endorsing a
specific theory of the mind, of psychiatric illness, and of psychiatric illnesses’
classification. These theories motivate and justify the choice of the imaging
apparatus, which is supposed to allow to see a putative diagnostic indicator in
the image in question. Since the theory is contested, it becomes visible through
the technology and through the image.
5.1.4 Diagnostic images and the “phenomenotechnique
of the observer”
Independently from the fact that the theory about the phenomenon under study
is transparent or visible, diagnostic images are always “belief-opaque.”86 In the
definition of the philosopher and cognitive scientist Adina Roskies, an imaging
technique is belief-transparent “if it is possible to appropriately interpret the
image it produces with information contained in the image,” and it is belief-
opaque “when the information needed for the interpretation is not present in
the resultant image.”87 Typically, a photograph of a visible object is belief-
transparent, because we have a previous knowledge of how the thing represented
in the picture looks like. It has a visible referent and thus we can rely on
our intuition, that is, on the visual habits produced by everyday experience to
interpret the image (of course, this does not mean that our interpretation is
always correct). When the referent is invisible, however, not only we lack such
intuitive knowledge, but relying on commonsense visual habits might lead to
gross mistakes in the interpretation of the image. For instance, a non-expert
viewer who looks at the PET scan of an oncological patient will probably think
that all the “spots” on the image are an indication of active disease, and that
one can easily see the disease in the image. The expert viewer, on the contrary,
knows that the image must be interpreted in the light of a wider set of knowledge,
because noncancerous conditions such as chronic or acute inflammations have
the same appearance of cancer on PET images, while many types of tumors
do not show up. The gaze of the experienced observer incorporates a wider
set of knowledge that is not directly available in the image and that allows
from philosophy and from the human and social sciences. On the other hand, within the
neuroscientific community who endorses this approach to mental illness, the debate revolves
around the use of brain imaging in the actual identification of neurocorrelates. For a review
of the two debates see Vidal and Ortega, 2012. The debate over the neural correlates of
psychiatric diseases can be seen as part of a larger debate over brain modularity and the use of
neuroimaging in cognitive studies. For an epistemological analysis of the use of neuroimaging
in cognitive science see Roskies, 2007. For an epistemological critique of the localizationist
and modularity approach in neuroscience see Hardcastle and Stewart, 2002.
86Roskies, 2007, 868.
87Roskies, 2007, 868.
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making such distinctions. The expert viewer knows the rules, both implicit
and explicit, necessary to make sense of the extended sensory domain produced
by the phenomenotechnique. This is to say that, although visual experience
is fundamental for the radiologist to deal with the data generated by imaging
technologies, his visual experience is of a diﬀerent order compared to primary,
everyday life visual experience. It is a peculiar form of perception that requires
a phenomenotechnique of the observer.88
A fundamental element of the divide between naïve perception and educated
perception is the comprehension of the complex nature of the causal and coun-
terfactual relation between an image and the object of study. The untrained
viewer is not aware of the complexity of the causal chain of events that links
the original phenomenon to its image, and consequently has no awareness of
the number of variables at stake (for instance, the production of artifacts). He
has an equally simplified understanding of the counterfactual relation, that is,
he does not know that diﬀerent phenomena (e.g., benign rather than malignant
tumor) could result in the same image. The expert viewer, on the contrary,
not only is aware of such problems, but is also in command of the theoretical
knowledge and practical skills necessary to deal with them. In other words, the
naïve viewer engages in an intuitive process of signification that is misleading,
he takes a complex sign for a simple index, or an icon.
In Chapter 3 I argued that we are warranted in inferring properties of invis-
ible objects and phenomena from mechanical images because such images are
indices. I also argued that the indexical mode of signification is not enough,
because it does not allow to endow an image with meaning and to directly dis-
tinguish the properties of the object from the artifacts created by the imaging
process. To tackle this problem, scientists resort to three strategies: (1) they put
in place a symbolic mode of signification based on the creation of operational
standards for image production;89 (2) they inscribe the image into a specific
88I use the term “phenomenotechnique” rather than simply “technique” of the observer for
two reasons. First, because by maintaining a homogeneous terminology along the description
of technologies, images and observers I stress the entanglement of the processes of image
production and image signification, the continuum that binds the production of an image to its
interpretation. Second, I want to mark a conceptual distance from the expression “technique
of the observer” as used by Jonathan Crary. In the book Techniques of the Observer (1990),
Crary explores the dynamics of embodiment and disembodiment of the act of vision brought
about by diﬀerent optical devices, and he analyzes such devices as part of a larger assemblage
of historical events and powers. By talking of phenomenotechnique of the observer, I frame
my analysis in a diﬀerent domain. I am not interested in the embodied act of seen, nor in
the relations of power in which optical devices are embedded. I rather focus on how scientific
vision is constructed as an explicitly and necessarily artificial form of perception, and as a
distributed process.
89See Section 3.2.
230 Medical imaging as “phenomenotechnique”
theoretical framework that defines what can be seen;90 (3) they manipulate the
object under study performing diﬀerent sorts of experiments in order to gather
additional information to combine with that obtained through the image.91 I
consider all these activities, both practical and intellectual, a phenomenotech-
nique of the observer, because they put the viewer at the centre of an epistemic
network that makes possible the emergence of a perception removed from that
which is granted by everyday experience.
This way of understanding the process whereby scientific perception is pro-
duced is quite diﬀerent from Bachelard’s idea of psychoanalysis of the scientific
spirit.92 To Bachelard, science is continuously getting rid of conventions and
mental habits so that new forms of rationality can emerge. It aims to a surra-
tionality that constantly breaks with the past and will necessarily change in the
future. The phenomenotechnique of the observer I have just described works at
a diﬀerent level. It has a pragmatic value, in the sense that its aim is to make
possible actual scientific observations in the present, rather than to break with
the past. It produces and stabilizes perceptual habits that are diﬀerent from
those of commonsense experience, but they are habits nevertheless. It leads
to the creation of conventions for image production and interpretation. These
conventions are responsive to conceptual change, because they rely on the prac-
tical and theoretical knowledge of a given scientific domain, but they do not
necessarily emerge in polemic with past knowledge. Finally, what is demanded
of the observer is not the ability to dissolve reality into pure rationality. Rather,
it is demanded that he learns to deal with the materiality of the instruments
and of the objects that through the instruments are made visible and examined
(the human bodies).
The phenomenotechnique of the observer entails the training of the scientists
in relation to the strategies of image signification mentioned above: operational
conventions, theoretical frameworks, experimental practices. This means that
medical images acquire meaning within a distributed process that goes well
beyond the act of watching. It is an educated act of perception that is possible
because there are standards for image making; semiotic networks created and
distributed on the pages of journals, books and atlases; practices of samples
preparation and manipulation. Since early medical photography, the meaning
of diagnostic images has emerged from a combination of all these factors, and the
process has been further enriched and complicated by the introduction of digital
imaging, with its mathematical models for image reconstruction. Through this
90Section 3.3. See also Section 2.4
91See Sections 3.2.3 and 4.2.3.
92See Bachelard, 1938.
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multilayered process the act of seeing is deeply transformed. It moves away
from intuitive natural perception and acquires a scientific character.
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Conclusions
In this dissertation I attempted to develop an epistemology of medical imaging
that took into account the fact that diagnostic images are simultaneously di-
agnostic instruments and scientific images. It was thus necessary to highlight
distinct epistemological problems concerning, respectively, medical diagnostics
and the cognitive statute of instrument-mediated images.
Although, as a whole, my study is mainly focused on the problems posed
by diagnostic images qua images, in the first chapter I proposed an account of
the historical and conceptual conditions of possibility of diagnostic images qua
diagnostic instruments. I did so by going back to the birth of clinical anatomy,
when diagnosis became a matter of scrutinizing the inner body, and medicine
started to establish itself as an empirical science capable of producing a clear
and precise visibility of illness. My basic intuition was that one can diagnose
a disease by means of an image of the inner body only if illness is understood
in visual and spatial terms. Drawing on Foucault’s The Birth of the Clinic and
on historical medical literature, I argued that the conceptual roots of medical
imaging as a diagnostic technique go back to the understanding of body and
disease defined by clinical anatomy at the end of the eighteenth century, and
that diagnostic images are to be understood first and foremost as instruments
that help turning diseases into an objective, visual entity. The clinical paradigm
that emerged from clinical anatomy commanded specific forms of objectivation
of the human body: to make a diagnosis, the physician could no longer rely
exclusively on the symptoms related by the patient, he had to actively elicit or
even fabricate the signs that pointed to the disease, which was conceptualized in
terms of organic lesion. In this context it became necessary to develop diagnostic
instruments that could produce a specific expressivity of the human body.1 By
turning the inside out, such instruments transformed invisible structures and
processes into visible indices of health or disease.
By analyzing the wide range of diagnostic modalities developed in the nine-
teenth century, I tracked down the clinical tradition wherein medical imaging
can be inscribed, and highlighted the entanglement between the development of
1See Section 1.1.
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the new instruments and the transformations in the understanding of anatomy,
physiology and of the nature of disease.2 From this part of the research it was
possible to conclude that although the invention of radiography has been often
described as a revolution in medicine and in medical visual culture,3 it should
be understood less as an epistemological than as a technological and cultural
transformation. On the one hand, the conceptual bases for medical imaging are
rooted in the conceptualization of disease put forward by clinical anatomy; on
the other hand, the vast array of diagnostic instruments developed during the
nineteenth century posed some epistemological questions that were subsequently
inherited by radiology. In particular, the replacement of subjective sensations
of both patients and physicians with objective (or at least inter-subjective) me-
chanical indices of health and disease; the production of visual records of the
interior of the body that could be filed, retrieved and shared by several ob-
servers; the need to develop a specialized language that allowed to describe and
discuss such visual data; the introduction of a mediation between the observer
(the physician) and the object (the patient), which generated diﬀerent forms of
instrument-mediated perception.
Subsequently I turned my attention to the image-related problems posed by
medical imaging. Through the analysis of early photography, I explored the
role played by this groundbreaking optic media in reshaping the visibility of
both the human body and disease.4 More precisely, I tried to understand how
medical photography contributed to the reconfiguration of a natural object (the
human body and its ailments) into a scientific object. Following Peirce’s semi-
otics, more precisely his organization of signs in indices, icons and symbols, I
argued that although nineteenth-century theorization of photography revolved
essentially around the idea of photographs as perfect records of reality (iconic
mode of signification), predicated on the mechanical nature of the photographic
process (indexical mode of signification),5 the symbolic mode of signification
played a fundamental role in establishing specific forms of visibility of disease
in such diverse fields such as psychiatry, dermatology and neurology. In fact,
what the physician-photographers struggled to see in their pictures were less the
visible signs of illness in a specific patient, than the facies of the disease, that is,
its general yet characteristic appearance. On the one hand, photographs were
used to keep records of individual patients and monitor the evolution of their
condition. In this case each picture was an index, in the sense that it identi-
2Sections 1.2 to 1.5.
3See, for instance, Reiser, 1978; Cartwright, 1995.
4See Chapter 2.
5It should be noted that our commonsensical intuition about photography and its epistemic
reliability has not changed since the nineteenth century.
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fied in a strict one-to-one relation the individual patient aﬀected by a specific
manifestation of the disease. On the other hand, photographic collections were
used to make abstraction of the specific circumstances of a patient and generate
a universal image of the disease. These collections were nomological machines,
they worked according to the symbolic mode of signification and were meant to
reveal the laws of nature that govern the appearing of a disease.
The analysis of medical photography was further enriched by taking into
consideration Benjamin’s reflections on the photographic series (mechanical pro-
duction and reproduction of an image and of the body it represents), and on the
intrinsic analytic and dissecting potential of photography (the photographer as
a surgeon). Looking at the works of the early physician-photographers in the
light of Benjamin’s ideas, I reached the conclusion that the photographic series
collected in medical journals, manuals, and hospital archives produced a clini-
cal gaze in the Foucauldian sense. That is, they created a neutral visual space
similar to that of the hospital wards, where each body was open to medical ob-
servation and could be put in relation with other bodies, so that the pathological
could emerge as a stable pattern from the heterogeneous variability of the indi-
vidual instances. The photographic collection recreated on paper the sensorial
and cognitive domain of the clinic. Moreover, in the new regime of mechani-
cal visibility and reproducibility created by the photographic camera, the body
became not only an object of scientific analysis, it was also directly embedded
into a complex apparatus for visualization and experimentation (an emblematic
case is that of the electrophysiologic portraits by Duchenne de Boulogne), which
enhanced and transformed the visibility of the body.
From the scrutiny of early medical photography and of its role as a prede-
cessor of radiology, I zoomed out, so to speak, to a problem that concerns not
only medical imaging, but scientific imaging in general. Namely, the problem of
the visualization of the invisible and of the validation of instrument-mediated
images that are meant to show invisible referents. Taking into account specific
examples from microphotography, chronophotography and early radiography, I
defended the idea that the process of signification of the images of invisible ref-
erents entails a complex interplay of indexical, iconic and symbolic semiosis. In
these cases, the creation of operational conventions for image production and the
definition of theoretical frameworks for image interpretation play a fundamental
role in securing the epistemic authority of the image. My argumentation, built
in opposition to Daston and Galison’s idea of mechanical objectivity as suppres-
sion of the subjectivity of the image maker and of the observer, was organized
in three moments. Firstly, I stressed that in the case of microphotography the
acceptance of the truthfulness of an image and of its scientific value largely
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depended on the definition of experimental standards for samples’ preparation,
observation and imaging. These standards provided operational conventions
that grounded a symbolic mode of signification. That is, the microscopists be-
lieved that two microphotographs showed the same thing, and that what they
showed was the actual specimen and not an artifact produced by a specific
apparatus, when the pictures had been produced under the same conditions.
The microphotograph was considered the result of a complex experimental pro-
cess, not the direct and transparent imprint of nature. Accordingly, their idea
of objectivity was grounded in inter-subjectivity, not in the suppression of the
subjectivity of the individual researcher.6
In a second step, through the analysis of the chronophotographic method
developed in the 1880s by the French physiologist Etienne-Jules Marey to study
animal locomotion, I argued that Daston and Galison’s notion of mechanical
objectivity should be replaced by that of “mechanical sensibility,”7 a concept
strictly related to Benjamin’s idea of optical unconscious. The aim of chronopho-
tography, in fact, was not that of suppressing the subjectivity of the observer,
but rather to extend his sensorial domain. As theorized by Benjamin, imaging
devices can be considered sensorial prosthesis, because they grant us access to
the optical unconscious, that is, to a perceptual domain that lies beyond our
senses. This sensorial enhancement, however, cannot be passive. The fragmen-
tation of motion produced by high-speed cameras does not pertain to natural
perception. As a consequence, in order to make sense of this new world of im-
ages, vision has to be complemented by imagination, and the indexical and iconic
modes of signification must leave space to symbolic semiosis. This means that
when we deal with pictures of invisible objects and phenomena, the notion of
image objectivity and truthfulness must be separated from that of photographic
realism and visual likeness.8
Finally, I delved into the diﬀerent phases of the process of signification of
radiographs. This process, that spanned over several years, entailed the stan-
dardization of instruments and procedures (as in the case of microscopy); the
validation of the visual content of radiographs by comparing them with real or-
gans; the comparison of X-ray images with other diagnostic techniques, in order
to validate the diagnostic value of the images; and the comparison of images
of diﬀerent patients or of the same patient in diﬀerent moments, in order to
check the internal coherence of a system of images and turn radiographs into
relatively autonomous instruments for diagnosis. As a whole, the questions I
6See Section 3.2.
7Snyder, 1998, 393.
8See Section 3.3.
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dealt with in this discussion suggested that scientific images show their objects
through several layers of mediation, which are related to the preparation of the
object to be imaged (e.g., the treatment of a sample for microscopy analysis);
to the imaging process proper (the functioning and the conditions of operation
of the imaging device); and to the theoretical framework wherein the image has
to acquire a meaning.9
From these considerations emerged the need to further explore the statute
of scientific images as epistemic tools, and to shed more light on the processes
of signification of diagnostic images, considered as a specific case of scientific
images. For what concerns the first point, I argued in favor of an epistemology
of images grounded in a poietic rather than mimetic conception of visual repre-
sentation. Drawing on both historical and theoretical arguments, I emphasized
the embodied dimension of image production and fruition, and suggested that
scientific images should be considered cognitive tools in a strong, non metaphor-
ical sense.10 To clarify this idea I examined three cases of clinicians and scien-
tists working with images.11 First, I developed the concept of semiotic network
through the analysis of a radiology article published in 1903. I observed that in
such article text, diagrams, and tables of numbers were combined into a nexus
of interrelated signs, in order to prove that X-ray images can be eﬀectively
used to diagnose diﬀerent pathologies of the heart and the lung. Subsequently,
drawing on a classical study in laboratory ethnography carried out by Karin
Knorr-Cetina and Klaus Amann,12 I stressed the relevance of the experiential
and collective dimension of image interpretation in a discipline, such as molecu-
lar biology, that deals with forms of visualization and invisibility quite diﬀerent
from those of radiography. Finally, following Ian Hacking’s theory of scientific
observation and his discussion of microscopy images,13 I pointed out that, in
order to learn something about invisible entities from instrument-mediated im-
ages, watching is not enough.14 One has to perform a range of activities, such as
using imaging equipments that work according to diﬀerent physical principles,
and preparing the sample in diﬀerent ways. Also, one has to complement vi-
sual observations with the results from other sciences (in the case examined by
Hacking, microscopy observations are complemented by biochemical and crys-
tallographic data, in the case of medical imaging, additional information can be
collected using a variety of diagnostic methods).
9See Section 3.4.
10See Section 4.1.
11See Section 4.2.
12See Knorr-Cetina and Amann, 1990.
13See Hacking, 1983, Ch. 11.
14Hacking refers to this methodological imperative with the catchphrase “Don’t just peer:
interfere.” Hacking, 1983, 189.
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What became apparent from this analysis is that the process of signification
of scientific images has a distributed character. It is not simply a matter of
interpreting a ready-made image released by a mechanical or electronic appara-
tus. It rather requires a complex set of operations, both material and cognitive,
that might involve diﬀerent people at diﬀerent moments and the use of a variety
of instruments. Scientific images can be considered experimental tools, in the
sense that scientists and physicians handle them in several forms in order to ex-
plore diﬀerent aspects of their object of study. More importantly, these images
are to be understood as controlled, artificial phenomena produced with the aim
of redefining the visibility of natural objects.
The need to elaborate more on this latter idea drew me to Bachelard’s con-
cept of phenomenotechnique. Although I could not directly apply this concept to
medical imaging, for the reasons explained in Chapter 5,15 it proved useful and
inspiring for summarizing and reorganizing the ideas and arguments developed
in the dissertation, as well as to analyze some specific features of contemporary
medical imaging, characterized by a high level of mathematization. A central
point I retained from Bachelard’s idea of phenomenotechnique is that science has
to create its own objects.16 Scientific instruments – that for Bachelard are reified
theories – produce scientific objects by isolating and dissecting natural objects
into partial components that can be reassembled and observed under stable and
reproducible conditions. Although we cannot say that medical imaging creates
the human body or its diseases, we can reasonably say that it creates artificial
objects (images) that in turn produce a specific visibility, and thus intelligibil-
ity, of both the body and disease. This visibility sums up to the reconfiguration
of the natural phenomenon under controlled, experimental conditions. By an-
alyzing medical imaging through the lens of phenomenotechnique, I reached
four conclusions that summarize and refine the arguments and considerations
developed in the course of the dissertation: (1) diagnostic images should be con-
sidered simulations of the patient’s body, rather than mimetic representations;
(2) diagnostic images are an example of materialized knowledge; (3) diagnostic
images are a medium of the human body and of the individual experience of
illness; (4) a phenomenotechnique of the observer is needed in order to make
sense of diagnostic images.
For what concerns the first consideration (diagnostic images as simulations),
it emerged from the observation that diagnostic images can be conceived of as
artificial, technical entities generated by an apparatus that extracts information
from the patient’s body and displays it in a visual form. If we actually examine
15See Section 5.1.
16See Bachelard, 1938, 221.
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the technologies for medical images production, we understand that the imag-
ing apparatus elicits the emission of biochemical and biophysical signals from
the inner organs (quantitative data), and transforms such signals into images.
It is thus possible to say that medical imaging creates images by probing non-
visual properties of the biological tissues (e.g., X-ray attenuation in the case
of radiography, ultrasounds reflection in the case of ultrasound imaging). In
contemporary digital imaging the detection and elaboration of the original sig-
nal relies on advanced physics and complex mathematical algorithms for image
acquisition and reconstruction. The image that results from these processes has
an enhanced plasticity for two reasons. On the one hand, during the phase of
data acquisition it is possible to fine tune the kind of biochemical and biophys-
ical signals we want to collect (e.g., signals corresponding to high metabolical
activity in specific areas of the body); on the other hand, in the phase of image
reconstruction the selected algorithms will further refine the information to be
retained (e.g., fat tissue or liquids could be phased out). Finally, during the
phase of analysis and interpretation the observer can manipulate the image in
several ways, for instance rotating it or changing the color scale. This is why
diagnostic images are akin to computer simulations: they are virtual objects on
which one can perform a number of operations that would be impossible or very
diﬃcult on the natural object. These virtual objects, however, are more than
the assembling of millions of bits of mathematical data, they are the technical
(or electronic) reconfiguration of real bodies. That is to say that the image,
as an artificial object created by making visible non-visual data, gives a new
sensible form to the human body. It brings into presence an artificial figure
whereby the observer can see the inner body. The diagnostic image is not a
mirror, it does not work by mimesis, it is rather a dissecting device that makes
visible that which the body by transforming disease into a visual entity.
The formulation of the second conclusion (diagnostic images as material-
ized knowledge) owes much to Bachelard’s claims about instruments as reified
theories and to the fact that the concept of phenomenotechnique implies that
scientific instruments and technologies are not a secondary product of scientific
development, but an intrinsic facet of the scientific process. By analyzing in the
light of these ideas the history of the invention of positron emission tomography,
it became clear to me that a medical imaging as a technology, and diagnostic
images as the product of such technology, can be seen as the materialization of
a wide set of knowledge. They embody theories, concepts, problems and prac-
tices pertaining to diﬀerent scientific areas, not only medicine, but also physics,
chemistry, biology, engineering, and so on. Medical imaging reconfigures the vis-
ibility of the natural objects (the human body and its ailments), and in doing so
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it extends the domain not only of what can be perceived (mechanical sensibility
and the optical unconscious), but also of what can be thought and how it can
be thought. Indeed, to think of technology as the reification of various strands
of knowledge and, at the same time, as an active constituent of scientific con-
cepts (thus also medical concepts) helps to better understand why radiology –
which according to my analysis was grounded in the conceptualization of dis-
ease put forward by clinical anatomy at the end of the eighteenth century – not
only accompanied the transformation of medical theories during the twentieth
century, but also exerted a very strong impact on the theoretical and practical
development of diﬀerent areas of medicine (from oncology to obstetrics).
The concept of phenomenotechnique also helped clarify the idea that diag-
nostic images are a medium of the patient’s body. Discussing the introduction of
radiography in clinical medicine and its relation with clinical anatomy, in Chap-
ter 3 I argued that X-ray images can be considered a medium of the patient’s
body for diﬀerent reasons: because they physically mediate the sensorial access
of the physician to the interior of the body of the diseased person; because they
replace (or displace) human vision creating an extra-sensory form of perception;
because they are a material support that shows outside and away from the real
body that which the actual body normally conceals; because they mediate the
first-person experience of illness, by virtually allowing the physicians to recog-
nize signs of disease well before they manifest themselves through symptoms
that can be perceived by the patient.17 Now, if we consider the radiographic
image as the product of a phenomenotechnique, we can say that it works as a
medium because it is an artificial, technical entity that replaces a natural ob-
ject, namely the human body, and in so doing it grants sensorial and cognitive
access to anatomical structures and physiological processes that under normal
conditions are screened by the flesh and the skin. Medical imaging is thus one
of the instruments developed by medicine to transform disease into a scientific,
although not mathematical, object. Through medical imaging disease acquires
a novel visual dimension, but the meaning of such visibility is discernible only
in the context of a wider set of knowledge.
This latter point is related with the idea that medical imaging does not just
entail the creation of artificial phenomena that objectify the human body. It nec-
essarily implies a transformation of the perceptual habits of the observer, and of
his modes of image signification. I coined the expression “phenomenotechnique
of the observer” to emphasize the fact that scientific instruments do not only
produce specific objects, they also mold specific observers. I used this phrasing,
instead of simply talking of techniques of interpretation, because I wanted to
17See Section 3.4.6.
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maintain a linguistic unity that underlined the continuity and interrelatedness
of the processes of image production and signification. In the case of medical
imaging technologies, the observer can make sense of the new entities (a variety
of complex images of the inner body) only if he has gone through a cycle of
instruction and education that allows to resort to the sophisticated modes of
image signification examined above (combination of indexical, iconic and sym-
bolic semiosis related to operational conventions, theoretical frameworks and
experimental practices). The proposed notion of phenomenotechnique of the
observer is akin to Bachelard’s idea of formation of the scientific spirit in that it
stresses the importance of education and scientific training,18 and the ongoing
character of the formative process19 (potentially, each new instrument opens
new possibilities for experimenting and thinking). Unlike Bachelard’s formation
of the scientific spirit, however, the idea of phenomenotechnique of the observer
does not focus on the systematic abandonment of pre-existing mental habits
and forms of rationality. It rather tries to account for the process whereby one
learns to make sense of a continuously enhanced sensorial domain. In this it
is akin to the idea defended by Benjamin and other theorists of photography,
such as Moholy-Nagy and Balász, according to whom the new optical fields
open by photography forced a training of the eye and led to a reorganization
and evolution of our senses.20 However, while the training of the eye envisaged
by these authors was related to the idea of optical unconscious and “unbiased
optical vision,”21 thus emphasized the autonomy of the imaging apparatus in
relation to the sensorial capabilities and cognitive intentions of the viewer, the
idea of phenomenotechnique of the observer stresses not only the intentional
nature of the training of visual perception, but also its constructed and social
dimension (the education of the eye occurs within the scientific community and
through the composite, distributed process of image signification described in
Chapters 3 and 4). In other words, the notion of phenomenotechnique of the
observer refers to the fact that the creation of a new perceptual domain must
be accompanied by a specific education of the observer if it is to have scientific
(or medical) import. It is a platitude to say that an image has to be interpreted
in order to acquire a meaning. Still, it is interesting to remark how wide the
18In French, as in Italian and Portuguese, but also German, the word formation (formazione,
formação, Bildung) also means teaching and training. Indeed, the discussion of school teach-
ing is pursued by Bachelard throughout La formation de l’esprit scientifique, alongside the
consideration of epistemic obstacles, and in the last page of the book he wrote: “The principle
of continued culture is [...] at the root of modem scientific culture. [...] There is science only
if schooling is permanent.” Bachelard, 1938, 249, italics in the original.
19“The mind must be formed by being reformed.” Bachelard, 1938, 33.
20See Benjamin, 1936; Moholy-Nagy, 1925. See Section 2.3.
21Moholy-Nagy, 1925, 5.
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range of significations attributed to diagnostic images can be, and how equally
wide can be the divide between naïve and expert perception. In this regard a
telling example is provided by fetal ultrasound. The hyper-real images of the un-
born are nowadays part of popular visual culture. They enter the family album
and the social media as the baby’s first picture. In the eye of the lay observer
they are portraits and are treated as such, both at the emotional and rhetorical
level. In the eye of the expert viewer, the medical operator who went through
the necessary process of training and education, they are diagnostic tools and
can be used to take therapeutical decisions, often resorting to complex proba-
bilistic reasoning, rather than to some indisputable evidence displayed by the
image.22 Medical imaging technologies do not only redefine the visibility of the
human body and of disease, they also impose a reshaping of the perception of
the radiographer.
By producing new optical domains, medical imaging has deeply transformed
doctor’s perception of the human body. Through medical imaging the dark,
dense and amorphous visceral body has been turned into a seemingly transpar-
ent volume, wherein overlapping shadows or neat sectional images reveal the
geography of an orderly anatomy and the marks of disease. Together with the
other diagnostic techniques developed by Western medicine over the last two
centuries, medical imaging has contributed to transform both the lived body
and its ailments into scientific objects. Reconfigured into a vast array of images,
the natural object has been cleared of the redundant features of its materiality
and of the sensations it produces, and thus made amenable to scientific analy-
sis. The body reconstructed through the imaging apparatus can be observed at
will, phasing out irrelevant aspects and enhancing others, it can be measured,
compared, filed, retrieved, manipulated in unprecedented ways.
Radiology, and the perceptual domain it produces, acquired diagnostic signif-
icance within the conceptualization of body and disease put forward by clinical
medicine. It subsequently evolved through technological innovations and, more
importantly, through the integration of physiological and molecular theories.
Functional imaging has been in use since the 1950s to monitor physiological and
metabolic processes, and molecular imaging (also called quantitative imaging)
is emerging as a diagnostic and research instrument in the context of so-called
22Fetal ultrasound scans render a clinical and emotional message at the same time. This
ambiguity is unproblematic when the fetus appears to be healthy. However, when the image
shows indications of potential malformations or syndromes, prospective parents are asked to
suspend the iconic mode of signification (the idea that the sonographic image is a photographic
portrait of their baby), and to focus on the clinical meaning of the ultrasound examination.
This passage can be extremely diﬃcult not only for psychological reasons, but also because
most parents do not posses the knowledge required to assess an image in diagnostic terms.
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personalized medicine.23 By producing new phenomena, each innovation in
medical imaging brings with it a reconfiguration of the human body and disease
into diﬀerent scientific objects organized around morphology, physiology, cellu-
lar metabolism or genetic expression. At each reorganization of the scientific
object corresponds a reorganization of the perception of medical researchers and
practitioners. Old and new objects and modes of perception are not mutually
exclusive, they rather coexist in quite complex dynamics, and in some cases tend
towards integration.24 For instance, in oncology the physical examination of the
patient is still part of the assessment of the disease. The physician inspects by
touch and auscultation the body of the patient and listens to his or her descrip-
tion of symptoms. On occasions he might also pay attention to the patient’s
emotional distress or practical daily diﬃculties. In the clinician’s oﬃce, cancer is
still perceived and conceptualized in clinical terms. But the construction of the
scientific objects corresponding to “cancer X” and “patient with cancer X” relies
on a variety of additional elements gathered through radiological, pathological,
and molecular examinations. These are the phenomenotechniques whereby the
scientific objects are brought into being, that is, these are the prisms through
which the physician operatively perceives the patient and the disease.
One of the main struggles of this study was to keep the focus on image epis-
temology, resisting the temptation to follow the endless threads of research that
appeared along the way. For instance, I could not fully engage in a discussion
of the ontology of disease, a fundamental topic in philosophy of medicine, and
I could only couch the complexity of the process of medical diagnosis. Another
important and fascinating topic that was merely alluded to is the relationship
between scientific images and specialized language. A question that has relevant
practical implications when it comes to define standardized lexicons to improve
communication among health practitioners and researchers, and to allow data
retrieval for both clinical and research purposes. Also, much remains to be said
about the paradoxical statute of diagnostic images as images of a specific indi-
vidual. Unlike other scientific images, in fact, the function of diagnostic images
is not that of leading from the particular (the contingent phenomenon captured
in the image) to the general (the scientific model or law that accounts for all the
contingent manifestations of that phenomenon), but rather to provide informa-
23There is no univocal definition of what personalized medicine (PM) is, or might be. The
concept of PM was born in 2003 with in the sequence of the completion of the Human Genome
Project. Put in a nutshell, PM devises a diﬀerent treatment for each patient, tailored on his or
her genetic makeup. In recent years, however, there have been many attempts to redefine PM
in more realistic and operative terms, in order to encompass factors that go beyond genetics.
24For an insightful description of how the same disease can be conceptualized and made the
object of actual medical practice by diﬀerent specialists, see Annemarie Moll’s ethnographic
study on atherosclerosis. Moll, 2002.
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Figure 5.1: Cluster heat map of lung tumor image features extracted from CT
images from 276 patients. Biomarkers such as tumor volume, shape and texture were
represented. Each row of the heat map represents a specific imaging feature across
patients, and each column represents all features for a patient’s lung tumor from CT.
From Kumar et. al., 2012.
tion about an idiosyncratic subject. Through diagnostic images the physician
does not want to grasp a general picture of a disease, he wants to understand the
exact features with which the disease manifests itself in a specific patient. Diag-
nostic images have the individualizing nature of the portrait. For the physician,
however, they are not the portrait of the patient. They are the portrait of a
specific instance of a disease, not of a person. This is why Méheux’s photographs
of dermatological patients were deemed art, not science.25 They told the private
story of a human being, more than they displayed the features of the disease
(Figure 2.10). Important insights about the individual, distinctively humane
dimension of diagnostic images might come from the study of artworks that rely
directly or indirectly on medical imaging technologies. In the article “Inside
the body: medical imaging and visual arts,”26 I analyzed a variety of artworks,
ranging from John Heartfield’s photomontages to Mona Hatoum’s endoscopic
installations, providing an overview of the multiple perspectives whereby visual
artists assimilate medical imaging into their works. On this topic, however,
much work remains to be done.27
25See Section 2.6.
26Di Marco, 2012.
27To my best knowledge there are not many works published on this subject. See Kevles,
1997, Ch. 11; Slatman, 2004; van de Vall, 2008, Ch. 3; Casini, 2010, 2011; Laryionava, 2012.
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Diagnostic images are by their own nature multidisciplinary objects that call
into question problems of philosophy of science and technology, philosophy of
medicine, image theory, aesthetics, media theory, and anthropology, to name
just a few. Consequently, they provide a virtually endless field of research,
because one can always approach them from a diﬀerent perspective. Moreover,
the emerging field of radiomics, which relies on advanced image analysis to
infer genomic and proteomic patterns from image data,28 promises to blur more
and more the boundaries between quantitative and qualitative information, to
reshape the visual landscape of clinical medical imaging (Figure 5.1), and to
redefine the theory and practice of diagnostic images’ interpretation. Hence,
future research in the philosophy of medical imaging will necessarily come across
the methodological and philosophical problems posed by so-called Big Data,29
as well as with the conceptual and ethical issues posed by personalized medicine.
Hopefully, the epistemological work developed in this dissertation will serve as
a point of departure and conceptual basis for further investigations.
28See Gillies et al., 2010; Lambin et al., 2012; Kumar et al., 2012.
29This term is used to refer to any collection of data sets too large and complex to be
properly processed using traditional computational methods. Among the problems posed
by Big Data we can count data collection, analysis, visualization, mining, sharing, storage,
transfer, and privacy protection.
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